

Pax Populi?
An Analysis of the Conflict Resolution Potential of Referendums
on Self-Determination

Supplementary Material

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1 Global Analysis

1.1 Sample Definition

The global analysis includes all self-determination disputes between 1946 and 2012 which i) are included in the Self-Determination Movements (SDM) dataset (Sambanis et al. 2018) and ii) are also included in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009; Vogt et al. 2015). As stated in the paper, the advantage of this approach is that I gain access to EPR's large library of data on pertinent control variables. However, the cost is that certain self-determination disputes cannot be included in the analysis. On the one hand, that is because neither SDM nor EPR provide data on groups engaged in anti-colonial liberation struggles. On the other hand, that is because EPR does not include some of the self-determination groups included in SDM. Most importantly, EPR's definition of ethnicity includes linguistic, religious and racial groups, but not regionally defined groups. 86 of the 464 separatist groups coded in SDM represent groups whose identity derives from their region, such as the Texans in the U.S. or the Lombards in Italy. Another 39 separatist groups cannot be matched because EPR does not include groups in overseas territories even if their relationships with the metropole no longer qualify as colonial (e.g., the Guadeloupeans), groups in micro-states with a population of less than 500,000 (e.g., the Nevisians in St. Kitts and Nevis), and groups classified as 'tribes' or 'clans' rather than 'ethnicities' (e.g., the Isaaqs in Somalia). Finally, there are 39 cases where EPR does not include a separatist group identified in SDM even though it meets the criteria for inclusion in EPR (e.g., the Talysh in Azerbaijan or the Sidama in Ethiopia).

Overall, I am able to include 290 of the 464 separatist groups identified by Sambanis et al. (2018), or 63%. About half of all SDM groups (225/464) correspond directly to a group in EPR. In another 65 cases, SDM and EPR aggregate groups differently, but a match can still be established. Typically, this scenario emerges when EPR codes an umbrella group of which SDM codes one large or several smaller sub-groups as separatist (52 cases). For example, while EPR codes a single umbrella indigenous group in the U.S., SDM codes several different indigenous groups. In these cases, I code nonviolent separatist activity if at least one constituent group made a nonviolent claim and no other group made a violent claim. I code violent separatist activity if at least one of the constituent groups was involved in separatist violence. In 13 cases, EPR codes two or more sub-groups of a larger separatist group. For example, SDM codes a single Anglophone group in Cameroon whereas EPR distinguishes between the northwestern and the southwestern Anglophones. In these cases, I establish start and end dates of violent and nonviolent separatist activity separately for each constituent group based on case evidence. For information on how each of the 464 separatist groups identified by Sambanis et al. (2018) is handled, refer to the file "SDM2EPR.xls", which is included with the replication materials.

1.2 Data on Self-Determination Referendums

Table S1 lists all 106 self-determination referendums included in the global analysis. The column "EPR group(s)" provides information on what groups a referendum is associated with in my data. Note that a small number of referendums affected more than one self-determination dispute and are therefore associated with multiple groups. For example, the 1991 referendum on a new Union Treaty for the Soviet Union affected the status of multiple separatist groups, including the Armenians, Georgians, and all three Baltic nations (Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians), among others. The column "Agreed" shows whether a referendum is coded as mutually agreed (1) or unilateral (0). The column "Coding notes" includes the coding justifications while the column "Sources" gives the sources. Finally, note that one of the referendums occurred before 1946, the first year included in the global analysis: the 1945 referendum on the merger of Inner Mongolia with Mongolia. This referendum is partially included because the referendum dummies used in the paper are coded 1 both in the year of the referendum and the following year, and therefore also in 1946.

Note: In addition to the 106 self-determination referendums included in the analysis, there were another 156 self-determination referendums held between 1946 and 2012 which are not part of the statistical analysis and, therefore, also not included in the table below. This includes a total of 101 self-determination referendums which dealt with the status of one or more colonies. As stated in the paper, self-determination referendums in colonial contexts cannot be included in the global statistical analysis because neither SDM nor EPR provide data on groups engaged in anti-colonial liberation struggles. Furthermore, a total of 55 noncolonial self-determination referendums cannot be included because the corresponding separatist groups are not represented in EPR (see the paper and section 1.1 for details).

Table S1: List of self-determination referendums included in the global analysis

Country	EPR group(s)	Date	Issue	Agreed	Coding notes	Sources (other than Mendez & Germann 2018)
China	Mongolians	??/1945	Merger with Mongolia	0	This referendum was initiated by the self-proclaimed authorities of China's Inner Mongols (or, Southern Mongols) and held without the consent of the Chinese government. The Chinese communists appealed to the Soviet Union to block implementation of the referendum.	Liu (2006: 365); Minahan (2002: 1782)
India	Naga	5/16/1951	Independence	0	Initiated by the Nagaland National Council (NNC), a Naga separatist outfit. This unofficial vote was not recognized by the Indian government.	c2d (2011)
UK	Catholics In N. Ireland	3/9/1973	Merger with Ireland	0	Initiated by the British government over objections of all Northern Irish nationalist parties and Republic of Ireland. Boycotted by Catholics in Northern Ireland.	Bogdanor (1981); Tierney (2012); Wheatley (2012)
Cyprus	Turks	6/8/1975	Independence	0	Referendum on constitution proclaiming independence of Northern Cyprus in aftermath of Turkey's invasion in 1974. Not recognized by (Greek) Cyprus government.	c2d (2011)
Philippines	Moro	4/17/1977	Autonomy	0	Philippines and Moro rebels signed peace agreement in 1976 that promised the Moros far-reaching autonomy. However, the ensuing implementation talks broke down. Philippines central government proceeded unilaterally and organized a referendum in Mindanao on an autonomy arrangement widely described as "hollow" and "cosmetic". The main Moro separatist outfit, MNLF, was opposed to the referendum (also because of resettlement policies which had resulted in the Moros no longer constituting a majority in several parts of Mindanao) and boycotted the vote.	DADM project; McKenna (1998: 168); Santos (2005); Tuminez (2007: 80); Walter (2009: 183f)
South Africa	Blacks	5/18/1977	Turnhalle plan	0	Turnhalle was an attempt by apartheid South Africa to achieve Namibian independence under its own terms. The referendum was preceded by "negotiations" involving representatives from various groups in Namibia that were all handpicked by the South African government. The main Namibian separatist outfit – SWAPO – was not invited and the eventual "agreement" would have perpetuated white rule in Namibia. The Turnhalle plan was subjected to a whites-only referendum in Namibia. The referendum was widely condemned, including by SWAPO.	Banks et al. (1998: 672); c2d (2011); Saunders (2008)
UK	Scots	3/1/1979	Devolution	1	The 1979 devolution referendums were called by the government in London to prevent a backbencher revolt from British unionists. The referendums were initially opposed by many separatists in Scotland and Wales in part because of the high bar that needed to be crossed for approval (40% of eligible voters needed to approve). Nevertheless, most separatists ultimately came to terms with the referendum and campaigned for yes votes. The fact that key separatists took part in	Rourke et al. (1992: 121-122); Thompson 1989: 192

					the campaign suggests implicit agreement.	
UK	Welsh	3/1/1979	Devolution	1	See Scotland (1979) above.	
Spain	Basques	10/25/1979	Autonomy Statute	1	After Franco's death in 1975, Spain embarked on rapid democratization and decentralization. Spain's 1978 constitution promised autonomy to the Basques and the Basques' main separatist outfit, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), subsequently took the lead in negotiating an autonomy statute with Madrid. Both parties agreed on an autonomy statute in 1979 and in accordance with the constitution, the autonomy statute was subsequently subjected to a mandatory regional referendum in the Basque Country. The referendum is coded as mutually agreed because it constituted a direct outflow of negotiations between the central state and key representatives of the separatist group.	Keating & Wilson (2009: 539); MAR; Minahan (2002: 287)
Spain	Catalans	10/25/1979	Autonomy Statute	1	The Catalan road to autonomy evolved similarly to the Basques' (see above). Catalan legislators prepared a draft statute that was approved by the Cortes in 1979. In line with the 1978 constitution, the statute was subsequently subjected to a mandatory regional referendum in Catalonia. The referendum is coded as mutually agreed because it constituted a direct outflow of negotiations between the central state and key representatives of the separatist group.	Keating & Wilson (2009: 539); MAR; Thompson (1989: 200f)
Canada	French speakers	5/20/1980	Independence	1	Initiated by Quebec's regional government (led by main Quebecois separatist outfit, PQ). Right to hold referendum was uncontested by central government, which campaigned for a no vote.	LeDuc (2003: 104); Leslie (1999 :136); Rourke et al. (1992); Smith (2013)
Spain	Galician	12/21/1980	Autonomy Statute	1	The Galician road to autonomy evolved similarly to the Basques' and the Catalans', but negotiations on the autonomy statute took longer because of internal disagreements between Galicia's Socialists and nationalists, who wanted a more expansive autonomy solution, and the region's Conservatives, who wanted more limited autonomy. In line with the 1978 constitution, the statute was subsequently subjected to a mandatory regional referendum in Galicia. The referendum is coded as mutually agreed because it constituted a direct outflow of negotiations between the central state and key representatives of the separatist group.	Keating & Wilson (2009: 539); Thompson (1989: 202)
Canada	Aboriginal peoples	4/14/1982	Division of Northwest Territories	1	Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), an Inuit separatist outfit, began campaigning for the division of the Northwest Territories (NWT) in the mid-1970s. In April 1982, NWT government agreed to hold a referendum on the division of NWT. The referendum was uncontested by Canada's central government.	Légaré (1998: 274f); Minahan (2002: 797)
Philippines	Moro	11/16/1989	Autonomy	0	Philippines government promised to finally make good on Tripoli agreement and give real autonomy to Moros in Mindanao (see 1977 referendum above). However, like in 1977, the central government wanted to subject the transfer of autonomy to a province-by-province referendum. The main Moro separatist outfits of the time – MNLF and MILF – both rejected this idea due to relocation schemes that had resulted in the Moros losing majority status in many provinces. The referendum was still held, over the objections of Moro separatists.	McKenna (1998: 246ff); Santos (2005); Tuminez (2007: 80)
Moldova	Russian speakers	12/3/1989	Separation from Moldovan SSR	0	In Moldova's Transnistria region, several local referendums were held in the late 1989/early 1990 on separation from what was then the Moldovan union republic.	c2d (2011); Neukirch (2001); Sato (2009)

					All were held without the agreement of the Moldovan authorities and followed by unilateral proclamation of Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic in September 1990.	
Philippines	Indigenous	1/30/1990	Autonomy	0	Referendum on an autonomy regime in Cordillera. The referendum was preceded by unsuccessful negotiations between the main Cordilleran (Igorot) separatist outfits, the CPLA and the CPDF, and the central government. The Philippine government proceeded with a referendum despite the lack of agreement from the separatists.	Ferrer (2005)
Namibia	Baster	5/?/1990	Independence	0	Referendum in Rehoboth held in aftermath of unilateral independence declaration. Held without agreement of Namibian government, which did not recognize the referendum outcome.	MAR; Minahan (2002: 293)
Croatia	Serbs	8/19/1990	Autonomy	0	Autonomy referendum organized by the self-proclaimed Serbian National Council in Kraijna region. Croatian authorities declared the referendum illegal.	Peters (1995: 99)
Yugoslavia	Slovenes	12/23/1990	Independence	0	Initiated by Slovenian parliament and declared illegal by Yugoslav authorities.	Peters (1995: 93)
Ukraine	Russians	1/20/1991	Restoration of the Crimean ASSR	1	Drive for restoration of Crimean autonomy was led by local Communist party. Referendum was initiated by regional authorities in Crimea but uncontested by central authorities in Kiev/Moscow. Kiev's official position was that "Crimeans were entitled to restoration of their autonomy" (Sochanyk 1994: 51).	Solchanyk (1994); Sasse (2001)
USSR	Lithuanians	2/9/1991	Independence	0	Initiated by Lithuanian parliament and declared illegal by Soviet authorities.	Peters (1995: 142)
USSR	Estonians	2/24/1991	Independence	0	Attempt by Estonia's Moscow-oriented Communist Party to de-legitimize the Estonian independence referendum. This 'alternative' referendum was held in the Russian-populated north-east of the republic with goal of signalling opposition to independence. Held without agreement of Estonian separatists and Estonia's republican government.	
USSR	Estonians	3/3/1991	Independence	0	Initiated by Estonian parliament and declared illegal by Soviet authorities.	Peters (1995: 142)
USSR	Latvians	3/3/1991	Independence	0	Initiated by Latvian parliament and declared illegal by Soviet authorities.	Peters (1995: 144)
USSR	Kirghis	3/17/1991	Sovereignty	1	Three Soviet republics – Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan – attached proposals reaffirming the sovereignty of their respective republics to Gorbachev's referendum on the Union Treaty (i.e., preservation of USSR). While the Soviet leadership was not exactly wild about these extra questions, it also did not reject them outright, with the chairman of the referendum commission stating that "republic parliaments should be allowed to decide whether to "include a concrete question of the given region.".	Brady & Kaplan: (1994); CSCE (1992: 24)
USSR	Ukrainians	3/17/1991	Sovereignty	1	See referendum in Kyrgyzstan.	
USSR	Uzbeks	3/17/1991	Sovereignty	1	See referendum in Kyrgyzstan.	
USSR	Armenians; Estonians; Georgians; Latvians; Lithuanians;	3/17/1991	Union Treaty	0	This was a union-wide referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union – effectively an attempt by the Soviet authorities to de-legitimize and halt the secessionist tendencies in various parts of the union. The vanguard secessionists in the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova all adopted resolutions against the referendum, refused to set up referendum commissions, and boycotted the	Brady & Kaplan (1994: 187); Laponce (2010); Peters (1995: 211)

	Moldovans; Abkhaz; Ossetes				referendum. However, in order to showcase their willingness to break away from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia still proceeded with the vote, thus defying the Georgian authorities.	
USSR	Ukrainians	3/17/1991	Independence	0	Ukraine added a question on Ukrainian sovereignty to the Union Treaty referendum (see above). In Galicia (a region in Western Ukraine), the local authorities went one step further and added a third question on Ukrainian independence. This was rejected as illegal by the central authorities.	Beissinger (2002: 197); CSCE (1992: 22-23)
USSR	Georgians	3/31/1991	Independence	0	Initiated by Georgian parliament but not recognized by Soviet authorities.	c2d (2011); Peters (1995)
Croatia	Serbs	5/11/1991	Merger with Serbia	0	Secession referendum called by self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Krajina in response to Croatia's intention to hold a vote on independence from Yugoslavia. Declared illegal by the Croatian authorities.	Peters (1995: 99)
Yugoslavia	Croats	5/19/1991	Independence	0	Initiated unilaterally by Croatian president, this referendum was swiftly declared void and illegal by the Yugoslav authorities.	Peters (1995: 95)
Yugoslavia	Macedonians	9/8/1991	Independence	0	Initiated by Macedonian parliament, without consent of Yugoslav authorities. The referendum was boycotted by the local Albanian and Serbian populations.	c2d (2011); Peters (1995: 100ff)
USSR	Armenians	9/21/1991	Independence	1	This referendum was held in the aftermath of the August coup, after which it became increasingly clear that the USSR would split up. According to Brady & Kaplan, that Armenia would become independent was "obvious" by the time of the referendum. Yeltsin was now basically in charge in Moscow, who was more than happy to grant referendums and independence to the various Soviet republics.	Brady & Kaplan (1994: 201); Zaprudnik & Urban (1997)
Yugoslavia	Albanians	9/26/1991	Independence	0	"Unofficial" referendum called by self-proclaimed Kosovar Assembly. Serbian authorities tried to stop the vote, but were largely unsuccessful. The referendum was boycotted by the local Serbian population.	c2d (2011); MAR; Peters (1995: 105)
Yugoslavia	Bosniaks/ Muslims	10/25/1991	Autonomy	0	Autonomy referendum in Sandzak region straddling border of Serbia and Montenegro. Organized by local offshoot of the SDA (Bosniak separatist party). The Serbian government declared the referendum illegal and Serbian police tried to forcibly close polling stations.	Minahan (2002: 1645); Peters (1995: 108)
USSR	Turkmens	10/26/1991	Independence	1	Initiated by Turkmenistan's executive in aftermath of August coup, when independence was there for the taking (cf. September referendum in Armenia).	c2d (2011)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs	11/9/1991	Merger with Serbia	0	Organized by self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Srpska region and held without consent of Bosnian authorities.	Peters (1995: 113)
USSR	Ukrainians	12/1/1991	Independence	1	Initiated by Ukraine's parliament in aftermath of August coup, when independence was there for the taking (cf. September referendum in Armenia).	c2d (2011)
Ukraine	Hungarians	12/1/1991	Autonomy	1	This referendum took the form of a second question attached to Ukraine independence referendum. Question was on formation of an autonomous national district. Organized by Berehove's local district council. The account in Sasse (2001) suggests that the referendum had tacit agreement by the Ukrainian president, but overall information is limited.	Batt (2002: 168); Duplain (1996); Nahaylo (1999: 408); Sasse (2001: 83); Solchanyk (1994: 65)
Ukraine	Romanians/ Moldovans	12/1/1991	Economic autonomy	1	Chernivtsi oblast's regional council attached a second question on autonomy to Ukraine's independence referendum. Support was strongest among the local Romanian population. Like the referendum in Berehove, this is an ambiguous case, but the attachment of second questions on autonomy seems to have had the	Nahaylo (1999: 408); Sasse (2001: 82)

					tacit support of the Ukrainian president.	
Moldova	Gagauz	12/1/1991	Independence	0	Called by self-proclaimed Gagauz authorities and declared illegal by Moldovan authorities.	Peters (1995: 193)
Moldova	Russian speakers	12/1/1991	Independence	0	Called by self-proclaimed Transnistrian authorities and declared illegal by Moldovan authorities.	Peters (1995: 193)
Azerbaijan	Armenians	12/10/1991	Independence	0	“Unofficial” referendum called by self-proclaimed Karabakh authorities. Declared unconstitutional by Azerbaijani authorities.	c2d (2011); Peters (1995: 197f)
USSR	Azerbaijanis	12/29/1991	Independence	1	Initiated by Azerbaijan’s parliament in aftermath of August coup, when independence was there for the taking (cf. September referendum in Armenia).	c2d (2011)
USSR	Uzbeks	12/29/1991	Independence	1	Initiated by Uzbekistan’s parliament in aftermath of August coup, when independence was there for the taking (cf. September referendum in Armenia).	c2d (2011)
Russia	Balkars	12/29/1991	Separate Balkar republic	0	“Unofficial” referendum initiated by separatists. Declared illegal by the authorities of the Kabardino-Balkaria republic.	Hahn (2007: 143); Roeder (2007: 130)
Russia	Ingush	12/29/1991	Separation from Chechnya and return of Prigorodny raion	0	Initiated by Ingush parliament. Question was whether Ingushetia should become a separate republic (hence, separation from Chechnya) and whether that republic should include the Prigorodny raion (part of North Ossetia). Based on the sources I consulted, there was no prior coordination with Chechen representatives, North Ossetia, or Moscow.	Dunlop (1998: 122); Tishkov (1997: 171)
Macedonia	Albanians	1/11/1992	Autonomy	0	Albanians boycotted Macedonia’s independence referendum and instead organized their own referendum on autonomy. The Macedonian authorities declared the referendum illegal.	c2d (2011); Bennett (1994); Lund (2005); Peters (1995: 103)
Georgia	Ossetians (South)	1/19/1992	Merger with Russia	0	Called by unofficial South Ossetian authorities and declared illegal by Georgian authorities.	Peters (1995: 211)
Yugoslavia	Bosniaks/Muslims	2/29/1992	Independence	0	Called by Bosnian parliament in response to EC promise of recognition if independence was approved in a referendum. Rejected by Yugoslav/Serbian authorities and boycotted by local Serbian minority.	c2d (2011); Brady & Kaplan (1994: 209); Peters (1995: 114)
Yugoslavia	Albanians	3/1/1992	Independence	0	Unofficial referendum in Presevo Valley on joining bordering Kosovo. Unilaterally initiated by local Albanian leaders in aftermath of Kosovo’s vote for independence.	Petersen (2011: 204f)
Yugoslavia	Montenegrins	3/1/1992	Independence	0	Called by Montenegrin parliament at behest of Milosevic without prior consultation with leaders of Montenegrin independence movement. Largely boycotted by supporters of Montenegrin independence as well as Sandzak Muslims.	Bender (2009); Minahan 2002: (1646)
Russia	Tatars	3/21/1992	Sovereignty	0	Initiated by Tatarstan parliament. Declared unconstitutional by Russian constitutional court.	George (2009: 62ff); Peters (1995: 206f)
Russia	Circassians; Karachai	3/28/1992	Division of Karachay-Cherkess Republic	0	Referendum on unity of republic initiated by Karachay-Cherkess authorities to avert plan by Yeltsin at partition. Held over protests mainly of Karachay supporters of partition, who among other things objected to referendum question and boycotted the referendum.	Comins-Richmond (2002); Peters (1995: 208)
Canada	Aboriginal peoples	5/4/1992	Parker boundary lines	1	Referendum on border between Northwest Territories and Nunavut (new state to be created with Inuit majority) that resulted from inclusive negotiations involving NWT government and key Inuit representatives.	Légaré (1998: 275ff)

Russia	Kumyks	7/?/1992	Kumyk republic	0	Referendum on creation of an autonomous Kumyk republic within Dagestan. Organized by Tenglik, a Kumyk separatist organization. There seems to have been no prior consultation with Dagestani authorities (or Moscow), but information on this referendum is scarce.	MAR
Canada	French speakers; Aboriginal peoples	10/26/1992	Charlottetown Accord	1	Referendum on constitutional reform project negotiated between federal, provincial, and territorial governments, as well as aboriginal representatives. Charlottetown Accord would have devolved additional powers to Quebec, recognized Quebec as a distinctive society, and increased aboriginal self-government. Quebec separatists signaled intention to hold a referendum on accord, which they saw as too limited; central government then agreed to a federal referendum in all provinces.	LeDuc (2003)
Canada	Aboriginal peoples	11/3/1992	Creation of Nunavut	1	Confirmatory referendum among all Inuit in Northwest Territories on creation of separate state for Inuits. Referendum foreseen in agreement negotiated between key Inuit representatives, NWT government, and Canada's central government.	Légaré (1998: 275ff); c2d (2011)
Ethiopia	Christian Eritreans; Muslim Eritreans	4/23/1993	Independence	1	Referendum resulted from negotiations between Ethiopia's transitional government and EPLF (Eritrean separatist outfit).	Tesfaye (2002); Peters (1995: 228ff)
Russia	Bashkirs	4/25/1993	Economic autonomy	0	Held simultaneously with 1993 Russian constitutional referendum at initiative of Bashkir authorities. Moscow did not strongly object to the referendum –likely given the relatively limited demands for economic autonomy – but due to the lack of explicit agreement still best seen as unilaterally initiated.	Gorenburg (2003: 139); Szajkowski (1993: 174f)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs	5/15/1993	Merger with Serbia	0	Referendum on Vance-Owen plan for re-integration of self-proclaimed Serb and Croat entities with Bosnia. Called unilaterally by Bosnian Serbs' self-styled National Assembly with goal of reaffirming secession and merger with Serbia.	Goodby (1996: 512)
Croatia	Serbs	6/19/1993	Merger with Republika Srpska	0	Called by self-proclaimed Krajina parliament without consent of Croatian government.	c2d 2011; Brady & Kaplan (1994)
Estonia	Russians	7/16/1993	Autonomy	0	Called by Russians in Estonia's north-east (Narva & Sillamae) and declared illegal by Estonia. CSCE intervened diplomatically to prevent escalation.	MAR; Peters (1995: 164)
Russia	Tuvians	12/12/1993	Constitution (autonomy)	1	Vote on regional constitution that conferred extra autonomy to Tuva. Held simultaneously with referendum on Russian constitution. I found no evidence to suggest that Moscow objected to the referendum.	Ortung et al. (2000: 582)
Ukraine	Russians	3/27/1994	Autonomy	0	Referendum on Crimean autonomy called by Crimean authorities. Declared illegal by Ukrainian authorities.	MAR; Sasse (2001)
Ukraine	Russians	3/27/1994	Federal Ukraine	0	Called by pro-Russian forces in Donbas region and declared unconstitutional by Ukrainian authorities.	Flynn (1996: 346); Sasse (2001)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs	8/28/1994	Merger with Serbia	0	Referendum on another plan for re-integration of self-proclaimed Serb and Croat entities with Bosnia. Called unilaterally by Bosnian Serbs' self-styled authorities with goal of reaffirming secession and merger with Serbia.	Sudetic (1994)
Russia	Balkars	?/?/1994	Division of Kabardino-Balkaria Republic	0	Information on this referendum is scarce. Overall, though, it seems that the referendum was initiated by the republican authorities with the goal of affirming popular support for unity of Kabardino-Balkaria and without prior consultation with Balkar separatists.	Richmond (2008); Roeder (2007: 130)
Moldova	Gagauz	3/5/1995	Autonomy	1	Gagauz separatists and the Moldovan state reached agreement on an autonomy arrangement in 1994, which also foresaw a referendum, to be held in 1995.	Roper (2002: 118)

Cameroon	Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders); Southwestern Anglophones (Bakweri etc.)	9/1/1995	Independence	0	Organized by Anglophone independence movement without consent of Cameroon's central government.	Konings & Nyamnjoh (2004); Minahan (2002: 1777)
Canada	Aboriginal peoples	10/26/1995	Separation from Quebec	0	Held in context of Quebec's vote on secession from Canada. Called by leaders of three indigenous groups in Quebec (Crees, Inuit, and Innus). Called without consent of Quebec government, which pledged to ignore the referendum.	Laponce (2010: 42); Minahan (2002: 496f)
Canada	French speakers	10/30/1995	Independence	1	Initiated by Quebec's regional government (led by main Quebecois separatist outfit, PQ). Right to hold referendum was uncontested by central government, which campaigned for a no vote.	LeDuc (2003: 105); Leslie (1999 : 136); Smith (2013)
UK	Scots	9/11/1997	Autonomy	1	Proposed by central government in agreement with Scottish Constitutional Convention, an association of Scottish political parties and civic groups lobbying for Scottish home rule. Scottish National Party was initially opposed to referendum, but relented and campaigned for yes vote.	BBC (1997); LeDuc (2003: 114ff)
UK	Welsh	9/18/1997	Autonomy	1	Proposed by central government with support of main Welsh separatist outfit, Plaid Cymru, and other key Welsh representatives.	LeDuc (2003: 114ff)
Philippines	Indigenous	3/7/1998	Autonomy	0	Repeat of the 1990 referendum (see above).	Ferrer (2005)
UK	Catholics in N. Ireland	5/22/1998	Goodfriday Agreement	1	Referendum was result of inclusive negotiations involving various representatives from both the Protestant and Catholic divide, as well as the governments of both Britain and Ireland.	McGarry & O'Leary (2009); Wheatley (2012)
UK	Catholics in N. Ireland	5/22/1998	Goodfriday Agreement	1	Goodfriday Agreement mandated a simultaneous referendum to be held in Republic of Ireland.	McGarry & O'Leary (2009); Wheatley (2012)
Mexico	Maya	3/21/1999	Autonomy	0	San Andres Accords signed in 1996, which among other things promises the Mayans autonomy. Was not properly implemented. In response, the EZLN/Zapatistas, a mainly Mayan separatist outfit, launched a nation-wide referendum that included a question on implementation of the San Andres Accords. The vote was "unofficial" and not recognized by Mexico.	c2d (2011); Swords (1987: 82f)
Indonesia	East Timorese	8/30/1999	Independence	1	Referendum resulted from international agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and UN. East Timorese separatists led by FREITLIN were not part of negotiations leading to referendum, but had a long-standing claim to a referendum and happily embraced it.	Gundersen (2015: 131ff); Symonds (1999); Schulze (2001: 77ff) Traub (2000)
Georgia	Abkhazians	10/3/1999	Constitution (independence)	0	"Unofficial" referendum on new constitution declaring Abkhazia an independent state. Initiated by Abkhazia's de facto authorities without consent of Georgian authorities.	c2d (2011); Coppieters (2004); Wheatley (2012)
Ecuador	Indigenous lowland peoples (Shuar, Achuar etc.)	9/24/2000	Autonomy	0	Called by authorities of Amazonian region of Sucumbios. Not recognized by Ecuadorian authorities.	Albornoz & Molina (2004: 61ff); Eaton (2011: 302); Explored (2000)

Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats	11/11/2000	Separate Croat entity	0	Called by separatist HDZ party. Declared illegal by Bosnian authorities.	Bideleux & Jeffries (2007: 377); Bieber (2001: 2); Council of Europe (2001); Kasapovic (2005: 18)
Philippines	Moro	8/14/2001	Expansion of autonomous region	0	Government-initiated referendum that was outright rejected by MNLF, one of the two main Moro separatist outfits. MILF, the other main Moro separatist outfit, merely “observed” the process. Separatists were not consulted in the drafting of the autonomy law and referendum provisions.	Ferrer (2005: 129)
France	Corsicans	7/6/2003	Autonomy	1	Referendum on autonomy arrangement that was proposed by central government. Referendum not preceded by formal negotiations, but separatists were not opposed and campaigned for a yes vote.	Sánchez (2008: 658f); The Economist (2003)
Cyprus	Turks	4/24/2004	Annan plan	1	Vote on re-unification and federalization of Cyprus. Separate votes were held in Greek and Turkish part. Resulted from negotiations between both sides, mediated by UN.	Sözen & Özersay (2007)
Cyprus	Turks	4/24/2004	Annan plan	1	See above.	
Serbia and Montenegro	Montenegrins	5/21/2006	Independence	1	Resulted from inclusive negotiations involving both Serbian and Montenegrin leaders with EU mediation.	Bieber (2010: 941ff); Vidmar (2007:)
Spain	Catalans	6/18/2006	Enhanced autonomy	1	Constitutionally mandated referendum on new Autonomy Statute negotiated by Catalonia’s regional government and Madrid.	Keating & Wilson (2009); c2d 2011
Bolivia	Aymara Quechua	7/2/2006	Autonomy	1	Separatists in Santa Cruz department collected >400,000 in 2005 for a referendum (popular initiative) on increased departmental autonomy. In accordance with constitution, central government agreed to the referendum. The (regionalist) Santa Cruz movement is not represented in EPR, but Aymara/Quechua would have been indirect beneficiaries as they make up the majority in several departments (contrary to the lowland indigenous peoples).	Eaton (2011)
Moldova	Russian speakers	9/17/2006	Merger with Russia	0	Initiated by Transnistria’s self-declared authorities without consent of Moldovan government.	c2d (2011)
Georgia	Ossetians (South)	11/12/2006	Independence	0	Repeat of the 1992 independence referendum. Initiated by self-proclaimed South Ossetian authorities over opposition of Georgian government.	c2d (2011); Wheatley (2012)
Georgia	Ossetians (South)	11/12/2006	Autonomy	0	Enraged by South Ossetia’s decision to hold another vote on independence, the Georgian government (through a proxy, the so-called Salvation Union of Ossetia) organized its own referendum in those parts South Ossetia it controlled. The vote proposed the start of negotiations with Georgia on a federal arrangement for South Ossetia. The vote was held without prior consultation, and agreement, of South Ossetian separatists.	Wheatley (2012)
Azerbaijan	Armenians	12/10/2006	Constitution (independence)	0	Referendum on new constitution reaffirming Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. Called by Karabakh’s de facto authorities. Azerbaijan was opposed to the referendum, arguing that it was unconstitutional.	c2d (2011); Caspersen (2008) Today.az 2006
Romania	Hungarians	12/?/2006	Autonomy	0	Referendum on autonomy of Szeklerland launched by Szekler National Council, a Hungarian organisation advocating autonomy for Hungarians in Romania. Declared illegal by Romania’s courts.	sudd (2014)

Spain	Catalans	9/13/2009	Independence	0	Between 2009 and 2011, 552 of Catalonia's 947 municipalities held "unofficial" municipality-level referendums on Catalan independence.	Muñoz & Guinjoan (2013)
Bolivia	Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Departmental autonomy	1	5 Andean departments (La Paz, Potosi, Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Cochabamba) held referendums on increased autonomy in December 2009 in context of major constitutional overhaul involving a series of negotiations between elected representatives from every region of the country.	Centellas (2010); Corte Nacional Electoral (2009); Eaton (2013)
Bolivia	Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Departmental autonomy	1	See above.	
Bolivia	Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Departmental autonomy	1	See above.	
Bolivia	Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Departmental autonomy	1	See above.	
Bolivia	Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Departmental autonomy	1	See above.	
Bolivia	Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups	12/6/2009	Regional autonomy	1	Bolivia's 2009 constitution also provided for the possibility of autonomy at the provincial level (i.e., below departmental level) if so desired by citizens in a referendum (referendums could be triggered by signature collection). Gran Chaco – a province that is located in the eastern Amazonian lowland and mainly inhabited by indigenous peoples – was the only province holding a vote on provincial autonomy.	Centellas (2010); Corte Nacional Electoral (2009); personal communication with Yanina Welp
Bolivia	Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups; Aymara; Quechua	12/6/2009	Local autonomy	1	Bolivia's 2009 constitution also provided for the possibility of local-level autonomy for indigenous peoples if so desired by citizens in a referendum (referendums could be triggered by signature collection). 12 such referendums were held involving municipalities by Aymaras, Quechuas, and eastern indigenous groups.	Centellas (2010); Corte Nacional Electoral (2009); Tockman & Cameron (2014)
Sudan	Azande; Bari; Dinka; Latoka; Nuer; Other Southern groups; Shilluk	1/9/2011	Independence	1	Referendum was part of 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The CPA had resulted from negotiations between Khartoum and Southerner rebels under the aegis of the SPLM/A.	c2d (2011)
United Kingdom	Welsh	3/3/2011	Enhanced autonomy	1	Referendum on enhanced autonomy. Agreed unanimously in the Welsh assembly in February 2010 and subsequently given go ahead by central government in London.	Gov.uk
Kosovo	Serbs	2/14/2012	Merger with Serbia	0	The (Serbian-dominated) North Kosovo had declared itself part of Serbia in 2008. In 2012 the unrecognized authorities in North Kosovo organized a referendum on the recognition of the official authorities in Pristina (and, hence, de facto separation from Kosovo). The vote was not recognized by the Kosovar authorities.	BalkanInsight (2012); c2d (2011)

1.3 Variable Descriptions

Separatist war onset

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a separatist group transitions from no separatist war to separatist war, 0 otherwise. Cases of ongoing war are dropped.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).¹

Separatist war termination

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a separatist group transitions from separatist war to no separatist war, 0 otherwise. Cases of ongoing peace are dropped.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).²

Mutually agreed SD referendum

Description: Coded 1 if a mutually agreed self-determination referendum was held in the current or the previous calendar year, 0 otherwise.

Sources: See section 1.2.

Unilateral SD referendum

Description: Coded 1 if a unilateral self-determination referendum was held in the current or the previous calendar year, 0 otherwise.

Sources: See section 1.2.

Exclusion

Description: Dummy variable indicating whether members of an ethnic group did (0) or did not (1) have meaningful representation in the national executive at the beginning of each calendar year.

Source: Vogt et al. (2015), with the corrections described in Germann & Sambanis (2021).

Regional autonomy

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group had a meaningful level of regional autonomy at the beginning of each calendar year.

Source: Vogt et al. (2015), with the corrections described in Germann & Sambanis (2021).

¹ In deviation from Sambanis et al. (2018), I code a separatist war onset for the Bosnians in Yugoslavia in 1992. Sambanis et al. (2018) do not code this onset because Correlates of War and other datasets start to treat Bosnia as an independent state a few days after Bosnia's 1992 referendum. However, the Bosnian civil war was clearly connected to the 1992 referendum in Bosnia (Kalyvas & Sambanis 2005). Therefore, coding a war onset in 1992 better reflects the case dynamics.

² In deviation from Sambanis et al. (2018), I code an end to the war in Northern Ireland in 1997 instead of 1998 because there was no violence above the 25-deaths threshold after the 1998 referendum. Coding the end of the war in 1998 would associate the referendum with continued violence and thus misrepresent the case dynamics. Analogously, I code an end to the violence in Corsica in 2002 instead of 2003 because there was no violence above the threshold after the July referendum (see Sambanis et al. 2018).

Autonomy restriction

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a separatist group lost autonomy in the previous two years. This includes cases where groups lost independence, became stranded, and lost internal autonomy within the previous two years.

Source: Germann & Sambanis (2021).

Separatist kin

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group has a kin group adjacent to its settlement area that makes a separatist claim against its host state. The variable is lagged one year, except in the first year of a country series.

Source: Germann & Sambanis (2021).

Hydrocarbon reserves

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a group's regional base overlaps with a giant oil or natural gas field (from the year of discovery). An oil or gas field is considered giant if it has a minimum of 500 million barrels (79,000,000 m³) of ultimately recoverable oil or gas equivalent. The variable is lagged one year, except in the first year of a country series. Groups without an identifiable regional base are coded 0.

Sources: Horn (2010); Hunziker & Cederman (2017).

Democracy

Description: A country's level of democracy, lagged one year except in the first year of a country series.

Source: Teorell et al. (2016).

ln(GDP per capita)

Description: The natural logarithm of a country's gross domestic product per capita in constant 2005 dollars (1,000s), lagged one year except in the first year of a country series.

Sources: Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data (v6.0), with missing country-years imputed using real GDP growth statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) (The World Bank 2017), Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy (Maddison 2010), including the updates in the Maddison-Project (2013), and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).

Peacekeeping

Description: Coded 1 if there was an active peacekeeping operation in a country in the previous year, 0 otherwise.

Source: Cederman et al. (2017).

Cold War

Description: Dummy variable coded 1 until and including 1989.

Source: Own calculation.

Peace years

Description: Count of the number of years a separatist group has lived in peace with its host state.

Source: Own calculation.

War years

Description: Count of the number of years a separatist group has been engaged in war with its host state.

Source: Own calculation.

1.4 Summary Statistics

Table S2: Summary statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Separatist war onset	6,571	0.028	0.165	0	1
Separatist war termination	2,246	0.071	0.257	0	1
Mutually agreed SD referendum	8,817	0.008	0.090	0	1
Unilateral SD referendum	8,817	0.012	0.110	0	1
Exclusion	8,817	0.806	0.400	0	1
Regional autonomy	8,817	0.374	0.481	0	1
Autonomy restriction	8,817	0.014	0.116	0	1
Separatist kin	8,817	0.229	0.420	0	1
Hydrocarbon reserves	8,817	0.144	0.351	0	1
Democracy	8,812	0.423	0.272	0.018	0.928
ln(GDP per capita)	8,817	1.229	1.185	-1.814	3.773
Peacekeeping	8,817	0.160	0.367	0	1
Cold War	8,817	0.462	0.499	0	1
Peace years	8,817	11.551	14.053	0	66
War years	8,817	3.403	8.531	0	64

1.5 Robustness Checks

Table S3 shows the results when the following five time-varying variables are added to the models reported in the paper (data sources in brackets): lagged civil war mediation (De Rouen et al. 2011), lagged large-scale nonviolent campaign (Chenoweth & Lewis 2013; Lakey 2011), de facto independence (Vogt et al. 2015), lagged share of government military personnel in total population (Singer et al. 1972), and the number of politically relevant groups (Vogt et al. 2015; also cf. Walter 2009). The results are similar compared to those in the paper. Table S3 also shows the results of models not including any controls. The results are again similar, though some of the referendum coefficients are now much larger, presumably because of the endogeneity of self-determination referendums to conflict processes and separatist war.

The results reported in the paper rely on referendum variables which are coded 1 in the year of a referendum and the subsequent year, 0 otherwise. Table S4 shows the results when the referendum dummies are coded as 1 i) only in the year a referendum is held and ii) only in the year after a referendum. The results for separatist war onset remain similar (see models 1 and 2), but some differences emerge for the war termination models. Specifically, while the coefficient for mutually agreed referendums remains similarly sized, it is no longer statistically significant in both model 5 and 6. The likely reason is that even fewer observations are now coded with an occurrence of a consensual referendum (e.g., just 6 observations in model 5). Another difference is that the unilateral referendum dummy is now statistically significant in one model 6, though it remains statistically indistinguishable from zero in model 5.

Table S4 also reports the results when longer time frames are considered. Models 3 and 7 consider the effects of referendums held in the current as well as the two subsequent years instead of just the current and subsequent year. The results are similar to those reported in the paper. Finally, in models 4 and 8 I analyze exponential decay functions indicating the time elapsed since a consensual or unilateral referendum. The decay functions are coded 1 in the year of a referendum and then decrease exponentially with a half-life of three years, thus allowing consideration of the long-term implications of referendums under the assumption that the effects referendums decrease over time. The results are visualized in Figure S1 and suggest that the effects of mutually agreed and unilateral referendums can be long-lasting.

Table S5 shows the results when the dependent variables are restricted to the onset/termination of major separatist wars as defined by Doyle & Sambanis (2006). I get similar results compared to those in the paper in linear probability models including just the main predictors (see models 1 and 4), in fixed effects models including the controls used in the paper (see models 2 and 5), as well as in fixed effects models which in addition include the five controls introduced above (see models 3 and 6).

Table S3: Additional controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Onset	Onset	Term.	Term.
Mutually agreed SD referendum	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.021** (0.008)	0.421** (0.156)	0.433* (0.187)
Unilateral SD referendum	0.113* (0.048)	0.088* (0.041)	0.090 (0.087)	-0.082 (0.094)
Exclusion		0.038* (0.017)		-0.075 (0.059)
Regional autonomy		0.010 (0.015)		0.078 (0.059)
Autonomy restriction		0.167*** (0.048)		-0.075 (0.050)
Separatist kin		0.000 (0.017)		-0.005 (0.026)
Hydrocarbon reserves		0.049+ (0.025)		0.005 (0.048)
Democracy		-0.011 (0.027)		0.027 (0.078)
ln(GDP per capita)		-0.020 (0.014)		-0.007 (0.027)
Peacekeeping		-0.002 (0.023)		0.061 (0.041)
Cold War		0.030* (0.012)		-0.007 (0.035)
Civil war mediation		0.175 (0.141)		-0.002 (0.027)
Nonviolent campaign		0.071+ (0.036)		0.030 (0.041)
De facto independence		0.060 (0.070)		-0.067 (0.064)
Government military personnel		0.570 (0.702)		-2.558+ (1.314)
Number of pol. relevant groups		-0.002* (0.001)		-0.001 (0.002)
Dispute FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes
Peace years	No	Yes	No	No
War years	No	No	No	Yes
Groups	277	277	123	123
Countries	94	94	51	51
Observations	6571	6566	2246	2241

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. FEs = fixed effects; GDP = gross domestic product; SD = self-determination; pol. = politically; term. = termination. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S4: Alternative time frames

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Onset	Onset	Onset	Onset	Term.	Term.	Term.	Term.
<i>Mutually agreed SD referendum in:</i>								
Current year	-0.020*				0.380			
	(0.009)				(0.236)			
Previous year		-0.011+				0.467		
		(0.006)				(0.364)		
Current & previous two years			-0.014*				0.380+	
			(0.006)				(0.199)	
Decay function				-0.030**				0.435*
				(0.010)				(0.206)
<i>Unilateral SD referendum in:</i>								
Current year	0.101+				0.074			
	(0.058)				(0.090)			
Previous year		0.109*				-0.315*		
		(0.052)				(0.137)		
Current & previous two years			0.095*				-0.010	
			(0.039)				(0.066)	
Decay function				0.106*				0.001
				(0.044)				(0.069)
Exclusion	0.046*	0.034+	0.046*	0.044*	-0.089	-0.088	-0.089	-0.090
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Regional autonomy	0.016	0.011	0.017	0.017	0.057	0.061	0.058	0.058
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Autonomy restriction	0.185***	0.177***	0.185***	0.187***	-0.085	-0.067	-0.081	-0.082
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Separatist kin	-0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.007	-0.011	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Hydrocarbon reserves	0.046+	0.045+	0.047+	0.048+	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Democracy	-0.005	-0.021	-0.007	-0.009	0.061	0.040	0.054	0.053
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.075)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.024+	-0.015	-0.023+	-0.022+	-0.008	-0.004	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Peacekeeping	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.055	0.048	0.055	0.055
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Cold War	0.028*	0.019+	0.029*	0.030*	-0.011	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Dispute FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peace years	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
War years	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groups	277	271	277	277	123	123	123	123
Countries	94	94	94	94	51	51	51	51
Observations	6571	6465	6571	6571	2241	2217	2241	2241

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. FEs = fixed effects; GDP = gross domestic product; SD = self-determination; term. = termination. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S1: Long-term effects of mutually agreed and unilateral self-determination referendums




Table S5: Major separatist war onset and continuation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Onset	Onset	Onset	Term.	Term.	Term.
Mutually agreed SD referendum	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.011* (0.004)	0.597*** (0.162)	0.665*** (0.151)	0.593** (0.198)
Unilateral SD referendum	0.091* (0.039)	0.092** (0.032)	0.091** (0.032)	0.080 (0.089)	-0.064 (0.103)	-0.042 (0.098)
Exclusion		0.020+ (0.011)	0.019+ (0.010)		-0.179+ (0.097)	-0.163+ (0.085)
Regional autonomy		-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)		0.146 (0.097)	0.185+ (0.102)
Autonomy restriction		0.149*** (0.037)	0.149*** (0.037)		-0.078 (0.058)	-0.090 (0.060)
Separatist kin		0.002 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)		-0.029 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.034)
Hydrocarbon reserves		0.027* (0.013)	0.028* (0.013)		-0.112 (0.080)	-0.112 (0.077)
Democracy		-0.000 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)		-0.148 (0.180)	-0.219 (0.180)
ln(GDP per capita)		-0.014+ (0.007)	-0.015+ (0.008)		-0.122+ (0.062)	-0.138* (0.061)
Peacekeeping		-0.015 (0.010)	-0.018+ (0.010)		0.072 (0.094)	0.063 (0.078)
Cold War		0.018** (0.006)	0.018** (0.006)		0.020 (0.048)	0.015 (0.044)
Civil war mediation			0.084+ (0.043)			-0.019 (0.036)
Nonviolent campaign			0.009 (0.012)			-0.056+ (0.029)
De facto independence			0.011 (0.044)			-0.110 (0.112)
Government military personnel			0.349 (0.467)			-2.518 (1.502)
Number of pol. relevant groups			-0.000 (0.001)			0.025 (0.031)
Dispute FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Peace years	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
War years	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groups	280	280	280	73	73	73
Countries	94	94	94	38	38	38
Observations	7824	7819	7814	993	993	993

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. FEs = fixed effects; GDP = gross domestic product; SD = self-determination; pol. = politically; term. = termination. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

2 Survey Experiment

2.1 Vignette and Outcome Questions

The Scottish government is about to ask permission from the UK government to hold a second independence referendum. However, it remains unclear whether the UK government will agree to another referendum. You can help our research by imagining that the Scottish government organises another independence referendum next year.

Imagine that, as in 2014, the UK government agrees to the referendum. The referendum is therefore held with the consent of the UK government. // Imagine that, contrary to 2014, the UK government does not agree to the referendum. The referendum is therefore held without the consent of the UK government.

How fair would this referendum be? [Possible answers: 0 (very unfair) – 10 (very fair)]

Imagine that Scotland voted to become an independent country in the referendum we just described to you. How important do you think it would be to comply with the referendum outcome? [Possible answers: 0 (not important at all) – 10 (very important)]

2.2 Sample Descriptives

Table S6: Sample descriptives

	English	English & unionist	Scottish	Scottish & separatist
Female	51%	49%	50%	47%
Age:				
18-29	37%	33%	34%	35%
30-44	37%	39%	32%	30%
45-59	19%	20%	23%	23%
60+	7%	8%	11%	12%
University degree	59%	63%	63%	64%
High political interest	40%	44%	53%	61%
Left-right position:				
Leftist	40%	37%	64%	77%
Centrist	29%	28%	22%	17%
Rightist	31%	35%	14%	7%
Observations	7687	3827	1355	889

Note: Political interest was measured using a three-point scale ranging from “not much” to “some” and “a good deal” of political interest. Subjects are coded as having high political interest if they indicated “a good deal”. Left-right position was measured on a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Subjects are coded as leftist if they gave a score of 0-4, as a centrist if they gave a score of 5, and as a rightist if they gave a score of 6-10. Observations gives the total number of subjects in a given category, including subjects with missings on gender, age, etc.

2.3 Robustness Checks

Table S7 shows the results when the analyses reported in the paper are repeated while adjusting for the following five covariates: age, gender, education, political interest, and general political orientation. Age is measured in years. Gender is measured using a female dummy and education using a university degree dummy. Political interest is measured using a three-point scale ranging from “not much” to “some” and “a good deal”. Finally, general political orientation is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). All covariates were measured pre-treatment. The results are very similar to those reported in the paper.

Table S8 repeats the analyses reported in the paper while dropping subjects who rushed through the tool in almost super-human speed. Speeders are defined as subjects who completed *WhoGetsMyVoteUK* in less than half of the average time (i.e., less than $499/2 = 249.5$ seconds). Again, the results remain similar.

Finally, Table S9 repeats the analyses reported in the paper while applying a more lenient definition of ethnic identity. When filling in the *WhoGetsMyVoteUK* application, subjects were asked about the extent to which they consider themselves to be English or Scottish on a scale ranging from 0 (does not describe me at all) to 10 (describes me perfectly). In the paper, I applied a strict definition of ethnic identity and included only respondents who indicated that English/Scottish perfectly describes them. Table S9 reports the results when subjects instead gave a score of 5 or higher. The results are similar.

Table S7: Adding covariates

	<u>Procedural fairness perceptions</u>				<u>Willingness to accept a Scottish vote for independence</u>			
	(1) English	(2) English & unionist	(3) Scottish	(4) Scottish & separatist	(5) English	(6) English & unionist	(7) Scottish	(8) Scottish & separatist
Mutually agreed referendum ¹	1.941*** (0.079)	2.156*** (0.109)	1.169*** (0.196)	0.699*** (0.194)	1.968*** (0.076)	2.567*** (0.111)	1.042*** (0.169)	0.343* (0.133)
Age	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.011* (0.005)
Female	-0.175* (0.082)	-0.080 (0.114)	-0.013 (0.206)	0.145 (0.201)	0.488*** (0.079)	0.650*** (0.116)	0.097 (0.178)	0.040 (0.138)
University degree	0.126 (0.084)	0.261* (0.117)	-0.066 (0.215)	0.044 (0.216)	-0.466*** (0.080)	-0.488*** (0.120)	-0.002 (0.186)	-0.072 (0.149)
Political interest	0.125* (0.059)	0.083 (0.084)	0.667*** (0.156)	0.373* (0.165)	0.174** (0.056)	0.216* (0.085)	0.272* (0.135)	0.253* (0.114)
Left-right	-0.319*** (0.019)	-0.308*** (0.028)	-0.517*** (0.052)	-0.170** (0.056)	-0.078*** (0.018)	-0.064* (0.028)	-0.398*** (0.044)	-0.101** (0.038)
Constant	5.466*** (0.213)	4.617*** (0.313)	6.491*** (0.547)	6.738*** (0.547)	6.685*** (0.205)	5.772*** (0.318)	8.536*** (0.475)	8.211*** (0.376)
Observations	5530	2845	1005	676	5597	2871	1003	674

¹ Reference category = referendum is unilaterally initiated by Scottish government.

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S8: Dropping speeders

	<u>Procedural fairness perceptions</u>				<u>Willingness to accept a Scottish vote for independence</u>			
	(1) English	(2) English & unionist	(3) Scottish	(4) Scottish & separatist	(5) English	(6) English & unionist	(7) Scottish	(8) Scottish & separatist
Mutually agreed referendum ¹	1.919*** (0.076)	2.059*** (0.105)	1.123*** (0.200)	0.749*** (0.191)	1.882*** (0.071)	2.497*** (0.105)	1.065*** (0.160)	0.416** (0.126)
Constant	3.917*** (0.053)	3.113*** (0.074)	6.227*** (0.143)	7.754*** (0.136)	6.265*** (0.051)	5.418*** (0.075)	7.713*** (0.114)	8.948*** (0.090)
Observations	6483	3247	1181	768	6588	3271	1191	779

¹ Reference category = referendum is unilaterally initiated by Scottish government.

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S8: More lenient definitions of English and Scottish identity

	<u>Procedural fairness perceptions</u>				<u>Willingness to accept a Scottish vote for independence</u>			
	(1) English	(2) English & unionist	(3) Scottish	(4) Scottish & separatist	(5) English	(6) English & unionist	(7) Scottish	(8) Scottish & separatist
Mutually agreed referendum ¹	1.843*** (0.052)	2.028*** (0.070)	1.261*** (0.165)	0.897*** (0.167)	1.831*** (0.049)	2.427*** (0.071)	1.139*** (0.139)	0.450*** (0.105)
Constant	4.140*** (0.037)	3.331*** (0.050)	5.728*** (0.117)	7.542*** (0.118)	6.203*** (0.035)	5.358*** (0.050)	7.299*** (0.099)	8.892*** (0.075)
Observations	12935	6711	1841	1063	13074	6713	1836	1071

¹ Reference category = referendum is unilaterally initiated by Scottish government.

Note: The table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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