

Scaling Up?
Unpacking the Effect of Deliberative Mini-Publics on Legitimacy Perceptions

Supplementary Material

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Table of Contents

1	Departures from the Pre-Analysis Plan	2
2	Survey Materials.....	3
2.1	Scenario	3
2.2	Outcomes.....	4
2.3	Attention & Comprehension Checks.....	4
2.4	Moderators.....	4
2.5	Manipulation and Memory Checks	5
3	Sample Descriptives	6
4	Scaling Analysis	7
5	Sub-Group Analysis	8
6	Robustness Checks	10
6.1	Covariates.....	10
6.2	Alternative Thresholds	14
6.3	Prior Knowledge of Citizens' Assembly	17
6.4	Complier Analysis	18
6.5	Full Sample.....	19
6.6	Opinion Change.....	22
	References	23

1 Departures from the Pre-Analysis Plan

We pre-registered our design and empirical analysis with AsPredicted (#53606) before we started the data collection. Below we provide the full list of departures from the pre-analysis plan:

- *H4a* and *H4b* were listed as two separate hypotheses in the pre-analysis plan (*H3* and *H4*).
- Because our main interest is in mini-publics, we listed what is now *H3* about the average effects of referendums in section 8 of the pre-analysis plan, which includes miscellaneous things we wanted to pre-register, instead of in section 2, which includes the main hypotheses. The same applies to *H5* about individual-level causal heterogeneity.
- Contrary to what was promised in the pre-analysis plan, we cannot report analyses including subjects who failed a simple pre-treatment attention check which gave the instruction to choose a given response option. The reason is that Lucid informed us only after pre-registration that their standard policy demands that respondents who fail such a simple attention check are immediately screened out so that they can refuse payment. As a result, subjects who failed the attention check never proceeded to the experiment and outcome questions.
- In addition to the robustness checks mentioned in the pre-analysis plan, we report (1) split sample models using alternative thresholds for the identification of subjects with low vs high political trust and subjects who did vs did not think of the policy issue at stake as important; (2) the results of analyses dropping subjects who did not correctly recall the decision process and outcome after answering the outcome questions; and (3) analyses assessing whether certain experimental conditions made subjects more likely to change their opinion on the policy issue and, therefore, perceive themselves as decision winners after the final decision.
- Consistent with the pre-analysis plan, we replicate all main analyses while dropping subjects who had not previously heard of the Irish Citizens' Assembly. However, due to the significantly decreased number of observations and resulting concerns about statistical power, we do not report split sample models with these subjects dropped (i.e., we do not replicate the sub-group analysis).

While not a departure from the pre-analysis plan, we would also like to note the following: The pre-analysis plan suggested that we will report the results both including and excluding (1) respondents who failed a simple language comprehension check and (2) speeders who rushed through the questionnaire in less than a third of average time. Furthermore, the pre-analysis plan suggested that we will report the results excluding these respondents as our main analysis if their number is substantial. Our sample included a substantial number of 199 respondents who failed the language comprehension check (71), sped through the questionnaire (116), or both (12). Therefore, we chose to report the results excluding those respondents as our main analysis. The results including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are highly similar (see section 6.4).

2 Survey Materials

2.1 Scenario

We are now going to describe a scenario to you about a political decision-making process in Ireland. Please read the scenario carefully and then tell us your beliefs about the process we are describing.

The policy matter at stake is whether or not Ireland should introduce a **basic income scheme**. Under this scheme, the Irish government would pay every adult €200 per week to cover essential living costs. Children would receive a smaller amount (€30). The basic income would replace most other welfare benefits, including unemployment and child benefits. Top-up payments would remain in place for those with special needs and for pensioners. People could keep the money they earn from work or other sources. The basic income scheme would be paid for by increasing income tax and the introduction of a property tax.

How important is this issue to you?

Possible answers: 0 (not important at all) – 10 (very important)

In your opinion, should Ireland introduce the basic income scheme we just described to you?

Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree – Don't know

[Filter: only if no opinion on issue] You indicated that you do not have an opinion on the introduction of the basic income scheme. If you *had* to choose, would you agree that the basic income scheme we described to you should be introduced?

Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree – Really don't know

Next, consider that the decision as to whether or not Ireland introduces the basic income scheme can be made in several different ways:

- Some people say that the issue should be referred to a **citizens' assembly** *before* a final decision is made. A citizens' assembly is a body comprised of Irish citizens who are randomly selected to broadly mirror the Irish electorate. The assembly would meet to hear from experts, debate the issue between themselves, and make a recommendation on whether to introduce the scheme.
- When it comes to the *final decision*, some people say that it should be made by elected representatives in the **Irish parliament (Dáil)**.
- Other people say that the *final decision* should be made by Irish citizens in a **referendum**.

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made. As Ireland is about to make the decision, the pros and cons of the proposal are widely debated in the media.

- The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is // is not** referred to a **citizens' assembly** before the final decision.
- [if citizens' assembly:] After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends **the introduction of // not to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- The final decision is made by elected representatives in **parliament // the people** in a **referendum**.
- Parliament // the people decides **to introduce // not to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Now we would like to ask about your perceptions of the way in which the decision to introduce the basic income scheme was made.

Recall that:

- The issue **was // was not** debated by a **citizens' assembly** prior to the final decision
- The citizens' assembly recommended **the introduction of // not to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- The final decision was made by elected representatives in **parliament // the people** in a **referendum**.

- Parliament // the people decided **to introduce** // **not to introduce** the basic income scheme.

2.2 Outcomes

Note: outcome questions were asked immediately after the scenario.

How fair do you think matters were when the decision was taken?

Possible answers: 0 (not fair at all) – 10 (very fair)

How just do you think that the decision process was?

Possible answers: 0 (not just at all) – 10 (very just)

How appropriate do you think that the decision process was?

Possible answers: 0 (not appropriate at all) – 10 (very appropriate)

How willing are you to accept the decision?

Possible answers: 0 (not at all willing) – 10 (very willing)

How important do you think it is to comply with the decision?

Possible answers: 0 (not important at all) – 10 (very important)

2.3 Attention & Comprehension Checks

Note: attention and language comprehension check questions were included in the pre-treatment questionnaire.

We also want to see whether people read our questions carefully. Please select "Completely agree" and proceed to the next question.

Answers: Completely disagree – Disagree – Neither agree nor disagree – Agree – Completely agree

We are also interested in your language skills. Please indicate the correct meaning of the following sentence: “Andrea is looking after the children.”

Possible answers: She can see the children. - She is taking care of the children. - She is looking at the children. -The children are in front of her.

2.4 Moderators

Note: moderator questions were included in the pre-treatment questionnaire and scenario description.

Please tell us how much you personally trust politicians.

Possible answers: 0 (no trust at all) - 10 (complete trust)

How important is this issue to you?

Possible answers: 0 (not important at all) – 10 (very important)

In your opinion, should Ireland introduce the basic income scheme we just described to you?

Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree - Don’t know

[Filter: only if no opinion on issue] You indicated that you do not have an opinion on the introduction of the basic income scheme. If you *had* to choose, would you agree that the basic income scheme we described to you should be introduced?

Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree – Really don’t know

2.5 Manipulation and Memory Checks

Note: Manipulation and memory check questions were asked after the outcome questions.

Do you remember whether the citizens' assembly recommended to introduce the basic income scheme?

Possible answers: Yes, the citizens' assembly recommended introduction – No, the citizens' assembly recommended against introduction – The citizens' assembly did not debate the issue

Do you remember the final decision on the basic income scheme?

Possible answers: Against introduction – In favour of introduction

And who made the final decision?

Possible answers: Elected representatives in parliament – Citizens in a referendum

3 Sample Descriptives

Table S1: Sample descriptives and population reference figures

	Sample	Population ¹
Gender ²		
Female	52%	51%
Male	47%	49%
Other	1%	?
Age ²		
18-24	13%	11%
25-44	46%	36%
45-65	36%	34%
65+	5%	20%
Region of residence ²		
Northern & Western	18%	18%
Southern	34%	34%
Eastern and Midland	45%	48%
Outside Ireland ³	2%	NA
Education		
Did not finish 3 rd level education	32%	58%
Finished 3 rd level education	68%	42%
Vote intention in future election ⁴		
Fianna Fáil (center-right)	11%	14%
Fine Gael (center-right)	23%	13%
Sinn Féin (leftist)	30%	18%
Green Party (leftist)	11%	4%
Labour (leftist)	8%	3%
Other	11%	11%
Would not vote	5%	37%
Political interest		
Not at all interested	5%	28%
Hardly interested	19%	27%
Quite interested	46%	35%
Very interested	30%	11%

Note: Some of the figures do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors. NA = Not applicable; ? = unknown.

¹ Our target population were Irish citizens who are aged 18 years or older and live in Ireland. Population figures for gender, age, region of residence, and education are based on the 2016 census of Ireland. In the case of vote intention in a future election, we report results of the February 2020 election for comparison. Population figures for political interest represent population-weighted estimates from the European Social Survey (ESS 2016).

² There were sampling quotas in place for gender, age, and region of residence. Nevertheless, older Irish citizens are under-represented in our sample because Lucid was unable to provide sufficient responses from Irish citizens aged 65 or older.

³ While our sampling frame did not include expatriates, Lucid informed us that they cannot fully pre-empt Irish individuals who live outside of Ireland from taking our survey. Therefore, our sample includes a small number of expatriates (28).

⁴ Party left-right classifications are based on the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2020).

4 Scaling Analysis

Tables S2 and S3 inform about the psychometric performance of our two dependent variables. We consider two key psychometric properties in our analysis: unidimensionality (Gerbing & Anderson 1988) and reliability (Lord & Novick 1968). For the unidimensionality assessment, we rely on Mokken scale analysis (MSA). A set of items can be considered a unidimensional Mokken scale if i) the overall H-coefficient is ≥ 0.30 ; ii) all item-specific H-coefficients are ≥ 0.30 ; and all crit-values are < 80 (van Schuur 2003). Mokken scales with overall H-scores ≥ 0.30 are considered weak, ≥ 0.40 moderate and ≥ 0.50 strong. For the reliability assessment we draw on Cronbach's α . $\alpha \geq 0.60$ is generally seen as indicating a minimally acceptable level of reliability, though $\alpha \geq 0.70$ is preferable. As can be seen from the two table below, both our dependent variables constitute strong unidimensional Mokken scales with high reliability.

Table S2: Scaling analysis - procedural fairness perceptions

#	Question text	H_i	crit
1	How fair do you think matters were when the decision was taken?	0.85	0
2	How just do you think that the decision process was?	0.87	0
3	How appropriate do you think that the decision process was?	0.85	0
H		0.85	
α		0.94	
N		1302	

Table S3: Scaling analysis – decision acceptance

#	Question text	H_i	crit
1	How willing are you to accept the decision?	0.78	0
2	How important do you think it is to comply with the decision?	0.78	0
H		0.78	
α		0.87	
N		1303	

5 Sub-Group Analysis

Table S4: Effects of deliberative mini-publics and referendums depending on level of political trust

	Low political trust						High political trust					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.23*** (0.18)			0.68*** (0.20)			0.02 (0.19)			-0.07 (0.18)		
...if recommendation honored		1.54*** (0.21)	1.82*** (0.29)		0.98*** (0.23)	1.17*** (0.32)		0.19 (0.22)	0.59 (0.30)		0.04 (0.20)	0.39 (0.28)
...if recommendation not honored		0.93*** (0.21)	0.96** (0.30)		0.40 (0.23)	0.48 (0.33)		-0.15 (0.22)	-0.38 (0.32)		-0.20 (0.20)	-0.40 (0.29)
Referendum	2.05*** (0.17)	2.08*** (0.17)	2.29*** (0.29)	1.62*** (0.19)	1.65*** (0.19)	1.83*** (0.33)	0.75*** (0.18)	0.76*** (0.18)	0.90** (0.31)	0.55*** (0.16)	0.56*** (0.16)	0.69* (0.29)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.60 (0.42)			-0.40 (0.47)			-0.79 (0.43)			-0.71 (0.40)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.05 (0.41)			-0.16 (0.46)			0.40 (0.44)			0.35 (0.41)
Constant	3.11*** (0.17)	3.09*** (0.17)	2.99*** (0.21)	4.19*** (0.19)	4.18*** (0.19)	4.08*** (0.23)	6.72*** (0.18)	6.71*** (0.18)	6.64*** (0.22)	7.22*** (0.17)	7.22*** (0.17)	7.15*** (0.20)
Observations	678	678	678	678	678	678	623	623	623	623	623	623

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents were classified as having low/high political trust if they gave a score of 0-5/6-10 when they were asked to indicate how much they personally trust politicians on a scale of 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S5: Effects of deliberative mini-publics and referendums depending on level of perceived importance of policy issue at stake

	Low issue importance						High issue importance					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.00*** (0.29)			0.28 (0.34)			0.67*** (0.16)			0.41* (0.16)		
... if recommendation honored		1.46*** (0.34)	1.89*** (0.48)		0.58 (0.39)	0.87 (0.55)		0.85*** (0.19)	1.17*** (0.26)		0.59** (0.19)	0.86*** (0.26)
... if recommendation not honored		0.58 (0.33)	0.75 (0.47)		0.00 (0.38)	0.31 (0.55)		0.49* (0.19)	0.37 (0.28)		0.23 (0.19)	0.12 (0.27)
Referendum	2.14*** (0.27)	2.16*** (0.27)	2.55*** (0.48)	1.31*** (0.31)	1.33*** (0.31)	1.72** (0.56)	1.27*** (0.16)	1.29*** (0.16)	1.45*** (0.27)	1.08*** (0.15)	1.10*** (0.15)	1.23*** (0.26)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.87 (0.67)			-0.54 (0.78)			-0.65 (0.38)			-0.56 (0.37)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.28 (0.66)			-0.59 (0.76)			0.20 (0.38)			0.19 (0.37)
Constant	3.22*** (0.29)	3.21*** (0.28)	2.99*** (0.36)	4.58*** (0.33)	4.57*** (0.33)	4.36*** (0.42)	5.16*** (0.15)	5.15*** (0.15)	5.08*** (0.19)	5.85*** (0.15)	5.84*** (0.15)	5.78*** (0.18)
Observations	279	279	279	279	279	279	1022	1022	1022	1023	1023	1023

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents were classified as having low/high perceived policy importance if they gave a score of 0-5/6-10 when they were asked to indicate how important the policy issue at stake (i.e., the basic income scheme) is to them on a scale of 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S6: Effects of deliberative mini-publics and referendums depending on strength of policy preference

	Weak policy preference						Strong policy preference					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Procedural fairness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.71*** (0.17)			0.38* (0.16)			0.69* (0.29)			0.34 (0.30)		
...if recommendation honored		1.03*** (0.19)	1.62*** (0.27)		0.64*** (0.19)	1.23*** (0.27)		0.81* (0.33)	0.56 (0.45)		0.48 (0.34)	0.07 (0.46)
...if recommendation not honored		0.40* (0.19)	0.42 (0.28)		0.13 (0.19)	0.18 (0.27)		0.56 (0.34)	0.07 (0.48)		0.19 (0.34)	-0.18 (0.49)
Referendum	1.54*** (0.16)	1.56*** (0.16)	1.96*** (0.27)	1.30*** (0.16)	1.31*** (0.15)	1.73*** (0.27)	1.31*** (0.27)	1.33*** (0.27)	0.82 (0.48)	0.80** (0.28)	0.82** (0.28)	0.26 (0.49)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-1.16** (0.38)			-1.17** (0.38)			0.52 (0.67)			0.89 (0.69)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.06 (0.38)			-0.11 (0.38)			0.98 (0.68)			0.76 (0.69)
Constant	4.74*** (0.16)	4.73*** (0.16)	4.52*** (0.19)	5.61*** (0.16)	5.61*** (0.16)	5.39*** (0.19)	4.82*** (0.28)	4.81*** (0.28)	5.05*** (0.34)	5.53*** (0.28)	5.52*** (0.28)	5.79*** (0.34)
Observations	871	871	871	869	869	869	431	431	431	434	434	434

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Respondents were classified as having a weak/strong policy preference if they indicated agree or disagree/completely agree or completely disagree when asked whether Ireland should introduce the policy described in the vignette (i.e., the basic income scheme). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6 Robustness Checks


6.1 Covariates

Table S7: Main models including covariates

	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Deliberative mini-public	0.60*** (0.12)			0.25* (0.13)		
...if recommendation honored		0.82*** (0.14)	1.09*** (0.19)		0.44** (0.14)	0.64** (0.20)
...if recommendation not honored		0.38** (0.14)	0.29 (0.20)		0.07 (0.14)	0.01 (0.21)
Referendum	1.45*** (0.11)	1.48*** (0.11)	1.61*** (0.19)	1.13*** (0.12)	1.15*** (0.12)	1.26*** (0.20)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.58* (0.28)			-0.42 (0.29)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			0.16 (0.28)			0.09 (0.29)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender (reference category = Female):						
Male	0.14 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)	0.17 (0.12)
Other	-0.77 (0.77)	-0.78 (0.77)	-0.88 (0.77)	-1.19 (0.81)	-1.20 (0.81)	-1.28 (0.81)
Education	0.24* (0.11)	0.24* (0.11)	0.23* (0.11)	0.27* (0.11)	0.27* (0.11)	0.26* (0.11)
Political interest	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)
Hypothetical election tomorrow (reference category = Fianna Fáil):						
Fine Gael	0.16 (0.21)	0.19 (0.21)	0.21 (0.21)	0.04 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.08 (0.22)
Green Party	0.99*** (0.24)	1.01*** (0.24)	1.02*** (0.24)	0.64* (0.25)	0.66** (0.25)	0.66** (0.25)
Labour	1.02*** (0.26)	1.05*** (0.26)	1.05*** (0.26)	0.51 (0.27)	0.54* (0.27)	0.54* (0.27)
Sinn Féin	0.58** (0.21)	0.62** (0.21)	0.62** (0.21)	0.18 (0.22)	0.21 (0.22)	0.21 (0.22)
Other	0.65** (0.25)	0.66** (0.24)	0.69** (0.24)	0.29 (0.26)	0.30 (0.26)	0.32 (0.26)
Would not vote	0.56 (0.32)	0.59 (0.32)	0.58 (0.32)	0.30 (0.33)	0.33 (0.33)	0.33 (0.33)
Political trust	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.27*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)
Constant	0.08 (0.43)	0.04 (0.43)	-0.01 (0.43)	1.68*** (0.45)	1.64*** (0.45)	1.60*** (0.46)
Observations	1292	1292	1292	1292	1292	1292

Note: This table re-estimates all models reported in Table 2 in the paper with covariates included. Age is measured in years; education with three categories (<secondary school, secondary school, 3rd level education); political interest with four categories (not at all interested, hardly interested, quite interested, very interested); and both political trust and satisfaction with democracy on scales from 0 to 10. All covariates are measured pre-treatment. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S1: Selected sub-group results with covariates included



Note: This figure shows the results when the split sample models reported in Figure 4 in the paper are re-estimated with the following covariates included: age, gender, education, political interest, vote intention in hypothetical election tomorrow, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. See above for the measurement of covariates. The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. DMP = deliberative mini-public.

Table S8: Complete set of sub-group results with covariates included [political trust]

	<u>Low political trust</u>						<u>High political trust</u>					
	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>			<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.07*** (0.17)			0.49* (0.19)			0.14 (0.16)			0.02 (0.16)		
...if recommendation honored		1.35*** (0.20)	1.58*** (0.28)		0.73** (0.22)	0.85** (0.31)		0.34 (0.18)	0.62* (0.25)		0.15 (0.18)	0.43 (0.25)
...if recommendation not honored		0.81*** (0.20)	0.78** (0.28)		0.26 (0.22)	0.28 (0.32)		-0.06 (0.18)	-0.17 (0.26)		-0.11 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.26)
Referendum	2.04*** (0.16)	2.07*** (0.16)	2.21*** (0.28)	1.62*** (0.18)	1.65*** (0.18)	1.74*** (0.31)	0.89*** (0.15)	0.91*** (0.15)	1.05*** (0.26)	0.64*** (0.15)	0.65*** (0.15)	0.80** (0.26)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.50 (0.40)			-0.25 (0.45)			-0.58 (0.36)			-0.57 (0.36)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			0.06 (0.39)			-0.03 (0.44)			0.19 (0.36)			0.14 (0.36)
Constant	1.02 (0.60)	0.97 (0.60)	0.86 (0.61)	2.12** (0.67)	2.07** (0.67)	2.00** (0.69)	-2.98*** (0.72)	-3.04*** (0.72)	-2.98*** (0.73)	0.13 (0.72)	0.09 (0.72)	0.15 (0.73)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	674	674	674	674	674	674	618	618	618	618	618	618

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S4 with the following covariates included: age, gender, education, political interest, vote intention in hypothetical election tomorrow, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. See above for the measurement of covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S9: Complete set of sub-group results with covariates included [issue importance]

	<u>Low issue importance</u>						<u>High issue importance</u>					
	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>			<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.86** (0.28)			0.02 (0.32)			0.58*** (0.13)			0.33* (0.13)		
...if recommendation honored		1.31*** (0.32)	1.66*** (0.45)		0.33 (0.37)	0.48 (0.52)		0.73*** (0.15)	1.02*** (0.21)		0.47** (0.15)	0.72*** (0.21)
...if recommendation not honored		0.47 (0.31)	0.69 (0.46)		-0.27 (0.36)	0.06 (0.53)		0.43** (0.15)	0.32 (0.22)		0.19 (0.15)	0.10 (0.22)
Referendum	2.17*** (0.26)	2.19*** (0.26)	2.57*** (0.46)	1.37*** (0.30)	1.38*** (0.30)	1.68** (0.53)	1.28*** (0.12)	1.29*** (0.12)	1.43*** (0.21)	1.06*** (0.13)	1.08*** (0.13)	1.20*** (0.22)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.70 (0.64)			-0.25 (0.75)			-0.62* (0.30)			-0.53 (0.31)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.40 (0.63)			-0.62 (0.73)			0.20 (0.30)			0.16 (0.31)
Constant	1.85 (1.01)	1.70 (1.00)	1.56 (1.01)	3.93*** (1.17)	3.84** (1.17)	3.73** (1.18)	-0.17 (0.47)	-0.18 (0.47)	-0.23 (0.47)	1.43** (0.48)	1.41** (0.48)	1.36** (0.49)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	274	274	274	273	273	273	1017	1017	1017	1018	1018	1018

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S5 with the following covariates included: age, gender, education, political interest, vote intention in hypothetical election tomorrow, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. See above for the measurement of covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.


Table S10: Complete set of sub-group results with covariates included [preference strength]

	<u>Weak policy preference</u>						<u>Strong policy preference</u>					
	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>			<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.64*** (0.14)			0.29* (0.14)			0.50* (0.23)			0.16 (0.25)		
...if recommendation honored		0.91*** (0.16)	1.39*** (0.23)		0.52** (0.16)	0.98*** (0.23)		0.62* (0.26)	0.63 (0.35)		0.28 (0.28)	0.10 (0.38)
...if recommendation not honored		0.38* (0.16)	0.40 (0.23)		0.08 (0.16)	0.07 (0.24)		0.37 (0.26)	0.07 (0.37)		0.03 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.40)
Referendum	1.48*** (0.13)	1.50*** (0.13)	1.83*** (0.23)	1.24*** (0.13)	1.26*** (0.13)	1.56*** (0.23)	1.38*** (0.21)	1.40*** (0.21)	1.21** (0.37)	0.87*** (0.23)	0.89*** (0.23)	0.62 (0.40)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.96** (0.32)			-0.92** (0.33)			-0.03 (0.51)			0.41 (0.56)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.05 (0.32)			-0.00 (0.32)			0.58 (0.52)			0.38 (0.57)
Constant	0.59 (0.49)	0.55 (0.49)	0.42 (0.50)	2.09*** (0.50)	2.05*** (0.50)	1.93*** (0.50)	-1.15 (0.84)	-1.18 (0.84)	-1.07 (0.86)	0.56 (0.91)	0.53 (0.91)	0.69 (0.94)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	865	865	865	863	863	863	427	427	427	429	429	429

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S6 with the following covariates included: age, gender, education, political interest, vote intention in hypothetical election tomorrow, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. See above for the measurement of covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.


6.2 Alternative Thresholds

Figure S2: Alternative threshold in split sample models (5 instead of 6)



Note: This figure shows the results when the split sample models reported in Figure 4 in the paper are re-estimated while using 5 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. DMP = deliberative mini-public.

Figure S3: Alternative threshold in split sample models (7 instead of 6)



Note: This figure shows the results when the split sample models reported in Figure 4 in the paper are re-estimated while using 7 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. DMP = deliberative mini-public.

Table S11: Complete set of sub-group results with threshold = 5 [political trust]

	Low political trust						High political trust					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.23*** (0.19)			0.72** (0.22)			0.08 (0.18)			-0.09 (0.17)		
...if recommendation honored		1.56*** (0.23)	1.83*** (0.32)		1.10*** (0.26)	1.17** (0.36)		0.22 (0.20)	0.40 (0.28)		-0.05 (0.19)	0.17 (0.27)
...if recommendation not honored		0.94*** (0.22)	1.04** (0.32)		0.36 (0.25)	0.55 (0.35)		-0.07 (0.21)	-0.42 (0.30)		-0.14 (0.20)	-0.47 (0.28)
Referendum	2.26*** (0.19)	2.27*** (0.19)	2.51*** (0.31)	1.85*** (0.21)	1.87*** (0.21)	2.03*** (0.35)	0.80*** (0.17)	0.82*** (0.17)	0.74* (0.29)	0.56*** (0.16)	0.57*** (0.16)	0.54 (0.28)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.56 (0.46)			-0.13 (0.51)			-0.39 (0.40)			-0.48 (0.38)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.20 (0.45)			-0.37 (0.50)			0.64 (0.41)			0.60 (0.39)
Constant	2.86*** (0.18)	2.85*** (0.18)	2.73*** (0.22)	3.92*** (0.20)	3.91*** (0.20)	3.83*** (0.25)	6.45*** (0.17)	6.44*** (0.17)	6.48*** (0.21)	7.04*** (0.16)	7.04*** (0.16)	7.05*** (0.20)
Observations	568	568	568	568	568	568	733	733	733	733	733	733

Note: This table shows the results when Table S4 is re-estimated while using 5 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S12: Complete set of sub-group results with threshold = 5 [issue importance]

	Low issue importance						High issue importance					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.27** (0.39)			0.32 (0.45)			0.64*** (0.16)			0.38* (0.15)		
...if recommendation honored		1.60*** (0.45)	1.48* (0.61)		0.58 (0.52)	0.53 (0.72)		0.87*** (0.18)	1.23*** (0.25)		0.59*** (0.18)	0.87*** (0.25)
...if recommendation not honored		0.99* (0.43)	0.51 (0.62)		0.09 (0.51)	0.08 (0.72)		0.41* (0.18)	0.33 (0.26)		0.18 (0.18)	0.10 (0.26)
Referendum	2.20*** (0.36)	2.23*** (0.36)	1.81** (0.64)	1.28** (0.42)	1.30** (0.42)	1.26 (0.75)	1.33*** (0.15)	1.35*** (0.15)	1.56*** (0.25)	1.11*** (0.14)	1.12*** (0.14)	1.27*** (0.25)
Mini-public honored X referendum			0.22 (0.90)			0.11 (1.06)			-0.74* (0.36)			-0.58 (0.35)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			0.95 (0.87)			0.02 (1.02)			0.13 (0.36)			0.15 (0.35)
Constant	2.79*** (0.37)	2.78*** (0.37)	2.99*** (0.45)	4.40*** (0.43)	4.39*** (0.43)	4.41*** (0.53)	5.07*** (0.15)	5.06*** (0.15)	4.95*** (0.18)	5.77*** (0.15)	5.76*** (0.15)	5.69*** (0.18)
Observations	175	175	175	175	175	175	1126	1126	1126	1127	1127	1127

Note: This table shows the results when Table S5 is re-estimated while using 5 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S13: Complete set of sub-group results with threshold = 7 [political trust]

	Low political trust						High political trust					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.08*** (0.17)			0.60** (0.18)			0.24 (0.19)			0.12 (0.19)		
...if recommendation honored		1.35*** (0.19)	1.87*** (0.27)		0.82*** (0.21)	1.25*** (0.29)		0.41 (0.22)	0.43 (0.31)		0.29 (0.22)	0.26 (0.30)
...if recommendation not honored		0.82*** (0.19)	0.87** (0.27)		0.37 (0.21)	0.44 (0.30)		0.07 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.33)		-0.05 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.32)
Referendum	1.99*** (0.16)	2.00*** (0.16)	2.39*** (0.27)	1.56*** (0.17)	1.58*** (0.17)	1.91*** (0.30)	0.60** (0.19)	0.62*** (0.19)	0.56 (0.32)	0.48** (0.18)	0.50** (0.18)	0.41 (0.31)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-1.06** (0.38)			-0.87* (0.41)			-0.05 (0.45)			0.06 (0.44)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.09 (0.38)			-0.13 (0.41)			0.23 (0.46)			0.21 (0.44)
Constant	3.37*** (0.16)	3.36*** (0.16)	3.16*** (0.20)	4.46*** (0.17)	4.45*** (0.17)	4.28*** (0.21)	7.11*** (0.18)	7.10*** (0.18)	7.13*** (0.22)	7.45*** (0.18)	7.44*** (0.18)	7.48*** (0.21)
Observations	841	841	841	840	840	840	460	460	460	461	461	461

Note: This table shows the results when Table S4 is re-estimated while using 7 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S14: Complete set of sub-group results with threshold = 7 [issue importance]

	Low issue importance						High issue importance					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.88*** (0.23)			0.37 (0.25)			0.67*** (0.18)			0.39* (0.18)		
...if recommendation honored		1.26*** (0.26)	1.80*** (0.37)		0.64* (0.29)	1.07* (0.41)		0.86*** (0.21)	1.12*** (0.29)		0.58** (0.20)	0.79** (0.28)
...if recommendation not honored		0.51* (0.26)	0.82* (0.38)		0.12 (0.29)	0.52 (0.42)		0.48* (0.21)	0.23 (0.30)		0.20 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.29)
Referendum	1.80*** (0.21)	1.83*** (0.21)	2.38*** (0.37)	1.28*** (0.24)	1.30*** (0.24)	1.84*** (0.42)	1.31*** (0.17)	1.33*** (0.17)	1.36*** (0.29)	1.08*** (0.17)	1.10*** (0.17)	1.11*** (0.29)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-1.09* (0.52)			-0.83 (0.59)			-0.54 (0.42)			-0.45 (0.41)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.55 (0.52)			-0.76 (0.58)			0.45 (0.42)			0.41 (0.41)
Constant	3.63*** (0.22)	3.62*** (0.22)	3.31*** (0.28)	4.73*** (0.25)	4.72*** (0.25)	4.42*** (0.31)	5.26*** (0.17)	5.26*** (0.17)	5.24*** (0.21)	5.97*** (0.17)	5.96*** (0.17)	5.95*** (0.20)
Observations	414	414	414	415	415	415	887	887	887	887	887	887

Note: This table shows the results when Table S5 is re-estimated while using 7 (instead of 6, as in the paper) as the cut-off for the identification of subjects with high political trust and subjects who thought of the policy issue at stake as important. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6.3 Prior Knowledge of Citizens' Assembly

Note: The sample size decreases by around 40% when subjects who have not previously heard of the Citizens' Assembly are dropped. To ensure sufficient statistical power, we replicate only the main analyses and do not report results from the split sample models (i.e., the sub group analysis).

Table S15: Main models when subjects who have not previously heard of the Irish Citizens' Assembly are dropped

	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Deliberative mini-public	0.72*** (0.19)			0.35 (0.19)		
...if recommendation honored		0.85*** (0.21)	1.12*** (0.29)		0.47* (0.21)	0.82** (0.29)
...if recommendation not honored		0.58** (0.22)	0.25 (0.30)		0.22 (0.21)	0.11 (0.30)
Referendum	1.28*** (0.17)	1.29*** (0.17)	1.29*** (0.31)	1.09*** (0.17)	1.10*** (0.17)	1.31*** (0.31)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.58 (0.42)			-0.75 (0.42)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			0.62 (0.43)			0.18 (0.43)
Constant	5.38*** (0.17)	5.38*** (0.17)	5.37*** (0.21)	6.09*** (0.17)	6.08*** (0.17)	5.99*** (0.21)
Observations	822	822	822	821	821	821

Note: This table re-estimates all models reported in Table 2 in the paper while including only subjects who indicated that they had previously heard of the Irish Citizens' Assembly (i.e., the mini-public organized by the Irish government between 2016 and 2018). Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6.4 Complier Analysis

Note: The results reported in this section should be taken with care. Post-treatment manipulation and memory checks can be affected by the experimental manipulations. Therefore, analyses which restrict the sample to subjects who correctly answered manipulation and memory check question can be affected by post-treatment bias (Montgomery et al. 2018). Instrumental variables regression allows to estimate complier effects without post-treatment bias. However, to the best of our knowledge, instrumental variable methods which can deal with factorial experiments including factors with more than two levels, such as our 3x2 experiment, remain unavailable (cf. Blackwell 2017; Blackwell & Pashley 2021).

Note as well: The sample size decreases by around 60% when subjects who did not correctly answer all manipulation and memory checks are dropped. To ensure sufficient statistical power, we replicate only the main analyses and do not report results from the split sample models (i.e., the sub-group analysis).

Table S16: Main results when only subjects are included who correctly answered all memory check questions

	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Deliberative mini-public	1.31*** (0.22)			0.61** (0.23)		
...if recommendation honored		1.77*** (0.24)	2.48*** (0.33)		0.88*** (0.26)	1.51*** (0.36)
...if recommendation not honored		0.81** (0.25)	0.95** (0.35)		0.31 (0.27)	0.36 (0.37)
Referendum	2.90*** (0.20)	2.91*** (0.20)	3.52*** (0.35)	2.38*** (0.21)	2.38*** (0.21)	2.89*** (0.38)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-1.45** (0.48)			-1.31* (0.52)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.27 (0.49)			-0.10 (0.53)
Constant	2.95*** (0.21)	2.95*** (0.20)	2.64*** (0.25)	4.29*** (0.22)	4.29*** (0.22)	4.04*** (0.27)
Observations	511	511	511	510	510	510

Note: This table re-estimates all models reported in Table 2 in the paper while including only subjects who correctly remembered whether a mini-public was involved in the decision process, the mini-public's recommendation, the final decision outcome, and whether the final decision was made by parliament or by referendum. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.


6.5 Full Sample

Table S17: Main results when speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are included

	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Deliberative mini-public	0.66*** (0.14)			0.36** (0.14)		
...if recommendation honored		0.91*** (0.16)	1.18*** (0.22)		0.58*** (0.16)	0.73** (0.22)
...if recommendation not honored		0.40* (0.16)	0.31 (0.23)		0.13 (0.16)	0.08 (0.23)
Referendum	1.30*** (0.13)	1.32*** (0.13)	1.45*** (0.22)	1.01*** (0.13)	1.03*** (0.13)	1.10*** (0.22)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.55 (0.31)			-0.30 (0.31)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			0.18 (0.31)			0.09 (0.31)
Constant	4.98*** (0.13)	4.96*** (0.13)	4.90*** (0.16)	5.72*** (0.13)	5.71*** (0.13)	5.68*** (0.16)
Observations	1494	1494	1494	1499	1499	1499

Note: This table re-estimates all models reported in Table 2 in the paper while including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check. Standard errors in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S4: Selected sub-group results when speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are included



Note: This figure shows the results when the split sample models reported in Figure 4 in the paper are re-estimated while including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check. The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. DMP = deliberative mini-public.

Table S18: Complete set of sub-group results when speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are included [political trust]

	<u>Low political trust</u>						<u>High political trust</u>					
	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>			<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	1.17*** (0.17)			0.66*** (0.19)			0.07 (0.17)			-0.01 (0.15)		
...if recommendation honored		1.49*** (0.20)	1.77*** (0.28)		0.97*** (0.22)	1.13*** (0.31)		0.22 (0.19)	0.57* (0.27)		0.08 (0.17)	0.33 (0.25)
...if recommendation not honored		0.88*** (0.20)	1.02*** (0.29)		0.38 (0.22)	0.51 (0.32)		-0.09 (0.19)	-0.37 (0.28)		-0.12 (0.18)	-0.31 (0.26)
Referendum	1.92*** (0.16)	1.95*** (0.16)	2.24*** (0.28)	1.48*** (0.18)	1.51*** (0.18)	1.71*** (0.32)	0.59*** (0.15)	0.60*** (0.15)	0.68* (0.27)	0.47*** (0.14)	0.48*** (0.14)	0.53* (0.25)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.59 (0.41)			-0.32 (0.45)			-0.68 (0.37)			-0.48 (0.35)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.27 (0.40)			-0.26 (0.44)			0.51 (0.38)			0.36 (0.36)
Constant	3.20*** (0.17)	3.18*** (0.17)	3.03*** (0.21)	4.26*** (0.18)	4.24*** (0.18)	4.14*** (0.23)	6.85*** (0.16)	6.85*** (0.16)	6.81*** (0.20)	7.27*** (0.15)	7.27*** (0.15)	7.24*** (0.18)
Observations	737	737	737	739	739	739	755	755	755	757	757	757

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S4 while including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S19: Complete set of sub-group results when speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are included [issue importance]

	<u>Low issue importance</u>						<u>High issue importance</u>					
	<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>			<u>Procedural fairness</u>			<u>Decision acceptance</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.79** (0.28)			0.26 (0.32)			0.66*** (0.15)			0.41** (0.15)		
...if recommendation honored		1.24*** (0.32)	1.58*** (0.47)		0.57 (0.37)	0.66 (0.53)		0.85*** (0.17)	1.17*** (0.24)		0.59*** (0.17)	0.82*** (0.24)
...if recommendation not honored		0.38 (0.32)	0.54 (0.47)		-0.03 (0.36)	0.24 (0.54)		0.46** (0.17)	0.39 (0.25)		0.21 (0.17)	0.14 (0.24)
Referendum	2.03*** (0.26)	2.06*** (0.26)	2.38*** (0.47)	1.32*** (0.30)	1.34*** (0.30)	1.57** (0.53)	1.12*** (0.14)	1.13*** (0.14)	1.32*** (0.25)	0.94*** (0.14)	0.96*** (0.14)	1.07*** (0.24)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.67 (0.65)			-0.12 (0.74)			-0.65 (0.34)			-0.46 (0.34)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.27 (0.64)			-0.50 (0.73)			0.12 (0.35)			0.13 (0.34)
Constant	3.41*** (0.28)	3.39*** (0.28)	3.20*** (0.36)	4.57*** (0.31)	4.55*** (0.31)	4.43*** (0.41)	5.35*** (0.14)	5.35*** (0.14)	5.25*** (0.18)	6.00*** (0.14)	6.00*** (0.14)	5.94*** (0.17)
Observations	304	304	304	304	304	304	1189	1189	1189	1193	1193	1193

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S5 while including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S20: Complete set of sub-group results when speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check are included [preference strength]

	Weak policy preference						Strong policy preference					
	Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance			Procedural fairness			Decision acceptance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Deliberative mini-public	0.74*** (0.15)			0.46** (0.15)			0.51 (0.27)			0.17 (0.27)		
...if recommendation honored		1.05*** (0.18)	1.55*** (0.25)		0.70*** (0.18)	1.14*** (0.25)		0.66* (0.30)	0.52 (0.42)		0.37 (0.31)	0.01 (0.42)
...if recommendation not honored		0.44* (0.18)	0.49 (0.26)		0.23 (0.17)	0.28 (0.25)		0.33 (0.31)	-0.03 (0.45)		-0.05 (0.31)	-0.30 (0.45)
Referendum	1.39*** (0.15)	1.41*** (0.14)	1.77*** (0.25)	1.19*** (0.14)	1.20*** (0.14)	1.52*** (0.25)	1.13*** (0.25)	1.15*** (0.25)	0.82 (0.45)	0.66** (0.25)	0.69** (0.25)	0.25 (0.45)
Mini-public honored X referendum			-0.99** (0.35)			-0.86* (0.35)			0.28 (0.61)			0.77 (0.62)
Mini-public not honored X referendum			-0.08 (0.35)			-0.10 (0.35)			0.69 (0.63)			0.49 (0.63)
Constant	4.88*** (0.15)	4.88*** (0.15)	4.68*** (0.18)	5.65*** (0.15)	5.65*** (0.15)	5.48*** (0.18)	5.15*** (0.25)	5.14*** (0.25)	5.30*** (0.31)	5.85*** (0.26)	5.83*** (0.26)	6.05*** (0.32)
Observations	987	987	987	988	988	988	507	507	507	511	511	511

Note: This table re-estimates all results reported in Table S6 while including speeders and subjects who failed the language comprehension check. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6.6 Opinion Change

Table S21: Assessing whether the probability of opinion change varies across experimental conditions

	<u>Side change</u>	<u>Exact position</u> <u>change</u>
	(1)	(2)
No DMP, parliament decides against SIP	<i>Reference category</i>	
No DMP, referendum decides against SIP	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
DMP recommends against SIP, parliament decides against SIP	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)
DMP recommends against SIP, referendum decides against SIP	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
DMP recommends in favor of SIP, parliament decides against SIP	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
DMP recommends in favor of SIP, referendum decides against SIP	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Constant	0.10*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.03)
<i>F</i> -test of overall significance:		
<i>F</i> (5, 1299)	0.71	0.38
<i>p</i>	0.62	0.86
Observations	1305	1305

Note: As noted in the paper, a potential concern is that subjects assigned to certain conditions, such as a mini-public which issues a recommendation against their initial policy preference, became more likely to change their opinion on the policy at stake and that some of the results reported in the paper could therefore be driven partly or even fully by outcome favorability instead of evaluations of the fairness of decision procedures. This table assesses this concern by comparing the rate of opinion change across experimental conditions. All models are estimated with OLS regression and standard errors are in brackets. Model 1 uses a more lenient definition of opinion change according to which subjects are considered to have changed their opinion (and are coded with 1) if they positioned themselves on different sides of the policy issue at stake before and after treatment, 0 otherwise. By contrast, model 2 uses a more restrictive definition of opinion change according to which subjects are considered to have changed their opinion (and are coded with 1) if they did not give the exact same answer when asked about their preference on the policy before and after treatment, 0 otherwise. For example, a subject who completely agreed that Ireland should introduce the basic income scheme before treatment but only tended to agree that Ireland should introduce the scheme after treatment is considered to have changed their opinion in model 2 but not in model 1. Reassuringly, we find that subjects from all six experimental conditions were equally likely to change their opinion on the policy at stake, including subjects exposed to a mini-public recommendation or referendum outcome which is counter to their initially expressed policy preference. This conclusion applies irrespective of the definition of opinion change. DMP = deliberative mini-public; SIP = subject's initial preference on the policy at stake (i.e., the basic income scheme). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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