Supplement for:

SDM: A new dataset on self-determination movements with an application to the reputational theory of conflict

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Introduction

This document includes supplementary information for the article "SDM: A new dataset on self-determination movements with an application to the reputational theory of conflict" by N. Sambanis, M. Germann, and A. Schädel. The first section shows an additional analysis referred to in the section "The SDM dataset." The second section provides supplementary information and additional analyses referred to in the section "The problem of incomplete case coverage." Finally, the third section includes supplementary information for the re-analysis of Walter (2006), including robustness checks, variable descriptions, and a discussion of the effects of control variables. The SDM codebook and coding notes constitute separate files and are not included here.

1 Supplementary information for the section "The SDM dataset"

In the paper we report estimates of the time until the first concession and restriction to an SD challenger depending on income, regime type, and previous violence. As stated in the paper, the conclusions remain similar when considering not only the first but all concessions and restrictions (see Table S1 below). First, SDMs are more likely to be accommodated in rich countries. Rich countries are also least likely to restrict group rights in the face of an SD challenge, though differences across income groups are somewhat less clear-cut, similarly to the analysis reported in the paper. Second, democracies are more likely to make concessions and less likely to restrict group rights. Similarly to the analysis reported in the paper, we also find that concessions are most common in anocracies, but that anocracies also impose more restrictions. Finally, movements that violently challenged the state in the past are somewhat less likely to receive concessions, but roughly equally likely to get restrictions, again similar to what is reported in the paper.

	${f Concessions} \ \%$	$\frac{\textbf{Restrictions}}{\%}$
Income		
Low	4.82	4.86
Medium	7.56	6.24
High	12.81	3.22
Regime type		
Democracy	8.9	3.35
Anocracy	11.84	6.56
Autocracy	3.35	5.62
Previous violence		
Yes	6.75	4.86
No	9.56	4.06

Table S1: Probabilities of concessions and restrictions

Note: Weighted estimates. A movement is considered to be located in a democracy if the host state's polity2 score is 6 or higher, in an anocracy if the host state's democracy score ranges between -5 and 5, and in an autocracy if the country's polity2 score is -6 or lower. In turn, a movement is considered to be located in a high-income country if the host state's GDP per capita is at least 10,000 constant US dollars (base: 2005 prices), in a medium income country if the GDP per capita is in-between 4,000 and 9,999 constant US dollars, and a low income country if GDP per capita is below that.

2 Supplementary information for the section "The problem of incomplete case coverage"

This section provides additional information on how Table 3 in the paper was constructed and reports several additional analyses referred to in the paper. The first sub-section discusses the identification of separatist cases in the MAR dataset. The second sub-section does the same for the CIDCM datasets. The third sub-section provides information on how we made cross-dataset comparisons on variables such as democracy or violence. The fourth sub-section lists all cases that are included in the MAR and CIDCM datasets but not in the SDM dataset and provides justifications. The fifth sub-section shows additional analyses suggesting that measurement error in MAR and CIDCM is primarily a function of whether movements are violent or not. Finally, the sixth sub-section shows the results of an additional set of analyses comparing the country-level determinants of the number of SDMs based on data from the MAR, CIDCM, and SDM datasets.

2.1 Identifying separatist groups based on MAR

There is not a single MAR dataset. The MAR dataset has a long history and it was released in several waves (or phases, to use MAR parlance) (Gurr 1993, Gurr 2000*b*, Minorities at Risk Project 2009). We considered all MAR releases in our comparisons; specifically, we drew on the combined phase I–IV release (version 2.05) and the separately available phase V release. Importantly, there is also not one, but two variables in the MAR dataset(s) that can be used to identify separatist movements: the SEPX index and the TYPE variable. Each is discussed in turn.

The separatism index (SEPX) ranges from 0-3. A score of 3 indicates that a group had an active separatist movement in the 1980s, 1990s, and/or 2000s (leaving open the possibility that these movements were active also before 1980). A score of 2 indicates a separatist movement that was active for at least 5 years before the 1980s but not thereafter ("historical" movements). Scores of 0 and 1 indicate "no separatism" and "latent separatism", respectively. We dropped cases of latent separatism while including both active and historical movements, though with a few exceptions (see below). Importantly, the SEPX variable is included in both the phase I–IV and phase V releases, and in some cases the different releases suggest different conclusions. For example, the Bahais in Iran are coded as separatist in the phase I–IV release but not in the phase V release. There are two reasons why codes may differ across releases. First, one of the two codes may be wrong. However, and second, the older phase I–IV release also covers some years that the newer phase V release does not, and vice versa. Specifically, whereas the newer phase V release starts in 1955 the older phase I–IV release also covers 1940–1954. Further, phase V covers 2004–2006 whereas phase I–IV stops in 2003. Due to the different time coverage, it is often difficult to determine whether coders in phase V overruled an older coding because they judged it to be wrong or because of the differential time spans. Thus, as a general rule, we included cases if they are coded as actively or historically separatist in any of the MAR releases.

That said, we dropped a number of cases that could unambiguously be excluded. First, we dropped a total of 3 cases of historical separatism (i.e., separatist activity before 1980) because

this activity must relate to a different host state. These 3 cases are the Slovaks in the Czech Republic (independence in 1993), the Europeans in Namibia (1990), and the Croats in post-war Yugoslavia (1991). All 3 cases are coded under their former host states: Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and pre-war Yugoslavia.

Second, we dropped a total of 5 cases where the different MAR releases in combination suggest that these were colonial movements, which we do not include in our comparisons. Consider the case of the Creoles in Sierra Leone. They are coded as a "historical" movement in phase I–IV, but with 0 in phase V. Assuming phase V is right, the activity picked up in phase I–IV should relate to 1940–1954. Since Sierra Leone gained independence only in 1961, the movement identified by MAR coders must thus have been colonial in nature. The remaining 4 cases excluded based on this reasoning are the Bakongo in Angola, the Luba in DRC, the Ashanti in Ghana, and the Kewri in Mauritania.

Third, we dropped the Ewe in Togo. Phase I–IV codes them as an active movement but phase V codes them as not separatist. We judged it likely that phase I–IV picked up colonial activity but mistakenly coded the movement as active.¹

Finally, we dropped the Muslims in India. We considered it likely that the historical separatism picked up by MAR coders relates to the partition and thus to the colonial period.²

The second variable in MAR that can be used to identify separatist movements is TYPE. The TYPE variable is only included in the phase I–IV release. MAR types include national minorities, religious sects, and ethnonationalist groups. MAR's definition of an ethnonationalist group overlaps with the concept of a separatist movement, but the concept is narrower as only separatist groups are counted that also have a history of autonomy and are territorially concentrated. Specifically, according to Gurr (2000*b*, p. 17) ethnonationalist groups are defined as "regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own states, traditional ruler, or regional government who have supported political movements for autonomy since 1945." In theory, one would expect that all groups MAR coders flagged as ethnonationalist are also separatist according to the SEPX variable. But this is not the case; while the overlap with SEPX is substantial, the TYPE variable identifies 8 additional movements, including important cases such as the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and the Moldovans in the former Soviet Union. We included these 8 cases in addition to the cases identified by the SEPX variable.³

2.2 Identifying separatist groups based on CIDCM

Identifying separatist groups based on the CIDCM Peace and Conflict reports is much more straightforward: all cases are explicitly listed in the respective reports' appendices. That said, there is some ambiguity regarding time coverage. On the one hand, the Peace and Conflict

¹The MAR online resources suggest that while Ewe groups in Togo received support from the separatist groups in Ghana, there is no evidence of an Ewe separatist group active in Togolese politics.

²Note that in addition, we corrected two obvious coding errors. First, in the phase I–IV release, the Darfuris' SEPX score is 2 in some years and 3 in others. Yet the SEPX score should not vary over time. We recoded with 3 in all years. The same issue appears to apply to Bolivia's Lowland Indigenous Peoples in the phase V release, where they are coded with 0 in 2004 and 2005 and 3 in 2006. Again, we recoded all years with 3.

³Note that one of the "ethnonationalist" groups was dropped because the SEPX variable suggests that the separatist activity relates to a different host state: the Slovaks in the Czech Republic.

reports list non-violent movements that are politically active since World War II. On the other hand, violent movements are only covered from 1955 onwards (see the respective appendices). Since only non-violent movements are coded in 1945–1954, the time period covered is best seen as 1955-2002 (in the 2003 version) and 1955–2006 (in the 2008 version).

2.3 Comparing case coverage across datasets

To evaluate differences in terms of case coverage, we compared the SDM dataset and the MAR and CIDCM datasets on a number of indicators. Note that all comparisons are based on the same time frames. For example, when comparing the 2003 version of the CIDCM dataset with SDM, we only considered movements between 1955 and 2002 in the SDM dataset.

Most indicators used to compare the datsets constitute simple counts, such as the number of movements covered or the movements per region. However, comparisons of the number of violent movements and the number of movements in rich and democratic countries are somewhat trickier. Our approach was to use information provided by the SDM dataset whenever possible. This has two advantages. First, while all datasets under consideration include information on whether groups engaged in violence, this information is not always compatible across datasets. A group may be violent according to the SDM dataset but not according to MAR. Using violence codes provided by the same dataset ensures comparability. Thus, to the extent that this was possible (see below), we consistently drew on SDM's VIOLSD indicator to determine whether a movement was violent or not.⁴

Second, the different datasets may suggest differential start and end dates for the same movements. For example, the CIDCM data may suggest that a movement started in the 1990s, whereas the SDM data may suggest it started in the 1970s. This creates comparability issues if, for example, the country this movement was located in was democratic in the 1990s but not before that. As stated in the paper, we classify a movement as located in a democracy if the host state's polity2 score was 6 or higher during at least 75% of the years this movement was active. Analogously, the same issue applies to classifying SDMs as located in high-income countries. To circumvent these problems, we used start and end dates from the SDM dataset when possible to ensure comparability across datasets.⁵

Our approach of using information on violence and start and end dates provided by the SDM dataset also for groups coded in MAR and CIDCM requires that we match movements identified in MAR and CIDCM to movements in the SDM dataset. This is extremely straightforward in most cases. For instance, both MAR and CIDCM include the Chechens in Russia, and so does SDM. In a minority of cases there is no perfect but at least a partial match. For instance, MAR identifies the Slavs in Moldova as a separatist group and SDM the Trans-Dniester Slavs. We followed a generous line and matched both full and partial matches to the respective SDM groups. Below we list all partial matches.⁶

⁴The VIOLSD indicator is an inclusive measure of violent separatist conflict that incorporates both high intensity separatist civil wars and low-level incidences of violent separatist conflict.

⁵In addition, this largely resolves the issue that MAR and CIDCM do not provide exact start and end dates for all movements.

⁶If there are multiple possible matches in SDM, we usually established a link to the SDM group that is active for the longest time period. This scenario applies foremost to indigenous groups; SDM sometimes includes multiple indigenous groups (e.g. in the US) whereas the other datasets include but one umbrella group.

Finally, for a small minority of 20 cases, no link could be established to an SDM group.⁷ This includes the 18 groups that are coded as separatist in MAR or CIDCM but for which we found no corroborating evidence of separatist activity (see below). In addition, in another two cases there are differences in terms of aggregation that are difficult to resolve.⁸ For these 20 cases, we hand-coded involvement in violence and start and end dates, drawing (in this order) on information in Hewitt, Wilkenfeld & Gurr (2008), Marshall & Gurr (2003), Cunningham (2013), MAR (phase V), and MAR (phase I–IV). We used the same codes for all comparisons.

2.3.1 Partial matches: MAR

- Bolivia–Indigenous Highland Peoples: Quechua-Aymara
- Bosnia–Muslims: Bihacs (Western Bosniaks)
- Canada–French Canadians: Acadians
- Canada–Indigenous Peoples: Iroquois
- Chile–Indigenous Peoples: Mapuche (Araucanians)
- Ethiopia–Nilo-Saharans: Anuaks
- Guatemala–Indigenous Peoples: Mayans
- India–Santhals: Santals (Assam)
- India–Scheduled Tribes: Jharkhandis (the largest scheduled tribe movement)
- Moldova–Slavs: Trans-Dniester Slavs
- Myanmar–Karenni (Kayah): Hill Tribals (The Hill Tribals in Burma appear appear to be an umbrella group. We associate them with the Karennis, one of Myanmars hill peoples and prominent secessionist group that is not coded in any of the MAR releases)
- Nicaragua–Indigenous Peoples: Miskitos
- Panama–Indigenous Peoples: Kuna
- Senegal–Diolas in Casamance: Casamancais
- Somalia–Issaq: Northern Somalis (Isaaqs & Others)
- South Africa–Europeans: Afrikaners
- Ukraine–Russians: Donbas Russians

 $^{^{7}}$ Between 92% (MAR) and 97% (CIDCM) of movements identified in other datasets have at least a partial correlate in SDM, and in most cases it is a straightforward 1:1 match (between 87% and 94% out of those with a match).

⁸These two cases are the Nubas in Sudan and the Albanians in Yugoslavia. On the one hand, both MAR and CIDCM code two SDMs in southern Sudan (Southerners and Nubas), whereas the SDM datset combines the Nubas with other southerner groups into a single movement. On the other hand, the CIDCM reports treat Albanians in Kosovo and the nearby Presevo Valley separately, whereas the SDM dataset codes a single Kosovar Albanian movement.

- U.S.–Hispanics: Chicanos
- U.S.–Native Americans: Pueblos
- Yugoslavia–Serbs: Vojvodina Serbs

2.3.2 Partial matches: CIDCM (03)

- Canada–Indigenous Peoples: Iroquois
- Chile–Indigenous Peoples: Mapuche (Araucanians)
- Colombia–Indigenous Peoples: Cumbales, Paez, Guambiano, and Nasa
- India–Scheduled Tribes: Jharkhandis (the largest scheduled tribe movement)
- Indonesia–Dayaks: Indigenous Peoples
- Mexico-Indigenous Peoples: Mayans (the Other Indigenous Peoples are active for more years but at least Walter associates the movement with the Zapatistas in Chiapas; our code follows Walter)
- Nicaragua–Indigenous Peoples: Miskitos
- Somalia–Issaq: Northern Somalis (Isaaqs & Others)
- U.S.–Native Americans: Pueblos

2.3.3 Partial matches: CIDCM 08:

- Bolivia–Indigenous Highland Peoples: Quechua-Aymara
- Canada–Indigenous Peoples: Iroquois
- Chile–Indigenous Peoples: Mapuche (Araucanians)
- Colombia–Indigenous Peoples: Cumbales, Paez, Guambiano, and Nasa
- India–Scheduled Tribes: Jharkhandis (the largest scheduled tribe movement)
- Indonesia–Dayaks: Indigenous Peoples
- Italy–Northerners: Lombards
- Mexico-Indigenous Peoples: Mayans (the Other Indigenous Peoples are active for more years but at least Walter associates the movement with the Zapatistas in Chiapas; our code follows Walter)
- Nicaragua–Indigenous Peoples: Miskitos
- Somalia–Issaq: Northern Somalis (Isaaqs & Others)
- U.S.–Native Americans: Pueblos

2.4 Notes on cases that are identified as separatist in MAR or CIDCM but not in the SDM dataset

This sub-section lists all cases that are coded as separatist by MAR or CIDCM but are not included in the SDM dataset and provides justifications.

- Bhutan-Lhotshampas: This case is listed in the CIDCM reports. Marshall & Gurr (2003, p. 64) peg the start date of the Lhotshampa movement to the early 1950s, most likely because in 1952 Lhotshampas formed the Bhutan State Congress (BSC)—Bhutan's first political party. However, the evidence we found suggests that the BSC did not make SD claims. Rather, the BSC demanded the abolition of the feudal system, democratization of the administration and civil and political rights for all Bhutanese people (Mathew 1999). While we found no claim for territorial SD as we define it, the Lhotshampas appear to have made claims for increased cultural autonomy. In 1990, the Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP) was formed and began to make claims, among other things, for the right to preserve Nepali dress, language and culture, in addition to demanding the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, multi-party democracy, amendments to the restrictive 1985 citizenship act and abolition of the traditional judicial system (Mathew 1999, Eli 2008, Mishra 2013).
- Congo-Zaire–Kivu Region: The MAR phase I–phase IV release codes the Kivu region in Congo-Zaire with a SEPX score of 2, suggesting a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. Also, they are coded as "ethnonationalist." Overall, the evidence we found was too thin to include the Kivu region. The only supportive evidence we have found is in Kisangani & Bobb (2010, p. xxxvi.), who state that "Lumumba and two colleagues are killed [in January 1961] shortly after arriving in secessionist Elisabethville under Arme Nationale Congolaise (ANC) custody [Elisabethville is the former name of the capital of secessionist Katanga, and Katanga is included in our dataset]. The assassination led to the secession of Orientale and Kivu Provinces". Whether or not this passage implies the presence of a separatist movement in Kivu (or Orientale) is ambiguous; and notably, we found no other reference to a possible separatist movement in Kivu in Kisangani & Bobb (2010), a book-length overview of Congolese history.
- Ecuador-Blacks: The Blacks in Ecuador are coded with a SEPX score of 3 in the MAR phase V release, suggesting an active separatist movement. The coding notes on the web do not explain the code, and we found no evidence in this direction in other sources. None of the other datasets lists the case.
- Iran–Bahais: Only one of the alternative datasets under consideration would suggest that the Bahais in Iran have made organized separatist claims: the MAR phase I–phase IV release, where they are coded with a SEPX score of 2, suggesting a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. The coding notes on the web do not explain the code, and we found no evidence in this direction in other sources either. The Bahais are a small, mostly urban religious minority.
- Iran–Bakhtiari: The MAR phase I–phase IV release codes the Bakhtiari in Iran with a SEPX score of 2, suggesting a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. The

coding notes on the web do not explain the code, and we found no evidence in this direction in other sources. In particular, none of the other datasets under consideration lists the case. Note: A large share of the Bakhtiari live in Khuzestan, a separatist province which is already coded under the Arabs (Arabistan) SDM. We found no evidence of Bakhtiari involvement in the Khuzestan separatist movement.

- Jordan–Palestinians: The MAR phase I–phase IV group type identifies this group as "ethnonationalist". The coding notes on the web do not provide any supportive evidence. We found no corroborating evidence of separatist claims raised against Jordan in other sources, either.
- Lebanon–Druze: The Druze in Lebanon are coded with a SEPX score of 3 in the MAR phase I-phase IV release, which indicates an active separatist movement in 1980–2003. We came across some evidence that supports the MAR code. In particular, Minahan (2002, p. 549) states that: "In April 2001 Walid Jublatt, long a firm ally of Syria, called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, demanded greater autonomy for the Druze regions of the country, and closer ties between the Druze in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel." Another possible justification for the MAR code (the code is not explained in the online coding notes) could be related to events during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), which led to virtual self-government for the Druze within their homeland in the south, where the Druze Civil Administration of the Mountain (CAOM) overtook many government services. But overall, we opined that the evidence is too thin for inclusion. First, we found no corroborating evidence for Minahan's statement. Second, none of the other datasets lists the case, including the generally improved MAR phase V release. Third, the CAOM does not appear to have had separatist goals. According to Hazran (2014), the "CAOM was a temporary measure and not indicative of Druze separatism." Finally, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which draws most of its support from the Druze, does not appear to have separatist goals.
- Lebanon-Maronite Christians: The MAR phase I-phase IV release codes the Maronite Christians in Lebanon with a SEPX score of 3, indicating an active separatist movement in 1980–2003. In line with MAR, we found evidence for separatist sentiment and some limited activity, but overall the movement appears too fringe to be included. Minahan (2002), namely, states that the Maronite minority "advocates returning to the pre-World War I Mount Lebanon, an enclave dominated by the Maronite majority." However, Minahan goes on to argue that the movement "has been dismissed as a fringe movement." Notably, none of the other datasets under consideration lists the case, including the generally improved MAR V release. Finally, similarly to the Druze, the break-up of the state into warring enclaves or militarized mini-states during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) could be seen as some form of separatist tendency. Again, we do not do so, also because the civil war is generally seen as one over the central government.
- Lebanon–Palestinians: This case is listed in the CIDCM reports. Cunningham (2013), who draws on the 2003 sample, excludes this case, arguing that the Palestinians in Lebanon

pressed demands on Israel rather than Lebanon. Cunningham's interpretation matches with our own research, thus we do not include this case.

- Lebanon–Shiites: The MAR phase I–phase IV release codes the Shiites in Lebanon with a SEPX score of 3, suggesting an active separatist movement in 1980–2003. None of the other datasets lists this case, including the generally improved MAR V release. We found no evidence that would allow us to include the Shiites, though it has to be noted that similarly to the Druze and the Maronite Christians, the break-up of the state into warring enclaves or militarized mini-states during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) could be seen as some form of separatist tendency. Again, we do not do so, also because the civil war is generally seen as one over the central government.
- Macedonia–Serbs: The MAR phase V release lists the Serbs with a SEPX score of 3, suggesting an active separatist movement in 1981–2006. None of the other datasets under consideration lists the case. The evidence we found suggests that claims have been focused on cultural autonomy and not on territorial self-determination as we define it. In particular, Serbs in Macedonia have demanded schools, churches and media in their native language (see the MAR online coding notes).
- Montenegro-Albanians: CIDCM 08 lists the Albanians in Montenegro as a separatist movement that has been active since the early 1990s. We found no corroborating evidence in this direction, at least not after Montenegro's independence in 2006. For instance, BBC Monitoring Europe (2010) explicitly states that the Albanian party in Montenegro does not support plans for a greater Albania. Meanwhile, it is possible that there was some contention by Albanians in Montenegro before the break-up of Serbia and Montenegro/Yugoslavia in 2006, but this would be covered by the Kosovar Albanians movement that is coded under the header of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro.
- Niger-Hausa: The MAR phase I-phase IV release codes Niger's Hausa with a SEPX score of 2, which indicates a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. Also they are coded as "ethnonationalist." We found no evidence in this direction in other sources. Furthermore, it cannot be precluded that the code relates to the colonial period (Niger attained independence in 1960). None of the other datasets under consideration list the case.
- Nigeria-Ndigbo: Nigeria's Ndigbo are coded as a separatist movement in CIDCM 03. Cunningham (2013), who draws on the CIDCM reports, does not include the case based on the grounds that they are "indifferentiable" from the Ibo, who Marshall & Gurr (2003) code separately. We did not find evidence for a separate Ndigbo group or separatist movement, either. In other words, CIDCM 03 appears to count Nigeria's Ibos twice.
- Romania–Germans: The MAR phase I–phase IV release codes the Germans in Romania with a SEPX score of 2, suggesting a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. They are also coded as "ethnonationalist." We found no corroborating evidence, and none of the other datasets under consideration list the case either.

- Taiwan–Taiwanese: The MAR phase I–phase IV release codes the Taiwanese in Taiwan with a SEPX score of 3. This code suggests an active separatist movement in 1980-2003. But this makes little sense. MAR codes the Taiwanese under the header of Taiwan, thus assuming that Taiwan is independent. In other words, MAR is suggesting that the Taiwanese want to break off from Taiwan. There would clearly be grounds to code the Taiwanese as a separatist movement as long as one assumes that Taiwan is still part of China. However, both the Correlates of War Project (2011) and Gleditsch & Ward (1999) (and MAR) consider Taiwan independent by 1949. Thus, we do not code the Taiwanese. None of the other datasets, including the generally improved MAR phase V release, code the Taiwanese as separatist. Note: An additional episode to consider is in 1947, when there was an uprising by local Taiwanese insurgents against the KMT. Both UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002, Themnér & Wallensteen 2014) and Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code this as a civil war over territory under the header of China. However, Doyle & Sambanis's (2006) coding notes suggest that this was not a self-determination movement but a conflict over the local government.
- USSR-Jews: The MAR phase I-phase IV release codes the Jews in Russia/USSR with a SEPX score of 2, suggesting a historical separatist movement active in 1940–1980. We did not find supporting evidence, and none of the other datasets includes the case either. There is a Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Russia's Far East. While many Russian regions have made claims for increased self-determination during the 1990s, we have not found such a claim for the Jewish Oblast. But even if there was such a movement, it would be doubtful to associate it with the Jews, as very few Jews actually live there (Orttung, Lussier & Paretskaya 2000).
- United Kingdom–Bermudans: The Bermudans are listed by CIDCM 08. We do not code the case because we consider this an anti-colonial movement. The United Kingdom's overseas entities are not fully integrated with the metropole and thus clearly fulfil our definition of a colony. For example, the British dependencies are not represented in the British Parliament (Banks, Day & Muller 1997).

2.5 Determinants of measurement error in MAR and CIDCM

In the paper we refer to additional analyses suggesting that measurement error in MAR and CIDCM is primarily a function of whether movements are violent or not. Tables S2–S4 show the results of logit regressions explaining whether a case was included in the MAR and CIDCM datasets. In all models, SDMs as coded in the SDM dataset constitute the unit of analysis, with each movement constituting one case.⁹ The dependent variables are whether or not a case is included in MAR, CIDCM (2003), and CIDCM (2008), respectively. The independent variables are whether a movement was violent and whether it is located in a democracy or in a high-income country. Refer to the paper and the coding notes above for the construction of the independent variables.

It becomes evident that whether or not a movement was violent constitutes the main factor in whether a movement is included in the MAR and CIDCM datasets. The violence indicators have by far the largest coefficients (all variables constitute dummies) and explain the largest share of variation in bivariate models. Further, if all three independent variables are included in the same model, the coefficients for high-income countries become much smaller and in two cases even insignificant (CIDCM 03 and CIDCM 08). The coefficients for democracy even change signs in two cases (MAR and CIDCM 03) whereas in the third (CIDCM 08), it is significant-positive, suggesting that conditional on violence and country wealth, MAR and CIDCM tend to slightly over-represent movements in democracies. Meanwhile, the coefficients for whether movements were violent remain practically unchanged and highly significant. In sum, this suggests that the differences regarding democracy and wealth reported in Table 3 in the paper are to a large extent a result of the fact that violent movements tend to be in poorer and less democratic countries.

 $^{^{9}}$ Cases where the SDM dataset has a lower level of aggregation were removed. For example, SDM codes 5 indigenous groups in the US whereas MAR and CIDCM all code a single umbrella group. Only one of the 5 indigenous groups are included in the analysis. Furthermore, note that the analysis excludes false positives—cases that MAR or CIDCM code as separatist but for which we found no corroborating evidence.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Movement is violent	1.98***			1.77***
	(0.23)			(0.24)
Movement is in democracy		-0.66^{***}		0.08
		(0.21)		(0.27)
Movement is in high-income country			-1.37^{***}	-0.77^{**}
			(0.28)	(0.33)
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.15	0.02	0.05	0.16
Ν	438	431	438	431

Table S2: Correlates of inclusion in MAR vs SDM

Note: All models estimated with logit regression. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Movement is violent	1.64***			1.57***
	(0.22)			(0.24)
Movement is in democracy		-0.28		0.26
		(0.22)		(0.27)
Movement is in high-income country			-0.87^{***}	-0.41
			(0.26)	(0.32)
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.11
Ν	433	427	433	427

Table S3: Correlates of inclusion in CIDCM 03 vs SDM

Note: All models estimated with logit regression. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Movement is violent	1.85***			1.94***
	(0.23)			(0.25)
Movement is in democracy		0.10		0.84^{***}
		(0.20)		(0.27)
Movement is in high-income country		. ,	-0.69^{***}	-0.44
			(0.24)	(0.31)
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.14
Ν	431	424	431	424

Table S4: Correlates of inclusion in CIDCM 08 vs SDM

Note: All models estimated with logit regression. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

2.6 Comparing the country-level characteristics of the number of SDMs across datasets

Here we report the results of an additional set of analyses referred to in the paper where we compare the country-level characteristics of the number of SDMs using data from the MAR, CIDCM, and SDM datsets, respectively. We depart from a standard civil war model, namely model 1 in Table 1 in Fearon & Laitin (2003). The dependent variables constitute counts of the number of SDMs in a country based on the MAR, CIDCM, or SDM datsets. To make sure that differences across datasets reflect case selection and not differential start and end dates of movements, we again use the start and end dates provided by the SDM dataset also for MAR and CIDCM, as described above. We consider counts of the number of movements over three different time periods: 1955–1999, 1955–1979, and 1980–1999. All models constitute cross-sections, that is, the unit of analysis is the country.

All independent variables are taken from Fearon & Laitin, except that we replace Fearon & Laitin's data on GDP per capita with Gleditsch's (2002) because the latter has fewer missings.¹⁰ We dropped "prior war" and "regime instability" from the list of covariates because of potential endogeneity and, in the case of regime instability, also because of poor measurement. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the time period under study (i.e., 1955 (1980)) or the year of a country's independence if this was after 1955 (1980)).

Table S5 below shows the results. It becomes evident that the models using counts of the number of SDMs based on the MAR and CIDCM datasets tend to under-estimate the effects of GDP per capita and democracy. Differences are most pronounced in the analyses focusing on the 1980–1999 period, which is likely because differences in coverage between MAR/CIDCM and the SDM dataset are more pronounced in recent years (see Figure S1). There are also smaller differences regarding other variables, including whether states are newly independent or non-contiguous. The substantive conclusions remain similar if Russia (an outlier in terms of the number of movements) is dropped and if independent variables are averaged across time periods instead of being measured at the beginning of the time period under study. The results also remain similar if group aggregation is harmonized across datasets (e.g., combining the 5 US indigenous movements coded by the SDM dataset to a single umbrella movement, as is the practice in MAR and CIDCM). Results can be obtained upon request.

¹⁰Further, in deviation to Fearon & Laitin we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita.

		1955 -	-1999			1955 -	-1979			1980-	-1999	
	(1) SDM	(2) MAR	(3) CIDCM (03)	(4) CIDCM (08)	(5) SDM	(6) MAR	(7) CIDCM (03)	(8) CIDCM (08)	(9) SDM	(10) MAR	(11) CIDCM (03)	(12) CIDCM (08)
GDP per capita (log)	0.23**	0.17	0.09	0.11	0.19	0.09	-0.10	-0.01	0.21**	0.11	0.10	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Country population (log)	0.57^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.44^{***}	0.46^{***}	0.44^{***}	0.61^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.50^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
% mountainous terrain (log)	0.14^{**}	0.29***	0.20^{**}	0.17^{**}	0.18^{**}	0.40^{***}	0.21^{**}	0.13	0.14^{**}	0.27^{***}	0.18^{**}	0.16^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Non-contiguous state	0.28	-0.23	-0.24	0.03	0.15	-0.29	-0.36	-0.07	0.36^{*}	-0.05	-0.12	0.20
	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Oil exporter	-0.07	-0.01	-0.15	-0.10	0.43	0.61^{*}	0.45	0.34	-0.04	0.22	-0.05	-0.17
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
New state	-0.37^{**}	-0.24	-0.12	-0.17	-0.28	-0.51^{*}	-0.49	-0.54	0.17	0.44	0.25	0.25
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Democracy	0.02^{*}	0.01	0.04^{**}	0.04^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.02	0.08^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.03^{**}	0.00	0.02	0.03^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.98^{***}	2.18^{***}	2.11^{***}	2.19^{***}	1.60^{***}	1.86***	1.65^{***}	1.89^{***}	1.90***	1.96^{***}	2.06^{***}	2.14***
	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Religious fractionalization	-0.62	-0.20	-0.55	-0.87^{*}	-0.68	0.34	-0.08	-0.71	-0.52	-0.01	-0.40	-0.74
	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.54)	(0.65)	(0.63)	(0.40)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.46)
Pseudo R ²	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.24
N	157	157	157	157	134	134	134	134	159	159	159	159

Table S5: Explaining the number of SDMs in a country

Note: All models estimated with negative binomial regression. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




Figure S1: Coverage in MAR/CIDCM vs SDM over time $% \mathcal{A}$

3 Supplementary information for the section "Application"

This section includes supplementary information for the replication of Walter (2006). The first sub-section compares case coverage in Walter's main model to the SDM dataset. The second sub-section further evaluates the robustness of Walter's main model based on her own data. The third sub-section provides additional information on the re-analysis of Walter's main model on the basis of the SDM dataset (variable descriptions, robustness checks, and a discussion of the behavior of control variables).

3.1 Case coverage in Walter (2006) vs. the SDM dataset

	Walter	SDM
Period	1956-2	2002
SDMs	86	450
Countries	51	117
Regional distribution:		
MENA	7	19
SS Africa	15	72
Central Asia	12	55
SE Asia	25	91
Europe	17	126
North America	3	26
Latin America	4	39
Oceania	3	22
Violent SDMs (%)	62.79	30.44
SDMs in democracies $(\%)$	30.23	39.19
SDMs in high-income countries (%)	11.63	27.56

Table S6: Comparing case coverage between Walter's (2006)main model and SDM

Note: A movement is considered violent if there was an incidence of low- or high-level violence over SD in at least one year. A movement is considered to be located in a democracy if the host state's polity2 score is 6 or higher in 75% or more of all years it was active. In turn, a movement is considered to be located in a high-income country if the host state's GDP per capita exceeded 10,000 constant US dollars (base: 2005 prices) in 75% or more of all active years. MENA stands for Middle East and Northern Africa, SS Africa for Sub-Saharan Africa, and SE Asia for Southern and Eastern Asia. See above for more details on how we compared the different datasets.

3.2 Robustness of Walter's main model

Table S7 shows the implications of several small changes to Barbara Walter's (2006) main model (column 1 in Table 1 in her article). All results are based on Walter's original data without any modifications to her dependent variable. In column 1 we show the implications of dropping India. As argued in the paper, India constitutes an influential case in Walter's analysis i) because it constitutes the most ethnically diverse country in Walter's sample (Walter codes 18 groups in India, more than in any other country), ii) because India makes up for almost 10% of the cases in Walter's main model, and iii) because Walter's data involves several coding errors with Walter coding "no accommodation" when in fact there were major acts of accommodation. In combination, the Indian case likely biases Walter's results in the direction of her hypotheses. In line with this, we find that Walter's main result concerning the number of ethnic groups is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels if India is dropped.

In column 2 of Table S7, we account for the fact that errors may be correlated within countries and cluster standard errors at the country level. It turns out that this is sufficient for Walter's main result concerning the number of ethnic groups to lose statistical significance at the 5% level.

In columns 3–8 of Table S7 we show the results if Walter's measure for the number of ethnic groups in a country (i.e. the number of potential future challengers) is replaced with one of several alternatives: the number of ethnic groups that make up at least 1% of a country's population according to Fearon (2003), the number of socially relevant ethnic groups in a country according to AMAR (Birnir, Wilkenfeld, Fearon, Laitin, Gurr, Brancati, Saideman, Pate & Hultquist 2015), the number of ethnic groups in a country according to Alesina et al. (2003), the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a country according to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker & Girardin 2015), the number of politically relevant and spatially concentrated ethnic groups in a country according to EPR, and the number of SDMs according to our dataset. It turns out that Walter's main result concerning the number of ethnic groups depends on the measure used. With both Fearon and AMAR the coefficient is no longer statistically significant at the 5% level, and with Alesina et al. it even changes its sign. Meanwhile, the significantnegative correlation remains with both EPR-based measures, as well as the number of SDMs. However, note that results based on EPR and the number of SDMs should be interpreted with care because of possible endogeneity. In the paper we argue that Walter's measures for the value of land of potential future challengers are problematic because they base on MAR, which may induce endogeneity. The same problem applies to group counts based on EPR and SDM. It is likely the case that the number of politically relevant (i.e. politically mobilized and/or discriminated) groups in a country as well as the number of SDMs is to some extent endogenous to regime behavior.

Finally, in columns 9–15 of Table S7 we replace Walter's measure for the number of ethnic groups with logged variants of both Walter's original measure and the 6 previously mentioned alternative group counts. Logging group counts follows the logic that a change from, say, 1 to 2 potential challengers may matter more for reputation building than a change from, say, 5 to 6. The effect estimates remain similar, with one notable exception: If logged, Walter's own

measure of the number of ethnic groups is no longer statistically significant at the 5% level.

					Alternative g	group counts	8				Logg	ed group co	unts		
	(1) No India	(2) Clust.	(3) Fearon	(4) AMAR	(5) Alesina	(6) EPR	(7) EPRcon	(8) SDMs	(9) Walter	(10) Fearon	(11) AMAR	(12) Alesina	(13) EPR	(14) EPRcon	(15) SDMs
Reputation model															
Number of ethnic groups	-0.05	-0.10^{*}	-0.04	-0.05^{*}	0.05	-0.12^{***}	-0.10^{**}	-0.08^{***}	-0.61^{*}	-0.34	-0.43	0.41	-1.31^{***}	-0.73^{**}	-0.67^{***}
· ·	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.25)
Combined economic value	0.05	0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}	0.09**	0.03	0.10***	0.08**	0.06*	0.05	0.06*	0.07**	0.04	0.07**	0.06^{*}	0.05^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Combined strategic value	-0.37^{**}	-0.31^{**}	-0.38^{***}	-0.46^{***}	-0.33^{**}	-0.33^{**}	-0.33^{**}	-0.34^{**}	-0.33^{**}	-0.37^{***}	-0.41^{***}	-0.34^{**}	-0.29^{**}	-0.32^{**}	-0.34^{**}
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Combined psychological value	0.37	0.28	0.18	0.30	0.10	0.31	0.36	0.14	0.21	0.17	0.23	0.15	0.36	0.33	0.21
	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Proportion of population (all groups)	-2.24^{**}	-2.03^{***}	-1.85^{*}	-2.24^{**}	-2.29^{**}	-2.51^{***}	-2.31^{**}	-2.49^{**}	-1.82^{*}	-1.73^{*}	-1.89^{*}	-2.41^{**}	-1.78^{*}	-1.60^{*}	-2.32^{**}
	(1.06)	(0.73)	(1.00)	(0.97)	(1.03)	(0.96)	(0.94)	(0.97)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(0.97)	(1.09)	(0.96)	(0.94)	(0.99)
Value of land under dispute															
Economic value	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Strategic value	0.10	0.05	0.11	0.16	0.08	-0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.06	-0.04	0.04	0.03
-	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Length of residence	0.07	0.01	0.04	-0.08	0.03	-0.18	-0.15	-0.10	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.02	-0.25	-0.15	-0.04
	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.39)
History of autonomy	-0.52	-0.39	-0.34	-0.49	-0.27	-0.43	-0.47	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.40	-0.31	-0.49	-0.42	-0.43
v v	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Proportion of population (current group)	1.61	1.37	1.42	0.94	1.46	1.42	1.20	0.96	1.04	1.39	0.91	1.65	-0.01	0.14	0.03
	(2.07)	(1.66)	(1.97)	(1.96)	(2.02)	(1.93)	(1.92)	(1.98)	(2.01)	(1.97)	(1.98)	(2.05)	(1.99)	(1.96)	(2.06)
Relative capabilities															
Government military personnel	-14.53	-13.57	-2.64	6.60	4.87	30.08	22.02	34.88	-7.95	-4.92	-0.23	4.26	20.54	4.92	23.23
v x	(28.49)	(25.63)	(29.22)	(25.82)	(26.10)	(27.36)	(26.56)	(27.68)	(27.86)	(28.54)	(26.20)	(26.13)	(27.34)	(26.63)	(27.19)
Government instability	0.43	0.41	0.54	0.71*	0.54	0.65*	0.61^{*}	0.56	0.45	0.54	0.61*	0.57	0.68^{*}	0.56	0.47
*	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Group concentration	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.05	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.06	-0.04	0.04	-0.06	0.04	0.03	0.04
*	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Neighboring ethnic groups	-0.15	-0.14	-0.13	-0.20	-0.10	-0.21	-0.18	-0.29^{*}	-0.14	-0.13	-0.19	-0.08	-0.23	-0.20	-0.26^{*}
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Other controls															
Level of democracy	0.12^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.12^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Duration of conflict	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R ²	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.30	0.25	0.27
N	78	86	86	86	86	86	84	86	86	86	86	86	86	84	86

Table S7: Robustness of Walter's (2006) main model

Note: Ordered probit regressions explaining the maximum level of accommodation ever granted to an SDM based on data from Walter (2006). Model 1 drops India. Model 2 clusters standard errors at the country level. Models 3–15 use alternative estimates of the number of groups in a country, including logged versions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

3.3 Reanalysis based on SDM data

3.3.1 Variable descriptions

This sub-section describes all variables used to replicate Walter's reputation argument based on the SDM dataset, including data sources. For most variables we provide separate descriptions of the cross-sectional version (CS version) and the time-series cross-sectional version (TSCS version). In some cases we provide additional, more detailed notes under "coding notes." For descriptions of the variables used by Walter's (2006) refer to her paper.

Dependent variables:

Accommodation

CS version: Four-point ordinal variable indicating the maximum level of accommodation ever granted to an SDM during the full course of its SD challenge. This variable combines information on concessions on cultural rights (including language, religion), autonomy (self-rule short of independence), independence, as well as access to central state power. Groups that never received a concession are coded with 0, groups that received one or more concessions on cultural rights or government inclusion are coded with 1 ("reform"), groups that received one or more autonomy concessions received a score of 2, and groups that received one or more concessions were coded based on the highest level of accommodation ever offered to the group.

TSCS version: The highest level of accommodation granted to a movement in a given year, with 0 = no concession, 1 = concession on cultural rights or government inclusion ("reform"), 2 = autonomy concession, and 3 = independence concession.

Source: SDM.

Strict accommodation

CS version: A stricter version of the accommodation variable that i) counts only concessions that were fully or to at least a high degree implemented, and ii) only codes a concession on autonomy when there was a major act of devolution. Less significant territorial reforms are coded with 1 ("reform").

TSCS version: Analogous.

Source: SDM.

Independent variables:

Number of ethnic groups

CS/TSCS version: The total number of ethnic groups in a country as coded by Walter (2006). Source: Walter (2006).

Coding notes: Walter's group count measure is time-invariant. Thus, at times it does not

adequately reflect the situation in countries that have undergone major territorial changes. For example, Walter counted 8 groups in Yugoslavia, and since Walter's group count is timeinvariant we have to apply this same figure to both the period before and after 1991/1992 even if this evidently cannot be true, given the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia. A number of alternative group counts we draw on, such as Fearon (2003), are also cross-sectional, but in other cases at least some of these evident inconsistencies can straightforwardly be fixed (see below). With Walter's group count no such fixes are possible, mainly because she does not provide the names of the groups. For example, combining group counts from successor states, as we do in other cases, is not possible without running the risk of counting the same groups multiple times. There is one exception. Unlike SDM, Walter codes the Soviet Union and Russia as two separate countries with 15 groups in the former and 7 groups in the latter. Hence, for Russia/the USSR we code 15 groups up to and including 1991 and 7 from 1992 onwards. In CS analyses we used the average number of groups weighted by the number of years a movement was active in the USSR.

Oil/gas reserves

CS version: Average of the annual oil/gas reserves variable during the full course of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether the claimed territory includes discovered hydrocarbon reserves (oil or gas) in a given year. This variable relates to the situation on January 1 or, if any of the following applies in a given year, to a country's date of independence, the date a group's territory was merged with the state, or the date of the first organized SD claim.

Source: SDM.

Strategic value

CS version: Average of the annual strategic value variable during the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Cumulative scale indicating whether the claimed territory includes i) a land border with an internationally recognized country and ii) a sea outlet. Coded 0 if the claimed territory has no land border and no sea outlet, 1 if it has one of the two, and 2 if it has both. The variable relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Proportion of population

CS version: Average of the annual ethnic group's population size as a proportion of the country's total population during the SD challenge.

TSCS version: The ethnic group's population size as a proportion of the country's total population in a given year. The January 1 rule applies (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Government military personnel

CS version: Average annual number of military personnel during the SD challenge as a proportion of a country's total population.

TSCS version: The number of military personnel as a proportion of a country's total population in a given year. While our measure of the number of government military personnel relates to the situation on January 1, our total population measure does not. To avoid potential simultaneity bias, we divided the number of military personnel by the one-year lag of country total population, except for a country's first year of independence when no pre-independence data was available.

Sources: For government military personnel: COW Material Capabilities Dataset v4.0 (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972, Singer 1988), updated for 2008–2012 using information from the "Military Balance" reports that are published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS (2008), (2009), (2010),(2011), (2012)). For country total population: Gleditsch (2002); missing values imputed using population growth statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) (The World Bank 2015), Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy (Maddison 2010) including the updates in the The Maddison-Project (2013)), Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015), and the COW Material Capabilities Dataset v4.0 (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972, Singer 1988).

Coding notes: In some cases data on government military personnel is missing in the immediate post-independence phase. We imputed the following country-years using leads (i.e. the value from the first year data is available in a country series): Bangladesh (1971), Macedonia (1991–1992), Moldova (1991–1992), Montenegro (2006), Vanuatu (1980), Micronesia (1986– 1990), and Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (all 1991). Furthermore, the data for Vietnam (1975), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) relates to the situation before the unifications of North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, and East and West Germany. Hence, we used the one-year lead (1976 and 1991, respectively) in these country-years for all movements that formed part of the named states only after the respective unifications.

Government instability

CS version: Dummy variable indicating whether a movement's host state experienced a 3 or more change on the polity2 variable in any year during the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether there is a 3 or more change between a country's one-year polity2 lag and the two-year polity2 lag. By default, a country's first two years of independence are coded with 0.

Source: Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2014).

Coding notes: For more details on the polity2 variable see below.

Group concentration

CS version: Average of the annual group concentration variable during the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether an ethnic group is spatially concentrated in a given year. Relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Kin groups

CS version: Average of the annual ethnic kin variable during the full course of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Three-point ordinal variable indicating numerically significant ethnic kin in another country. 0 means no transborder ethnic kin, 1 transborder ethnic kin in at least one non-adjacent country (but none in an adjacent country), and 2 transborder ethnic kin in at least one adjacent country. Relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Level of democracy

CS version: Average of a country's annual level of democracy during the full course of the SD challenge based on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset. The polity2 variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating a higher level of democracy.

TSCS version: A country's level of democracy based on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset, lagged one year except for a country's first year of independence.

Source: Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2014).

Coding notes: In some cases polity2 data is missing in the immediate post-independence phase. We imputed the following country-years using leads (i.e. the value from the first year data is available in a country series): Bangladesh (1971), Ghana (1957-1959), India (1947-1949), Laos (1953), and South Vietnam (1954).

Duration of conflict

CS version: The total number of years that a group challenged the state for increased SD.

TSCS version: The total number of years that a group has challenged the state for increased SD in a given year.

Source: SDM.

Additional variables used in robustness checks:

Number of ethnic groups (Fearon)

CS/TSCS version: The total number of ethnic groups that made up at least 1% of a country's population in the early 1990s. Since Fearon covers the situation in the early 1990s, his data does not always apply to countries that have undergone major territorial changes before or after this. Accordingly, we combined Fearon's group counts of China and Taiwan for China (1945–1949), of Pakistan and Bangladesh for Pakistan (1945–1971), and of Ethiopia and Eritrea for Ethiopia (1953–1993). Similar fixes are not always possible, especially not for major territorial changes after the early 1990s (at least not without revising Fearon's data based on additional sources). Thus we set Serbia/Yugoslavia (2007–2012) and Sudan (2012) to missing due to the secessions of Montenegro (and Kosovo) and South Sudan, respectively. We left Indonesia as is despite East Timor's secession in 2002 because the East Timorese make up less than 1% of Indonesia's population according to Fearon. Note that Fearon codes the Soviet Union and Russia as well as Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro as separate countries; we applied the USSR/Yugoslavia codes for the period up to and including 1991 and the Russia/Serbia and Montenegro codes for 1992 onwards. While Fearon's data is in principle time-invariant, the aforementioned changes induce minimal variation over time. Where applicable we used averages of the number of groups in all CS analyses. The TSCS variant needs not be lagged because it reflects the situation on January 1.

Source: Fearon (2003).

Number of ethnic groups (AMAR)

CS/TSCS version: The total number of socially relevant ethnic groups in a country (aggregated version). Though this is not explicitly stated in the documentation, AMAR appears to relate to the situation in the late 2000s. Hence data for countries that have ceased to exist by then is missing in some cases, and in other cases AMAR data is not directly applicable to earlier periods. To get get an estimate of the number of socially relevant groups for Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union we combined AMAR's group counts of the respective successor states. We did the same for Pakistan (1945–1971), Ethiopia (1953–1993), for China (1945–1949) and for Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro (1945–2008). No change was necessary for Indonesia before 2002 because AMAR codes two groups in East Timor which are both also coded under the header of Indonesia. AMAR's coding of Sudan appears to relate to the situation before South Sudan's secession, but no change was necessary for 2012 because AMAR codes an umbrella Southerners group, and some Southern Sudanese have remained in Sudan. While AMAR data is in principle time-invariant, the aforementioned changes induce minimal variation over time. In CS analyses we thus used averages of the number of groups where applicable. The TSCS variant needs not be lagged because it reflects the situation on January 1.

Source: Birnir et al. (2015).

Number of ethnic groups (Alesina)

CS/TSCS version: The total number of ethnic groups in a country. Alesina et al. cover the situation in the early/mid 1990s. Hence their data does not always apply to countries that have undergone major territorial changes before or after this. Accordingly, we combined Alesina et al.'s group counts of China and Taiwan for China (1945–1949), of Pakistan and Bangladesh for Pakistan (1945–1971), of Ethiopia and Eritrea for Ethiopia (1953–1993), and of the Soviet Union's successor states for the Soviet Union up to and including 1991. Similar fixes are not always possible, especially not for major territorial changes after the early/mid 1990s (at least not without revising Alesina et al.'s data based on additional sources). Thus we set Serbia/Yugoslavia (2007–2012) and Sudan (2012) to missing due to the secessions of Montenegro (and Kosovo) and South Sudan, respectively. We left Indonesia as is despite East Timor's secession in 2002 because the East Timorese are not counted as a separate group in Alesina et al. anyway. Alesina et al. do not provide data for Czechoslovakia, so we combined data for Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Note that Alesina et al. code Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro as separate countries; we applied the Yugoslavia codes for the period up to and including 1991 and the Serbia and Montenegro codes for 1992 onwards. While Alesina et al.'s data is in principle time-invariant, the aforementioned changes induce minimal variation over time. Where applicable we used averages of the number of groups in all CS analyses. The TSCS variant needs not be lagged because it reflects the situation on January 1.

Source: Alesina et al. (2003).

Number of ethnic groups (EPR)

CS version: Average of the annual number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a country during the full course of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: The total number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a given country-year. Relates to the situation on January 1.

Sources: Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010), Vogt et al. (2015).

Coding notes: Due to the January 1 rule the data for Vietnam (1975), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) relates to the situation before the unifications of North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, and East and West Germany. Hence, we used the one-year lead (1976 and 1991, respectively) in these country-years for all movements that formed part of the named states only after the unifications.

Number of ethnic groups (EPRcon)

CS version: Average of the annual number of territorially concentrated, politically relevant ethnic groups in a country during the full course of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: The total number of territorially concentrated, politically relevant ethnic groups in a given country-year. Relates to the situation on January 1.

Sources: Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010), Vogt et al. (2015), Wucherpfennig, Weidmann, Girardin, Cederman & Wimmer (2011).

Coding notes: Due to the January 1 rule the data for Vietnam (1975), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) relates to the situation before the unifications of North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, and East and West Germany. Hence, we used the one-year lead (1976)

and 1991, respectively) in these country-years for all movements that formed part of the named states only after the unifications.

Number of ethnic groups (SDM)

CS version: Average of the annual number of ethnic groups that challenged the state for increased SD during the full course of a given group's SD challenge.

TSCS version: The total number of ethnic groups in a country that challenge the state for increased SD, lagged one year except for a country's year of independence.

Source: SDM.

Number of 1st tier administrative subdivisions

CS/TSCS version: The total number of 1st tier administrative subdivisions in a country around 2000.

Source: Sambanis & Milanovic (2014).

GDP per capita (log)

CS version: Average of the annual natural logarithm of a country's GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars during the full course of a group's SD challenge.

TSCS version: Natural logarithm of a country's GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars, lagged one year except for a country's year of independence.

Sources: Gleditsch (2002); missing values imputed using real GDP growth statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) (The World Bank 2015), Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy (Maddison 2010) including the updates in the The Maddison-Project (2013), and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015).

Coding notes: Gleditsch's GDP per capita data for Vietnam (1975), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) relates to the situation before the unifications of North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, and East and West Germany. Hence, we used the one-year lead (1976 and 1991, respectively) in these country-years for all movements that formed part of the named states only after the unifications.

Mountainous terrain (log)

CS/TSCS version: Natural logarithm of the percentage (plus 1) of a country's area that qualifies as mountainous terrain.

Source: Fearon & Laitin (2003).

Coding notes: Fearon & Laitin's data is cross-sectional and covers the situation in the mid or late 1990s. Thus their data does not always apply to countries that have undergone major territorial changes before or after this. For example, the value they give for Ethiopia does not apply during

the time Eritrea formed part of Ethiopia as well (1953–1993). We corrected data for several episodes by combining estimates for successor states (e.g. Eritrea and today's Ethiopia) with data on total land mass from the World Bank (The World Bank 2015): Yugoslavia (1945–1992), Pakistan (1945–1971), China (1945-1949), and USSR (1945-1991). The same was not possible for countries undergoing major changes after the mid or late 1990s. Thus, we set Serbia (2007–2012) as well as Sudan (2012) to missing. We did not set Indonesia to missing after East Timor's secession due to the latter's small size relative to Indonesia as a whole. While Fearon & Laitin's data is in principle time-invariant, the aforementioned changes induce minimal variation over time. Hence, in all CS analyses we used averages where applicable. The TSCS variant needs not be lagged because it reflects the situation on January 1.

Federal state

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's host state constitutes a federal state throughout all years of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's host state constitutes a federal state, lagged one year except for a country's year of independence.

Source: Roeder (2009).

Proportional elections

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's host state had democratic, proportional representation at any point during the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's host state has democratic, proportional representation, lagged one year except for a country's year of independence.

Source: Bormann & Golder (2013).

Coding notes: In some cases data is missing in the immediate post-independence phase. We imputed the following country-years using leads (i.e. the value from the first year data is available in a country series): Micronesia (1986-1990) and Oman (1953-1969). Furthermore, the data for Vietnam (1975), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) relates to the situation before the unifications of North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, and East and West Germany. Hence, we used the one-year lead (1976 and 1991, respectively) in these country-years for all movements that formed part of the named states only after the unifications.

Regional autonomy

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement enjoyed a meaningful level of autonomy in the first year of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement enjoys a meaningful level of autonomy in a given year. The variable relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

De-facto independence

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement was de-facto independent in the first year of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement is de-facto independent in a given year. The variable relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Exclusion from central state power

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement was excluded from central state power in the first year of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement is excluded from central state power in a given year. The variable relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Secession claim

CS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's dominant claim was for secession (national independence or merger with another state) in the first year of the SD challenge.

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether a movement's dominant claim was for secession (national independence or merger with another state) in a given year. The variable relates to the situation on January 1, except under the circumstances detailed above (see above under "oil/gas reserves").

Source: SDM.

Post Cold War

CS version: Dummy flagging movements that challenged the state for increased SD in the post Cold War period (1992 onwards).

TSCS version: Dummy flagging the post Cold War period (1992 onwards).

High-level violence in past 3 years

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether the movement was engaged in high-level violence in the past 3 years.

Source: SDM.

Low-level violence in past 3 years

TSCS version: Dummy indicating whether the movement was engaged in low-level violence in the past 3 years.

3.3.2 Robustness checks

In Tables S8–S14 we show the results of a large number of robustness tests of our reanalysis of Walter's reputation argument based on our own dataset. As in the paper, we run both cross-sectional (CS) and time-series cross-sectional models (TSCS) with both our preferred measure of accommodation and the stricter version. In columns 1–4 of Table S8 we show the results of bivariate regressions without covariates (except for cubic time polynomials and counters of previous instances of accommodation in the TSCS models, which need be included to account for possible time dependence). The results are similar to the ones reported in the paper, except that the number of ethnic groups now fails statistical significance in all four models, including the cross-sectional model with the strict version of accommodation.

Next, in columns 5–8 of Table S8 we report results of models without India. India proved an influential case in Walter's analysis mainly because it is extremely ethnically diverse and because Walter erroneously coded "no accommodation" in a number of cases when there actually was significant accommodation. India proves influential in our analysis too. If India is dropped, the number of ethnic groups has a significant-positive relation with the level of accommodation across all 4 models, including all 3 where it has not previously had a significant relationship with accommodation. The reason is that the level of group accommodation in India is slightly below average. It remains true that Walter under-represents the level of accommodation in a number of cases, but in some other, less well-known cases (that are not considered by Walter) India indeed made relatively few concessions (the Rajbangsis constitute an example). In combination with India's high level of diversity and many movements, this turns out sufficient to push estimates upwards if India is dropped. However, most importantly, while our estimates change without India, our results speak against Walter's reputation argument with or without India.

In columns 9–12 of Table S8 we report results of models with a number of additional controls, generally based on established results from the civil war literature. Added controls include whether a state constitutes a federation, has proportional representation, and a state's GDP per capita. For details on measurement refer to the variable descriptions above. Interestingly, the effect estimates for the number of ethnic groups increase in size, and are now statistically significant across all 4 models (in direct contradiction to Walter's argument). Note that we did not control for violence in the cross-sectional models to avoid possible endogeneity (while violence may cause accommodation, (a lack of) accommodation may also cause violence; we can circumvent this problem, at least to some extent, in the TSCS analyses by lagging the violence variables, which is not possible in CS models).

In Table S9 we explore the implications of several alternative specifications of our dependent variables. First, in columns 1–4 we rerun the four models reported in the paper with binary versions of the dependent variables recording whether a movement was ever accommodated (in the CS models) or whether it was accommodated in a given year (in the TSCS models). The results are very similar to the ones reported in the paper, maybe except for column 2, where the number of ethnic groups no longer has a statistically significant effect. Second, in columns 5–8 we rerun all models with versions of the dependent variables that drop concessions on cultural rights and government inclusion and only count concessions on autonomy and independence as accommodation. The results remain roughly the same, though the number of ethnic groups is

now statistically significant at the 1% level in column 8 rather than at the 10% level. Finally, in columns 9–10 we focus on the first concession ever granted to a movement, thus analyzing the time until the first concession using TSCS models. All instances of accommodation except for the first are dropped. Again, the conclusion remains the same.

In Tables S10–S13 we replace Walter's measure for the number of ethnic groups in a country with a variety of alternative proxies for the number of potential future challengers: the number of ethnic groups that make up at least 1% of a country's population according to Fearon (2003), the number of socially relevant ethnic groups in a country according to AMAR (Birnir et al. 2015), the number of ethnic groups in a country according to Alesina et al. (2003), the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a country according to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, Vogt et al. 2015), the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a country according to EPR, and the number of SDMs according to our dataset. Note that, as mentioned above, models using group counts based on EPR or the number of SDMs should be interpreted with care due to possible endogeneity. Contrary to the results reported in the paper, we find a significant-positive effect in a large number of cases. However, we do not find a significant-negative effect, as Walter's reputation model would suggest, in a single case.

Finally, in Table S14 we use the number of 1st tier administrative subdivisions in a country instead of the number of ethnic groups as proxy for the number of potential future challengers. This follows the logic that any region may potentially claim more self-rule. The conclusion remains the same.

		Bivariate 1	regressions			India d	ropped			Additiona	l controls	
	CS		TSC	cs	CS	3	TSC	CS	CS	3	TS	CS
	(1) Standard	(2) Strict	(3) Standard	(4) Strict	(5) Standard	(6) Strict	(7) Standard	(8) Strict	(9) Standard	(10) Strict	(11) Standard	(12) Strict
Reputation model												
Number of ethnic groups	0.01 (0.04)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \\ (0.04) \end{array}$	0.01 (0.02)	(0.02) (0.02)	0.20^{***} (0.05)	(0.22^{***}) (0.05)	0.06^{**} (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.11^{***} (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.05^{***} (0.02)	0.05^{**} (0.01)
Value of land under dispute												
Oil/gas reserves					0.52^{*}	0.42	0.33***	0.32***	0.12	0.10	0.25^{**}	0.24^{**}
					(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Strategic value					0.14	0.15	-0.08	-0.07	0.06	0.09	-0.09	-0.05
					(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Proportion of population					1.01	3.16***	0.96***	1.03***	4.07***	4.94***	1.65***	1.46**
					(1.03)	(1.13)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(1.17)	(1.41)	(0.44)	(0.40)
Relative capabilities												
Government military personnel					3.90	-11.38	23.63^{*}	23.82**	-85.31^{**}	-52.27	16.32	24.73^{*}
					(34.77)	(31.12)	(13.31)	(11.99)	(41.16)	(45.69)	(13.29)	(12.79)
Government instability					-0.32	0.21	0.27*	0.27*	0.20	0.35	0.34**	0.31*
~					(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Group concentration					0.11	-0.41	0.05	-0.05	0.16	-0.22	0.28**	0.17
17:					(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Kin groups					-0.23	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	-0.25	-0.13	0.01	0.01
					(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Other controls												
Level of democracy					0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}	0.03***	0.02***	-0.07^{*}	-0.04	-0.00	-0.00
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Duration of conflict					0.02***	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.02***	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Added controls												
GDP per capita (log)									0.85^{***}	0.42^{*}	0.34^{***}	0.23^{**}
									(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Mountainous terrain (log)									0.45***	0.11	0.06	0.02
									(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Federal state									-0.21	0.13	0.01	0.03
									(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Proportional elections									1.03**	0.79**	-0.10	0.02
									(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Regional autonomy									1.07	0.80	0.22	0.20
De feste index en dex es									(0.73)	(0.60) -0.07	(0.16)	(0.14)
De-facto independence									-0.08 (1.01)	-0.07 (0.81)	-0.25 (0.21)	-0.73^{*} (0.39)
Exclusion from central state power									0.53	(0.81) 0.79**	0.35**	(0.39) 0.40*
Exclusion from central state power									(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.12)
Secession claim									0.72*	0.12	0.26***	0.21*
Second chilli									(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Post Cold War									-0.72	-0.44	0.23*	0.28*
									(0.44)	(0.54)	(0.14)	(0.13)
High-level violence in past 3 years									x- /	(<i>/</i>	0.26***	0.17
											(0.09)	(0.11)
Low-level violence in past 3 years											0.04	0.05
											(0.10)	(0.12)
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.06	0.07	0.24	0.17	0.09	0.09
N	101	101	3353	3353	91	91	3008	3008	101	101	0.03	3115

Table S8: Bivariate regressions, dropping India, and additional controls

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions explaining the level of accommodation granted to an SDM. Models 1–4 have no covariates except (in case of the two TSCS models) for a counter of the number of previous instances of accommodation and cubic polynomials of the time elapsed since the last instance of accommodation (not shown). Models 5–8 drop all movements from India. Models 9–12 include a number of additional control variables. All TSCS models include a counter of the number of previous instances of accommodation as well as cubic polynomials of the time elapsed since the last instance of accommodation (not shown). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

		Binar	ry DV		Only aut	onomy/indep	pendence con	cessions	First con	cession
	CS	}	TSO	CS	CS	5	TSC	CS	TSC	cs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict
Reputation model										
Number of ethnic groups	$0.01 \\ (0.03)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.04 \\ (0.03) \end{array}$	0.01 (0.02)	$0.02 \\ (0.02)$	$0.02 \\ (0.04)$	0.09^{***} (0.03)	$0.02 \\ (0.02)$	0.05^{***} (0.01)	$0.01 \\ (0.02)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \\ (0.02) \end{array}$
Value of land under dispute										
Oil/gas reserves	$0.32 \\ (0.44)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.30 \\ (0.39) \end{array}$	0.32^{***} (0.08)	0.33^{***} (0.09)	0.59^{**} (0.28)	0.43 (0.33)	0.32^{***} (0.09)	0.24^{*} (0.13)	0.32^{**} (0.14)	0.34^{**} (0.14)
Strategic value	-0.07	0.05	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	0.11	-0.07	-0.02	-0.24^{*}	-0.18
	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Proportion of population	1.98	2.80	0.78^{**}	0.85^{***}	0.42	2.94^{**}	0.75^{***}	0.99^{*}	0.38	0.69
	(1.70)	(1.83)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.98)	(1.38)	(0.29)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Relative capabilities										
Government military personnel	94.76^{*}	60.37	29.74^{*}	31.59^{**}	74.46^{*}	34.20	33.10^{**}	30.40^{**}	33.51^{**}	30.93^{**}
	(52.09)	(53.56)	(16.82)	(15.52)	(42.21)	(31.77)	(16.70)	(12.74)	(14.97)	(14.88)
Government instability	0.40	0.46	0.29^{**}	0.30^{**}	-0.24	0.25	0.29	0.38^{***}	0.27	0.35
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Group concentration	-0.12	-0.37	0.06	-0.00	0.26	-0.29	0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.18
	(0.51)	(0.45)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Kin groups	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.15	0.01	-0.07	0.03	0.10	0.08
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Other controls										
Level of democracy	0.09^{**}	0.09^{**}	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.01^{*}	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Duration of conflict	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.02^{**}	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.18	0.17	0.05	0.06	0.09	0.14	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.07
N	101	101	3347	3347	101	101	3347	3347	1280	1505

Table S9: Alternative specifications of dependent variables

Note: Weighted probit (models 1–4, 9–10) and ordered probit regressions (models 5–8). In models 1–4 the dependent variable is a binary coded 1 if a movement was accommodated. In model 5–8 the dependent variable does not include concessions on cultural rights and government inclusion, but only concessions on autonomy (=1) and independence (=2). In models 9–10 we model the time until the first concession, dropping all subsequent concessions. All TSCS models include cubic time polynomials, and all except for models 9–10 also include a counter of the number of previous instances of accommodation (not shown). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

		1	Alternative g	roup counts	;				Log	ged group co	ounts		
	(1) Fearon	(2) AMAR	(3) Alesina	(4) EPR	(5) EPRcon	(6) SDMs	(7) Walter	(8) Fearon	(9) AMAR	(10) Alesina	(11) EPR	(12) EPRcon	(13) SDMs
Reputation model													
Number of ethnic groups	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \\ (0.04) \end{array}$	0.04^{***} (0.01)	0.06^{***} (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.13 \\ (0.23) \end{array}$	-0.09 (0.22)	0.49^{***} (0.15)	0.83^{***} (0.19)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \\ (0.20) \end{array}$	0.39^{***} (0.15)	0.38^{***} (0.15)
Value of land under dispute													
Oil/gas reserves	0.50^{*} (0.28)	0.36 (0.28)	0.33 (0.29)	0.37 (0.28)	0.49^{*} (0.29)	0.27 (0.28)	0.51^{*} (0.27)	0.49^{*} (0.28)	0.37 (0.27)	0.38 (0.30)	0.45^{*} (0.27)	0.52^{*} (0.28)	0.29 (0.28)
Strategic value	-0.11 (0.25)	0.32 (0.25)	0.07 (0.26)	0.12 (0.26)	0.18 (0.27)	0.07 (0.26)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.24)	0.22 (0.27)	0.06 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.26)	0.17 (0.26)	0.07 (0.25)
Proportion of population	(0.23) (0.12) (0.91)	(0.23) (0.59) (1.00)	(0.20) (0.59) (0.91)	(0.20) (0.50) (0.92)	(0.21) 1.15 (0.86)	(0.20) 0.75 (0.91)	(0.24) 0.68 (0.96)	(0.24) 0.07 (0.91)	(0.21) 0.59 (1.01)	(0.20) 0.53 (0.97)	(0.20) (0.25) (0.89)	(0.20) 1.02 (0.85)	(0.25) 0.75 (0.94)
Relative capabilities	(0.31)	(1.00)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.00)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(1.01)	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.34)
Government military personnel	84.04^{**} (42.41)	61.24^{*} (32.65)	8.19 (29.85)	58.04^{*} (30.17)	54.19^{*} (30.61)	41.29 (30.60)	71.05^{*} (41.00)	81.88^{*} (42.85)	86.97^{**} (38.14)	25.97 (29.89)	75.89^{**} (32.97)	72.57^{**} (32.16)	53.93^{*} (32.01)
Government instability	-0.20 (0.32)	-0.55^{**} (0.28)	-0.22 (0.28)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.29 (0.28)	-0.29 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.32)	-0.18 (0.31)	-0.36 (0.31)	-0.20 (0.28)	-0.24 (0.29)	-0.14 (0.29)	-0.14 (0.28)
Group concentration	0.30 (0.29)	0.26 (0.26)	0.26 (0.27)	0.32 (0.28)	0.17 (0.28)	0.32 (0.28)	0.20 (0.29)	0.31 (0.28)	(0.20) (0.28)	0.22 (0.26)	0.30 (0.28)	0.12 (0.28)	0.27 (0.28)
Kin groups	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.27^{*} (0.14)	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.15)	(0.13) (0.15)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)	(0.10) -0.14 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.15)	(0.10) (0.15)
Other controls	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Level of democracy	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Duration of conflict	(0.03) (0.02^{***}) (0.01)	(0.02) (0.03^{***}) (0.01)	(0.00) 0.03^{***} (0.01)	(0.00) 0.03^{***} (0.01)	(0.00) (0.02^{***}) (0.01)	$(0.03)^{***}$ (0.01)	(0.00) 0.02^{**} (0.01)	(0.00) 0.02^{**} (0.01)	(0.03) (0.02^{***}) (0.01)	(0.00) 0.02^{***} (0.01)	(0.03) 0.02^{***} (0.01)	(0.03) (0.02^{***}) (0.01)	(0.00) 0.02^{***} (0.01)
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.08	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.11	0.11
Ν	103	103	105	104	102	106	101	103	103	105	104	102	106

Table S10: Alternative group counts (CS, DV =standard accommodation)

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions explaining the maximum level of accommodation ever granted to an SDM using a range of alternative measures for the number of ethnic groups in a country. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

			Alternative	group count	s				Log	ged group co	ounts		
	(1) Fearon	(2) AMAR	(3) Alesina	(4) EPR	(5) EPRcon	(6) SDMs	(7) Walter	(8) Fearon	(9) AMAR	(10) Alesina	(11) EPR	(12) EPRcon	(13) SDMs
Reputation model													
Number of ethnic groups	0.06^{*}	0.05^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.68^{***}	0.27	0.59^{***}	0.73^{***}	0.56^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.45^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Value of land under dispute													
Oil/gas reserves	0.41	0.20	0.32	0.21	0.28	0.23	0.31	0.42	0.22	0.34	0.23	0.28	0.24
	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Strategic value	-0.09	0.29	-0.03	0.15	0.17	0.04	0.14	-0.14	0.19	-0.05	0.12	0.25	0.03
0	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Proportion of population	1.82^{*}	2.30^{**}	1.97	2.25**	2.63***	2.30**	2.82***	1.69	2.31^{*}	1.98	2.07**	2.62***	2.34^{**}
	(1.10)	(1.17)	(1.21)	(1.00)	(0.99)	(1.05)	(1.08)	(1.12)	(1.21)	(1.43)	(1.05)	(0.98)	(1.11)
Relative capabilities	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,
Government military personnel	59.90^{*}	19.95	-3.56	12.01	8.97	8.90	47.21	57.23^{*}	52.02^{*}	9.66	37.88	34.22	23.28
	(32.84)	(27.65)	(28.43)	(22.09)	(22.22)	(21.28)	(34.25)	(34.04)	(31.03)	(30.01)	(26.02)	(24.86)	(23.47)
Government instability	0.20	-0.10	0.17	-0.07	0.09	0.02	0.31	0.18	0.08	0.17	0.06	0.26	0.18
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Group concentration	-0.16	-0.15	-0.13	-0.06	-0.18	-0.10	-0.30	-0.12	-0.24	-0.16	-0.10	-0.29	-0.18
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Kin groups	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Other controls													
Level of democracy	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Duration of conflict	0.01	0.01^{**}	0.01^{*}	0.02***	0.01^{**}	0.02***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01^{*}	0.01^{**}	0.01^{*}	0.01^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.14	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.09
N	103	103	105	104	102	106	101	103	103	105	104	102	106

Table S11: Alternative group counts (CS, DV =strict accommodation)

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions explaining the maximum level of accommodation ever granted to an SDM using a range of alternative measures for the number of ethnic groups in a country and the stricter accommodation coding as dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

			Alternative g	group counts	5				$\mathrm{Log}_{\mathbf{g}}$	ged group co	ounts		
	(1) Fearon	(2) AMAR	(3) Alesina	(4) EPR	(5) EPRcon	(6) SDMs	(7) Walter	(8) Fearon	(9) AMAR	(10) Alesina	(11) EPR	(12) EPRcon	(13) SDMs
Reputation model													
Number of ethnic groups	$0.02 \\ (0.02)$	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.03^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.11 (0.12)	$0.09 \\ (0.11)$	0.26^{***} (0.07)	0.35^{***} (0.08)	0.23^{***} (0.09)	0.23^{***} (0.08)	0.26^{***} (0.08)
Value of land under dispute													
Oil/gas reserves	0.37^{***} (0.09)	0.29^{***} (0.08)	0.33^{***} (0.08)	0.26^{***} (0.08)	0.27^{***} (0.08)	0.25^{***} (0.08)	0.31^{***} (0.07)	0.37^{***} (0.09)	0.30^{***} (0.07)	0.35^{***} (0.09)	0.27^{***} (0.07)	0.29^{***} (0.08)	0.25^{***} (0.08)
Strategic value	-0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)
Proportion of population	0.76^{**} (0.30)	1.14^{***} (0.34)	0.85^{**} (0.35)	0.90^{***} (0.27)	0.83^{***} (0.26)	1.11^{***} (0.33)	0.75^{**} (0.32)	0.74^{**} (0.32)	1.17^{***} (0.35)	1.02^{**} (0.42)	0.86^{***} (0.28)	0.77^{***} (0.25)	1.14^{***} (0.36)
Relative capabilities													
Government military personnel	31.69^{*} (17.46)	22.67^{*} (11.95)	14.38 (9.93)	26.60^{**} (11.88)	31.14^{***} (11.78)	22.59^{*} (13.09)	30.99^{*} (17.24)	30.31^{*} (17.38)	29.95^{*} (15.60)	21.73^{**} (11.02)	35.11^{**} (15.78)	40.17^{***} (15.51)	28.34^{*} (15.08)
Government instability	0.30^{**} (0.15)	0.24^{*} (0.14)	0.21 (0.16)	0.20 (0.14)	0.20 (0.13)	0.13 (0.11)	0.33^{**} (0.15)	0.30^{**} (0.15)	0.29^{**} (0.15)	0.24^{*} (0.14)	0.23^{*} (0.14)	0.23^{*} (0.13)	0.25^{*} (0.13)
Group concentration	0.06 (0.10)	0.05 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.14 (0.12)	0.13 (0.11)	0.14 (0.13)	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)	0.07 (0.12)
Kin groups	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)
Other controls													
Level of democracy	0.01^{*} (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01^{**} (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Duration of conflict	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
N	3441	3450	3485	3460	3353	3504	3347	3441	3450	3485	3460	3353	3504

Table S12: Alternative group counts (TSCS, DV = accommodation)

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions explaining the level of accommodation granted to an SDM in a given year using a range of alternative measures for the number of ethnic groups in a country. All models include a counter of the number of previous instances of accommodation as well as cubic polynomials of the time elapsed since the last instance of accommodation (not shown). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

	Alternative group counts					Logged group counts							
	(1) Fearon	(2) AMAR	(3) Alesina	(4) EPR	(5) EPRcon	(6) SDMs	(7) Walter	(8) Fearon	(9) AMAR	(10) Alesina	(11) EPR	(12) EPRcon	(13) SDMs
Reputation model													
Number of ethnic groups	0.03^{**} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.03^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.21^{*} (0.11)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \\ (0.10) \end{array}$	0.26^{***} (0.07)	0.35^{***} (0.08)	0.27^{***} (0.08)	0.27^{***} (0.07)	0.23^{***} (0.08)
Value of land under dispute													
Oil/gas reserves	0.33^{***} (0.09)	0.26^{***} (0.09)	0.29^{***} (0.09)	0.23^{**} (0.09)	0.25^{***} (0.09)	0.23^{**} (0.09)	0.29^{***} (0.09)	0.34^{***} (0.09)	0.26^{***} (0.09)	0.32^{***} (0.09)	0.23^{**} (0.09)	0.27^{***} (0.09)	0.23^{**} (0.10)
Strategic value	-0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)
Proportion of population	0.72^{**} (0.32)	1.11^{***} (0.39)	0.77^{*} (0.39)	0.86^{***} (0.31)	0.82^{***} (0.30)	1.04^{***} (0.38)	0.85^{**} (0.34)	0.68^{**} (0.34)	1.12^{***} (0.39)	0.94^{**} (0.48)	0.84^{***} (0.31)	0.78^{***} (0.29)	1.02^{***} (0.39)
Relative capabilities													
Government military personnel	32.90^{**} (15.90)	20.84^{*} (11.25)	13.01 (10.35)	24.20^{**} (11.43)	28.40^{**} (11.14)	20.34 (12.69)	32.27^{**} (15.73)	31.33^{*} (16.02)	28.75^{**} (14.63)	20.37^{*} (10.90)	34.40^{**} (14.94)	39.22^{***} (14.43)	26.92^{*} (14.78)
Government instability	$(10.30)^{**}$ (0.15)	(11.25) 0.25^{*} (0.14)	(10.30) 0.21 (0.15)	(11.40) 0.20 (0.14)	(11.14) 0.20 (0.14)	(12.03) 0.14 (0.13)	(10.15) 0.33^{**} (0.15)	(10.02) 0.30^{**} (0.15)	(14.05) 0.30^{**} (0.15)	(10.50) 0.25^{*} (0.14)	(14.54) 0.23^{*} (0.14)	(14.43) 0.23^{*} (0.14)	(14.10) 0.26^{**} (0.13)
Group concentration	(0.13) 0.00 (0.11)	(0.14) -0.01 (0.13)	(0.13) 0.04 (0.11)	(0.14) 0.09 (0.12)	(0.14) 0.07 (0.12)	(0.13) 0.08 (0.14)	(0.13) -0.02 (0.10)	(0.13) 0.02 (0.11)	(0.13) -0.05 (0.12)	(0.14) 0.01 (0.12)	(0.14) 0.04 (0.12)	(0.14) (0.01) (0.12)	(0.13) 0.02 (0.12)
Kin groups	(0.11) 0.01 (0.05)	(0.13) 0.02 (0.06)	(0.11) 0.02 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.04 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.04 (0.06)	(0.14) 0.04 (0.06)	(0.10) -0.00 (0.06)	(0.11) 0.01 (0.05)	(0.12) 0.01 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.02 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.02 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.03 (0.06)	(0.12) 0.03 (0.06)
Other controls	· · · ·	~ /	· /	· · /	· · /		· · /	· · /	· · ·	· · /	()	· · · ·	· · · ·
Level of democracy	0.01 (0.01)	0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01^{**} (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	0.02^{***} (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Duration of conflict	(0.01) -0.00 (0.00)	(0.01) 0.00 (0.00)	(0.00) -0.00 (0.01)	(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)	(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)	(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)	(0.01) -0.00 (0.01)	(0.01) -0.00 (0.00)	(0.01) -0.00 (0.00)	(0.00) -0.00 (0.00)	(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)	(0.00) (0.00)	(0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06
N N	0.05 3441	0.07 3450	0.07 3485	0.07 3460	0.07 3353	0.07 3504	0.05 3347	0.05 3441	0.06 3450	0.06 3485	0.06 3460	0.07 3353	0.06 3504

Table S13: Alternative group counts (TSCS, DV =strict accommodation)

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions explaining the level of accommodation granted to an SDM in a given year using a range of alternative measures for the number of ethnic groups in a country and the stricter accommodation coding as dependent variable. All models include a counter of the number of previous instances of accommodation as well as cubic polynomials of the time elapsed since the last instance of accommodation (not shown). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table S14: Proxying for the number of potential future challengers using the number of 1^{st} tier administrative subdivisions instead of the number of ethnic groups

		Origina	al scale	Logged				
	CS	5	TSC	CS	CS		TSCS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict	Standard	Strict
Reputation model								
Number of 1 st tier administrative subdivisions	0.01^{*}	0.02^{***}	0.01^{***}	0.01^{***}	0.22	0.38^{*}	0.11	0.13
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Value of land under dispute	~ /		~ /			~ /	~ /	~ /
Oil/gas reserves	0.19	0.00	0.22^{***}	0.19^{*}	0.19	0.02	0.26^{***}	0.22^{**}
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Strategic value	0.35 (0.30)	0.36 (0.31)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.34 (0.30)	0.30 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
Proportion of population	0.76	2.51^{**}	0.97^{***}	1.00^{**}	0.96	2.73^{**}	0.93^{**}	0.98^{**}
	(0.94)	(1.05)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.95)	(1.13)	(0.37)	(0.43)
Relative capabilities								
Government military personnel	36.97 (42.33)	-12.36 (27.02)	27.29^{*} (14.03)	26.30^{**} (12.40)	57.55 (39.36)	32.96 (29.81)	36.28^{**} (17.48)	36.70^{**} (15.41)
Government instability	0.16	0.11	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.29	0.27	0.24
	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Group concentration	0.38	0.02	0.14	0.08	0.35	-0.10	0.05	-0.01
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Kin groups	-0.04	0.12	0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.08	-0.01	0.03
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Other controls								
Level of democracy	0.01	-0.02	0.01^{*}	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Duration of conflict	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R ² N	0.09 85	0.12 85	0.05 2820	0.06 2820	0.09 85	0.10 85	0.04 2820	0.05 2820

Note: Weighted ordered probit regressions. All TSCS models include cubic time polynomials. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

3.3.3 Control variables

Due to space constraints we do not discuss the behavior of control variables in the paper. A number of interesting patterns emerge. First, Walter argued that governments are more willing to make concessions if the challenger's territory is valuable to them. In line with this, two of the variables meant to proxy the value of land that is under dispute tend to have significant-positive correlations with the level of accommodation: the presence of hydrocarbon reserves and group size (the group's proportion of population relative to the country as a whole). This is so especially in case of the (analytically superior) TSCS models.

Second, our results concerning the relative capabilities of contestants are much less consistent. Walter reasoned that weak governments are more likely to make concessions and that stronger challengers are more likely to get concessions. Contrary to Walter's expectations, our two measures for state strength yield mixed results. On the one hand, in line with Walter's hypothesis we tend to find that government instability makes concessions more likely (especially in the TSCS models). Yet contrary to Walter's expectations governments with higher military strength tend to be more, not less, likely to accommodate SD challengers (again especially in the TSCS models). How can we make sense of these contradictory results? We would argue that state strength needs not necessarily be negatively related to accommodation, as argued by Walter. Making concessions may involve smaller risks for strong states. Grigoryan (2015), for example, makes an argument along these lines when suggesting that weak states have stronger incentives to clamp down on separatism because they must fear that compromise would only embolden separatist movements to pursue outright secession more vigorously in the future, causing yet more trouble that weak states would find difficult to withstand. Further evidence in this direction comes from the fact that GDP per capita, which is often framed as a proxy for state strength in the civil war literature, is likewise positively related with the level of accommodation when added as a control.

If it were true that state strength is overall positively related to accommodation, how can we make sense of the fact that Walter's other indicator for state strength—regime instability correlates negatively with accommodation? We would argue that this likely has to do with the way government instability is measured. Walter's operationalization of government instability a 3 or more change on the annual polity2 scale compared to the previous year—may reflect regime change more than state strength. Hence, our finding regarding government instability may have to do with regime change rather than state strength. For example, a possible alternative explanation for our result regarding government instability is that accommodation becomes more likely when autocratic regimes fall and a country democratizes. A case such as Spain, which embarked on significant decentralization soon after Franco's death in 1975, would be consistent with this logic. Such an interpretation would also be consistent with recent findings that accommodation becomes more likely during civil wars when there is a change in state leadership (Prorok 2016).

Turning to challenger strength, we surprisingly find that neither group concentration nor transborder ethnic kin appear to matter. Nevertheless, our results are still consistent with the view that strong groups get more concessions. As mentioned, group size is consistently positively related to accommodation, and while Walter sees group size as a measure for the value of land under dispute it can also be seen as (and is probably better seen as) a measure of group strength (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010).

Third, contrary to Walter's results the level of democracy is not very robust, which is something that future research may want to follow up on. In some cases democracy is significantpositive, as we (and Walter) would expect, but oftentimes it is not, in particular not in the main models reported in the paper. There are two interesting exceptions to this pattern. First, when India is dropped. As soon as India is dropped, democracy becomes significant-positive in both TSCS models. Note that, as mentioned above, India, a long-standing democracy, has a slightly below average level of accommodation. Second, the behavior of the democracy variable hinges on the group count variable that is used, at least in the TSCS context where democracy becomes significant-positive if we replace Walter's variable with group counts, for example, from Alesina et al. (2003) or EPR.

Fourth, we tend to find that governments are no more or less likely to accommodate an SD challenger the longer a movement lasts. This result is robust especially in TSCS models. We do find diverging results in some of the cross-sections, but as argued in the paper the inclusion of the total duration of a movement in a cross-section is questionable because the total duration of a movement cannot cause government behavior in a movement's earlier stages.

Finally, some interesting patterns emerge also for the additional controls we introduce in Table S8. The positive correlation of GDP per capita with accommodation was mentioned already. Interestingly as well, we also find some evidence that governments have shown a higher willingness to accommodate SD challengers since the end of the Cold War, as suggested by (Gurr 2000*a*). Furthermore, we find, somewhat surprisingly, that groups without access to central state power are more likely to be accommodated (at least in the TSCS models). We also find some evidence that groups that demand secession (rather than only autonomy) and groups that were engaged in civil wars in the past 3 years are more likely to get accommodated, but these result are not very robust. Similarly, we find some evidence that countries with democratic proportional representation are more likely to accommodate, but not in all models.

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