

Self-Determination Movements (SDM) Dataset

Coding Notes II

Random Sample Data (Conflict Dynamics and Attributes of SDM groups)

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ALGERIA

Berbers (Kabyles)

Activity: 1963-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Prior to colonialization, the Berbers had an autonomous status under a nominally independent Muslim state. The Berbers opposed French colonial rule, but the French had subdued the Berbers by 1850. Berber rebellions in 1876, 1882, and 1899 were crushed (Minahan 2002: 866). No concession or restriction during the ten years before movement activity was found, but we code a prior restriction due to the long-standing loss of autonomy. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Kabyles had been promised autonomy upon independence, but the Arab government withdrew this promise in 1963 (Minahan 2002: 866-867). We found no evidence that there were steps towards implementation, thus we do not code this.
- Beginning with independence, the Algerian government began to target Berber education, language and media to spread its policy of Arabization. Government control of the press excluded any written production in Tamazight, the Berber language. The Kabyles lost the cultural and linguistic rights they had enjoyed under French rule (Minahan 2002: 867; Minorities at Risk Project). [1963: cultural rights restriction]
- The 1990 Arabization law projected the complete Arabization of official activities by 1992 and of higher education by 1997. Arabic would be the only official language after 1997, with substantial penalties for users of Berber languages or French (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 394). [1990: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1995, the central government allowed the limited use of the Berber language in education (Minahan 2002: 868; Minorities at Risk Project). [1995: cultural rights concession]
- "The National Charter of 1996 recognises the Berber culture and language as one of the components of Algerian identity. It is not possible to study for a degree in Berber culture and Amazigh. The state controlled television broadcasts programmes in Amazigh. Although Amazigh is not currently taught routinely in schools, a pilot has been set up to teach the Berber language in some schools. A commission has also been set up to promote Berber culture and introduce the Berber language into education and communication systems" (United Kingdom Home Office: B.10). [1996: cultural rights concession]
- In July 1998, "[d]espite widespread opposition, Algeria's government is celebrated its independence yesterday by banning the official use of all languages except Arabic" (The Ottawa Citizen 7/6/1998, Lexis Nexis). We do not code this as a restriction because it simply reaffirms the status quo – Tamazight has never been an official language.
- In 2001, an agreement was made to make Tamazight a national language (Cunningham 2014: 199). The agreement was implemented in 2002, when the Algerian government amended the Constitution so that Berber became a national language (Keesing's Record of World Events: March 2002). However, it was still not granted the status of an official language (ANSamed 8/20/2009, Lexis Nexis). This amendment came after demonstrations that took place between April 2001 and March 2002 to protest a high school student's death at a police station (AFP 6/19/2007, Lexis Nexis). It is not considered a repeal of the Arabization Laws since, despite

being a national language, Tamazight still cannot be used in any official activities without official status. [2001: cultural rights concession]

- In January 2002, after ongoing talks with the moderate Berbers, the Algerian government adopted “a series of resolutions” that proposed “the establishment of a special ministerial council to implement the creation of decentralized government councils in the Kabyle at *wilaya* level” (Europa World Yearbook 2003: 446-447). We do not code this as an autonomy concession since it was confined to the local level.
- In July 2003, the Algerian government “agreed to reintroduce the use of Tamazight into Algeria’s educational system, thereby fulfilling one of the demands of the el-Kseur Platform” (Europa World Yearbook 2004: 466). [2003: cultural rights concession]
- The Berber group Aarch demanded that the Algerian government accept all six of its preliminary demands in the 15-point El Kseur Platform before it would begin negotiations. The Algerian government had accepted five of the six preliminary Berber demands in January 2004 (Minorities at Risk Project; also see the 2003 concession). This led to the start of negotiations between the two sides (Europa World Yearbook 2004: 466). During the negotiations, the Algerian government accepted the sixth preliminary demand in the El Kseur Platform. In January 2004, the two sides signed an agreement noting that “unduly elected officials’ voted into office in regional, local and parliamentary elections in Kabylie in 2002” would be removed from office (AFP 2004; in October 2002, local-level elections had experienced low voter turnout as the Berbers boycotted elections. Subsequently, officials were installed into local office against Berber wishes. The removal of these officials was the sixth preliminary demand in the El Kseur platform). We do not code an autonomy concession since the grant of new elections refers to the local level. However, we code a cultural rights concession in 2005: in 2005 Algeria’s government signed a deal with Berber leaders, promising economic aid for the restive region and more recognition for its language (BBC 2005). There appear to have been some steps towards implementation. For instance, in June 2007, the Algerian government approved two new language authorities – the Amazigh Language Academy and the High Council for the Amazigh language – both of which aim to promote and standardize Tamazight (Magharebia 2007). [2005: cultural rights concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Algeria attained independence in 1962, which implies a host state change. However, this is before the start date and thus not coded.

Regional autonomy

- While there were some autonomy concessions, one cannot speak of meaningful regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Berbers’ most significant self-determination movement, the Socialist Forces Front, claims more political autonomy for the Berber dominated regions and official status for the Berber

language (Tamazight) (Minorities at Risk Project). Minority Rights Group notes, in addition, that while the Algerian government fears outright secessionism, there appears little support for secession. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1963-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Berbers (Kabyles)
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Berbers
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	61502000

Territory

- In the north-eastern provinces the Kabyles make up a majority (63%) and the Kabyles in these provinces in turn make up a majority of the entire Berber population in Algeria (Minahan 2002: 863). This is confirmed by Minority Rights Group International, which states that “about half of the Berber-speaking population is concentrated in the mountainous areas east of Algiers – Kabylia.” Other Berber communities, such as the Shawiya, the Mozabites or the Tuareg live scattered across the country’s southern and eastern parts (see GeoEPR). [concentrated]
- According to Minahan (2002: 863) the territory claimed by the nationalists (Kabylia) consists of the north-eastern provinces of Batna, Béjaia, Jijel, Setif, Tebessa, Oum-el-Bouaghi, and Tizi-Ouzou, which border Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea. There are also Berber settlements in the country’s south and east (not fully clear whether nationalists also make claims with regard to them), bordering Libya, Mali, and Niger (see GeoEPR). [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- The Kabyles’ homeland overlaps with the polygon representing the Atlas Uplift field (PRIMKEY: AG004PET) that was discovered in 1960. The southern Berber territories also include hydrocarbon reserves: PRIMKEY AG022PET, AG024PET, AG010PET. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The respective EPR group (scenario 1:1) is coded as having several kin groups throughout the movement’s period of activity. EPR lists the Tuareg in Mali, Niger and Libya and the Berbers in Morocco and Libya. All kin groups have a population of over 100,000. The Minorities at Risk data also provides evidence of “close kindred across a border”, mentioning the Berbers in Morocco and Tunisia as the two largest kin groups. According to Minahan (2002: 863) there is also a large Kabyle community in France (1.5 million). We thus code the presence of kin in neighboring countries. [kin in neighboring country]

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AUSTRALIA

Christmas Islanders

Activity: 1981-2009

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Britain annexed Christmas Island, then uninhabited, in 1888. The UK transferred the island to the Christmas Island Phosphate Company in 1897. In 1900, it was incorporated into the Straits settlement and became subject to the law of Singapore. It was occupied by the Japanese army from 1942 to 1945. Together with Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the island became a colony of Singapore. In 1958, it became an Australian territory (Green 2006: 115). The 1958 Christmas Island Act and the Assembly Ordinance established a local court and an elected Assembly (Arthur 2005: 76), hence we code a prior concession. No concessions or restrictions in the ten years before movement onset. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1981, Christmas Islanders attained Australian citizenship, which signifies the end of the colonial period. In 1984, Australian social security benefits were extended to Christmas Islanders (Green 2006: 116). Neither constitutes a concession as defined in the codebook.
- The 1958 Christmas Island Act and the Assembly Ordinance established a local court and an elected Assembly. The Assembly provided all local government and municipal services by means of the Christmas Island Services Corporation. Due to administrative problems, the Assembly was dismissed in 1987 and replaced by a Commonwealth Administrator (Arthur 2005: 76). [1987: autonomy restriction]
- The 1992 Territories Law Reform Act established a local parliament, the Christmas Island Shire Council. The Shire Council provides local services and has the power to receive Commonwealth Local Government funding (Arthur 2005: 76). This constitutes an autonomy concession, though it has to be noted that the Christmas Islanders' level of autonomy has remained limited. In particular, Christmas Island continues to be sub-ordinated to Western Australia; that is, most Western Australian laws apply also in Christmas Island. [1992: autonomy concession]
- Around 1994, there appear to have been plans to abolish the island's duty free status, which was at least part of the rationale of the Christmas Islanders to hold a unilateral referendum on their autonomy in 1994. It seems that the plan was never implemented (Christmas Island continues to have duty free status as of 2014). We do not code a restriction.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- There is a local parliament, but its competencies are too limited to justify a regional autonomy coding. Christmas Island is sub-ordinated to Western Australia and most Western Australian laws apply also there. Thus also no major territorial change.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The January 5, 2000, edition of *The Straits Times* reports that Christmas Islanders have been fighting the Australian government for two decades to gain more autonomy, namely “to make laws that are theirs, have a parliament or general assembly that matters, to control their own lives, to raise their own revenue.” Such provisions would be “no more or no less than the status enjoyed by every other Australian state, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory” and “even Australia’s other two island territories, Norfolk and Cocos Islands, enjoy a level of self-government denied to Christmas Islanders.” In an unofficial referendum in 1994, increased autonomy was supported but secession rejected. In 1999, a second unofficial referendum again favored autonomy. And a Commonwealth inquiry in 1995 found that residents were dissatisfied with their level of autonomy because they felt their administrative system did not provide a sufficient degree of self-government (Arthur 2005: 78). In sum, there appear to be claims for autonomy either within or outside Western Australia; since we were unable to establish the dominant claim, we code the more radical claim (sub-state secession). [1981-2009: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Christmas Islanders
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- EPR does not code Christmas Islands since it is an overseas entity. According to EPR, the Australian central government is dominated by Whites. We did not come by evidence that would suggest Christmas Islanders at any point had an important role to play in the central government. there are no signs of discrimination, either. Thus, we code Christmas Islanders as powerless throughout the movement’s activity. [1981-2009: powerless]
- We do not have an estimate of the number of people who self-identify as Christmas Islanders and thus have to draw on the island’s population. The CIA World Factbook estimates Christmas Island’s population at 1,513 in 2013. With Australia’s population at 22,262,501 (same year and source), the Christmas Islanders’ group size is estimated as 0.00007. [1981-2009: 0.0001 (group size)]

Territory

- We deemed it more likely than not that the threshold for territorial concentration is met, but whether or not the Christmas Islanders can be considered territorially concentrated is ambiguous. We lack population data based on self-identification. For the group size estimate, we relied on the island’s population. We do not know how many self-identified Christmas Islanders there are in

- other parts of Australia. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory, Christmas Island, has seashores, but given that it's an island no land border. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- None found. [no kin]

Sources

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Torres Strait Islanders

Activity: 1976-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Due to their geographic position, the Torres Strait Islanders lived in relative isolation until the late 19th century, when the islands were annexed by the Colony of Queensland (Shnukal 2001). Given their remoteness, the Torres Strait Islanders continued to have a fair degree of autonomy until the early 20th century, though amidst of increasing discrimination against Torres Strait Islanders (Shnukal 2001). In the 1960s the Queensland government changed its policy to an assimilationist one. The 1960s saw the removal of much of the social and economic discrimination laws (e.g., travel restrictions). From 1964 onwards Islanders were allowed to vote in both national and state elections (Shnukal 2001). In 1973, an Aboriginal advisory body to the Minister was established (Pratt 2003). In sum, there were concessions being made in the political (in particular introduction of the right to vote) and social and economic realm, but not related to culture or autonomy. Thus no concession or restriction during the ten years before movement onset.
- We code a prior restriction due to Queensland's annexation of the Island and subsequent assimilationist policy. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The 1989 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act established the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), a national body of elected representatives that govern both Torres Strait Islanders and the Aboriginal peoples (Pratt 2003). The ATSIC existed from 1990 to 2005, when it was dismantled due to allegations of corruption [1989: autonomy concession]
- In 1994, the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) was separated from the ATSIC. The TSRA is an elected body of representatives and was formed "to recognize and maintain the special and unique Ailan Kastom of Torres Strait Islanders living in the Torres Strait area" (Torres Strait Regional Authority). The TSRA's functions include creating and monitoring programs, acting as a liaison between the people living in the Torres Strait Islands and the mainland government, and "[protecting] Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal cultural material and information relating to the Torres Strait area if the material or information is considered sacred or otherwise significant by Torres Strait Islanders or Aboriginal persons" (Torres Strait Regional Authority). The creation of the TSRA increased the autonomy rights of the Torres Strait Islanders, hence we code an autonomy concession. [1994: autonomy concession]
- However, the TSRA remained linked to the ATSIC. In 1997, the Australian Prime Minister "promised TSRA full independence from ATSIC by 2000" (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 1997: 49; also see Shukal 2001). The Australian government passed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill, which removed the TSRA budget from ATSIC jurisdiction. This gave TSRA autonomy over budgeting as a first step towards fully separating it from the ATSIC. [1997: autonomy concession]
- Despite the 1997 promise and the development of a bill in 2001 that would give the TSRA complete independent from the ATSIC, the bill was put on hold in 2002, thus stopping the TSRA's road to full independence from the ATSIC. Thus, we code an autonomy restriction in 2002. [2002: autonomy restriction]

- Between 2001-2004, local Torres Strait Islands governing bodies formed two task forces to push for greater autonomy over local governance. However, their proposals – including the Bamaga Accord in 2002 - were ultimately rejected by the Queensland government. We do not code this as restrictions since the autonomy status remained unaffected and since Queensland does not appear to have promised increased autonomy.
- In 2005, the ATSIC was abolished and the TSRA took over the ATSIC's responsibilities with regards to programs relating to the Torres Strait Islanders, implying increased autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The competencies of the TSRA (mainly related to cultural and economic autonomy, see Minority Rights Group International) appear not significant enough to justify a regional autonomy coding. According to Elks (2011), “true autonomy has not been achieved”.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Torres Strait Islanders first called for independence in 1976 when James Akee formed the Torres United Party. “It called publically for the first time for a separate and independent “Free Nation of Torres Strait” where the Islanders would control the Strait’s resources and future and facilitate the return of Islander diaspora” (Shnukal 2001). In 1981 calls for independence were rejected by the High Court of Australia. In 1988, a Torres Strait Islanders Congress voted for the secession of the island not just from Queensland (to which it is sub-ordinated), but from Australia (Elks 2011).
- However, in subsequent years the mood appears to have softened, and most Torres Strait Islanders, including the leader of the secessionist movement, George Mye, “want to become a separate territory of Australia – similar to the Northern Territory – with their own parliament and full regional control of island affairs, including the provision of health and education.” Mr. Mye’s “vie on the ideal model for regional autonomoy has softened. The fervor remains. “To secede from Australia is a no-no,” he said. “What we want, what we need, to look after the Torres Strait’s future is autonomy for the region, but we should be Australians for all time. “ We’re not seceding from Australia, but Queensland, yes” (Elks 2011). Less radical claims have also been raised, such as the attainment of a status similar to the Christmas or Norfolk Islands, which would mean substantial autonomy within Queensland. While this is sufficient evidence for us to code a moderation of the independence claim issued in the initial phase, we were unable to establish whether the claim for outright separation from Queensland or for an autonomous setting within Queensland was dominant (hence we code the more radical claim, sub-state secession). Elks (2011) seems to suggest that the moderation happened following the establishment of the Torres Strait Regional Authority in 1994. Hence, we code an independence claim until and including

1994, and a sub-state secession claim for 1995 onwards. [1976-1994: independence claim; 1995-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Torres Strait Islanders
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- The Torres Strait Islands are not coded in EPR since it is an overseas entity. According to the 2001 census there are 26,046 Torres Strait Islanders in Australia, and another 17,528 of mixed Torres Strait Islander/Aboriginal descent (we combine the two). This yields a group size of 0.0023 relative to Australia's total population (18,769,249 in 2001). [1976-2012: 0.0023 (group size)]
 - o Note: Minahan (2002: 13) does not give an estimate of the number of Torres Strait Islanders but only of the total Aboriginal population.
- According to EPR Whites dominate the mainland's central government. Mainland Aborigines are considered powerless throughout the movement's existence. The power status of the islander indigenous people of the Torres Strait Islands is very similar to that of mainland Aborigines (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International; Shnukal 2001). During the movement's existence, Torres Strait Islanders were not actively discriminated against in terms of access to the central government. Thus, we code Torres Strait Islanders as powerless throughout. [1976-2012: powerless]

Territory

- According to the 2011 census, the Torres Strait Islanders make up a majority of their islands (roughly 90%). Yet, the islands' total population is only 4,248. The remaining approximately 40,000 Torres Strait Islanders live scattered across Australia. [not concentrated]
- The claimed territory (Torres Strait Islands) has seashores, but no land border. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- We found no information on numerically significant kin in another country (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 13). [no kin]

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AZERBAIJAN

Armenians

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created. In 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the union, which is tantamount to a reduction in the center's control of the regions, and thus a concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
- In early 1989, Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under direct rule by Moscow and its leaders were replaced by outsiders. Thus, we code an autonomy restriction. Note though that this also meant that Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh was suspended, a core demand of the movement. Thus direct rule could also be seen as a concession. However, it does not matter that much as we also code an autonomy restriction in 1989 due to Azerbaijan's angry reaction to the loss of control over Karabakh and its imposition of an economic blockade over Karabakh in 1989. Furthermore, we also code an autonomy concession in 1989 due to the re-instatement of autonomy (see below). Thus we would get the same result if we interpreted the removal of Azeri control as a concession and the reinstatement as a restriction (except for the prior concession/restriction). [1989: autonomy restriction]
- In November 1989 Karabakh was returned to Azeri administration after a short interlude of direct rule by Moscow (see Armenians under Russia). We code this as a concession as Karabakh re-attained its autonomy. Note though that this was a significant blow for the Karabakhis as the removal of Azeri control was their core demand. [1989: autonomy concession] [prior concession].

Concessions and restrictions

- Following Azerbaijan's declaration of independence on October 18, 1991, the Parliament of Azerbaijan abolished the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh on November 26, 1991. Under Soviet rule Nagorno-Karabakh had enjoyed the status of an Autonomous Oblast under Azeri control. Not only was autonomy abolished, also all administrative divisions were abolished and the territory was split up and redistributed amongst the neighboring administrative rayons (Caspersen 2012). In response, authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence and staged a referendum on independence. While Azerbaijan was formally still part of the Soviet Union in November 1991, we still code this under the header of Azerbaijan since the Soviet Union had been very close to dissolution since the August putsch. [1991: autonomy restriction]
- Full-scale war broke out, resulting in the occupation of most of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian mediation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the de-facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh led to the signing of a ceasefire in May 1994. The so-called Bishkek Protocol, in addition to the ceasefire, includes a reference that Nagorno-Karabakh is granted wide-ranging autonomy, the withdrawal of Armenian troops, and the return of refugees on both sides (International Crisis Group 2005a). [1994: autonomy concession]
- The 1994 ceasefire remained unstable at best, regularly broken and not internationally observed (Waal 2010; Cornell 1999: 41). Every year since saw casualties at the Karabakh-Azerbaijan border. Repeated rounds of negotiations over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh followed the 1994 cease-fire, whereby the OSCE has acted as main mediator. The negotiations remained without a

tangible result, that is, no formal agreement was reached even on the basic principles (Zourabian 2006). The Azeri side has repeatedly offered the Karabakhis autonomy, but Azerbaijan has not detailed what this autonomy would look like (International Crisis Group 2005) and unlike, for example, Moldova which has unilaterally raised the status of Transdniestria in its 1994 constitution, the Azeri constitution does not include a reference to an autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the blockade begun in 1989 is upheld. Traveling from Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh is impossible, the border is shut. Also the economic blockade is upheld (International Crisis Group 2005b: 24; International Crisis Group 2007). While no solution was found, the Azeri side repeatedly reaffirmed its promise to grant far-reaching autonomy. In accordance with the coding rules, we code the most significant of these reaffirmations of Azerbaijan's autonomy offer.

- In July 1997, the OSCE mediation team presented a possible peace deal, with Nagorno-Karabakh gaining far-reaching autonomy (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13). Azerbaijan's Aliyev appears to have agreed to the proposals, and he reaffirmed his willingness to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of autonomy (MAR). The plan was, however, rejected by Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan made similar promises in 1995 and 1996 (see MAR), but we only code the 1997 agreement to the peace proposal, since this is the most significant. [1997: autonomy concession]
- In 1998, Azerbaijan rejected a confederal solution (International Crisis Group 2005a: 14).
- In 1999, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan appeared to reach an agreement on a territory swap, with Armenia gaining Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan gaining Armenia's Meghri region. However, Azerbaijan never publicly offered such a territorial swap (International Crisis Group 2005a: 14).
- In 1999 and 2001, it looked like a deal was near, but the hopes were dashed. In 2002, Azerbaijan publicly rejected the option of attributing Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia (International Crisis Group 2005a: 14)
- Linked with big hopes, the Prague Process began in 2004, facilitated by the Minsk Group of the OSCE, led by France, Russia, and the US. In 2005 the mediators proposed core principles for a comprehensive settlement, including a withdrawal of Armenian forces, the return of IDPs, a vote on the future status of Karabakh, and an interim international security arrangement for Karabakh until the vote is held. At around this time, Azerbaijan's President Aliyev again promised the Karabakhis far-reaching autonomy, though reaffirming Azerbaijan's claim on Karabakh (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13): "Our position remains unchanged – our lands must be returned and our territorial integrity restored. Our greatest concessions are security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and our readiness to grant the highest degree of autonomy that exists in the world." Since the promise was made in the context of a high-profile attempt at a negotiated solution, we code an autonomy concession in 2005. Similar promises were made in 2006, when Azerbaijan promised autonomy akin to Russia's Tatarstan (BBC 2006). The negotiations, however, again ended in deadlock. In 2006, the Minsk co-chairs believed that a solution is near, and put significant international pressure on the parties. France's President, Chirac, met with both the Azeri and the Armenian presidents, the US Secretary of State, Rice, phoned them, and also Putin intervened. 2006 was widely perceived as a window of opportunity for reaching an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh (International Crisis Group 2007). However, the mood soured after meetings between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in February, June, and November 2006. The troop withdrawal and the modalities of the referendum (Armenia and Karabakh want a vote in Karabakh, including independence as an option, and Azerbaijan wants a national vote, see International Crisis Group 2005a, 2007) proved to be critical stumbling blocks. No agreement was reached, given a lack of political will to compromise on both sides. As background info, one has to notice that both Armenia and Azerbaijan invest heavily in an arms race, but Azerbaijan believes it will eventually outpace Armenia (given its isolation) and be able to dictate a solution. Azerbaijan has repeatedly threatened military action. Armenia, on the other hand, believes that time is on its side and that the status of Karabakh will eventually be accepted as a fait accompli (International Crisis Group 2007). [2005: autonomy concession]
- In 2007, the OSCE proposed another peace settlement, the Madrid Principles, linked with big hopes (International Crisis Group 2009). Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on certain principles, but no agreement could be reached regarding the modalities of the Armenian troop withdrawal

and the modalities of a future decision on the status of Karabakh. It is possible that Azerbaijan repeated its autonomy offer in these or subsequent negotiations, but we were unable to locate a further autonomy promise.

Sovereignty declarations

- September 2, 1991, the Armenian leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh declare their Oblast an independent Soviet Republic. January 6, 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan (Minahan 1998: 2; MAR). This is coded as a single independence declaration since Azerbaijan had already declared its independence (in at least implicit agreement with Moscow) on August 30. [1991: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Azerbaijan attained independence in 1991, implying a change of the host state. [1991: host change (new)]
- [1991: abolishment of regional autonomy]
- [1991: erection of de-facto independent state]

Regional autonomy

- Karabakh's autonomous status was abolished in late November 1991, but due to the erection of a de-facto state that same year we code regional autonomy throughout. [1991-2012: regional autonomy].

De-facto independence

- Caspersen (2012: 12) suggests that de-facto independence was achieved in 1994 and has remained in place ever since. EPR also considers the Armenians in Azerbaijan as having separatist autonomy, but in contrast to Caspersen, pegs the onset of de-facto independence already at 1991. Cornell (1999: 33) appears to support the EPR coding, noting that Armenian forces have gained the upper hand relatively quickly and controlled substantial parts of Karabakh already in 1992, if not 1991. In 1993 there was a UN Resolution that demanded the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories in Azerbaijan, thus supporting the view taken by Cornell and EPR. Since de-facto independence appears to have begun in 1991 and more or less simultaneously with Azerbaijan's independence, we code de-facto independence from 1991 onwards and do not apply the first of January rule in this case. [1991-2012: de-facto independence].

Claims

- The official stance of Nagorno-Karabakh is that they want to gain recognition as an independent state. However, the International Crisis Group (2005a) argues that the preferred outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh is either unification with Armenia or full independence. Caspersen (2012) argues that the effective aim is merging Karabakh with Armenia, and Cornell (1999: 44) notes that by all standards, Karabakh is de-facto integrated with Armenia already. Since Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan already in 1991 (see above), we code an irredentist claim throughout. [1991-2012: claim for unification with Armenia]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Armenians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Armenians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	37304000

- However, note that in our coding scheme self-exclusion becomes “powerless”.

Territory

- According to the Soviet Union’s 1989 census, there were 391,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 145,000 in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Armenians made up 75% of the local population (HRW 1994). This suggest that in 1989, the Armenians were not concentrated because less than 50% resided in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Karabakh war led to ethnic cleansing; very few Azeris remained in Nagorno-Karabakh, and very few Armenians remained in Azerbaijan proper (see e.g. The Economist 2011). We code the Armenians as concentrated from 1991 since the war had started already before Azerbaijan’s independence. [concentrated]
 - o The Armenians have remained concentrated in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the 2009 census, there are approximately 120,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan (from 400,000 in 1989). Apart from some smaller Armenian communities scattered throughout Azerbaijan, most Armenians are concentrated in the break-away region of Nagorno-Karabakh (Minorities at Risk). In the latter, the Armenians make up over 95% of the population (Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States).
- The Armenians in Azerbaijan inhabit Nagorno-Karabakh, the spatially contiguous mountainous region around valley of the Kura River in western Azerbaijan (see also settlement polygon in GeoEPR). The territory is an official autonomous district of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh is separated from Armenia and Iran by a strip of Azeri territory. That territory, however, has been occupied by Karabakh and Armenia since 1993, suggesting that the claim also includes this area. There is no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Nagorno-Karabakh overlaps with PRIMKEY AJ001PET (discovery unknown). An adjacent reserve, PRIMKEY GG002PET, was discovered well before 1945 (Lujala et al. 2007). On this basis, we code oil throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are numerous Armenian kin groups in neighboring countries (Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Iran) and a non-adjoining country (Lebanon) throughout the movement’s period of activity. The presence of ethnic kin groups is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk data where the Armenians in Armenia and Georgia are listed as the two largest kin groups. All of these groups have populations larger than 100,000 thousand. [kin in neighboring country]

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BANGLADESH

Chittagong Hills People

Activity: 1972-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Most of the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) indigenous peoples (also called Jummas; initially 16 tribes of which the Chakma are the largest), moved in the area from the south between the thirteenth and nineteenth century. In 1666, their territory came under the rule of the Bengali, who established treaty relations with the Chakma. These treaty relations were also maintained when the territory was annexed by the British in 1760. The British established the Chittagong Hills Tract, a tribal preserve. Tribal resistance by the Chakma finally led to the imposition of direct British rule in 1787. The tribes, however, could maintain administrative autonomy. In 1860, the hill area of Chittagong was separated from Chittagong district and an independent district Parbatya Chittagong was created (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
- The British colonial period brought preferential treatment of the indigenous peoples in the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) and their small Christian minority in particular. Not only did the British grant them more autonomy, but when immigration from the overcrowded lowlands was increasingly seen as a problem by the local population, the British prohibited further Bengali settlement in 1900 and in 1935 declared the territory a “totally excluded area” where entry was forbidden (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
- In return for tribal support against the advancing Japanese during the Second World War, the British promised the CHT indigenous peoples a separate state. However, the British reneged on their promise and the Hill Tracts were incorporated into Muslim Pakistan (East Bengal) in 1947, despite the fact that the CHT contained almost no Muslim population. Many Jummas would have preferred an independent confederation of northeast tribal states or the territory’s incorporation into India.
- Against rising protests, the Pakistani government granted limited autonomy to the Chittagong Hill Tract and prohibited further settlement from Bengali lowlanders. In 1955, however, the autonomy statute was violated when the Pakistani government took direct control of the district and lifted settlement restrictions. In 1962, tribal control was further reduced and in 1964 the region’s special autonomy status was abolished. [1962: autonomy restriction; 1964: autonomy restriction]
- We code a prior restriction due to the autonomy restrictions in 1962 and 1964. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The indigenous people of the CHT supported the struggle for independence by East Pakistan. However, once the new state of Bangladesh was founded, they had to realize that discrimination continued also under the new government. Secularism and the equality of all citizens irrespective of religious identity was enshrined in the newly adopted constitution but at the same time, immigration of Bengalis to the region was encouraged and the cultural identity of the indigenous peoples of the CHT was constitutionally subsumed under the concept of the "Bengalee Nation". The 1972 constitution recognized only the Bengali culture and language and not the distinct identity of non-Bengali peoples. All citizens were designated as Bengalis and the government insisted that the ethnic groups of the Hill Tracts adopt the Bengali identity (Roy 2000; UNDP

2005). Since this did not change the status of the CHT indigenous peoples, who were equally discriminated under Pakistani rule, this act is not coded.

- In 1977, the principle of secularism was removed by Ziaur Rahman, the country's military ruler, as Bangladesh tightened political, economic, and cultural ties with the Middle East. Islamic symbolism was introduced in all spheres of national life. The CHT indigenous peoples are mainly animist or Buddhist. [1977: cultural rights restriction]
- A 1987 law made Bengali compulsory in education and administration (Minahan 2002). The Bengali Language Introduction Act not only declared Bengali the language for all records and correspondences, laws, proceedings in court and other legal actions but also declared the use of any other language in such institutions as illegal. In light of the fact that the majority of the CHT indigenous peoples do not speak Bengali (Minorities at Risk Project) this law is coded as cultural rights restrictions. [1987: cultural rights restriction]
- Already in 1977, the principle of secularism had been removed by Ziaur Rahman, the country's military ruler, as Bangladesh tightened political, economic, and cultural ties with the Middle East. Islamic symbolism was introduced in all spheres of national life. There was, however, no specific policy implementing the removal of secularism. This only came a decade later, in 1988, when Islam was declared as the state religion of Bangladesh under the Eighth Constitutional Amendment by General Ershad. The constitutional amendment was seen by many as a step towards the imposition of the sharia. The constitutional principle of non-discrimination remained and there were also certain provisions such as Article 41 that guaranteed the right to practice, teach and promote a religious or to refuse to practice a religion (Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project; Udin 2006). Nevertheless, overall this can be seen as a clear restriction of the animist and Buddhist CHT indigenous peoples. [1988: cultural rights restriction]
- In order to devolve powers and responsibilities to the indigenous peoples, the government created three councils in 1989, one to govern each of the three semi-autonomous districts in the CHT (Khagrachari, Rangamati, and Bandarban). The District Council Act (which was amended after the 1997 peace accord) devolved competencies in 33 policy areas, including health and education. In the same year, elections were held. Two-thirds of the seats in the councils and the three chairpersons were reserved for the indigenous people. The PCJSS, the main party associated with the movement, protested against the measures since it sought full, genuine autonomy and the resettlement of Bengalis outside the CHT (Minorities at Risk Project; Peace Accords; UNPO 2014). Nonetheless, the 1989 measures increased the autonomy status of the Chittagong Hill Peoples, if only slightly. [1989: autonomy concession]
- After two decades of rebellion, the PCJSS and the government signed a peace agreement (Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord) in December 1997. The agreement promised limited autonomy through the establishment of a Regional Council consisting of the local government councils of the three CHT districts. The council was given the authority to maintain public administration, law and order and promote development. It furthermore recognized the distinct ethnicity of the CHT indigenous groups and set up the Ministry of Chittagong Hill tracts which is headed by a person of indigenous ethnicity and administers the affairs concerning the CHT. The agreement also made plans to return land to displaced natives via the establishment of a Land Disputes Commission (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International). According to a 2013 report by Amnesty International, the 1997 agreement has not been fully implemented. Nonetheless, the autonomy status of the CHT Peoples has improved, if only slightly. [1997: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- The limited concessions noted above are insufficient to constitute meaningful regional autonomy.

- Bangladesh attained independence in 1971, implying a host change for the Chittagong Hill People. However, the movement only started in 1972 and this change is thus not coded.

Regional autonomy

- See above.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) and its military arm, the Shanti Bahini, are the main parties representing the claims of the indigenous peoples of the CHT. A large majority of the indigenous people support the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini. The PCJSS to-be leaders presented a manifesto to the constitution drafting committee that demanded autonomy for the CHT and the creation of a legislative assembly (Minahan 2002). We thus code autonomy as the dominant claim in the early years of the movement's activity. [1972-1974: autonomy claim]
- There are many sources that see a radicalization of the party's claim once violence occurred. According to Minahan (2002: 848) "tribal leaders demanded secession and the establishment of a sovereign state". Minorities at Risk suggests a similar conclusion, given that it calls the PCJSS insurgency a "struggle for independence or at the very least widespread autonomy". Following the first of January rule, we code independence as the dominant claim from 1975 (violence started in 1974) until and including 1985. [1975-1985: independence claim]
- Negotiations between the government and the PCJSS started in 1985 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In these negotiations, the PCJSS put forward several demands, including in particular a degree of autonomy within the CHT (Minority Rights Group International). The PCJSS also supports the implementation of the 1997 agreement according to which the CHT should be granted autonomy. We can thus assume a moderation of the claim. This is confirmed by the second political party, the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), which was founded in 1998 and which also advocates full autonomy for the CHT, despite rejecting the 1997 accords (Minorities at Risk Project). Following the first of January rule, we code autonomy as the dominant claim as of 1986. [1986-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Chittagong Hills People
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Tribal-Buddhists
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77103000

Territory

- In the CHT, the Chittagong Hills People make up 51% of the population (Minahan 2002: 845). This amounts to around 640,000 people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 810,000 Chittagong Hills People in the whole country in that same year. We thus code the Chittagong Hills People as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Chittagong Hills People inhabit the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The CHT are a spatially contiguous territory that is divided into three autonomous districts (Khagrachari, Rangamati,

Bandarban). The CHT include an international land border (India, Myanmar) and does not have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]

- Two polygons of the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta petroleum fields (PRIMKEY: BG003PET, BG005PET) overlap with the CHT (Lujala et al 2007). One of them was discovered in 1967. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are kin groups in several countries. These are the Adibasi Janajati in Nepal, the Buddhist Arakanese in Myanmar and the Buddhist Arakanese in India. The presence of ethnic kin groups is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk data which states that “the group has close kindred in more than one country”, listing India and Myanmar as the countries with the largest kin groups. The same two countries are also listed in Minahan (2002: 845). [kin in neighboring country]

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BELGIUM

Flemish

Activity: 1954-2012

General notes

- Belgium has developed from a unitary state into a fully-fledged federation. However, the federalization process was not the result of a single legislation but has occurred step by step. Significant constitutional-institutional reforms were undertaken in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993 and 2001. A sixth reform is currently under way. In addition to these major reforms, there were also smaller acts of state-movement interaction that will be reflected in this coding. The peculiar thing about Belgium federalism is that it has both a territorial and a non-territorial dimensions as a consequence of its two different types of constituent units: There are three Communities (Flemish, French and German) and three Regions (Flanders Wallonia and Brussels). Whereas the Regions are territorial units, the Communities are “linked to individuals and language more than territory” (Lecours 2005: 62).

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Belgian Revolution of 1830 led to the separation of the Catholic Provinces in Flanders and Wallonia from the Dutch kingdom in which they had been incorporated by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The newly established kingdom of Belgium was an officially French speaking (first Walloon dialect) and strongly centralized unitary state (Lecours 2005).
- The French language prevailed in almost all of the country’s institutions, causing a sense of Flemish grievance and leading to Flemish resentment of the Walloon domination. Despite opposition from French-speaking elites, the DeVriendt-Coremans laws in the late nineteenth century introduced formal-legal equality between French and Flemish, full cultural and linguistic equality was however far from achieved (Witte et al. 2009).
- Early industrialization made Wallonia the “economic powerhouse of Belgium” (Minority Rights Group International) in the nineteenth century. However, with expanding new industries (petroleum, chemicals, cars) centering around Antwerp and Ghent and with the parallel decline of Wallonia’s coal and steel industry, the economic and social conditions reversed (Minority Rights Group International).
- Cultural and linguistic tensions intensified after World War II, when the Flemish Movement became increasingly powerful and stimulated Walloon nationalism in response. The French-speaking elite, who has been dominating the country since independence, was in decline. A new Flemish assertiveness finally led the government to implement new language legislation that would increase the status of the Flemish language in 1921 (Minahan 2002). Based on this we code a prior concession. [prior concession]
- No concession or restriction was found in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- A 1963 law established three official languages: Flemish in the north, French in the south and German along the Eastern border. Brussels was established as a bilingual area. This Second Gilson Act resulted in the split of universities, political parties and other official institutions (Minahan 2002). [1963: cultural rights concession]
- In December 1970 constitutional amendments were passed defining the country's linguistic regions and the rights of each language community and declaring that Belgium comprised the Flemish, Walloon (French-speaking) and Brussels (bilingual) administrative regions, and with the

establishment earlier in that year of regional economic councils. The territorially-defined regions were mainly active in the economic area. The 1970 constitutional amendments also stipulated the establishment of separate cultural councils for Wallonia and Flanders composed of members of their respective language groups in parliament. The councils had the power to legislate over cultural matters, education, international cultural exchanges, the language used in administration and labor relations (Blanpain 2010: 75; Witte et al. 2009). [1970: autonomy concession]

- In 1977, the Egmont Pact was negotiated as part of the government formation process. The pact aimed at resolving the status of Brussels and announced the establishment of autonomous councils for Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels (Covell 1982: 457; Tsebelis 1990: 182). [1977: autonomy concession]
- Prime Minister Tindemans and the parliament (in particular Flemish MPs), which should have passed the Egmont Pact, were reluctant to implement the pact. First, the pact was sent back for renegotiation between the presidents of the coalition parties. In the end, the pact was rejected in 1978 due to the resignation of the government (Covell 1982: 458). We code an autonomy restriction in 1978 because the center thus rowed back from a very significant promise of autonomy. Note, however, that since then a great number of the 1978 have since been stepwise implemented. Note as well that many Flemish in fact had been opposed to the Egmont pact, which makes this restriction somewhat ambiguous. [1978: autonomy restriction]
- The second constitutional reform in 1980 greatly expanded the capacity of communities and regions. The communities were granted regional legislative assemblies (Councils) and a government. As a continuation of the 1970 reform, the two regions – the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region – were also established and were granted a Council and a Government. Whereas in Flanders, the Government and the Council of the Flemish Region merged with the Government and the Council of the Flemish Community, the French-speakers kept the two institutions separate (Minority Rights Group International; Portal Belgium). [1980: autonomy concession]
- The series of constitutional revisions continued in 1988, when the regions were consolidated and given responsibility for transport and public works while the communities were granted more competences in the field of education (Portal Belgium; Witte et al. 2009: 384). [1988: autonomy concession]
- The fourth constitutional reform in 1993 effectively partitioned Belgium and made it a fully-fledged federal State. Article 1 of the constitution now reads “Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions” (Constitution of Belgium). Additional powers were devolved to the regions (Minahan 2002). [1993: autonomy concession]
- The fifth constitutional reform in 2001 (The Lambermont Accord) gave more power to the communities and regions as it strengthened tax autonomy of the former and implemented an increase in the federal transfers to the latter (Blöchliger et al. 2012: 52). According to Hooghe (2004: 26), the reform also allowed the direct election of subnational councils and introduced a senate representing subnational interests, constitutional autonomy over working rules, some international competencies and treaty power. [2001: autonomy concession]
- The sixth state reform transferred additional competences from the federal to the regional level (labor market, family allowance, part of healthcare). Furthermore, the Senate will no longer be directly elected but will be formed through an assembly of regional parliaments (Portal Belgium, Interel Belgium). [2011: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On November 29 in 1997, Gert Greens proclaimed the Republic of Flanders. Unofficial parliamentary elections and the passing of a constitution followed the next year (Minahan 2002: 611). Since we do not code declarations that are issued by marginal organizations that do not represent a significant part of the movement, this event is not coded.

Major territorial change

- Autonomy was established in 1980 (see below) [1980: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Regional autonomy is clearly given. The question remains as of when this is the case. As we require a “meaningful regional executive organ”, we consider the year of the establishment of the regional governments and community councils (1980) decisive (see above). Following the first of January rule, we thus code regional autonomy as of 1981. [1981-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Demands for cultural and linguistic equality were at the center of the Flemish demands for more self-determination (Minahan 2002). The People’s Union (*Volksunie*, VU), founded in 1954 and the dominant nationalist party in the early years of the movement’s activity period, aimed at autonomy and federalization for Flanders (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 315). This claim is confirmed by Breuning (1997: 16) who analyzes the party programmes of Flemish nationalist parties and states that the Volksunie’s goal was “Flemish autonomy within a confederal arrangement”. We hence code autonomy as the dominant claim in the movement’s first 35-odd years. [1954-1991: autonomy claim]
- A radicalization of the demand took place in the 1970s, when disaffected members of the Volksunie formed the extreme-right Vlaams Blok in 1976. The new party (since 2004 Vlaams Belang) is clearly secessionist as confirmed by their election programmes for the 1991 and 1995 election, where it stated that “it desired Flanders to become an independent state” (Breuning 1997: 17; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 315). In the early years the party’s vote share mostly remained low and only in the 1991 did it manage to overtake the VU as the strongest Flemish nationalist party (Breuning 1997). The party has since achieved considerable electoral success and got as much as 24% in the 2004 election of the Flemish parliament, making it the first party in the Flemish parliament. Although the support of the Vlaams Belang dropped to 15% in 2009 and below 4% in 2014, it has remained the first Flemish nationalist party, which is why we code secession as the dominant claim since 1992. [1992- 2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Flemish
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Flemings
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	21101000

Territory

- In the spatially contiguous Flanders Region the Flemish make up 86% of the population. This amounts to around 5.12 million people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 5,770,000 Flemish in the whole country in that same year (Minahan 2002: 606). We thus code the Flemish as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Flemish territory in Belgium includes Flanders Region (provinces of Antwerp, East Flanders, West Flanders, Limburg, Flemish Brabant) and Brussels metropolitan area. The territory borders the Netherlands and France; it does also have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]

- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The respective EPR group (scenario 1:1) is coded as having one kin group (Dutch in the Netherlands). This is confirmed by other sources such as Minahan (2002: 606) who additionally mentions Flemish communities (approximately 370'000 in 2002) in France. We thus code the presence of ethnic kin in a neighboring country. [kin in neighboring country]

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Walloons

Activity: 1964-2012

General notes

- Belgium has developed from a unitary state into a fully-fledged federation. However, the federalization process was not the result of a single legislation but has occurred step by step. Significant constitutional-institutional reforms were undertaken in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993 and 2001. A sixth reform is currently under way. In addition to these major reforms, there were also smaller acts of state-movement interaction that will be reflected in this coding. The peculiar thing about Belgium federalism is that it has both a territorial and a non-territorial dimensions as a consequence of its two different types of constituent units: There are three Communities (Flemish, French and German) and three Regions (Flanders Wallonia and Brussels). Whereas the Regions are territorial units, the Communities are “linked to individuals and language more than territory” (Lecours 2005: 62).

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Belgian Revolution of 1830 led to the separation of the Catholic Provinces in Flanders and Wallonia from the Dutch kingdom in which they had been incorporated by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The newly established kingdom of Belgium was an officially French speaking (first Walloon dialect) and strongly centralized unitary state (Lecours 2005).
- French language prevailed in almost all of the country’s institutions, causing a sense of Flemish grievance and leading to Flemish resentment of the Walloon domination. Despite opposition from French-speaking elites, the DeVriendt-Coremans laws in the late nineteenth century introduced formal-legal equality between French and Flemish, full cultural and linguistic equality was however far from achieved (Witte et al. 2009).
- Early industrialization made Wallonia the “economic powerhouse of Belgium” (Minority Rights Group International) in the nineteenth century. However, with expanding new industries (petroleum, chemicals, cars) centering around Antwerp and Ghent and with the parallel decline of Wallonia’s coal and steel industry, the economic and social conditions reversed (Minority Rights Group International).
- Cultural and linguistic tensions intensified after World War II, when the Flemish Movement became increasingly powerful and stimulated Walloon nationalism in response. The French-speaking elite, who has been dominating the country since independence, was in decline. A new Flemish assertiveness finally led the government to implement new language legislation that would increase the status of the Flemish language in 1921 and 1963 (Minahan 2002). Due to the relative decline of the French language, we code these developments as a restriction, in spite of the fact that there was no legislation that directly targeted the Walloon level of (linguistic) autonomy. [1963: cultural rights restriction]
- For the same reason, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In December 1970 constitutional amendments were passed defining the country's linguistic regions and the rights of each language community and declaring that Belgium comprised the Flemish, Walloon (French-speaking) and Brussels (bilingual) administrative regions, and with the establishment earlier in that year of regional economic councils. The territorially-defined regions were mainly active in the economic area. The 1970 constitutional amendments also stipulated the establishment of separate cultural councils for Wallonia and Flanders composed of members of their respective language groups in parliament. The councils had the power to legislate over

- cultural matters, education, international cultural exchanges, the language used in administration and labor relations (Blanpain 2010: 75; Witte et al. 2009). [1970: autonomy concession]
- In 1977, the Egmont Pact was negotiated as part of the government formation process. The pact aimed at resolving the status of Brussels and announced the establishment of autonomous councils for Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels (Covell 1982: 457; Tsebelis 1990: 182). [1977: autonomy concession]
 - Prime Minister Tindemands and the parliament (in particular Flemish MPs), which should have passed the Egmont Pact, were reluctant to implement the pact. First, the pact was sent back for renegotiation between the presidents of the coalition parties. In the end, the pact was rejected in 1978 due to the resignation of the government (Covell 1982: 458). We code an autonomy restriction in 1978 because the center thus rowed back from a very significant promise of autonomy. Note, however, that since then a great number of the 1978 have since been stepwise implemented. [1978: autonomy restriction]
 - The second constitutional reform in 1980 greatly expanded the capacity of communities and regions. The communities were granted regional legislative assemblies (Councils) and a government. As a continuation of the 1970 reform, the two regions - the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region - were also established and were granted a Council and a Government. Whereas in Flanders, the Government and the Council of the Flemish Region merged with the Government and the Council of the Flemish Community, the French-speakers kept the two institutions separate (Minority Rights Group International; Portal Belgium). [1980: autonomy concession]
 - The series of constitutional revisions continued in 1988, when the regions were consolidated and given responsibility for transport and public works while the communities were granted more competences in the field of education (Portal Belgium; Witte et al. 2009: 384). [1988: autonomy concession]
 - The fourth constitutional reform in 1993 effectively partitioned Belgium and made it a fully-fledged federal State. Article 1 of the constitution now reads “Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions” (Constitution of Belgium). Additional powers were devolved to the regions (Minahan 2002). [1993: autonomy concession]
 - The fifth constitutional reform in 2001 (The Lambermont Accord) gave more power to the communities and regions as it strengthened tax autonomy of the former and implemented an increase in the federal transfers to the latter (Blöchliger et al. 2012: 52). According to Hooghe (2004: 26), the reform also allowed the direct election of subnational councils and introduced a senate representing subnational interests, constitutional autonomy over working rules, some international competencies and treaty power. [2001: autonomy concession]
 - The sixth state reform transferred additional competences from the federal to the regional level (labor market, family allowance, part of healthcare). Furthermore, the Senate will no longer be directly elected but will be formed through an assembly of regional parliaments (Portal Belgium, Interel Belgium). [2011: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Autonomy was established in 1980 (see below) [1980: Establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Regional autonomy for the Walloons is clearly given. The question remains as of when this is the case. As we require a “meaningful regional executive organ”, we consider the year of the establishment of the regional governments and community councils (1980) decisive (see above).

Following the first of January rule, we thus code regional autonomy as of 1981. [1981-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- We only code movement activity as of 1964, when Walloon movements united to form the Front démocratique des francophones (FDF), which entered the political space at the 1965 general elections. Autonomy is coded as the dominant claim throughout the movement's activity.
- There had been some secessionist and irredentist tendencies in the late nineteenth century, when French-speaking intellectuals wanted to break-away and join France (Minority Rights Group International). The movement, however, quickly moved towards the support of a federalist project for Belgium (van Haute and Pilet 2006).
- This trend was confirmed when in a 1945 poll at the second Walloon National Congress a majority first favored unification with France. However, when the poll was declared invalid, a second round turned out in favor of a federalist option inside the Belgian state (Mabille 2000; Minority Rights Group International).
- The two most popular regionalist movements (FDF and the Rassemblement Wallon RW) turned from a protectionist project to a federalist option. Secessionist ideas emerged again during the 1970s and 1980s with the Front pour l'Indépendance de la Wallonie and the programmatic turn of the Rassemblement Wallon. Their popular support was weak though. [1964-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Walloons
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Walloon
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	21102000

Territory

- In spatially contiguous Wallonia the Walloons make up 83% of the population. This amounts to around 2.778 million people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 3.61 million Walloons in the whole country in that same year (Minahan 2002: 2040). We thus code the Walloons as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Walloon territory in Belgium comprises the provinces of Liège, Namur, Walloon Brabant, Luxembourg, and Hainaut. The territory adjoins international land borders (Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxembourg), but has no sea access. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The respective EPR group (scenario 1:1) is coded as having several linguistic kin groups in both neighboring and non- neighboring countries. These kin groups live in France, Switzerland, Italy (Aostans), Canada and Mauritius. Apart from the Aostans in Italy, all groups mentioned by EPR have a population larger than 100,000. The presence of ethnic kin is confirmed by Minahan

(2002: 2040) who has a narrower definition of ethnic kin and who only lists the Walloons in France (approximately 200,000 in 2002). [kin in neighboring country]

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BOLIVIA

Santa Cruz (Lowlanders)

Activity: 2003-2012

General notes

- Bolivia consists of 9 departments, four of which (Santa Cruz, Pando, Beni, and Tarija – the media luna) are associated with the whites-dominated Santa Cruz autonomy movement. Changes in these four regions' status are coded as concessions/restrictions.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- As a consequence of La Paz emerging victorious from Bolivia's so-called federal war shortly before the end of the 19th century (this war was fought between two of Bolivia's regions, La Paz and Chiquisaca), the Bolivian state was sharply centralized. Previously rather politically independent regions were stripped of their autonomy, and henceforth governed by centrally appointed governors (Eaton 2007: 75). Following the 1952 revolution, Bolivia continued on its path of strong centralization, with local elections for departmental mayor's being abolished (Eaton 2007: 76). Local mayor elections were re-introduced in 1985 (Eaton 2007: 76). Still, Eaton argues that Bolivia remained the most centralized Latin American country at the turn of the millennium, with Bolivia's regions having very little powers. In 1994 and 1995, there were decentralization reforms, but powers were devolved not to the regional level, but to the municipal level. In effect, this even further reduced the regions' competencies. According to Eaton (2007: 81): "Most importantly, this 1995 law amended the 1967 constitution, which had called for the conversion of departments from mere administrative units into actual governments with their own directly elected representative assemblies (asambleas departamentales). The 1995 law downgraded these assemblies to mere councils (concejos departamentales), which would be indirectly elected by municipal councils, and stipulated that departmental authorities would serve not as leaders of their own governments but rather as representatives of the national executive branch at the regional level (poder ejecutivo a nivel regional). Thus, while the law strengthened the role of the regions in administering nationally determined policies, it erased from the constitution the possibility of direct elections for regional authorities." Coming to power in 1997, Hugo Banzer – originating in Santa Cruz and opposing municipalization – issued several decrees in the late 1990s aiming to constrain municipal autonomy (Eaton 2007: 81), but the regions' (lack of) autonomy was left untouched. We code an autonomy restriction due to the 1995 autonomy downgrade and a prior restriction. [1995: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In June 2004, several hundreds of thousands of residents of Santa Cruz participated in a demonstration demanding autonomy for the departments. Movement participants subsequently collected roughly 500,000 signatures, demanding a referendum on autonomy, and organized a large-scale civic strike in November 2004 to substantiate their demand (Eaton 2007: 84). The central government was fiercely opposed to the vote on autonomy. In January 2005, there was another large-scale rally in Santa Cruz with more than 350,000 participants. The central government gave in to the demand in June 2005. Shortly before his fall from power, President Carlos Mesa agreed to schedule a nation-wide referendum on autonomy (Eaton 2011: 296). Moreover, the beleaguered interim President agreed in April 2005 to institute elections for regional prefects. The regional elections – the first of their kind in Bolivia – were held in December 2005. We code an autonomy concession in 2005 due to the granting of a referendum

on autonomy and the introduction of direct elections to regional prefects. [2005: autonomy concession].

- Morales assumed power in January 2006. He kept the promise made by the former president, and the autonomy referendum was held in July 2006. Morales initially said he would vote yes, but then campaigned against the referendum, though he promised that his party would respect the results in Santa Cruz and initiate a debate on autonomy in the constitutional assembly that was elected on the same day as the autonomy referendum. Significant controversy emerged over the interpretation of the referendum results. While an overall majority of 56 per cent voted against autonomy, in Santa Cruz 71 per cent of voters endorsed the proposal. Similarly, there were majorities in favour in the three other media luna departments, too. The ballot question, based on the wishes of the initiators, suggests that every province voting yes would be granted autonomy. However, Morales refused to implement the outcome (Eaton 2013: 14) and the National Electoral Court rejected the arguments of the media luna departments that the votes of each department had to be considered separately: it ruled that the referendum was rejected because the referendum was a national process whose results have to be judged nationally. The final decision on departmental autonomy was thus to be made by the constituent assembly, which was elected the same day. The fact that Morales' Movement for Socialism won a slight majority in the assembly, however, made it somewhat unlikely that powers would be devolved (Eaton 2011; Breuer 2008: 21). We consider this an autonomy restriction since the ruling appears to stand in direct contrast to the previously agreed upon ballot question, but note that this coding decision is not completely unambiguous. [2006: autonomy restriction]
- In the first years of his presidency, Evo Morales sought to recentralize authority and resources relative to the departments. This becomes clearest with regard to the sharing of revenues between departments and the national centre and the associated decrease in regional economic autonomy. "In November 2007, the president decreed a 70% reduction in the departments' share of revenues from the direct tax on hydrocarbons. [...] When opposition governors complained, the president responded by calling them oligarchs and by directing his new Ministry of Transparency to launch investigations into charges that governors had misused IDH transfers to reward business partners. Morales also favored a draft of the new constitution that would limit the authority of departmental governments (Eaton 2013: 13-14)." [2007: autonomy restriction]
- Santa Cruz representatives were marginalized in the upcoming constitutional convention, and in 2008, the four media luna departments held unofficial referendums on their self-proclaimed autonomy statutes. Strikes organized by the movement prevented Morales from scheduling a national referendum on the draft constitution drafted by the constitutional assembly. After weeks of violence, unofficial autonomy referendums in the four media luna departments, and negotiations with leaders of the conservative autonomy movements, Morales agreed on October 21, 2008, to a series of concessions, including the establishment of regional legislatures and protections for wealthy landowners. According to Eaton (2013: 16): "Three features of this regional compromise deserve special emphasis, though the president agreed to nearly 100 changes in his preferred constitutional draft. First, at the procedural level, Morales reversed his position on the eastern departments' autonomy referenda in May/June 2008, allowing the statutes approved in those votes to stand as long as they were adjusted to fit within the new constitution (Ayo, 2010). Second, the president agreed to transform departmental councils into assemblies with full legislative powers, a core demand of the eastern opposition that has moved Bolivia in the direction of federalism (Barrios, 2010). Third, in response to eastern concerns about new constitutional limits on the size of landholdings (5,000 hectares), Morales agreed to make these limits nonretroactive, a dramatic concession that prevents expropriation by the national government of virtually all existing lowland agribusinesses (Urioste 2009)." The revised constitution was approved in a January 2009 referendum (though Santa Cruz voted against; see Eaton 2011: 297). With this, Bolivia became the most decentralized of Latin America's non-federal states, even if the specific form is still evolving and the distribution of powers is somewhat ill-defined. Subsequently, the five Andean departments as well as several indigenous communities voted on their autonomy in December 2009 (Centellas 2010). Departmental (and indigenous) autonomy was further elaborated with Bolivia's Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization, passed in July 2010 (Aguirre 2012: 55; Faguet 2013). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 2009. [2009: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 2005, Santa Cruz moved close to declaring autonomy unilaterally, but stopped short of a unilateral declaration (in particular, they moved to create a departmental assembly, which is illegal under Bolivia's constitution, and symbolically declared its own president as governor of Santa Cruz in January 2005; see Eaton 2007: 87). The military warned that a unilateral declaration of autonomy would be considered a breach of the constitution. With tensions coming to a new head after Morales assumed power, the four media luna provinces unilaterally declared autonomy statutes in December 2007 (DeMoura 2007). The autonomy statutes were ratified in unofficial referendums in the spring of 2008 in all four departments (Beni, Tarija, Pando, and Santa Cruz). [2007: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- With the 2009 constitution and the subsequent successful autonomy referendums in the five Andean departments and the 2010 Framework for Autonomy, Bolivia moved strongly in the direction of a federal state (Eaton 2013; Faguet 2013). Regional elections were introduced, and administrative and (limited) legislative competencies were devolved. Hence, we code a major change in 2009. It has to be noted, however, that the exact division of powers remains somewhat ill-defined, and overall, the competencies attributed to departments remain somewhat limited. Bolivia cannot be considered a federal state, even if it is the most decentralized unitary state in the region. [2009: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- We code regional autonomy after the adoption of the 2009 constitution (see above). [2010-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Santa Cruz movement is sometimes accused of secessionism. Secessionist claims have also been made. However, the dominant claim appears to be for territorial autonomy within Bolivia (Eaton 2007: 88, 2011, 2013). [2003-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Santa Cruz (Lowlanders)
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Whites/mestizos
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	14504000

- The Santa Cruz movement seeks autonomy for the four eastern departments (Tarija, Pando, Beni, and Santa Cruz). These departments, as well as the movement are dominated by whites. The movement uses an ethnically inclusive rhetoric. While the movement managed to co-opt some lowland indigenous leaders, it is better associated with whites in the four eastern provinces (see Eaton 2007: 91-92). Hence, the Lowlanders form a regional branch of the EPR group of the

Whites/mestizos. EPR codes the Whites as dominant up until 2005 and as junior partner 2006 onwards. However, the EPR code relates to all white Bolivians, and not necessarily to whites in the eastern departments. Eaton (2007: 77-78) argues that Santa Cruz elites traditionally exerted very substantial influence on the national executive, resulting for instance in financial resources being disproportionately transferred to the eastern departments. EPR downgrades the Bolivians as a result of Morales coming to power in 2006, but Eaton (2007) argues that the influence of Santa Cruz elites had decreased already under the interim presidency of Mesa (2003-2005). Mesa cooperated with Morales, and no representatives of Santa Cruz' powerful agricultural sector were invited into the presidential cabinet – a primer in democratic Bolivia. Morales appointed many white cabinet members, but most white ministers appear to stem from the western departments, in particular La Paz. We found no evidence for a white-mestizo minister from the eastern departments (Nemecia Achacollo, the current agricultural minister, stems from Santa Cruz, but is indigenous). This suggests a powerless code. In line with this, Eaton (2007) argues that the agro-petro elite of Santa Cruz lost voice after 2003. In light of this evidence, we code the Santa Cruz movement as powerless from 2004 onwards. In early 2003 (before Mesa), the eastern departments still had substantial influence at the national level, hence we code a senior partner status for 2003. [2003: senior partner; 2004-2012: powerless]

- The group size estimate is calculated as follows. According to the 2001 census, the population of Santa Cruz is 2,029,471, the population of Beni 362,521, the population of Pando 52,525, and the population of Tarija 391,226. This yields a combined 2,835,743. Since the movement should be associated with whites in the eastern provinces, we subtract from this the number of Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups, which EPR pegs at 3% of Bolivia's total population. According to the 2001 census, Bolivia's population amounted to 8,274,325, hence the relative group size estimate results if we divide $(2,835,743 - .03 \times 8,274,325 = 2,587,000)$ by 8,274,325: 0.3127159. [2003-2012: .3127 (group size)]
 - o Note: the figure we use is a bit higher than the one provided in Minahan (1996: 478): 1.8 million. However, note that Minahan counts but two departments, Santa Cruz and El Beni, and we count four.

Territory

- As noted above, the number of Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups in the four departments amounts to 248,000, or 8.74% of the population in the four departments. Most of the remaining population, a clear majority, is Cruzian. Though he assigns only two of the four media luna departments to this movement (Santa Cruz and El Beni), evidence in this direction comes from Minahan (1996: 478), according to whom the Cruzians make up 78% of the population of the Santa Cruz area with 3% Guaraní, 17% other Bolivians, and 1% Brazilians. We found no information on the number of self-identified Cruzians outside the region, but it is very unlikely >50%. [concentrated]
- The territory comprises the four eastern departments (known as the Media Luna) of Tarija, Pando, Beni, and Santa Cruz for which the self-determination movement seeks autonomy. The territory adjoins an international land border (Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina) and does not have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There are numerous oil and gas fields on the territory (PRIMKEY: BL001PET, BL002PET, BL003PET, BL004PET). The Bermejo Field (in the Santa Cruz-Tarija Basin) was discovered in 1925, the Camiri Field in 1927. Additional discoveries were made near Santa Cruz and in the region between Santa Cruz and La Paz in the 1960s and in the 1980s and 1990s (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The Santa Cruz (Lowlanders) are a regional branch (eastern departments) of the EPR group of the Whites/mestizos. We code ethnic kin due to whites/mestizos in several (adjoining) countries of South America. [kin in neighboring country]

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CANADA

Iroquois

Activity: 1977-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Iroquois have a history of autonomy. A confederacy of the Iroquois tribes was formed around 1570. The confederacy managed to survive until the late eighteenth century, when the tribes gradually lost their traditional lands and the Iroquois people were forced to adapt to White culture (Minahan 2002:802-803). From Canadian independence in 1867 onwards, there was a policy of assimilation. The highly repressive Indian Act and other aspects of the Canadian government's Aboriginal policy have had substantial and devastating impacts on First Nations societies, and limited both the autonomy and cultural rights of Canada's First Nations (Minority Rights Group International). Hence, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]
- No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before movement onset.

Concessions and restrictions

- The 1982 constitution recognized the First Nations' right to land and self-government, that is, a right to manage their own affairs (Minority Rights Group International). In 1983 the Quebec National Assembly also recognized the autonomy of aboriginal nations (Resolution of February 9, 1983). The resolution included self-governance, land ownership rights, competencies of self-rule in areas of culture, education, language, health and social services as well as economic development. It also included some tax exemptions. A significant share of the Iroquois is located in Quebec (Minahan 2002). We only code the national recognition of self-rule in 1982 because the national recognition seems more significant, and the sub-national recognition appears to be an outflow of the national legislation. [1982: autonomy concession]
- In 1985, the Canadian Parliament amended the Indian Act. The act lifted many discriminatory practices, including that Aboriginal women who marry a non-Aboriginal automatically lose their Aboriginal status. Moreover, indigenous communities were allowed to regulate membership in their communities themselves. [1985: cultural rights concession]
- After the Oka Crisis in 1990, when a local dispute over land rights between the Mohawk and the town of Oka escalated and resulted in the killing of one police officer, the Mohawk settlement of Kanesatake (Quebec) was granted the right to run its own police force (McMilland and Yellowhorn 2004: 101; Milward 2012: 159). This concerned a rather small share of the Iroquois group, namely approx. 17% of the Mohawk community. The Mohawks, in turn, make up only 25% of the Iroquois. In other words, this concerned only approx. 4% of the Iroquois. Thus we do not code a concession. However, we still code a concession in 1990:
 - o In 1990 the Supreme Court set a precedent with the ruling in the Sparrow case by setting out criteria "to determine whether governmental infringement on Aboriginal rights was justifiable, providing that these rights were in existence at the time of the Constitution Act, 1982" (Salomons and Hanson 2009). The Court hereby restricted the possibility to limit aboriginal rights, such as fishing, that were in existence in 1982. The government

can no longer infringe upon these rights without justification. The Sparrow case is recognized by many as “a significant victory for those interested in the affirmation of Aboriginal rights” (Kulchyski 1994: 212). [1990: cultural rights concession]

- In 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney announces a new federal aboriginal agenda dealing including the acceleration of land claims and the improvement of the Aborigine’s socio-economic conditions. More importantly, in 1992 a constitutional conference presents a new proposal for constitutional amendments called the Charlottetown Accord. The agreement foresaw unprecedented self-government for Canada’s Aborigine population, including the right to raise taxes. Essentially, the Accord would have created three levels of government, a federal, a provincial, and a Native. The Charlottetown Accord was accepted by all major national parties and (later) by all provincial leaders in 1992 (Minorities at Risk Project). Since it constitutes a very significant autonomy offer, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
- However, the Charlottetown Accord was subjected to a referendum. The proposal was rejected in October 1992 (Minorities at Risk Project). In line with the codebook, we do not code a restriction. Note: one could, however, construct a case for coding a restriction because it is possible that non-Iroquois outvoted the Iroquois. But the vote was widely perceived as a vote on the concessions granted to Quebec and not a vote on indigenous peoples’ rights.
- In 1997, the Canadian Supreme Court fleshed out and extended the Aborigine’s land rights, ruling that, among other things, the Aboriginal title to land is a communal right protected under the 1982 constitution. Critically, the Court ruled that oral histories and traditions constitute sufficient evidence for land claims. It also stated that Aborigines are entitled to activities beyond traditional activities like hunting and fishing (Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project). [1997: autonomy concession]
- According to Cunningham (2014: 204), there was a court ruling in 2003 “in Native favor over the residential schools program” which “resulted in restitution paid to the Natives and establishment of programs to promote Native languages and cultures.” [2003: cultural rights concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1777 Iroquois representatives presented a petition to the United Nations seeking that the Iroquois Confederacy, a political unit that predates both Canada and the US, be recognized as a sovereign nation (Minahan 2002: 803). [1777: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- The 1982 constitution recognized the First Nations’ right to land and self-government, that is, a right to manage their own affairs (Minority Rights Group International). [1982: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- See above. [1983-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- The Haudenosaunee government that was declared in 1977, according to Minahan (2002: 803), issues its own passports, but they do not appear to exercise de-facto control over a significant territory.

Claims

- The Iroquois movement is split on the issue of the degree of sovereignty that is sought. Some advocates consider the Iroquois a sovereign nation and seek outright independence (e.g., the Iroquois confederacy issues its own passports), while others seek more autonomy within Canada and increased land rights – consider, for instance, the Idle No More movement (Minahan 2002: 799, 803-804; Carlson 2011; Idle No More). Since it is unclear what claim is dominant, we code an independence claim throughout. [1977-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Iroquois
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Aboriginal peoples
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	2004000

- The Iroquois are part of EPR's umbrella group of the Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal peoples are considered powerless throughout. In line with EPR we did not find evidence of active discrimination as defined in EPR. First Nations enjoy the right to vote since 1960. At least since the early 1980s the Canadian government has made significant concessions to several Aboriginal peoples (significant steps include the recognition of Aboriginal rights in the 1982 Constitutional Act, the (defeated) Charlottetown Accord, and the creation of the (Inuit) Nunavut state in 1999). Also in line with EPR we did not find evidence of substantial representation (of either Aboriginal peoples as a whole or Iroquois in particular) in the national executive (Cairns 2011). In Canada there is a ministry for Aboriginal affairs (up to 2011 called the ministry for Indian affairs), but this is consistently filled by non-Aborigines. In 2008, Leona Aglukkaq became the first Aboriginal (yet Inuit) cabinet member. Thus, we code the Iroquois as powerless throughout the movement's existence. [1977-2012: powerless]
- The information in Minahan (2002: 799) is inconclusive because it counts Iroquois in both Canada and the U.S. (in total about 150,000). According to the 1996 census there are 50,000 Iroquois living in Canada (see the Canadian Encyclopedia), which in combination with Canada's total population of 28,846,761 yields a group size of .0017333. [1977-2012: 0.0017 (group size)]

Territory

- The Iroquois are scattered on the fringes of their original homeland and are “concentrated in about 20 towns and eight reservations [...] in Ontario, and Quebec” (see Minahan 2002: 799). Given the non-contiguous Iroquois settlement, we code them as not regionally concentrated. [not concentrated]
- We code a claim for independence of the Iroquois confederacy (Haudenosaunee). The territory encompasses the area to the south and east of lake Ontario (this is mainly in the United States). Only a small fraction of their homeland reaches into Canada (eastern Ontario and southern Quebec). The territory adjoins an international land border and does not have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 799), there are Iroquois in the United States. They number below 100,000; we nevertheless code kin in an adjoining territory since the Iroquois have ethnic bonds with Indigenous Peoples in the US more generally. [kin in neighboring country]

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Newfoundlanders

Activity: 1983-1993

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1855 Newfoundland won dominion status (colonial autonomy). In 1934, Britain revoked the dominion status (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 205). After a referendum on the issue in 1948, Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949 and became a province equipped with significant autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1373; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 205). In the 1960s, mainly due to Quebec leader Jean Lesage, the centralist tendency that had existed since WWII was reverted. Between 1960 and 1980, the center made several concessions with regard to provincial taxation (Canadian Encyclopedia: section “Federalism”). The two most significant concessions appear to have been made in 1962 and 1965. In 1962 far-reaching tax competencies were given back to the provinces. In 1965 the provinces were allowed to opt out of shared cost programs. This was mainly directed at Quebec, which is the only province which chose to opt out of all shared cost programs (Fenwick 1981: 210), but considers a concession for the other provinces, too. However, in 1969, the newly elected Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau set out to make Canada a bilingual country. The federal parliament passed the 1969 Official Languages Act, which implemented the official use of both languages in all federal institutions (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 102). Relatively to French, the English language lost in status as a result.
- In October 1980, three months after the Quebecois independence referendum, Trudeau announced plans to repatriate the constitution – that is, write a new document that would be entirely Canadian and thus cut links with the UK. After initial reservations, nine of ten provinces agreed to the repatriation in 1981 – all except for Quebec (Meadwell 1993: 235). This had been possible because the constitutional amendment formula was changed beforehand. Until 1981, there was an implicit agreement that constitutional changes require unanimous provincial consent. Many Quebecois had furthermore even been under the impression that Quebec enjoys a special veto, though this belief was not widely shared outside of Quebec. In 1981, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that only a “substantial degree of provincial consent” was necessary for constitutional changes (Dunsmuir & O’Neal 1992). We code an autonomy restriction in 1981 because the provinces, including in particular Quebec but also Newfoundland, effectively lost their traditional right to veto constitutional amendments by way of the 1981 Supreme Court ruling. [1981: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]
- Given Quebec’s opposition to repatriation, the 1982 Constitution Act (Canada Act) was signed by all provinces except for Quebec, even if it applies to Quebec as well (Meadwell 1993: 235). Given Quebec’s opposition to repatriation, the 1982 Constitution Act (Canada Act) was signed by all provinces except for Quebec, even if it applies to Quebec as well (Meadwell 1993: 235). The new constitution confirmed the provinces’ loss of the right to veto constitutional amendments as it introduced a formula that treats each province equally. From now on, the consent of only two thirds of the provinces that have at least 50% of Canada’s population was required (note: this still gave Quebec in combination with Ontario a de-facto veto because they together make up more than 50% of Canada’s population; see Heard & Swartz 1997: 340). The 1982 constitution introduced new restrictions for Quebec (see Quebecois) but does not appear to have implied similar restrictions for the English-speaking provinces. Thus, we do not code a restriction.

Concessions and restrictions

- The fact that Quebec did not sign Canada's 1982 constitution initiated a constitutional crisis. The 1987 Meech Lake Accord set out to resolve the situation. The proposal included major concessions to Quebec; however, also other provinces would have profited from increased autonomy rights, including a constitutional veto, increased competencies with regard to immigration, and the right to opt out of certain national programs. The Meech Lake Accord was never implemented, but constitutes a very significant promise: all provincial first ministers promised ratification (Meadwell 1993: 236). Hence, it is coded as a concession. [1987: autonomy concession]
- In June 1990, the three-year deadline for ratification of the Meech Lake Accord ended without ratification of all provinces (Manitoba and Newfoundland did not ratify; Minorities at Risk Project). Even if the Newfoundland government rejected the Meech Lake Accord, this implies that a significant autonomy promise was revoked. [1990: autonomy restriction]
- The failed Meech Lake Accord was followed by a similar Accord, the Charlottetown Accord. Again, Quebec would have gained the most, but also other provinces were promised increased autonomy, including competencies in forestry, mining, natural resources, and cultural policy. (Minorities at Risk Project). The Charlottetown Accord goes even beyond Meech Lake in terms of devolved competencies. It was accepted by all major national parties and (later) by all provincial leaders in 1992. Since the Charlottetown Accord constitutes a very significant autonomy offer, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
- However, the Charlottetown Accord was subjected to a referendum. The proposal was rejected in October 1992. The Newfoundlanders had voted in favour with a 63.2 per cent majority. Nevertheless, we do not code a restriction in line with general practice. Note: this is a borderline decision, but this decision can be defended because the vote was primarily perceived as a vote on the (asymmetric) concessions granted to Quebec.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date and is thus not coded.

Regional autonomy

- Newfoundland has had provincial status in Canada. [1983-1993: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Party for an Independent Newfoundland called for the disintegration of the Newfoundland province from the Canadian Confederation and the establishment of an independent state (Minahan 2002: 1374). No other claim was found. [1983-1993: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Newfoundlanders
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	English speakers
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	2001000

- Newfoundlanders are Canadian English-speakers living on the Newfoundland Island. EPR codes English speakers in Canada as senior partner (and French speakers as junior partner). Generally, Quebec and Ontario have the most important role in Canada's federal government, but despite their relatively small size, Newfoundlanders should not be considered powerless. It is established practice in Canada to guarantee regional representation in the assignment of ministerial posts. Hence, Western representatives regularly hold ministerial posts (e.g., Brian Tobin, who served from 1993-1996 under Jean Chrétien), even if there has not yet been a prime minister from Newfoundland (Bakvis 1988). Based on this, a junior partner coding appears most adequate. [1983-1993: junior partner]
- According to Minahan (2002: 1370) there are .72 million Newfoundlanders in Canada in 2002. Combined with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Canada's population (31.36 million), this yields a group size of .02295918. [1983-1993: 0.023 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1370), Newfies make up 96% of the province of Newfoundland. This amounts to around 512,000 people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 720,000 Newfies in the whole country in that same year. We thus code the Newfoundlanders as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Newfoundlanders' territory comprises the most easterly province of Newfoundland and Labrador consisting of the islands of Newfoundland and the mainland territory of Labrador. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al (2007) code two offshore oil/gas fields (PRIMKEY: OF070PET and OF071PET) off the coast of Newfoundland (approximately 122 sea miles). They were discovered in 1979 and 1984, respectively. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1370), the Newfoundlanders are concentrated in Newfoundland with only smaller communities in Ontario, Quebec, and the New England region of the United States. Note: The Newfoundlanders belong to the group of English speakers, but we do not code English speakers in other countries (e.g. in the United States) as kin because this movement is directed against a government dominated by English speakers. [no kin]

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Quebecois

Activity: 1945-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Quebec has been a federal province throughout Canada's existence (Meadwell 1993). Initially, the Canadian provinces did have very little powers, but by the 1880s they had become at least as powerful as their US counterparts, if not more so. There was a short interlude of centralization during the First World War and immediately after, when the central government levied an income tax. The centralist tendencies were largely reversed after 1921. A second wave of centralization began in the context of the Second World War. There were constitutional amendments in 1940 which gave the Parliament the power to establish employment insurance and universal pensions. And in 1941, the central government started to monopolize income taxes (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"). Since these are both instances of centralization, we code autonomy restrictions in the respective years and a prior restriction. [1940: autonomy restriction] [1941: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1949, the ultimate judicial appellant competence was transferred from the (British) Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to Canada. The Privy Council was widely regarded as favorable to provincial autonomy (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council"), but we consider this too ambiguous to be coded as a restriction.
- In 1951, the constitution was amended to allow for a federal pension fund, but at the same time provinces were also allowed to set-up pension funds (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"), hence the autonomy of the regions remained unaffected and we do not code a restriction.
- After the war Ottawa sought to perpetuate the income tax monopolization that had been introduced in 1941. Until about 1960 the tax system had remained highly centralized. However, in the 1960s, mainly due to Quebec leader Jean Lesage, the centralist tendency was reverted. Between 1960 and 1980, the center made several concessions with regard to provincial taxation (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"). The two most significant concessions appear to have been made in 1962 and 1965. In 1962 far-reaching tax competencies were given back to the provinces. [1962: autonomy concession]
- In 1965 the provinces were allowed to opt out of shared cost programs. This was mainly directed at Quebec, which is the only province which chose to opt out of all shared cost programs (Fenwick 1981: 210). This allowed Quebec to have its own contributory pension plan (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"), while the central government established a joint pension scheme for all other provinces. [1965: autonomy concession]
- In 1969, the newly elected Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau set out to make Canada a bilingual country. The federal parliament passed the 1969 Official Languages Act, which implemented the official use of both languages in all federal institutions (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 102) [1969: cultural rights concession]
- In the wake of the October crisis (Quebec terrorism), federal troops assisted the Quebecois under the War measures act (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "October Crisis"). It was the Quebecois government itself that called for the federal help, and no restriction as we define it seems to have been involved. Hence, we do not code a restriction.

- In 1974, the Quebec National Assembly adopted the official languages act, which made French the official language in a number of areas, including labor relations and education (Canadian Encyclopedia: section “Québec Language Policy”). This is not coded since it is the Quebecois region which legislated. In other words, this was not a concession granted by the central government. Furthermore, in 1974, the federal level required bilingual packaging and labeling throughout the country, which appears too minimal to be coded as a concession (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 102).
- In 1977, Quebec’s Parti Québécois (PQ) government enacted the French Language Charter, a yet stricter and more nationalist language law. The French Charter restricted education in English to children of English-speaking parents born in Quebec, declared bilingual signs illegal, and renamed English town names (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 102). This is not coded since it is the Quebecois region which legislated. In other words, this was not a concession granted by the central government. The Language Charter was repeatedly challenged with the courts. Quebec’s courts struck down a number of its provisions; these decisions were upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court when challenged. The first challenge came in 1979. In 1979 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that Quebec legislation had to be issued in both French and English, thereby declaring Chapter III of the French Language Charter unconstitutional. In 1981 this was extended to any governmental regulation (Keesing’s Record of World Events: May 1980). We do not code the 1979 ruling as a restriction because this is not an instance where the central government revokes a previously granted concession. Quebec unilaterally grabbed cultural rights and the center/the courts intervened to restore the constitutional status quo. The repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 opened the door to further challenges (see below).
- The Parti Québécois (PQ), a Quebecois separatist outfit, came to power in Quebec in 1976 on a platform that included a promise for a referendum on independence. The PQ government pushed back the date for the referendum several times. Eventually, it was held in May 1980. Upon a turnout of 86%, 59.5% of Quebecois voters voted against independence (Thompson 1989: 197). Note: while the origins of the 1980 Quebec referendum are unilateral (the referendum was called for by Quebec’s PQ government and Canada’s federal government “never viewed the referendum as binding. The referendum, instead, was unilaterally called for by the Quebec province” (Rourke et al. 1992: 118). However, the federal government did not dispute the legality of the referendum (see e.g. Leslie 1999: 136, though Leslie does not explicitly refer to the 1980 referendum but only to the 1995 referendum). Moreover, the federal government was actively involved in the no campaign. In fact, the federal Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Trudeau (himself a Quebecois), was the de-facto leader of the no campaign. Thus, it could be argued that the central government had conceded a referendum on independence. However, given the referendum’s unilateral origins, we consider this too ambiguous to be coded.
- Before the independence referendum in 1980, PM Trudeau made promises for “renewed federalism” if the Quebecois were to reject the referendum (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 189). Given the vagueness of this promise, we do not code this as a concession.
- In October 1980, three months after the Quebecois independence referendum, Trudeau announced plans to repatriate the constitution – that is, write a new document that would be entirely Canadian and thus cut links with the UK. After initial reservations, nine of ten provinces agreed to the repatriation in 1981 – all except for Quebec (Meadwell 1993: 235). This had been possible because the constitutional amendment formula was changed beforehand. Until 1981, there was an implicit agreement that constitutional changes require unanimous provincial consent. Many Quebecois had even been under the impression that Quebec enjoys a special veto, though this belief was not widely shared outside of Quebec. In 1981, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that only a “substantial degree of provincial consent” was necessary for constitutional changes. In 1982, the Quebec Court of Appeal in a decision that was later confirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court furthermore ruled that had neither a legal nor conventional right to veto constitutional changes (Dunsmuir & O’Neal 1992). We code an autonomy restriction in 1981 because the provinces, including in particular Quebec, effectively lost their traditional right to veto constitutional amendments by way of the 1981 Supreme Court ruling. [1981: autonomy restriction]
- Given Quebec’s opposition to repatriation, the 1982 Constitution Act (Canada Act) was signed by all provinces except for Quebec, even if it applies to Quebec as well (Meadwell 1993: 235). The

new constitution confirmed the provinces' loss of the right to veto constitutional amendments as it introduced a formula that treats each province equally. From now on, the consent of only two thirds of the provinces that have at least 50% of Canada's population was required (note: this still gave Quebec in combination with Ontario a de-facto veto because they together make up more than 50% of Canada's population; see Heard & Swartz 1997: 340). The 1982 constitution introduced new restrictions for Quebec: the associated Charter of Rights was widely seen as an infringement of Quebec's autonomy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 189). In particular, Section 2 of the Charter guarantees freedom of expression, which opens the door to challenges to laws which restrict an individual's ability to use a particular language, while section 23 introduced the notion of "minority language education rights", an obvious response to Quebec's nationalist language law. Overall, the repatriation limited Quebec's autonomy, and it is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1982: autonomy restriction]

- Note: the 1982 Charter of Rights opened the floodgates for further challenges of Quebec's 1977 French Language Charter. A number of provisions were declared invalid as a result. We do not code separate restrictions because these rulings were a direct result of the 1982 repatriation. Below is a list of such rulings that we have come across.
 - In 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court scrapped another part of the 1977 French Charter, this time the chapter prohibiting education in English for kids of immigrated English-speakers (Keesing's Record of World Events: April 1985).
 - In 1985, the Quebec's Superior Court scrapped another part of the 1977 French Charter. The Quebec Superior Court on January 2, 1985, ruled against Article 58 banning the use of languages other than French in exterior commercial signs (Keesing's Record of World Events: April 1985).
 - In 1986, Quebec's Court of Appeal upheld the right to display publicly signs in English and other languages apart from French, and rejected as unconstitutional a clause in the Quebec French Language Charter which restricted the language of public signs to French, the official language of the province (Keesing's Record of World Events: February 1987).
 - In 1988, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the sections of the French Language Charter enforcing the exclusive use of French on outdoor commercial signs were unconstitutional (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 103).
- The fact that Quebec did not sign Canada's constitution initiated a constitutional crisis. In 1987, the Quebecois were offered significant concessions by way of the Meech Lake Accord in return for Quebec signing the constitution: recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, guaranteed disproportionate representation on the Supreme Court and in the Senate, limited veto rights over constitutional amendments, and the right to opt out of certain national programs. The Meech Lake Accord was never implemented, but constitutes a very significant promise: all provincial first ministers promised ratification (Meadwell 1993: 236). Hence, it is coded as a concession. [1987: autonomy concession]
- In June 1990, the three-year deadline for ratification of the Meech Lake Accord ended without ratification of all provinces (Manitoba and Newfoundland did not ratify; Minorities at Risk Project). Since the Meech Lake Accord promised Quebec significant autonomy, we code an autonomy restriction in 1990. [1990: autonomy restriction]
- In June 1991, Quebec's PQL administration approves a bill that gives the Quebec government the right to call an independence referendum if an acceptable constitutional reform offer is not devised by October 1992 (Minorities at Risk Project). This is not coded as a concession since it was the region itself which legislated.
- The failed Meech Lake Accord was followed by a similar accord, the Charlottetown Accord. Again, Quebec was promised recognition as a distinct society and several more competencies (Minorities at Risk Project). The Charlottetown Accord goes even beyond Meech Lake in terms of devolved competencies. It was accepted by all major national parties and (later) by all provincial leaders in 1992. Since the Charlottetown Accord constitutes a very significant autonomy offer, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
- However, the Charlottetown Accord was subjected to a referendum. The proposal was rejected in October 1992. Notably, a majority voted against Charlottetown in Quebec (many thought of the concessions as insufficient; see Minorities at Risk Project). We do not code a restriction, in line

with general practice. Still, one could construct a case because the referendum was widely perceived as a vote on the (asymmetric) concessions granted to Quebec, with Quebec perceiving the concessions as too limited and English Canada generally as too extensive.

- Support for independence surged again after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990. The PQ regained power in 1994 on a campaign including a referendum pledge. After the elections the PQ moved quickly to a second referendum in 1995. “The 1995 referendum question was shorter and still proposed a negotiated agreement with the rest of Canada. But it put a one-year limit on any such talks, after which Quebec would become sovereign regardless of their outcome” (LeDuc 2003: 105). Moreover, this time there was no promise of a second referendum after the negotiations. Upon a turnout of 93.5%, a very narrow majority of 50.8% of the Quebecois voted no. Note: while the origins of the 1995 Quebec referendum are unilateral (the referendum was called for by Quebec’s PQ government without consent by the federal government), the federal government did not dispute the legality of the referendum (see e.g. Leslie 1999: 136). Moreover, the federal government was actively involved in the no campaign. In fact, just like in 1980, the no campaign was de-facto led by the federal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien. Thus, it could be argued that the central government had conceded a referendum on independence. However, given the referendum’s unilateral origins, we consider this too ambiguous to be coded.
- After the narrow loss of the sovereigntists in the 1995 independence referendum, the center initiated a number of concessions. In 1996, the constitutional amendments formula was changed so that Quebec regained a veto over constitutional amendments. The formula that had been introduced in 1982 treated all provinces equally in that it required the consent of two thirds of the provinces that together have at least 50% of Canada’s population (Heard & Swartz 1997: 340). The 1996 formula required the consent of a majority of the provinces that includes Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, two or more of the Atlantic provinces that in combination have at least 50% of the region’s population (thus giving Alberta a de-facto veto) and two or more of the Prairie provinces that have at least 50% of the region’s population (Heard & Swartz 1997: 342). [1996: autonomy concession]
- By the 1997 Calgary declaration, Quebec was recognized as a unique (rather than a distinct, see above) society. While this appears mostly symbolic, in the same year the Canadian constitution was changed to allow Quebec to replace the denominational school boards with ones organized on linguistic ones (Minorities at Risk Project). [1997: cultural rights concession]
- In 1998 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled on the validity of Quebec’s 1995 referendum, stating that unilateral secession was not permitted, that separation requires a ‘clear’ majority in a referendum, after which there had to be negotiations with the center (Minorities at Risk Project). In 1999, the court ruling was converted into law (Clarity Act). Quebec was not granted the right to initiate an independence referendum at any time; hence, we do not code a concession.
- In 2002, the Quebec National Assembly re-introduced the earlier legislation that kids from newcomer English-speakers and Francophones cannot use the English language education system. This is not coded since it constitutes a unilateral power grab. In 2009, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled against the so-called Bill 104, declaring as unconstitutional that certain students are barred from attending English-language schools (CBC News 2009). We do not code a restriction because this simply restored the status quo.
- In 2006, the Canadian House of Commons recognized Quebec as a nation within Canada (Minorities at Risk Project). This appears as a largely symbolic step. Hence we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- There were two independence referendums, one in 1980 and the other in 1995 (Minahan 2002: 1547-1548), but we have not come across evidence for a sovereignty declaration. In 1995 a bill was tabled that included a declaration of sovereignty, but the bill was not passed because the government planned to wait for the result of the 1995 referendum (which returned a thin no majority) (Smith 2013: 12).

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Quebec has been a federal province throughout Canada's existence (Meadwell 1993). [1945-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In the initial post-war period, the dominant self-determination claim is unambiguous. The Union Nationale (UN) and, to a lesser extent, the Quebecois Liberals (PQL) both advocated increased autonomy within Canada. There was no major faction demanding independence yet. However, the situation becomes trickier with the rise of the independence movement in the early 1960s. In 1963 the FQL was founded (employing terrorist strategies), and somewhat later in 1968 the Parti Québécois (PQ), the major organization associated with the independentist view (Minorities at Risk Project). From the early 1960s onwards there are thus different factions within the self-determination movement, with some advocating (different shades of) autonomy within Canada (the federalist position) and others advocating independence, possibly with some sort of continual association with the remaining Canada (the separatist or sovereigntist position). The Parti Québécois quickly had electoral success, receiving 23.5 per cent of the vote in 1970 and 30.8 per cent in 1973 (though this translated into a minimal number of seats; see Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Parti Québécois"). In 1976 the PQ won 41 per cent of the vote, enough to form the government (Minahan 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 233-234). The independentist PQ has played an important role in Quebecois politics ever since, even if it was out of government from 1986 to 1994 and from 2003 to 2012. It is strongly associated with the Quebecois self-determination movement. Upon the PQ's initiative, an independence referendum was organized in Quebec in 1980. The referendum turned out a 60 per cent majority against independence, causing the PQ to put back the independence issue. However, it did not give up the independence claim or moderate its position to autonomy within Canada. In the early 1990s, the independence option gained significantly in popularity over the failed Meech Lake Accord, as documented by extensive polling. The PQ retook power in 1994, and organized another independence referendum in 1995 (which turned out an even closer no-majority of 50.58 per cent). Subsequently support for independence decreased (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 244), but the PQ remained the most important organization associated with the movement and continued to make claims for independence. Based on this, we code an independence claim from the foundation of the PQ onwards (thus 1969 onwards, following the first of January rule), and an autonomy claim prior to this. While independence was twice rejected in referendums, it seems the dominant claim raised by the self-determination movement. [1945-1968: autonomy claim; 1969-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Quebecois
<i>Scenario</i>	1945/n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	French speakers
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	2002000

- The Quebecois form part of the EPR group of the French speakers. EPR codes French speakers in Canada as junior partner (and English speakers as senior partner). Generally, Quebec and Ontario have the most important role in Canada's federal government, and several of Canada's prime ministers were Quebecois (in particular, Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien). Hence, it appears appropriate to retain the junior partner coding (there might even be a case to code the Quebecois as senior partner). [1945-2012: junior partner]
- According to EPR, the share of French speakers decreased over time, which is reflected in a group size estimate of .28 for the French Canadians in 1946-1981, and an estimate of .23 for 1982-2013. This is also true in the case of the Quebecois, though the decrease is less drastic. According to Statistics Canada (2007: 23) the number of French-speakers in Quebec was 4.2697 million in the 1961 census and 5.802 million in the 2001 census. The latter figure matches well with Minahan's (2002: 1544) figure of 5.75 million Quebecois. Canada's total population was 18.238 million in the 1961 census and 30.007 million in the 2001 census, which yields group sizes of .2341 and .1934, respectively. We use the EPR time thresholds (1945-1981 vs 1982-2012). [1945-1981: 0.2341 (group size); 1982-2012: 0.1934 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1544), there are 78% Quebecois in the Province of Quebec. This amounts to around 5,844,000 people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of all Quebecois in the whole country in that same year. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory comprises the regionally contiguous Province of Quebec. The territory adjoins an international land border (United States) and has access to the Atlantic Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The Quebecois form part of the EPR group 'French speakers'. EPR codes several kin groups. These are the French (France), Walloon (Belgium), Swiss French (Switzerland), Aostans (Italy), and Franco-Mauritians (Mauritius). We follow EPR and code ethnic kin in non-neighboring countries. [kin in non-adjointing country]

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Westerners

Activity: 1974-2001

General notes

- The term Westerners, as employed here, relates to English-speaking Canadians in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan; some also include English-speakers in Manitoba and the Northwest and Yukon Territories (Minahan 2002: 2059).

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1867 Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick united to become independent Canada. The Northwest Territories became part of Canada in 1870. Manitoba, then part of the Northwest Territories, was allowed separate province status. A former British colony, British Columbia joined the Canadian confederation in 1871. Alberta and Saskatchewan followed suit in 1905. All received province status, implying significant autonomy. Yukon Territory was split from Northwest Territories in 1898. There was a short interlude of centralization during the First World War and immediately after, when the central government levied an income tax. The centralist tendencies were largely reversed after 1921. A second wave of centralization began in the context of the Second World War. There were constitutional amendments in 1940 which gave the Parliament the power to establish employment insurance and universal pensions. And in 1941, the central government started to monopolize income taxes (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"). In the 1960s, mainly due to Quebec leader Jean Lesage, the centralist tendency was reverted. Between 1960 and 1980, the center made several concessions with regard to provincial taxation (Canadian Encyclopedia: section "Federalism"). The two most significant concessions appear to have been made in 1962 and 1965. In 1962 far-reaching tax competencies were given back to the provinces. In 1965 the provinces were allowed to opt out of shared cost programs. This was mainly directed at Quebec, which is the only province which chose to opt out of all shared cost programs (Fenwick 1981: 210), but considers a concession for the other provinces, too. [1965: autonomy concession]
- However, in 1969, the newly elected Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau set out to make Canada a bilingual country. The federal parliament passed the 1969 Official Languages Act, which implemented the official use of both languages in all federal institutions (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 102). We code a (prior) restriction due to the relative status decrease of the English language. [1969: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In October 1980, three months after the Quebecois independence referendum, Trudeau announced plans to repatriate the constitution – that is, write a new document that would be entirely Canadian and thus cut links with the UK. After initial reservations, nine of ten provinces agreed to the repatriation in 1981 – all except for Quebec (Meadwell 1993: 235). This had been possible because the constitutional amendment formula was changed beforehand. Until 1981, there was an implicit agreement that constitutional changes require unanimous provincial consent. Many Quebecois had furthermore even been under the impression that Quebec enjoys a special veto, though this belief was not widely shared outside of Quebec. In 1981, Canada's Supreme Court ruled that only a "substantial degree of provincial consent" was necessary for constitutional changes (Dunsmuir & O'Neal 1992). We code an autonomy restriction in 1981 because the provinces, including in particular Quebec but also the Westerner provinces, effectively lost their traditional right to veto constitutional amendments by way of the 1981 Supreme Court ruling. [1981: autonomy restriction]

- Given Quebec's opposition to repatriation, the 1982 Constitution Act (Canada Act) was signed by all provinces except for Quebec, even if it applies to Quebec as well (Meadwell 1993: 235). Given Quebec's opposition to repatriation, the 1982 Constitution Act (Canada Act) was signed by all provinces except for Quebec, even if it applies to Quebec as well (Meadwell 1993: 235). The new constitution confirmed the provinces' loss of the right to veto constitutional amendments as it introduced a formula that treats each province equally. From now on, the consent of only two thirds of the provinces that have at least 50% of Canada's population was required (note: this still gave Quebec in combination with Ontario a de-facto veto because they together make up more than 50% of Canada's population; see Heard & Swartz 1997: 340). The 1982 constitution introduced new restrictions for Quebec (see Quebecois) but does not appear to have implied similar restrictions for the English-speaking provinces. Thus, we do not code a restriction.
- The fact that Quebec did not sign Canada's 1982 constitution initiated a constitutional crisis. The 1987 Meech Lake Accord set out to resolve the situation. The proposal included major concessions to Quebec; however, also other provinces would have profited from increased autonomy rights, including a constitutional veto, increased competencies with regard to immigration, and the right to opt out of certain national programs. The Meech Lake Accord was never implemented, but constitutes a very significant promise: all provincial first ministers promised ratification (Meadwell 1993: 236). Hence, it is coded as a concession. [1987: autonomy concession]
- In June 1990, the three-year deadline for ratification of the Meech Lake Accord ended without ratification of all provinces (Manitoba and Newfoundland did not ratify; Minorities at Risk Project). Thus a significant promise of increased autonomy was revoked. [1990: autonomy restriction]
- The failed Meech Lake Accord was followed by a similar Accord, the Charlottetown Accord. Again, Quebec would have gained the most, but also other provinces were promised increased autonomy, including competencies in forestry, mining, natural resources, and cultural policy. (Minorities at Risk Project). The Charlottetown Accord goes even beyond Meech Lake in terms of devolved competencies. It was accepted by all major national parties and (later) by all provincial leaders in 1992. Since the Charlottetown Accord constitutes a very significant autonomy offer, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
- However, the Charlottetown Accord was subjected to a referendum. The proposal was rejected in October 1992. All four Western provinces had voted against the proposal, with no-majorities ranging from 55.3 per cent (Saskatchewan) to 68.3 per cent (British Columbia). One of the two Territories associated with the movement voted against the accord too (Yukon Territory with 56.3 per cent no). The remaining Territory, the Northwest Territory, voted in favor with 61.3 per cent yes. Even if most Westerners voted against the accord, we do not code a restriction, in line with general practice. This can be defended also because the vote was widely perceived as a vote on the (asymmetric) concessions granted to Quebec, and not the concessions to English Canada.
- After the narrow loss of the sovereigntists in the 1995 independence referendum, in 1996, the constitutional amendments formula was changed so that Quebec regained a veto over constitutional amendments. The formula that had been introduced in 1982 treated all provinces equally in that it required the consent of two thirds of the provinces that together have at least 50% of Canada's population (Heard & Swartz 1997: 340). The 1996 formula required the consent of a majority of the provinces that includes Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, two or more of the Atlantic provinces that in combination have at least 50% of the region's population (thus giving Alberta a de-facto veto) and two or more of the Prairie provinces that have at least 50% of the region's population (Heard & Swartz 1997: 342). While this was first and foremost a concession for the Quebecois, it also increased the Westerner provinces' stake in constitutional amendments (see Heard & Swartz 1997: 342). British Columbia gained an outright veto and Alberta a de-facto veto. The other, smaller Westerner provinces lost some of their influence because provinces were no longer treated equally, but on balance the Westerners' stake in constitutional questions increased. [1996: autonomy concession]
- In 1999, Nunavut was separated from the Northwest Territories to become the first majority-indigenous Canadian territory. The separation was endorsed by the residents of the Northwest Territory, as evidenced by referendums in 1982 and 1992 (c2d). Thus we do not code a restriction.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan are Canadian provinces, and territories have a degree of autonomy too. [1974-2001: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1974, the Committee for Western independence was founded (Minahan 2002: 2062), and also the Western Canada Concept founded in 1980 advocated independence for the western Provinces (Minahan 2002: 2063; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319). Also the Western Independence party, which split from the WCC in 1987, favored independence. Based on this, we code an independence claim throughout. [1974-2001: independence claim]
 - o There was also a party that called for union with the U.S., the Saskatchewan Unionist Party (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319)

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Westerners
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	English speakers
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	2001000

- The term Westerners, as employed here, relates to English-speaking Canadians in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan; some also include English-speakers in Manitoba and the Northwest and Yukon Territories (Minahan 2002: 2059). EPR codes English speakers in Canada as senior partner (and French speakers as junior partner). Generally, Quebec and Ontario have the most important role in Canada's federal government (Minahan 2002: 2063), but Western Canadians should not be considered powerless. It is established practice in Canada to guarantee regional representation in the assignment of ministerial posts (Bakvis 1988). Hence, Western representatives regularly held ministerial posts (e.g., Dufferin Roblin served from 1984-1986 under Brian Mulroney), even if prime ministers during the movement's existence consistently were non-Westerners (except for the interim prime minister Kim Campbell from British Columbia, who served for a mere five months in 1993). A junior partner coding appears most adequate. [1974-2001: junior partner]

- According to Minahan (2002: 2059) there are 7.92 million Western Canadians in Canada in 2002. Combined with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Canada's population (31.36 million), this yields a group size of .2526. [1974-2012: .2526 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 2059), Western Canadians make up 84% of the population in their three heartland provinces. This amounts to around 7,026,600 people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 7,920,000 Western Canadians in the whole country in that same year (see Minahan). [concentrated]
- The Westerners' territory comprises the western Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan (with some nationalists also including the territories of English-speakers in Manitoba and the Northwest and Yukon Territories). The territory adjoins an international land border (United States) and has access to Pacific Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- Oil or gas: Lujala et al (2007) code several oil/gas fields in Western Canada, mainly in Alberta (PRIMKEY: CA008PET - CA018PET). The first discovery was in the 19th century. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Minahan (2002: 2059) reports smaller Westerner communities in the rest of Canada and the United States. These are not significant enough to be considered here. Note: While the Westerners are also English speakers, we do not code English speakers in other countries (e.g. in the United States) as kin because this movement is directed against a government dominated by English speakers. [no kin]

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CHINA

Hui (Dungans)

Activity: 1953-1958

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Hui people first settled in the south of the Alashan Desert and established a separate state ruled by Hui sultans, which was only nominally under the rule of the Chinese Empire. However, when the Manchu rulers took over the Hui homeland in 1648, the Hui were not able to defend their land. Manchu rule was very repressive. The Hui were persecuted, many fled to other parts within China. By the 18th century the Hui were dispersed throughout China. Today, the largest part lives in Ningsia-Hui Autonomous Region in the Northwest of China (Minahan 2002:744-746). In 1911, during the Chinese Revolution, the Hui Nationalists took advantage of the political situation and created an autonomous government in Ningsia, the heartland of the Hui. However, the independence did not last long. Troops loyal to the new republic took over shortly after (Minahan 2002:746). In the 1920s and 1930s the central government was weak due to the civil war. A separate Ningsia province was established in 1928, which gave the Hui some limited autonomy (Minahan 2002:747). Minahan (2002: 747) suggests that the Hui were granted increased autonomy in 1949, but this information could not be confirmed (see e.g. Encyclopedia Britannica). We code a prior concession due to the formation of a separate Ningsia province in 1928. [prior concession]
- No concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset was found.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1954 Ningsia was incorporated into the province of Gansu. However, at the same time autonomous Hui prefectures were established (Encyclopedia Britannica). Thus, it is not clear whether this constitutes a concession or a restriction.
- In 1958, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia was established (Minahan 2002: 747; Encyclopedia Britannica). [1958: autonomy concession]
- The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) “abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogeneizing approach” (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748; Bovingdon 2004: 19). [1958: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- In August 1953 the Chinese Islamic Association declared the Hui-populated districts south of the Alashan Desert independent of China as the Chinese Islamic Republic (Minahan 2002:747). [1953: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1958, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia was established (Minahan 2002: 747; Encyclopedia Britannica). Note that it is possible that the Hui had enjoyed some autonomy already before 1958 (there were autonomous prefectures since 1954). [1958: establishment of regional autonomy]
- It has to be noted that the extent of regional autonomy is not fully clear. Many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293), but at the same time they report that there is some autonomy in education, culture and other “soft” issues (also see Sautmann 1999: 293). Our coding practice follows EPR which considers most Chinese minorities (including the Hui) autonomous before and after the Cultural Revolution.

Regional autonomy

- We would code autonomy only from 1959 when the movement was no longer active.

De-facto independence

- The Chinese Islamic Republic that was proclaimed in 1953 lasted for a single month, before it was retaken by the Communists (Minahan 2002:747). Hence, we do not code de-facto independence.

Claims

- In 1953 Hui nationalists proclaimed an independent republic (see above). Furthermore, according to Minahan (2002: 747-748), in 1957 Hui nationalists demanded the “socialist self-determination preached by the communist leaders”, which appears to indicate contention for independence. [1953-1958: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Hui (Dungans)
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Hui
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	71005000

Territory

- Both MAR and GeoEPR code the Hui as dispersed. Minahan (2002: 744) suggests that only about a third of the Hui lives in the Hui region, where they in addition do not comprise a majority. [not concentrated]
- The exact contours of the claimed territory are unclear. According to Minahan (2002: 747), Hui leaders claimed Hui-populated territories south of the Alashan desert. This is also where today’s Ningsia region is located, though the claimed territory may well have been larger. It is clear, however, that there is no international border or seashore in the area. [border: no; seashore: no]
- Whether there is hydrocarbon reserves is trickier. Today’s Ningxia overlaps with PRIMKEY CH045PET, but the date of discovery is only 1988, thus after the movement ended. There are other reserves in the area: in particular PRIMKEY CH046PET (date of discovery unknown),

which is part of today's Inner Mongolia, and PRIMKEY CH047PET (which appears to be three or four dozens of miles away from today's Ningsia). Assuming that the claimed territory overlaps plus minus with today's Ningsia, we do not code a reserve. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- Minorities at Risk and Minahan (2002: 744) suggest that the Hui have close kindred across a border. There are Huis in Kyrgyzstan and in Kazakhstan. None exceeds the 100,000 threshold (each roughly 40,000). However, EPR considers the Kazakhs as kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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Tibetans

Activity: 1945-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Tibet has a varied history; at times it was independent and at times under Chinese and/or British rule (or influence).
 - o During the Ming Dynasty, Tibet was ruled as an independent kingdom.
 - o When China came under the rule of the Manchu dynasty, Tibet negotiated a protective alliance with the Emperor to avoid maintaining a military force.
 - o Nominal Chinese rule over Tibet was established in the 18th century.
 - o As the British gained foothold around Tibet, the Tibetans rejected British overtures. The British dispatched forces to occupy Tibet in 1903-1904 and opened the area to trade.
 - o In 1906, the British signed a treaty with China without Tibetan participation that recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.
 - o In 1910 China sent forces to enforce this claim in 1910 – the Dalai Lama and many followers fled to British India.
- Tibetan soldiers eventually succeeded in driving the Chinese from Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama returned to Tibet and declared it independent in 1912 or 1913 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293-294). A brief border war in 1930-31 ended in additional loss of territory to China (thus we code a prior restriction). We have not identified a concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset. [prior restriction]
- Note: it is questionable whether Tibet could be considered an independent state at the time (this is a matter of significant contention with the Tibetans claiming they were independent and the Chinese that Tibet was not). Gleditsch & Ward (1999) list Tibet as an independent country from 1913-1950, but Tibet had very limited international recognition. The UK recognized Tibet as an autonomous entity under Chinese suzerainty. Chinese influence over Tibet was however very limited. Thus, Goldstein (1998) describes Tibet as de-facto independent. China appears to have tacitly accepted Tibet's status until 1950 (when Tibet was invaded, see below).

Concessions and restrictions

- In October 1950 China invaded eastern Tibet. This ended Tibet's (de-facto) independence. An appeal to the UN was denied. In 1951 the Chinese forced the Dalai Lama to sign an annexation treaty (Minahan 2002: 1891-1892). The 17-Point Agreement for the Liberation of Tibet put Tibet formally under the jurisdiction of China while guaranteeing the Dalai Lama the right to continue administering Tibet and hence a certain degree of autonomy (Goldstein 1998: 85; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 294). But Tibet's autonomy clearly became more limited (some parts were even incorporated into neighbouring Chinese provinces). [1950: autonomy restriction]
- According to Minahan (2002: 1892), Mao launched a massive migration campaign in 1954 with the intention that Han Chinese would outnumber the Tibetans by 5:1. In line with the codebook, relocation policies are not coded.
- The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) "abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogenizing approach" (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748, 1959; Bovingdon 2004: 19; Minority Rights Group International). [1958: cultural rights restriction]

- In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama was driven into exile (Minahan 2002: 1893; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 295). The monastic system was dismantled, feudalism and serfdom abolished and communes instituted in monastic and pastoral areas (Goldstein 1998: 86). This ended much of the autonomy Tibet had previously enjoyed. [1959: autonomy restriction]
- The end of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 led to more relaxed policies again. [1961: cultural rights concession]
- In 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region was formed, which *formally* ended Tibetan self-rule and made Tibet an autonomous Chinese province. Tibet's autonomy appears unchanged relative to 1959 (see above).
- In 1966 the Cultural Revolution began, a period of extreme assimilation pressure with intensified persecution of religion and campaigns to eradicate traditional cultures. All religious activities were prohibited (Bajoria 2008) and most of Tibet's monasteries were destroyed (Minorities at Risk Project). The Cultural Revolution also meant the loss of much of the autonomy of ethnic minorities, as signified for instance by the 1975 constitution (Sautmann 1999: 288). [1966: autonomy restriction]
- The situation for China's ethnic minorities improved gradually after Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Edgar 2004: 533; also see Minahan 2002: 748). The autonomous regions' powers were restored. In particular, the 1978 constitution restored some of the powers the autonomous regions had lost during the Cultural Revolution (Sautmann 1999: 288). But legal revisions have followed policy changes rather than vice versa (Bovingdon 2004: 17). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1976 to coincide with the end of the Cultural Revolution. [1976: autonomy concession]
- In the 1980s, the scope of the autonomous regions' autonomy was increased (Tibet enjoyed the status of an autonomous region since 1965). The 1982 constitution reinstated all (or most of) the rights of autonomous provinces that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution (Carlson 2004: 18). The 1984 Regional Autonomy substantiated the autonomy rights. According to Minority Rights Group International, the law increased autonomy mainly in education and culture and other "soft" issues (see Sautmann 1999: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1982 to coincide with the constitution. [1982: autonomy concession]
- In the late 1980s Beijing imposed martial law in Tibet (Carlson 2004: 24); this is not coded in line with the codebook.
- Despite some improvements, the Tibetans have remained severely repressed. The number of Tibetans employed by the local authorities is gradually decreasing. Official bilingualism appears not enforced. In sum, there appear to be many instances of restrictions. The evidence about specific events is scarce, however. We have found sufficient evidence for three post-Cultural Revolution events that can be coded as cultural rights restriction. In 1994 the "Tibetans began resisting against a new series of restrictions on the practice of cultural and religious life. Restrictions included the display of photographs of the Dalai Lama except inside temples, limitation of the numbers of monks in each temple, elimination of the Tibetan tradition of polyandry, banning of Tibetan language schools and the use of Tibetan language in postsecondary institutions, and others." Moreover, "[i]n 1994 Beijing also controversially handpicked Ugyen Trinley as the successor of the Dalai Lama" (Minorities at Risk Project). [1994: cultural rights restriction]
- In 2000, the Chinese government instituted regulations intended to "manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to the central task of economic construction, the unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity", leading to policies prohibiting religious education and limiting religious ceremonies (Chido 2008). [2000: cultural rights restriction]
- In 2001 the 1984 regional autonomy law was revised. However, little changed (Smith 2004: 14).
- A further significant event appears to be the imposition of a Mandarin language exam as a prerequisite for state employment in 2006. Many Tibetans do not speak Mandarin, thus effectively excluding them from state employment. Furthermore, Tibetan appears to have been replaced with Mandarin as the language of instruction in secondary and tertiary education in recent years (Minority Rights Group International). [2006: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- Tibet declared independence in 1912 or 1913 but this is out-of-sample.

Major territorial change

- Whether Tibet can be considered an independent state prior to China's 1950 invasion is controversial. Given Tibet's limited recognition as an independent state we consider Tibet a de-facto independent state until 1950, when de-facto independence was abolished by way of China's invasion. [1950: abolishment of de-facto independent state]
- Initially Tibet enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. In 1959 Tibet's autonomy was decreased and the Dalai Lama exiled. Upon the Cultural Revolution autonomy was fully abolished. [1966: abolishment of autonomy]
- Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution (see above and below). [1976: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Until October 1950 Tibet was de-facto independent. Tibet retained some autonomy until 1966. [1945-1966: regional autonomy]
- Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution. [1977-2012: regional autonomy]
- It has to be noted that the extent of regional autonomy is not fully clear. Many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293), but at the same time they report that there is some autonomy in education, culture and other "soft" issues (also see Sautmann 1999: 293). Our coding practice follows EPR which considers most Chinese minorities (including the Tibetans) autonomous before and after the Cultural Revolution.

De-facto independence

- Whether Tibet can be considered an independent state prior to China's 1950 invasion is controversial. Given Tibet's limited recognition as an independent state we consider Tibet a de-facto independent state until 1950, when de-facto independence was abolished by way of China's invasion. Due to the 1st of January rule Tibet is coded as de-facto independent until 1950. [1945-1950: de-facto independence]

Claims

- The Tibetans' claim has unambiguously been for independence until the late 1980s (see e.g. Minahan 2002). [1950-1988: independence claim]
- In 1988 the Dalai Lama renounced the claim for independence and instead began to advocate full internal autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). At the same time, several groups continue to make claims for independence. But since the Dalai Lama is the most authoritative representation of the self-determination movement, we code autonomy as the dominant claim from 1989 onwards. [1989-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tibetans
<i>Scenario</i>	1945/Irrelevant/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Tibetans
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	71010000

- 1945 is not coded in EPR and they are coded as irrelevant in 1946-1948 (all other years are 1:1). At the time the Tibetans were de-facto independent, thus a powerless code. [1945-1948: powerless]
- 1945-1948 group size = 1949 group size. [1945-1948: .0048 (group size)]

Territory

- Most Tibetans reside in today's autonomous Tibet region, formerly Outer Tibet, and adjacent Chinese provinces, formerly Inner Tibet. The Tibetans make up the majority of the autonomous region, but according to Minahan (2002: 1889), only about 30% of the Tibetans live there. As regards the other regions (Inner Tibet), Minahan notes that Han Chinese outnumbered Tibetans in all regions except for the autonomous region by the early 1980s. This suggests that since the early 1980s the Tibetans can no longer be considered concentrated. [1940-1979: concentrated; 1980-2012: not concentrated]
- Tibet borders Nepal and Bhutan, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- PRIMKEY CH025PET, discovered in 1999, lies in Outer Tibet. Some other fields lie in Inner Tibet, where the Tibetans no longer make up a majority but that is also claimed by some Tibetan groups: PRIMKEY CH019PET (discovered in 1958), CH018PET (discovery unknown), and CH020PET (discovered in 2001). [oil/gas: 1945-1958: no; 1959-2012: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there are numerically significant Tibetan kin groups in Bhutan (Bhutanese and Ngalops (Drupka)). MAR V also provides evidence of "close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base" without listing the countries these groups live in. Minahan (2002: 1889) mentions large kin groups in India (approximately 150,000 – this population is the result of emigration after the Dalai Lama's emigration to India in 1959) and further communities in Nepal, the United States, Europe and Canada. Finally, the Buddhist Ladakhis, mainly in India (see the respective movement) have Tibetan origin and retain close ethnic ties to the Tibetans (Minahan 2002: 1063). [1945-2012: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Uyghurs

Activity: 1945-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Uyghur homeland came under Chinese control in 1759, followed by repression of Uyghur culture, in particular religion (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 1961). In 1884 the Qing dynasty established a Xinjiang province but this does not appear to have implied significant autonomy (Encyclopedia Britannica). In 1911 the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, and the Chinese Republic was installed. The central government's hold on the Uyghurs was relatively weak. The Uyghurs took advantage of the political vacuum and, with support from the Soviet Union, declared the independence of the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in 1933. China was able to retake the region only shortly thereafter, in 1934 (Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 1065). A new revolt began in the years of 1936-1937. In 1944, the Uyghurs established a de-facto independent East Turkestan. However, these are not center-initiated policies; we were unable to locate center-initiated concessions or restrictions in the years before 1945. We code a prior restriction, given the Uyghurs' long-standing loss of autonomy. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1949 the de-facto independent East Turkestan reintegrated with China, when the Communist People's Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). Since China never granted de-facto independence, this is not coded as a restriction.
- According to Bovingdon (2004: 23-24), the Communist regime, in 1949, began a relocation policy whereunder Han Chinese were motivated to move into the Xinjiang region. Relocation policies are not coded, in accordance with the codebook.
- Initially the Communist government took a relatively favorable stance towards its ethnic minorities. In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). [1955: autonomy concession]
- The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) "abandoned the relatively conciliatory policy towards nationalities in favour of a more homogenizing approach" (Edgar 2014: 533). There was assimilationist pressure with regard to language and severe repression of religious practices (Minahan 2002: 748, 1959; Bovingdon 2004: 19; Minority Rights Group International). [1958: cultural rights restriction]
- The end of the Great Leap Forward in 1961 led to more relaxed policies again. [1961: cultural rights concession]
- However, in 1966 the Cultural Revolution began, a period of extreme assimilation pressure with intensified persecution of religion and campaigns to eradicate traditional cultures. The Cultural Revolution also meant the loss of much of the autonomy of ethnic minorities, as signified for instance by the 1975 constitution (Sautmann 1999: 288). [1966: autonomy restriction]
- The situation for China's ethnic minorities improved gradually after Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 (Edgar 2004: 533; also see Minahan 2002: 748). The autonomous regions' powers were restored. In particular, the 1978 constitution restored some of the powers the autonomous regions had lost during the Cultural Revolution (Sautmann 1999: 288). But legal revisions have followed policy changes rather than vice versa (Bovingdon 2004: 17). Hence, we

code an autonomy concession in 1976 to coincide with the end of the Cultural Revolution. [1976: autonomy concession]

- In the early 1980s, the Chinese government loosened some of its control over religion and many mosques were rebuilt. (Bovingdon 2004: 32-33; Minahan 2002: 748). Moreover, in 1981 the region's four major languages, including Uyghur, regained official status (Minahan 2002: 1962). [1981: cultural rights concession]
- In the 1980s, the scope of the autonomous regions' autonomy was increased (Tibet enjoyed the status of an autonomous region since 1965). The 1982 constitution reinstated all (or most of) the rights of autonomous provinces that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution (Carlson 2004: 18). The 1984 Regional Autonomy substantiated the autonomy rights. According to Minority Rights Group International, the law increased autonomy mainly in education and culture and other "soft" issues (see Sautmann 1999: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1982 to coincide with the constitution. [1982: autonomy concession]
- Minority Rights Group International reports that since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has moved towards replacing Uyghur with Mandarin in education. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
- In response to the 1990 Baren incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chinese government reversed its tolerance towards Islam. Several anti-Muslim policies were adopted. Among other things, the construction of mosques was stopped, already-existing mosques were closed, and around 10 per cent of Uighur clerics were stripped of their positions in 1991 (Bovingdon 2004: 33-34; for religious discrimination against Uighurs, also see Minority Rights Group International). [1991: cultural rights restriction]
- There seem to be many more instances of restrictive policies, but information is scarce. In 2000, the Chinese government instituted regulations intended to "manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to the central task of economic construction, the unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity", leading to policies prohibiting religious education and reading banned versions of the Koran, and limiting religious ceremonies (Chido 2008). [2000: cultural rights restriction]
- In 2001 the 1984 regional autonomy law was revised. Little changed (Smith 2004: 14).
- We code a further cultural rights restriction in 2002 since "[a] policy adopted in 2002 seems to require that Uyghur names be changed into Chinese pinyin" (Minority Rights Group International). [2002: cultural rights restriction]
- In 2008, the Chinese government outlawed the wearing of beards for officials (Styles 2013). [2008: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- In January 1945 the Uyghurs declared the independence of the Republic of East Turkestan (Minahan 2002: 1961). [1945: independence declaration]
- In 2004, the East Turkestan government-in-exile declared independence (East Turkistan Government in Exile). We do not code this because it is a declaration issued by a diaspora organization in the US.

Major territorial change

- [1949: revocation of de-facto independence]
- In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica). [1955: establishment of regional autonomy]
- Upon the Cultural Revolution autonomy was fully abolished. [1966: abolishment of autonomy]
- Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution (see above and below). [1976: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- 1945-1949 is coded with regional autonomy since the Uyghurs were de-facto independent (see below). [1945-1949: regional autonomy]
- In 1955, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region was established (Encyclopedia Britannica). Autonomy was abolished in 1966 (Cultural Revolution). [1956-1966: regional autonomy]
- Autonomy was re-established after the Cultural Revolution. [1977-2012: regional autonomy]
- It has to be noted that the extent of regional autonomy is not fully clear. Many are skeptical about autonomy solutions in China (e.g. Ghai 2000). According to Minority Rights Group International the 1980s autonomy increase was mostly theoretical (also see Bovingdon 2004, in particular page 293), but at the same time they report that there is some autonomy in education, culture and other “soft” issues (also see Sautmann 1999: 293). There appears to be some Uighur representation in the regional government, though they are “quite underrepresented”, especially in the party cadre, where the most important decisions are taken (Bovingdon 2004: 30). Our coding practice follows EPR which considers most Chinese minorities (including the Uyghurs) autonomous before and after the Cultural Revolution.

De-facto independence

- In 1944 the Uyghurs, with the support of the Soviet Union, established the East Turkestan Republic. Most sources suggest that the East Turkestan Republic remained de-facto independent until 1949, when the communist People’s Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 1065). Hence, we code de-facto independence from 1945-1949. [1945-1949: de-facto independence]

Claims

- The dominant claim is not fully clear, given the movement’s factionalization (Minahan 2002: 1963). In 1944, a de-facto independent East Turkestan state was erected, and there was an independence declaration in 1945 (see above). The independent Turkestan republic, was disbanded in 1949. According to Bovingdon (2004: 12), Uyghur leaders began to press for far-reaching autonomy. In 1967 or 1968, the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, a clandestine group advocating an independent Uighur state that was presumably supported by the Soviets. According to Chinese scholars, the Revolutionary Party was one of the most important Uyghur organizations (Dillon 2004: 57-58). There appear to have been significant organizations (many of which exile organizations) calling for outright independence ever since (Chung 2002; Hyer 2006; Reed & Raschke 2010: 37). Based on this, we code an independence claim for 1945-1949 and for 1968 onwards, and an autonomy claim in 1950-1967. [1945-1949: independence claim; 1950-1967: autonomy claim; 1968-2012: independence claim]
- Note that Minorities at Risk states, somewhat ambiguously, that “[m]ost desire widespread autonomy with a smaller number preferring autonomy”. We still code an independence claim from 1968 onwards because it seems the most significant organizations advocate independence.

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Uyghurs
<i>Scenario</i>	1945/Irrelevant/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Uyghur
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	71036000

- In principle a 1:1 case, the Uyghurs are not coded in EPR in 1946-1948 (that is, they are coded as irrelevant), and obviously not in 1945 since EPR does not go back to this year. In 1945 Uyghur rebels declared their own state, East Turkestan. The unilaterally declared East Turkestan was dissolved in 1949, after negotiations with the Chinese government. Thus, the period of 1945-1948 constitutes self-exclusion from the political center (de-facto independence). In the EPR2SDM coding scheme, this makes up a powerless status. The power status for 1949-2012 is directly extracted from EPR. [1945-1948: powerless]
- The 1949 group size estimate is used also for 1945-1948. [1945-1948: .0062 (group size)]

Territory

- Both MAR and GeoEPR consider the Uyghurs concentrated, but they do not require that the Uyghurs make up an absolute majority of their regional base.
 - o According to both Minahan and MAR, the overwhelming majority of the Uyghurs live in Xinjiang province. According to Minahan (2002: 1958), the Uyghurs make up a relative majority in the province, yet not an absolute majority (46% Uyghurs, 42% Han Chinese). Minahan also notes that population estimates are difficult, and that the number of Uyghurs may be higher. It is, however, widely established that the share of Uyghurs in the region has decreased massively over the years; the Han share increased from single digits in the 1940s to approximately 40% from 1970 onwards (see Hannum & Xie 1998). Thus, even if census figures are not reliable, it may well be that the Uyghurs lost their absolute majority in Xinjiang as a whole. Nevertheless, they can probably be considered concentrated in the sense employed here. Both Minahan (2002: 1958) and Hannum & Xie (1998) suggest that there is a very significant level of ethnic segregation in Xinjiang, with the Uyghurs primarily settling in the less well-off eastern part of Xinjiang. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory (Xinjiang) borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. No seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Xinjiang includes rich hydrocarbon reserves (Minahan 2002: 1958), including PRIMKEY CH013PET (discovered in 1977), CH010PET (unknown), CH008PET (1988), CH003PET (unknown), and CH002PET (1897) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there were Uyghur kin groups in the Soviet Union and three of its successor states (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan). All of them adjoin China, and at least the community in Kazakhstan is numerically significant (approximately 200-300,000 according to EPR). Further evidence for kin groups in adjoining states comes from Minahan (2002: 1958), who states that there are Uyghur communities in Pakistan, Russia, and the Central Asian states neighboring China (together with smaller communities in Europe, Turkey, Australia, Canada, United States). [kin in adjoining country]

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COLOMBIA

Raizals

Activity: 1960-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Raizals are an English-Creole speaking, Protestant Afro-Caribbean group located mainly in the Caribbean San Andrés Archipelago. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, this remote archipelago has increasingly been Colombianized (implying centralization and the promotion of the Spanish language and Catholicism), which met some opposition by the English-Creole speaking, mainly Protestant Raizals (Ross 2007: 18-19). The Colombia state did not recognize indigenous people and reduced them to the status of children or “minors” in a 1890 law (EPR, citing Minority Rights Group International). De-facto a part of Colombia, the archipelago also came under de-jure Colombian sovereignty by the 1928 Esguerra-Barcenas treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua (Minority Rights Group International). Assimilation pressure went as far that the teaching of English in schools was prohibited. Furthermore, migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority (Ross 2007: 24; Mow n.d.). Given the centralization process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and repression of cultural rights, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- A new constitution came into force in July 1991. The constitution “gave place to a more comprehensive recognition of indigenous languages and cultures, their rights over their territories, and political representation for indigenous peoples and Afrocolombians in the Congress” (EPR). In addition to the recognition of language and culture, article 329 of the 1991 constitution granted the right to collective ownership of traditional lands and administrative autonomy of indigenous territories (Inter American Commission on Human Rights). Unlike in the case of the indigenous peoples (which EPR codes as regionally autonomous as of 1992), the Afro-Colombian population of which the Raizals form part was not granted any form of regional autonomy by the 1991 constitution (and is thus also not coded as regionally autonomous by EPR). However, with so-called „Community Councils“, which should guarantee the administration of legally recognized Afro-Colombian territory, they were granted some autonomy on a local level (EPR, citing UN expert on minority issues 2011). Furthermore, the right of mainland Colombians to migrate, settle and work on the archipelago was also restricted by Decree No. 2762 of 1991. This restriction was confirmed by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in 1993 and 1999 (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Boards Canada 2001). We code a concession due to the increase in local autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]
- 1993 legislation aimed to protect the island’s environmental and cultural identity (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Boards Canada 2001). The 1993 law appears to be an outflow of the changes in 1991, thus we code a single concession in 1991.

Sovereignty declarations

- According to a 2008 NY Times article by Simon Romero (2008), the Archipelago Movement for Ethnic Native Self-Determination for the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providence and Kethlena (AMEN-SD) symbolically declared independence in June 2007. The declaration of independence is also annexed to a 2013 letter addressed to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Navi Pillay) in which AMEN-SD call her attention to their cause (AMEN-SD 2013). We do not code this since the declaration was only symbolic.

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The local autonomy that was granted in 1991 is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The dominant claim appears to be for autonomy. According to Romero (2008), AMEN-SD symbolically declared independence in June 2007. We do not code independence as the dominant claim due to the declaration's symbolic character. [1960-2012: autonomy claim]
 - o Raizal mobilization for self-determination began after the Second World War when "Islanders not only demonstrated against the 'abuses' of the government but also tried to have the matter raised at an international level by appealing the British Queen, the Vice-President of the U.S.A., and the United Nations with the argument that they should have the status of a 'Self-governing Territory of Colombia'" (Ross 2007: 24). An organized claim for more self-determination was first articulated by the Club Archipiélago Unido, which acted as a pressure group to defend Islander culture under the slogan "La isla para los isleños" (Clemente 1991:254). Their main aims were the removal of the Mission Territory status of the islands, the election of Mayors and the development of education programmes in traditional Islander activities such as fishing. They also advocated the setting up of schools and social centres through community action. They focused on the issues of identity and the preservation of the traditions and the ecology of the islands."
 - o The movement continued to gain track throughout the 1970s. According to Ross (2007: 25), "[b]y the end of the 1970s these feelings had developed into a clear resistance to Colombianisation with the appearance of publications and organisations such as the Islander Civic Movement, founded in 1978, and followed in the 1980s by MAR (Movimiento Autónomo Regional) and SOS (Sons of the Soil). The Islander Civic Movement proposed a return to traditional Islander culture, the officialisation of English, bilingual education and television programmes, the restoration of civic pride and consciousness and the right to self-government (Clemente 1991:163). MAR and SOS continued the resistance in these areas but focused particularly on controlling immigration and establishing political autonomy."
 - o The movement appears to be ongoing. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (2000) makes mention of a separatist movement among Raizals; they report a protest that took place in July 1999, which was organized by the Movimiento por la Autodeterminación de la Isla (MAI), an organization they say is led by local pastors, priests, and other native

leaders. Another 2001 report by Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board suggests that the SOS (that was formed back in the 1980s, see above) continued to exist. Mow (n.d.: 9) gives further evidence of an ongoing separatist movement: "many native islander groups, aware of the struggle between the two worlds and the consequences of the complete loss of their identity and extinction as an ethnic group, have risen up against the growth and socio-economic system imposed by the Colombian government and have made serious attempts to reaffirm and protect their people. Pastors of Baptist and Adventist churches are leading an initiative to take an active stand on issues related to native rights, equity, land and sea tenure, and self-determination." Moreover, Martinez & Nelson (2008: 787) report that "Afro-descendants" on San Andrés founded an umbrella organization, the Archipelago Movement for Ethnic-Native Self-Determination (AMEN-SD). This is the organization that symbolically declared independence in 2007 (see above)

- Also see Bushnell & Hudson (2010: 88).

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Raizals
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Afrocolumbians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	10002000

- According to Minority Rights Group International, the Raizals are descendants of original settlers, enslaved Africans, Amerindians and British emigrants. However, Minority Rights Group International lists them under the Afro-Colombian group and the Colombian authorities also consider them as part of the Afro-Colombian group. We thus link them to the EPR group 'Afro-Colombians'. The Afro-Colombians are considered irrelevant until 1979 and from then on are coded powerless. EPR acknowledges that Afro-Colombians "face persecution, displacement and disappearances when their territories are in conflict with the state system" but following Van Cott (2007), who considers Colombia as one of Latin America's countries most strongly committed to multiculturalism, the Afro-Colombians are not coded as discriminated. We still code the Raizals as discriminated [1960-2012: discriminated]:
 - The Minority Rights Group International states that there is "oppression and multiple discrimination" in terms of race, religion, language, and political and socio-economic status.
 - Furthermore, citing OHCHR (2004), the Minority Rights Group International states that there is cultural domination and religious aggression from "both mainland Colombians and the Catholic Church who are currently in control of the educational institutions and judicial systems [...] The economy is in the hands of mainland Colombians who employ very few of the Raizales. The unemployment rate among the indigenous population is estimated at 70%".
- According to Romero (2008), the Raizals nowadays make up roughly a third of the local population of the San Andrés y Providencia Department, though note that Romero pegs the total population at approximately 100,000 while Mow (n.d.) pegs it at approximately 80,000. According to the Minority Rights Group International, which cites official statistics (OHCHR, 2004), the Raizal number 24,444. This number is in line with the proportion indicated by Mow (n.d.) and, relatively speaking, also very close to the number provided by Romero (2008). We go along with the information in Minority Rights Group International and, given Colombia's total population in 2004 (45.53 million according to the World Bank), code a population share of 0.00053. [1960-2012: .0005 (group size)]

Territory

- Migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority in their own homeland (Ross 2007: 24; Mow n.d.), and as of today, the Raizals make up roughly a third of the local population of the San Andrés y Providencia Department (see Romero 2008). [not concentrated]
- The Raizals claim the territory of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Caribbean Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- We could not find any evidence of kin groups outside Colombia. EPR codes the Raizals as a subgroup of the EPR group 'Afro-Colombians' which are also coded as having no kin groups. [no kin]

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CONGO-ZAIRE

Katangans (Lunda and Yeke)

Activity: 1960-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Before colonization the Katangans used to have their own autonomous Kingdom. In 1885, the Katanga Kingdom was subdued by the Belgians. Katanga was fully integrated into the Belgian colony in 1933. The Lunda and Yeke lost much of their autonomy; incoming Luba-Kasais occupied most of the important administrative and business positions (Minahan 2002: 968; Minorities at Risk Project). Hence, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1960 Katanga declared its independence. Subsequently war broke out. We do not code this as a restriction because we only code non-violent restrictions.
- According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 152), Zaire's leadership at a 1961 conference agreed to a federal structure for Zaire, but only two months later renounced the agreement. We do not code a concession because the promise was not acted upon and it was taken back after only two months.
- In 1963, Katanga was forcibly reintegrated into Zaire (Minahan 2002: 969). We do not code this as a restriction because we only code non-violent restrictions and because Congo-Zaire did not revoke autonomy it had previously granted (Katanga's sovereignty was de-facto).
- In December 1993, the Katanga government led by Kabila declared regional autonomy and announced that "Katanga will impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area" (Minorities at Risk Project). Mobutu did not respond to this declaration and many considered this a tacit acceptance (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 971). However, despite a lack of response to Katanga's declaration of regional autonomy in 1993, in 1994 Mobutu's government rejected a charter from the Katanga government that outlined "the powers of the regional parliament" (Minahan 2002: 971). Since no change in the Katangans' autonomy was involved, we do not code a restriction.
- The 2006 DRC constitution called for a decentralization process in which the 11 provinces of DRC would be reorganized into 26 provinces, and each province would have budgetary autonomy via control of 40% of the provincial revenue (AFDB 2009: 8; Weiss & Nzongola-Ntalaja 2013). In 2008, DRC passed a series of laws that aimed to implement the 2006 decentralization plans. "The laws relating to the (i) creation, organization and functioning of [decentralized territorial entities] within provinces; and (ii) setting-up of the Governor's Conference (a body intended to facilitate consultation between provinces and the central authority) were enacted..." (AFDB 2009: 8). The law ratified the division of the 11 original provinces into 26 provinces, one of which would be Kinshasa. However, decentralization has not been implemented. The ICG notes that from 2008-2010, the government had not progressed towards drawing the boundaries of the 26 provinces and the provinces still do not receive 40% of the provincial revenue as stated in the decentralization process. In fact, the provinces continue to receive less than 10% and these funds are considered grants from the government rather than any control over provincial revenue (International Crisis Group 2010: 13). As of 2014, DRC

continues to recognize 11 provinces rather than 26 provinces. Hence, the promise of decentralization seems an empty one. Based on this, we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- Shortly after Congo's independence, in July 1960, Katanga declared its independence (Minahan 2002: 2123; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 152). [1960: independence declaration]
- In December 1993, the Katanga government led by Karl-i-Bond declared regional autonomy and announced that "Katanga will impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area" (Minorities at Risk Project). [1993: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- Zaire attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. [1960: host change (new)]
- [1960: establishment of de-facto independent state]
- [1963: abolishment of de-facto independent state]

Regional autonomy

- The regional autonomy coding coincides with the period of de-facto independence. No regional autonomy beyond 1963. [1960-1963: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- Katanga was declared independent on July 11, 1960, a few days after Congo-Zaire's independence, which came at the end of June. Katanga operated as a de-facto independent state until 1963, when it was forcibly reintegrated (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 151). We do not apply the first of January rule because the establishment of de-facto independence more or less coincided with Zaire's independence. [1960-1963: de-facto independence]

Claims

- In 1960, Katanga declared independence and there was a de-facto independent state until 1963. In 1977/1978, there was another attempt at secession. According to UCDP, there have been several outright secessionist organizations ever since the 1960s. Also Minahan (2002) argues that the dominant claim has been for secession from Zaire/DRC. Based on this, we code an independence claim throughout, even if in 1993, there was a declaration of autonomy rather than independence. [1960-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Katangans (Lunda and Yeke)
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1/Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Lunda-Yeke
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	49011000

- EPR considers the Lunda-Yeke irrelevant from 1966-1997. We code the Lunda-Yeke as powerless throughout this period. Evidence for this coding can be found in the coding notes of the Minorities at Risk Project. MAR reports that the Mobutu regime used the Lunda and Yeke as

pawns by encouraging them to drive out the Luba-Kasai but without giving them representation within the central government. There is also no evidence of discrimination: Minahan (2002: 969) mentions a “terrorist campaign of murder, rape, and looting” by Luba rebels against the Katangans (Lunda-Yeke) as a result of ethnic rivalry, but there seems not to have been active discrimination by the central government. For all other years, the EPR codes are adopted. [1966-1997: powerless]

- EPR estimates the Lunda and Yeke’s population share at .056 in 1966-1997. For all other years, the EPR codes are adopted as well. [1966-1997: .056 (group size)]

Territory

- In the spatially contiguous Province of Katanga the Katangans make up 76% of the population. This amounts to around 3.27 million people (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the around 5,360,000 Katangans in the whole country in that same year (Minahan 2002: 966). [concentrated]
- The Katangans (Lunda and Yeke) claim the territory of the Province of Katanga. The territory adjoins an international land border (Angola, Tanzania, Zambia), but does not have a seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- There is kin (Lundas) in Angola and Zambia (see EPR). Additional evidence of the existence of ethnic kin is provided by the Minorities at Risk Project. MAR states that the “group has close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base” and also lists the Lunda in Zambia and the Lunda in Angola as the two largest kin groups from 1960 onwards. Finally, Minahan (2002: 966) also names Angola and Zambia as countries with settlements of approximately two million Katangans. [kin in neighboring country]

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COTE D'IVOIRE

Agni

Activity: 1960-1970; 1991-2011

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Agni established four distinct kingdoms in 1740, which often were indirectly ruled by the Ashanti and Baule peoples (Minahan 2002: 148). In the 19th century, the Agni Kingdoms became French protectorates. The Agni Kingdoms were administered as part of the French Ivory Coast after WWI (Minahan 2002: 149). In 1959 the autonomous status of one of the traditional Agni Kingdoms, Sanwi, was formally abolished (World Statesmen). Agni calls for separate independence were ignored (Minority Rights Group International). [1959: autonomy restriction] [1st phase prior restriction]
- The Sanwi (Agni) king was allowed to return from exile in Ghana in 1981 (Valsecchi n.d; it is not clear when the Agni king was exiled). We do not code a concession since the Agni kingdom does not appear to have significant autonomy (see above). Thus we code a prior restriction also for the second phase due to the revocation of autonomy in 1959. [2nd phase: prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

NA

Sovereignty declarations

- In February 1960 the Sanwi King declared independence from both France and Côte d'Ivoire. The other Agni Kingdoms decided to follow suit (Minahan 2002:149; World Statesmen pegs the declaration to May 1959, but says that a provisional Sanwi Government in exile was declared in February 1960). Note that the declaration was made prior to Cote d'Ivoire's formal independence (in August). Given that independence was near and by that time out of question, it is nonetheless coded. [1960: independence declaration]
- In 1969, there was another attempted secession, with the Agni king again calling for the secession of the Sanwi Kingdom (Minority Rights Group International; Handloff 1988: 27). Minahan (2002: 150), in contrast, argues that an independence declaration was prepared but not issued. Noting the ambiguity, we nonetheless code an independence declaration. [1969: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Cote d'Ivoire attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. [1960: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Re the first phase of activity: it is not fully clear whether the Agnis aimed at independence or union with Ghana (Touval 2007: 284), but independence seems more likely given that the Agni King declared independence in 1960 and 1969 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 264; World Statesmen). [1960-1970: independence claim]
- In 1991 the movement re-emerged. Minahan (1996) and Minahan (2002: 151) both appear to suggest an independence claim. For instance, Minahan (2002: 151) notes that “[i]n November 2001, a leading member of the Anyi exile community in Ghana called for the establishment of an autonomous Anyi state as a prelude to a future referendum on reunification and sovereignty.” No other claim was found. Hence, we code a claim for secession also in the second phase. [1991-2011: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Agni
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Other Akans
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	43704000

- The Agni constitute a sub-group of the Akans. EPR includes two Akan groups, the ‘Baule’ and the ‘Other Akans’. The Other Akans (of which the Agni make up around 18%) are coded throughout as junior partner. However, Valsecchi (n.d.) reports that the Agnis suffered from “repression and enduring marginalization” at the period. [1960-1970: discriminated]
- In the 1991-2011 period the Agnis are coded as junior partner. The Other Akans (of which the Agni make up around 18%) are coded throughout as junior partner. Information on the exact government constellation is scarce, but Valsecchi (n.d.) suggests that the situation normalized after the Sanwi king returned in 1981. This makes it likely that the Agnis were – at least temporarily – part of the government. [1991-2011: junior partner]
- Estimates of the number of Agnis differ widely. Minahan (2002: 146) counts almost 1.4 million Anyis in Cote d’Ivoire. In contrast, the World Directory of Minorities counts around 610,000 Agni living in the far south-east of Côte d’Ivoire (in 2007). The latter yields a group size of .0339 if combined with the CIA 2007 estimate of Cote d’Ivoire’s total population (18 million). The figure provided by the World Directory appears more realistic and is e.g. supported by Handloff (1988). [1960-1970: .0339 (group size); 1991-2012: .0339 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 146), the Agni homeland has a population of around 1.8 million. We could not find information on the percentage of Agni living in their homeland but from the narrative in Minahan (2002: 146) it appears that the threshold for territorial concentration is met. The only Agni community mentioned by Minahan that lives outside their homeland are the Agnis Abidjan. [concentrated]
- The Agni claim the territory of the former Kingdom of Sanwi, Indene and Moronou in the south-east of Côte d’Ivoire. A map displaying this territory was very hard to find. The territory of the Kingdom of Sanwi is illustrated by the Association pour le Développement du Sanwi (APDS). A map showing an approximation of all three kingdoms is provided by Wikipedia. The territory

adjoins an international land border (Ghana) and has access to the Atlantic Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]

- Lujala et al. (2007) code offshore fields (PRIMKEY: OF119PET) off the coast of the Agni territory. However, Lujala et al (2007) assign these reserves to Ghana. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 146), there were approximately 240'000 Agni in neighboring Ghana back in 2002, making this a large enough kin group to be coded here. [kin in neighboring country]

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CROATIA

Croatian Serbs

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia and established a puppet Croatian 'Ustasha' state. Under the Ustasha regime, the Croatian Serbs were severely discriminated against (Minority Rights Group International). After the war, Croatia was integrated into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as one of six federal republics. The Croatian Serbs were not granted autonomy, but the Serbs were recognized as one of five constituent nationalities. During Yugoslav times, Serbs in Croatia were overrepresented in the government and public administration. For instance, although constituting 12 percent of the population of Croatia, the Serbs made up 50 percent of the police in Croatia in 1984 (Stulhofer 1993). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Yugoslavia underwent rapid decentralization. Thus Croatia gained increased autonomy (Keesing's Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000). However, the decentralization reforms mainly raised the status of the republics' constituent nations (Croats in Croatia etc.).
- "By the end of 1989, reformist forces had taken over the Croatian party, and both the Slovene and Croatian parties had scheduled multi-party elections for the spring of 1990" (Gagnon 1994: 152). In 1990, Croatia enacted two amendment packages to the Constitution of the Socialist Croatian Republic. First, in January 1990, it legalized multi-party elections. Second, it dropped communist and Yugoslav symbols, language and the Cyrillic script in July 1990 (Widner 2004). Thus, the Croatian authorities no longer promoted the use of the Serbian language. Furthermore, "[i]n December 1990 the Croatian government promulgated a new constitution proclaiming Croatia the state of the Croat nation (thereby demoting the Croatian Serbs, formerly a constituent nation, to minority status)" (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). "The Republic of Croatia is established as the nation state of the Croatian nation and state of members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs..." (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 1990: 2). Thus, in 1990 the Croatian Serbs' cultural rights were restricted. [1990: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Croatia's independence could be seen as a restriction. The Badinter Commission had ruled on the right to self-determination of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs as well as other issues related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Prior to that commission, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs thought they had a legitimate/legal right to secession. The perception was that this right was taken away from them. Nonetheless, we do not code a restriction (in line with the codebook). Formally the Serbs did not actually have a right to secession, thus technically speaking nothing was taken away from them.
- "To satisfy the requirements for international recognition, the Croatian parliament on 4 December 1991 passed the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms, [...] this law was amended in May 1992 and autonomous status was granted to the regions of Knin and Glina" and "the Croatian government had nevertheless accepted some form of territorial autonomy for Krajina." (Caspersen 2003: 11). There were obviously no steps towards implementation as the Croat

government was involved in war with the Croatian Serbs and the latter had their own, de-facto independent entity. But in line with the codebook, this autonomy offer to a de-facto independent state is nonetheless coded. [1992: autonomy concession]

- In 1995 autonomy was put back on the table. The Croatian government agreed to an international plan that would have involved significant autonomy for the Serbs “as a starting point for negotiations”. Croatia was however reluctant to accept an autonomy plan since it believed it could strike a military victory (Caspersen 2003: 13-14). In November the so-called Erdut Agreement was signed that guarantees the Serbs “the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” and the Serb community was furthermore given the right to “appoint a joint Council of Municipalities” (Caspersen 2003: 16). The agreement also guaranteed some cultural rights, such as Serb minority institutions as schools, kindergartens as well as limited local self-government (Djuric n.d.). Croatia did not implement the agreement. Instead, it began to undercut the autonomy and political representation that was promised in the 1991 law (as amended in May 1992). The provisions for special status districts and proportional representation were suspended until the next census (Caspersen 2003: 17). [1995: autonomy restriction]
- The regime change in 2000, following the death of Tudjman in 1999, led to more moderate policies of the Croatian authorities towards the Serbian minority (Zakosek 2008: 606). According to Minorities at Risk, “[m]uch has changed, however, in the post-Tudjman era. The Croatian government has been eager to demonstrate its commitment to EU membership and has implemented policies to comply with previous agreements and facilitate the return of Serb refugees. These policies include greater allocation of reconstruction funding and a landmark decision in the courts to facilitate repossession of Serb property lost during the conflict in the 1990s. In response to this, Serbs have begun returning.” In May 2000, Croatia passed a language law that while retaining Croatian in the Latin script as the only official language allowed for the official use of other languages under conditions specified by the law as well as another law that provides for education in minority languages (U.S. Department of State 2001). In 2002 Croatia adopted a constitutional law on national minorities that Minority Rights Group International describes as a “generally good legal framework for the protection of minorities”. In 2005, the Republic of Croatia ratified a bilateral agreement with Serbia and Montenegro on the protection of the Serbian/Montenegrin national minority in the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian national minority in Serbia and Montenegro (Minority Rights Group International). Minority Rights Group International reports that implementation of cultural rights has been slow and patchy, but that there have been important changes in both legislation in practice (also see Caspersen 2003). We code a cultural rights concession in 2000 to coincide with the regime and the adoption of the first new minority laws. [2000: cultural rights concession]
- In 2001 the “Law on Local and Regional Self-Government” was adopted. The law implied limited decentralization but mostly of an administrative sort (Bakaric et al. 2007: 77-80; Caspersen 2003: 20). Autonomy seems too limited to code a concession.
- It has to be mentioned that there continues to be discrimination against Serbs. The most often named problem is the return of property that many Serbs abandoned during the war.

Sovereignty declarations

- On February 28, 1991, the Republic of Serbian Krajina declared its independence from Croatia (Grandits and Leutloff 2003: 36). Arguably, the goal was to merge with Serbia: on May 12, 1991, another referendum was held, where the majority of the Croatian Serbs supported the unification of their territories with Serbia (Gagnon 1994: 159). Consequently, the assembly of the Krajina SAO declared that the Krajina is part of the Republic of Serbia: on December 19, 1991, the parliament of the SO Krajina proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Ustav Republike Srpske Krajine 1991), which was joined by the SAO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmia and the SAO of Western Slavonia in February 1992 (Caspersen 2003: 10). Since the aim appears to have been to merge with Serbia all along, we code a single irredentist declaration in 1991. [1991: irredentist declaration]

- In the autumn of 1992, the parliament of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska parliament in Bosnia adopted a Declaration on Unity, „thereby signaling its clear refusal to be part of Croatia“ (Caspersen 2003: 11). Consequently, in June 1993, a referendum was held in RSK where voters were asked whether or not they want to unify with the RS and later with the rest of Serbia. The vast majority voted in favor. We found no declaration, however. Only in May 1995 (when the territory was about to be re-taken by Croatian forces), the Krajina parliament voted to join with Republika Srpska. We code an irredentist declaration, though noting that this is not completely unambiguous. [1995: irredentist declaration]

Major territorial change

- Croatia attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
- As of summer 1990, the Croatian authorities had lost control over the municipalities with a Serb majority (see e.g. Grandits and Leutloff 2003). In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. Soon thereafter, Serbian autonomous oblasts were declared in other regions of Croatia (the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO Western Slavonia). The three SAOs merged to form the Krajina Republic in 1991 and declared their independence from Croatia. Thus, de-facto independence had existence before Croatia's independence. De-facto independence lasted until 1995 (the Croatian army re-took most of the area, a rump remained in eastern Slavonia under UN administration until 1998) (Minority Rights Group International). [1995: abolishment of de-facto independence]

Regional autonomy

- Coinciding with de-facto independence. [1991-1995: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- De-facto independence had existed since 1990 (before Croatia attained independence) and lasted until 1995 (the Croatian army re-took the area) (Minority Rights Group International; BBC; Zakosek 2008: 607). [1991-1995: de-facto independence]

Claims

- During the Croatian war (1991-1995) that erupted with Croatia's independence in 1991, the Serbs had the explicit goal of seceding from Croatia and ultimately joining Serbia. Based on the international Law of Self-Determination that legitimized the claims of other minorities to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serbs argued that they have the right to choose to remain part of Yugoslavia and join the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia (Stojanovic 1995: 345; also see Gagnon 1994: 154; Caspersen 2003). Irredentist claims were raised already before Croatia's independence, thus we code an irredentist claim from 1991-1995. [1991-1995: irredentist claim]
- After the war, the Croatian Serbs tended to tone down their demands. Minorities at Risk notes that some Serbs in Croatia still want to secede and join Serbia while others demand independence. But the dominant demand has become cultural autonomy (which is not coded) and territorial autonomy (also see Jacobs 2011). The two main parties currently representing the Serbs in Croatia are the Serb People's Party (SNS, founded in 1991) and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS, founded in 1997). Since 2003, the SDSS has three seats in the Croatian parliament while the SNS has none (the Croat Constitution grants three seats to the Serb minority (Croatian Parliament 2014; Minorities at Risk Project). One of the political aims of the SDSS is the promotion of cultural and educational autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia as well as regionalism and decentralization (SDSS 1997). [1996-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Croatian Serbs
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Serbs
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34402000

Territory

- MAR codes the Serbs as concentrated in phase I-IV, but not concentrated in phase V. GeoEPR codes the Serbs as concentrated throughout. However, these data sets employ lower thresholds for territorial concentration. We code the Serbs as concentrated from 1992-1995 (i.e. during the war) and not concentrated thereafter. 1991 is coded as not concentrated because we code an onset of violence in this year, and because the change in spatial concentration was a result of the war. [1991: not concentrated; 1992-1995: concentrated; 1996-2012: not concentrated]
 - o Based on the information we found, the Croatian Serbs cannot be considered concentrated before the war. Until the war, there were large populations of Serbs living in the Krajina region as well as in Eastern Slavonia. The 1991 census counted 581,663 Serbs in Croatia. Based on data from the ICTY, the Krajina region included approx. 250,000 Serbs and the Serbs made up a bare majority there (52%). Another 60,000 lived in Eastern Slavonia, but there the Serbs were in a minority (approx. 30%). Krajina and Eastern Slavonia are not spatially contiguous. The remaining Serbs lived scattered throughout Croatia. Although it is close, the Krajina region (the only region where Serbs comprised the majority) did not include the majority of the Serbs.
 - o The situation changed with the onset of the war. According to the ICTY, Serb forces began to drive out non-Serb populations in late summer 1991 (August/September). Though there is no reliable data, it appears likely that our threshold was met during the war.
 - o The share of Serbs in Yugoslavia decreased sharply as a result of the end phase of the Croatian civil war, according to EPR from 12% to 4.5% thereafter. From ethnic maps that we consulted it becomes clear that most of the Serbs that remained in Croatia/returned to Croatia live in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia region, but there does not appear to be a spatially contiguous territory in which they form the majority and where also the majority of Serbs lives. There are some areas where the Serbs continue to form the majority of the population, but these are scattered along the eastern border with BiH and Serbia, respectively.
- The claimed territory (Krajina, Eastern Slavonia) borders BiH and Serbia/Serbia and Montenegro, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There is a hydrocarbon reserve, PRIMKEY HR001PET, discovered in 1952 (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR, there is kin in a number of other countries, in particular Serbia and BiH, but also Slovenia, Macedonia, and (from 2006) Montenegro as well as (from 2008) Kosovo. MAR also notes the same kin. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Istrians

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After centuries of divisions and shifting borders, the Istrian peninsula was divided between the state of Venetia and Austria. The northwestern districts became part of the Venetian state. The southeastern districts were under Habsburg control and became a separate crownland in the Ausrian Empire. The northern districts were passed to Austria in 1797 with the Treaty of Campoformio and – apart from a short interlude of French rule under Napoleon between 1805 and 1813 – remained a Habsburg possession until 1918 (Minahan 2002: 815; Ashbrook 2006: 622).
- After the First World War and the defeat of the Habsburg Empire, Trieste and the Istrian peninsula were awarded to Italy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299). The region was placed under Italian administration in 1920 and with the fascist takeover in 1922, a policy of denationalization and Italianization was initiated. Slav languages were banned in 1926 and immigration from southern Italy was supported (Minahan 2002: 816; Beovic 2013: 29).
- After the Second World War, the Istrian territory was contested by Tito's Yugoslavia and Italy. Apart from the city of Trieste and the surrounding Muggia, the Istrian peninsula fell to Yugoslavia.
- In 1989, reformist Croatian-nationalist forces took over the Croatian government (Gagnon 1994: 152). According to Minahan (2002: 817), "[t]he new Croatian government, under a resolutely nationalist administration, began to limit local government autonomy, passing laws that threatened Istrian culture." Since we do not code changes in municipal autonomy, we do not code an autonomy restriction. However, basing on Minahan ("threatened Istrian culture") we code a cultural rights restriction, pegging it to 1990, the year the highly nationalist Croatian constitution was promulgated (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). [1990: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1993 Croatia introduced a new system of 20 counties (among which Istria) plus the city of Zagreb. According to the national Law on Local and Regional Self-Government, the counties are granted a "significant say in their constitutions, powers, and level of regional and local autonomy" (Ashbrook 2006: 644). However, the new administrative division did not result in regionalization/decentralization and the counties were primarily "executors of central government policy at the regional level rather than [...] self-governing units" (Jordan 2001: 255).
- The regime change in 2000, following the death of Tudman in 1999, led to more moderate policies of the Croatian authorities towards its minorities, in particular the Serbs but also other minorities (Zakosek 2008: 606). In particular, in May 2000, Croatia passed a language law that while retaining Croatian in the Latin script as the only official language allowed for the official use of other languages under conditions specified by the law as well as another law that provides for education in minority languages (U.S. Department of State 2001). Note that the Istrian movement consists of both Croats and Italians. In 2002 Croatia adopted a constitutional law on national minorities that Minority Rights Group International describes as a "generally good legal framework for the protection of minorities". Minority Rights Group International reports that implementation of cultural rights has been slow and patchy, but that that there have been

important changes in both legislation in practice (also see Caspersen 2003). We code a cultural rights concession in 2000 to coincide with the regime and the adoption of the first new minority laws. [2000: cultural rights concession]

- The Croatia Government launched a decentralization initiative in July 2001 with the aim to extend competencies of local units and to change the sources of financing public functions by transferring from the state government budget to regional and local government budgets. According to Alibegović and Slijepčević (2012: 2), the initial steps were not followed by necessary political measures, which is why the level of decentralization “has stayed broadly unchanged.” Thus we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Croatia attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) worked “toward the regionalization of Croatia and securing increased autonomy for Istria within a democratic Croatian state”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 817), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013) and also represented by the Istrian Socialdemocratic Forum (ISDF), a splinter party of the IDS. [1991-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Istrians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Croats; Italians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34401000; 34404000

- The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) joined the national government in 2000 but, dissatisfied with the coalition government’s treatment of Istria, left the government in 2001. The IDS was again part of the government coalition from 2011 onwards. We code the Istrians as junior partners throughout since there were also several Istrian ministers in non-IDS cabinets. [1991-2012: junior partner]
- According to Minahan (1998, 2002) there are Istrians in both Slovenia and Croatia. Minahan gives conflicting information on the number of Istrians in these two countries. According to

Minahan (2002), the total number is 412,000 (this figure includes some Istrians in Italy), while according to Minahan (1998) there are 245,000 in Croatia and 37,000 in Slovenia. These figures are incompatible as they suggest that there are approx. 130,000 Istrians in Italy while Minahan (2002: 813) suggests that the Italian Istrian community is not that large. We decided to stick to Minahan (1998) to have a consistent figure – we need disaggregated data on the number of Istrians in Croatia as they are coded in both Yugoslavia and, after Croatia's secession, in Croatia. Given Croatia's total population of 4.501 million in 1998, we code a population share of 0.0544. [1991-2012: 0.0544 (group size)]

Territory

- From Minahan (2002: 813) we can conclude that the majority of the Istrians lives in Istria and that they form an absolute majority there. [concentrated]
- The Croatian part of Istria borders Slovenia and the Adriatic Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- There are Istrians in Slovenia, but drawing on the figure provided in Minahan (1998) (see above for why we use this source) they are not numerically significant. There are also Istrians in Italy, but their number is yet lower.
- Note: Most Istrians are also Croats, but we do not code Croats in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against a Croat-dominated government. [no kin]

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CYPRUS

Turkish Cypriots

Activity: 1961-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Despite its Greek-speaking majority, the island was ruled by the Ottoman Empire until 1878, when the administration was handed over to Britain in return for British protection against tsarist Russia. When the Ottoman Empire joined World War I against the Allied Forces, Great Britain formally annexed the territory (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).
- Relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots deteriorated in the early twentieth century, as the latter increasingly and violently demanded its incorporation in the Greek state (*enosis*). A 1959 agreement envisaged constitutional guarantees for the Turkish minority (Minority Rights Group International) and a strong power-sharing arrangement. The agreement included the appointment of a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president as well as a disproportionate, seven-to-three ratio between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives (Bahcheli 2000; Minahan 2002). The power-sharing agreement was predominantly personal and lacked a territorial dimension (Coughlan 2000). In terms of autonomy measures, the agreement granted the Turkish Cypriots five separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities in Cyprus' main towns and non-territorial autonomy in the form of separately elected communal chambers: "[t]he constitution also called for the creation of two communal chambers, composed of representatives elected by each community. These chambers were empowered to deal with religious, educational, and cultural matters, questions of personal status, and the supervision of cooperatives and credit societies. To supplement an annual provision to the chambers from the government budget, the constitution enabled the communal chambers to impose taxes and fees of their own to support their activities" (Solsten 1991). The power-sharing system was enshrined in Cyprus' 1960 constitution. [1959: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1963, President Makarios, in order "to resolve constitutional deadlocks", proposed 13 changes to the constitution that would have effectively ended the consociational system. The proposed changes include: abolishing the veto rights of the (Greek Cypriot) President and the (Turkish Cypriot) Vice-President, abolishing the separate elections for the Presidency/Vice Presidency, abolishing requirements for qualified majorities in the House of Representatives, abolishing the provisions calling for five, lowering the guaranteed share of Turkish Cypriots in public service, and abolishing the Greeks' communal chamber. The proposals did not include the abolishment of the Turkish Cypriots' communal chamber. Although the amendments were declared illegal by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus, Makarios implemented them (Solsten 1991). This effectively meant the end of the consociational system and in particular the five separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities in Cyprus' main towns, thus we code an autonomy restriction (while we do not normally code measures concerning the local level, in this case we do since the provision for separate municipalities was a fundamental part of the autonomy arrangement). Note that the non-territorial autonomy arrangement with two communal chambers remained intact (at least in

theory since the Turkish Cypriots retreated from national politics in 1963). [1963: autonomy restriction]

- The Cyprus Government published a “Declaration of intentions on the Constitutional Rights of Turkish Cypriots” on October 11, 1965. The declaration made a commitment to respect the minority rights of the Turkish Cypriots (Denktas 2009) and proposed autonomy for minorities in education, religion, culture, personal status, and related matters, as well as participation in Parliament and local government in proportion to their numbers. U.N. observers were accepted “for a reasonable transition period” (Keesing's April 1966 - Cyprus). We do not code a concession since this is rather a symbolic act that did not alter the level of self-determination.
- The Turkish invasion of 1974 resulted in a de-facto partition of the island with a Turkish north and a Greek south and the establishment of governmental structures in a separate “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (Minorities at Risk Project). In 1977, both communities accepted four guidelines for future intercommunal talks (Makarios-Denktas Accords). The first guideline was that “Cyprus would be an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic” (Solsten 1991). This represents a significant promise to a de-facto independent state and is hence coded as an autonomy concession. [1977: autonomy concession]
- The Annan plan (Sözen & Özersay 2007) endorsed a reunification of the island in a bi-zonal federal structure with a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot constituent state. The idea was a hybrid between a federation and a confederation similar to the Swiss or Belgian model. The constituent states were granted far-reaching autonomy with the central state retaining responsibility for issues regarding defence, foreign policy, currency and economy. The plan furthermore included territorial adjustments, several points related to the sharing of power at the center and no restrictions on the freedom of movement. In total, the Annan plan underwent five revisions, all presented between November 2002 and March 2004. Since the idea of a bi-zonal federal structure was already part of Annan Plan I and II, both presented in 2002, we code a concession in 2002. [2002: autonomy concession]
- The Annan plan was rejected in a 2004 referendum. Among Turkish Cypriots, the support amounted to 65%, while 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it (Minority Rights Group International; Sözen & Özersay 2007). This implies that center had to revoke a significant autonomy offer. In this case, we deviate from the general rule that we do not code a restriction if a concession is revoked after a referendum because the Turkish Cypriots were clearly outvoted. [2004: autonomy restriction]
- In 2008 the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders committed themselves to working towards “a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions” (United Nations). This represents a significant autonomy promise, and is hence coded as an autonomy concession. [2008: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1975, following the Turkish invasion of the island’s northern territory, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”. The move was rejected by the Republic of Cyprus and the international community (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 302). [1975: independence declaration]
- After several rounds of negotiations with limited progress, the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. With the exception of Turkey, the new state was not recognized by the international community. In 1985, a constitution was approved in a referendum (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002). [1983: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Cyprus attained independence in 1960, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date.
- [1974: establishment of de-facto state]

Regional autonomy

- As mentioned above, the power-sharing agreement at independence was predominantly personal and lacked a territorial dimension, also due to the interspersed ethnic demography of the island (Coughlan 2000). Hence, we only code regional autonomy from 1975 onwards due to the establishment of de-facto independence in 1974 (see above). [1975-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- From 1974 onwards and following the Turkish invasion, the government of the Republic of Cyprus did no longer control the occupied northern part of the island (Minority Rights Group International). In line with Caspersen (2012) and following the first of January rule, we thus code de-facto independence from 1975 onwards. [1975-2012: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Already prior to independence, the Turkish Cypriot minority demanded *taksim* (Turkish for division), the partition of the island between the Greek and Turkish (Minahan 2002). The proclamation of a Turkish-Cypriot federal state in 1975 and the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 is further evidence of independence being the dominant claim. As is the Turkish Cypriot rejection of a 1992 proposal by the United Nations that foresaw a single Cypriot state made up of two zones. [1961-2001: independence claim]
- With the prospects of common EU membership paired with increasing economic backwardness and Turkish attempts to reduce the military costs of presence in Northern Cyprus, the claim for independence started to lose some of its appeal. A 2001 poll found that 32% of Northern Cypriots wanted a loose federation of two Cypriot states, while only 23% opted for full-fledged independence and 8% for integration within Cyprus (Minahan 2002). Sovereign status within a bizonal federation was also supported by a majority of Turkish Cypriots in the 2004 referendum (Annan Plan), where 65% of them voted in favour of a federation of two constituent states under a joint federal government apparatus. The proposal was rejected since 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it (Minority Rights Group International). The endorsement of the final version of the Annan Plan, Annan Plan V, by the Turkish Cypriot elite provides further evidence for a moderation of the dominant claim. Annan Plan V stipulated a federation of two states and not two independent states. Furthermore, in 2008 the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders committed themselves to working towards “a bicomunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions” (United Nations). Following the first of January rule we thus code autonomy as the dominant claim as of 2002. [2002-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Turkish Cypriots
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Turks
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	35202000

Territory

- Before the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Turkish communities were scattered across the island (see GeoEPR). The invasion lead to an almost complete geographical segregation after Greek

Cypriots were expelled from the northern territory and Turkish Cypriots were displaced from the south to the north. We thus code the Turkish Cypriots as regionally concentrated from 1975 onwards. [1961-1974: not concentrated; 1975-2012: concentrated]

- The movement makes claims for northern Cyprus, which roughly coincides with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see Minahan 2002: 1394). The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Mediterranean Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- Turkish in Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, and Kosovo (see MAR; EPR). Minahan (2002: 1394) also lists Turkish Cypriot communities in the United Kingdom. According to a report by the Home Affairs Committee, the latter amount to around 300,000. With Turkey being within 150 statute miles, we code ethnic kin in a neighboring country. [kin in adjoining country]

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DENMARK

Faroese

Activity: 1945-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Faroese Logting (parliament) was abolished in 1816. Henceforth, Faroe was to be governed as an ordinary Danish county. In 1851, the Logting was re-established; it had, however, only an advisory role until 1948. According to Minahan (2002: 597), the Faroese language gained official status in 1912; from other sources it appears though that Faroese attained this status only with the 1948 home rule act. In 1937 Faroese replaced Danish as the official school language, and in 1938 it became the church language as well. [1937: cultural rights concession; 1938: cultural rights concession] [prior concession]
- According to Minahan (2002: 597), Faroe briefly enjoyed autonomy during the First World War, but this was more of a de-facto autonomy: during the Second World War, the Faroe Islands were occupied by the British, which de-facto gave Faroe much-increased autonomy (Minahan 2002: 597); since this was not granted by Denmark (also see Ackrén 2006: 225), this cannot, however, be seen as a concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- When the Faroe Islands were returned to Denmark after the Second World War (in 1945; the UK had occupied the islands during the war), many Faroese considered a return to the pre-war situation (integral part of Denmark without autonomy) unthinkable (Ackrén & Lindström 2012: 500). The Danish government invited a Faroese delegation to negotiations on the future status. The negotiations were held from January to March 1946 (Ottosson 1998: 16). In late February, the Danish government essentially conceded independence if wished by a majority of the Faroese (hoping for a no to independence) (Ottosson 1998: 17). In addition, the Danish government made several proposals for increased autonomy. The final one, dated March 27, 1946, would have granted the Faroe Islands a rather limited degree of autonomy: under the final proposal, the Faroese would have the power to make some decisions over strictly Faroese matters, but no legislative powers (Ottosson 1998: 17). In April and May 1946, the Faroese parliament debated on a referendum on the future status of the Faroe Islands. Initially, the People's Party and the Social Democrats were opposed to a referendum while the Union Party was in favour because it felt that the people would vote against independence. The Danish government also wanted a referendum, at least partly for the same reason, but also to find a way out of the constitutional impasse. The Danish government prevailed, and the next question became the ballot question(s) (Wylie 1987: 226). The People's Party proposed a four-question ballot, including i) the Danish offer of limited autonomy, ii) a more extensive form of autonomy, iii) independence, and iv) the pre-war status quo (no autonomy at all). The Danish government favoured a two-question ballot pitting the government's offer of limited autonomy against independence (Ottosson 1998: 18; Wylie 1987: 226). Again, the Danish government prevailed. The vote, held on September 14, 1946, returned a narrow majority for independence (51% upon a turnout of 68%). [1946: independence concession; autonomy concession]
- Having expected a unionist victory, the Danish government was taken by surprise. The Danish parliament wanted to continue negotiations despite the referendum, arguing that the result was

narrow and that the referendum cannot be relatively considered an unequivocal expression of the Faroeses' will given the high number of invalid votes (4%) in combination with the low turnout. Furthermore, Denmark now began to argue that the referendum was purely consultative and thus cannot constitute the basis for independence (Ottoosson 1998: 18). Unimpressed, the Faroese parliament declared independence on September 18 (Minahan 2002: 597). Unwilling to grant independence, the Danish government temporally dissolved the Lagting, the Faroese parliament, and called for new elections (Minahan 2002: 597). The elections, held in November that same year, produced a majority against independence (Ottoosson 1998: 20). Independence was now off the table; new negotiations began on an autonomous status within Denmark. [1946: autonomy restriction; independence restriction]

- The negotiations were held in May-July 1947. The final offer (July 16, 1947) was adopted by the Faroese parliament in December 1947 and by Denmark's parliament in March 1948 (Ottoosson 1998: 20-21). We code the concession in 1947 since this is when the government made the proposal. With the 1948 Act of Faroese Home Rule, the Danish government granted Faroe significant autonomy, with the Faroese government gaining responsibility for almost everything other than foreign policy and defense (Minahan 2002: 597-598; Minority Rights Group International). The 1948 home rule act, in addition to devolving competencies, also established Faroese as the principal language in the Faroe Islands, though requiring that Danish be taught as well and may be used in official matters (Staatsministeriet n.d.). [1947: autonomy concession]
- By way of the 2005 Takeover Act, Faroe Islands gained increased autonomy (Staatsministeriet n.d.). [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- "Following a plebiscite, the Faeroese parliament, the Lagting, declared the islands independent on 18 September 1946; the Lagting ratified the proclamation by a vote of 12 to 11" (Minahan 2002: 597). It is somewhat ambiguous whether this constitutes a unilateral declaration as the Danish government had agreed an independence referendum. However, it changed its mind after independence had won in the referendum and was unwilling to grant independence, arguing that the referendum was not binding and cannot constitute the basis for independence (see above). Thus we code the declaration as a unilateral independence declaration. [1946: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1945: revocation of de-facto independence]
- [1948: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- In 1945 due to de-facto independence. [1945: regional autonomy]
- Faroe Islands became autonomous with the 1948 home rule act; hence, we code regional autonomy from 1949 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1949-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- According to Minahan (2002: 597), Faroe briefly enjoyed autonomy during the First World War, but this was more of a de-facto autonomy: during the Second World War, the Faroe Islands were occupied by the British, which de-facto gave Faroe much-increased autonomy (Minahan 2002: 597). Denmark did not have control over the Faroe Islands. After the war, Faroe came back under Danish rule. [1945: de-facto independence]

Claims

- We code an independence claim in 1945-1949 due to the 1946 referendum, in which a narrow majority of 51% chose the independence option (the alternative being the Danish autonomy proposal) and because of Minahan's (2002: 597) report that "[a]t the end of the war and the return of Danish administrators, there was growing sentiment for full independence. Nationalists pressed for the islands to follow Iceland, which had declared its independence of Denmark in 1944. Following a plebiscite, the Faeroese parliament, the Lagting, declared the islands independent on 18 September 1946; the Lagting ratified the proclamation by a vote of 12 to 11. The inhabitants of Sudhuroy, the third largest of the islands, announced their continued union with Denmark." Note though that the Faroese Islanders were divided over the question, with two camps with almost equal strength supporting independence (consider the referendum outcome, the 12 to 11 vote on the independence declaration and the dissenting declaration by Sudhuroy). [1945-1946: independence claim]
- After the vote for independence, Denmark dissolved the local parliament and called for new elections. The elections, held in November 1946, produced a majority against independence (Ottosson 1998: 20). Thus we code a shift to autonomy as the dominant claim. The 1948 home rule act appears to have further moderated the claims put forth, at least until the late 1970s when support for independence began to increase again (Minahan 2002: 598). In 1998, the Faroe government began to negotiate with the Danish government with the intention of obtaining the status of a sovereign nation under the Danish Crown for 25 years (analogously to Iceland's path towards independence). As of today, there are strong parties which support continued union with Denmark (e.g., the Union Party and the Social Democrats; note that at least some of the unionists would still want increased autonomy), and other strong parties which advocate independence (e.g. the Faroese People's Party or the Republic Party). It seems that advocates of independence and unionists have about equal strength. Based on this, we code a claim for increased autonomy until and including 1979, and an independence claim from 1980 onwards. We code an independence claim from 1980 onwards since the autonomy and the independence camps seem to have about equal strength in recent years (following the codebook we code the more radical claim); we note, however, that the pegging of the radicalization to 1979 (reflected in 1980, following the first of January rule) is somewhat arbitrary. [1947-1979: autonomy claim; 1980-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Faroese
<i>Scenario</i>	1945/Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- The Faroe Islands are an overseas entity and thus not coded in EPR. Since 1948, the Faroese Islands enjoy significant autonomy. Moreover, the Faroese are guaranteed two seats in the Danish parliament. However, we found no evidence for a consistent Faroese representation in the executive, even if in some cases (e.g. in 1998) the Faroese parliamentarians had an important role in deciding about the fate of cabinets (Minority Rights Group International; Ackrén 2006; Minahan 2002). Overall, the influence of the Faroese appears however too limited to justify coding them as included in the central government. Thus, we code the Faroese powerless throughout the movement's activity. [1945-2012: powerless]
- According to a 2009 estimate, 45,000 Faroese live on the Faroe Islands, and around 22,000 in Denmark itself. Denmark's population in 2009 was 5,523,000, yielding a group size of .012. Note: this matches roughly with the 54,000 Faroese indicated by Minahan (2002: 595). [1945-2012: .0121 (group size)]

Territory

- The Faroese make up 95% of the Faroe Islands' population (Minahan 2002: 595). This amounts to 42,750 Faroese (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 54,000 Faroese in the whole of northern Europe in that same year (Minahan does not provide information on the number of Faroese in Denmark alone). [concentrated]
- The Faroese claim the territory of the Faeroe Islands, an archipelago of 21 islands. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the North Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code offshore fields (OF355PET, OF354PET) off the coast of Shetland close to the Faeroe Islands in the Faeroese-Shetland-Orkney Basin. However, both fields are assigned to the United Kingdom. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 595), there is a "sizeable" Faroese population in mainland Denmark and elsewhere in Scandinavia. However, with only 54,000 Faeroese in all of northern Europe, the kin groups are not large enough to be coded here. We found no other evidence for numerically significant transnational kin. [no kin]

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EL SALVADOR

Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1959-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1881 and 1882, the Spanish colonial government issued several decree laws that abolished communal lands and recognized only private property. As a consequence, land was concentrated in the hands of a small, Spanish-descended landowning elite. The traditional communal land ownership was abolished, leaving a large majority of the indigenous, rural population as landless peasants, forced to work on the plantations (Minority Rights Group International; Patrick 2004).
- The issue of land ownership and the resulting social and economic imbalances also lay at the core of several indigenous uprisings. When the 1920 recession hit the vastly coffee-dependent economy, the situation of the indigenous population deteriorated. Violence escalated in 1932, when ladino landholders were attacked by rural campesinos and indigenous people and approximately 35 ladinos were killed. The upheaval, orchestrated by communist forces, was brutally crushed by Salvadoran state forces and paramilitary troops. In a systematic act of killing ('La Matanza'), between 15,000 and 50,000 people were killed (Minority Rights Group International; Chapin 1989).
- The consequences for the indigenous population were devastating. The economic consequence of La Matanza was an additional transfer of land from indigenous people to the Ladinos. Politically, the events of La Matanza are at the roots of social erasure of the indigenous population that created the myth of the indigenous "extinction", according to which indigenous peoples, deterred from exposing their identity, adopted the mainstream language and culture (Tilley 2005). Contributing to this process of social erasure was the 1945 and 1950 elimination of racial notations from the civil registry (Ching and Tilley 1998) that led the Salvadoran legislature declare that "in our country indigenous populations do not exist" (Tilley 2005: 20). [1950: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Although the state policy towards indigenous peoples has undergone some slight changes in the 1990s, it remains one of social and political neglect. In 1991, the government established CONCULTURA (Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y el Arte) in order to promote, rediscover and revive the country's indigenous origins. In 1994, CONCULTURA established an Indigenous Affairs Office and a Centre for Cultural Revival to emphasize its revivalist efforts. However, according to Tilley (2002: 535), these initiatives were mostly "rhetoric and token gestures" as the government continued to follow a "no Indians" policy. Symptomatic in this regard is also the 1998 initiated program of the Ministry of Education with the support of CONCULTURA and the National Indigenous Salvadorian Coordinating Council (CCNIS) that aimed at revitalizing the Nahuat-Pipil language but, as of 2006, has only been implemented in five schools. Therefore, we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The most prominent organization representing the indigenous interests is the Asociacion Nacional de Indigenas de El Salvador (ANIS). Their goals, as of all other indigenous organizations, includes the recognition of indigenous land under Salvadoran law (Patrick 2004), the revival of indigenous customs and language, the inclusion of indigenous peoples into national politics and the “recognition of the existence of their communities and their distinct histories, culture and needs” (Minorities at Risk Project). While the indigenous claim is predominantly cultural, there are also claims to “autonomy or even sovereignty within their ancestral territories” (Tilley 2005: 59). [1959-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Indigenous Peoples
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Indigenous peoples
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	9202000

Territory

- According to GeoEPR, El Salvador’s indigenous peoples reside scattered across two larger areas in the country’s eastern and western part, respectively. This suggests that they cannot be concentrated according to our definition (note that the indigenous peoples make up but 10% of El Salvador’s population). Further evidence in this direction comes from Tilley (2005: 62), who states that the indigenous communities of El Salvador are fragmented and “scattered through wooded countryside dominated by ladino towns.” [not concentrated]
- The indigenous claim is predominantly cultural. However, there is also a claim to “autonomy or even sovereignty within their ancestral territories” (Tilley 2005: 59). Since Salvador’s indigenous population is composed of two different groups with distinctive cultures and a separate political history, there are also two ancestral territories. The Nahua’s territory is the indigenous society of Cuscatlan in the western coffee highlands and the southwestern coastal region (Tilley 2005). The Lenca claim their territory in the northeast. Both territories are approximately congruent with the

- settlement polygon of the indigenous peoples in GeoEPR. The territory adjoins an international land border (Honduras) and has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The respective EPR group (scenario 1:1) is coded as having several kin groups. EPR lists the Maya in both Mexico and Guatemala and the Indigenous Peoples in Honduras. MAR V also provides evidence of “close kindred across a border which does not adjoin its regional base” without giving details where these groups live (though in earlier versions of MAR, the indigenous peoples in El Salvador are coded as having no kin groups). We rely on EPR and code the presence of kin in neighboring countries. [kin in neighboring country]

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ETHIOPIA

Afars

Activity: 1975-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- A nomadic tribal culture, the Afars have traditionally been organized into independent Afar sultanates, among which the Sultanates of Aussa, Grifo, Gobaad, Rahayto and Tajurah. At times under the nominal rule of the ancient Ethiopian Empire, together, these sultanates formed a powerful federation in the twelfth century (Berhe and Adaye 2007; Minahan 2002; Rettberg 2013).
- In the sixteenth century, the Afars, together with other Muslim peoples such as the Sahos and Somalis, started a Jihad against Christian Ethiopians. At first successful, the conquest was ultimately defeated by Ethiopia and its Portuguese allies in 1541, causing the Afar to withdraw to their homeland and avoid contacts with other groups for the next century (Minahan 2002).
- The Italian colonization of the Afar territory started in 1869 with the establishment of a base at the seaport of Assab in what constitutes Eritrea today. The Ethiopian Empire feared further conquest of the colonialists and sent an army against the Afar sultanate of Aussa.
- A first part of the Afar territory was subsequently conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of an expanding Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Eventually, the entirety of the Afar territory was divided among the colonial powers of Italy (present-day Eritrea), Ethiopia and France (present-day Djibouti), who put in place new boundaries in 1896 (Afar Triangle). Whereas the French favored the Afars against the Somali clan of the Issas, in the Ethiopian entity, the Afars were exposed to internal colonialism and Ethiopian leaders' attempted to create "one Ethiopian nation" through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Afar had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007; Minahan 2002). In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization (Bulcha 1997).
- The allied forces liberated Italian East Africa from Italian occupation in 1941. In September 1952, Eritrea was incorporated into Ethiopia and became a semi-autonomous self-governing territory within the Ethiopian confederation (Negash 1997). With this act, the territory of the Afars, with the exception of the territory under French rule (present-day Djibouti), was united under Ethiopian rule. Haile Selassie, who regained his throne after the Second World War, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and, following the concept of Amharization, further diminished the status of all languages other than Amhara. Administratively, the Afar region was partitioned into five different provinces (Harar, Shoa, Wallo, Tigray, and Eritrea) during the reign of Haile Selassie. Berhe and Adaye (2007) report that the Afars constituted a smaller minority in these five provinces and were deprived of any political participation. In contrast, the Minorities at Risk Project states that the Afars did enjoy de facto self-determination and "maintained a high degree of autonomy until the Dergue came to power". In line with Minorities at Risk, Africa Watch (1991: 62) reports that "the Afar leader and Sultan of Awsa, Ali Mirrah, had been accorded a high degree of autonomy by Haile Selassie, and the well-armed Afar had never come fully under the administrative or military control of the government". Thus, it appears that the Afars enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy until 1974.
- In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which

states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). We do not code this act since it is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship. With the takeover of the Derg in 1974, the autonomy of the Afar was annulled and the Sultan had to flee. [1974: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987 approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country’s internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden (Minorities at Risk Project; Van der Beken 2012). The autonomous province of Assab only constituted a part of the Afars’ territory and the most fertile land in the Awash valley remained under Amhara control (Minority Rights Group International). Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime [...] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. We do not code a concession.
- In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. The Afar Liberation Front (ALF) became part of the new ruling coalition government even if it has remained vehemently opposed to the central government. The ALF’s participation in the coalition government concerns power access at the center and is thus not coded. However, with the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
- The Afars protested against Eritrea’s secession in 1993 as the territory of Eritrea includes a significant portion of Afar land. Due to the closed border pastoral movement of the Afars was restricted (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This does not appear to constitute a restriction in the sense employed here, however.
- A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the Afar Regional State, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; Minorities at Risk; Minority Rights Group International). The constitution also granted the right of secession and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). However, the 1994 constitution was undermined even before it was ratified. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency as well as grievances over the preeminent position given to the southern Afar regions as regards development spending and regional positions created tensions between the ALF and the TPLF-dominated EPRDF central government. As a consequence, the EPRDF formed the government-loyal Afar Peoples Democratic Organisation (APDO). The APDO was seen by many Afar as a TPLF puppet which gained its support mainly from Afar clans which were part of the historic province of Tigray. The APDO won the 1995 regional elections (mainly due to ALF fragmentation due to disputes between the Sultan and his sons) and gained control over the

region. Thus, the center undermined the Afars' autonomy and made Afar representation in the regional government token (Sansculotte-Greenidge and Fantaye 2012). [1994: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- In 1993 part of the Afars became part of Eritrea. [1993: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- The federalization reform and the establishment of an autonomous ethnic state did not result in genuine autonomy for the Afars. The Minority Rights Group International calls the Afars "one of the most marginalized peoples of Ethiopia". This is also reflected in EPR, where the Afars are coded as discriminated and not regionally autonomous. Additional evidence against regional autonomy is provided by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which states that the governing Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) strived to influence politics in the regional state by weakening the ALF and strengthening the pro-government, EPRDF-loyalist Afar People's Democratic Organization (APDO), which caused popular discontent in the region.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There is no disagreement among the sources as regards the Afars' claim. The Afar struggle for self-determination in Ethiopia has mainly been pursued by two different groups: The Afar Liberation Front (ALF), formed in 1975, and the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), formed in 1993. When the ALF was founded, its leader, Ali Mirah Anfere, declared the goal to be the establishment of an independent Islamic state for Afars (Minority Rights Group International). The secessionist claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002) and the Minority at Risk Project, which also calls the ALF a separatist group. ARDUF is similarly called a separatist movement "said to be fighting for a federal or confederal Afar state" (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; BBC 2012). [1975-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Afars
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Afar
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	53001000

Territory

- In the Afar State (1.6 million according to 2012 census), the Afars make up 92% of the population (Minahan 2002: 41). There is no evidence of significant Afar settlements outside the Afar State. [concentrated]
- The Afar homeland comprises the Afar Regional State, one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. The territory adjoins an international land border (Djibouti) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR the Afar ethnic group is distributed across Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. The Minorities at Risk data also provides evidence of “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base” and lists the Afars in Djibouti and Eritrea as the largest kin groups. Finally, Minahan (2002: 41) also mentions Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as the only countries with Afar population. [kin in neighboring country]

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Eritreans

Activity: 1958-1993

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Eritrea was colonized by the Italians in 1890 and became part of Italian East Africa when the fascist Italian forces occupied the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935/1936. In Ethiopia, centralization had been a core principle during the regencies of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) and his successors Iyasu V (1913-1916) and Haile Selassie I (as of 1916). This process was halted by the Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941, during which particularly the western parts of Eritrea enjoyed considerable autonomy (International Crisis Group 2009; Negash 1997). British forces liberated Italian East Africa from Italian occupation in 1941 and reestablished Ethiopian independence. Haile Selassie was reinstated as emperor and started to centralize power within his own ethnicity (Minahan 2002). Eritrea, however, was placed under British administration. Unsure about the territory's future, the UN dispatched a commission to Eritrea in 1950. The majority report presented by Burma, Norway and the Union of South Africa recommended incorporation into Ethiopia, as also requested by the expansionist Ethiopia and the British and the US, who wanted to reward Ethiopia for their support during World War II. The minority report compiled by Pakistan and Guatemala proposed an independent Eritrea (Negash 1997). Against the wishes of many Eritreans, the UN General Assembly decided to turn over Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1950. While the Eritreans' desire for independence was ignored, the UN resolution foresaw autonomy for the Eritreans: Eritrea should have its own administration with control over domestic affairs, including police and taxes. The first article of UN resolution 390(V) A of 1950 stated that Eritrea was to become "an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown" ('Federal Act'). [1950: autonomy concession]
- In September 1952, ignoring Eritrean wishes for independence, Eritrea became a semi-autonomous self-governing territory within the Ethiopian confederation. In line with the 1950 UN resolution, Eritrea was granted "its own government, parliament, prime minister, national flag, police force and two official languages, Arabic and Tigrinya" as well as its own "political parties, a free press and trade unions" (Minority Rights Group International; Negash 1997). However, Ethiopia soon began to violate the autonomy arrangement: Between 1952 and 1962 Addis Ababa gradually stripped Eritrea's autonomous status through a "systematic erosion of Eritrean constitutional rights" (Iyob 1997: 89). To reflect this, we code an autonomy restriction in 1952 and a prior restriction. [1952: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Ethiopian Parliament unanimously voted on November 14, 1962 to abolish the federal status possessed by Eritrea since 1952. The Eritrean parliament was unilaterally dissolved, the territory annexed and its status transformed to a province of the Ethiopian Empire (Keesing's Record of World Events: November 1962; Negash 1997). [1962: autonomy restriction]
- In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime was "even more brutal than the imperial administration" with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Behre 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of "rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind" (Berhe 2009: 163) and adopted an uncompromising position towards the EPLF

(International Crisis Group 2009). We do not code a further restriction since the former regime appears equally centralist.

- The National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987 approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures "were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime [...] continued to centralize power". However, special provisions were made for the former province of Eritrea which "was provided with more autonomy than the other autonomous regions." In acknowledgement of its 'unique social and economic situation', Eritrea was granted special status in political, economic, legislative and other spheres. The region would thus be permitted to promulgate and to enforce its own laws provided that they did not conflict with state law. The remaining autonomous regions on the other hand would need central government permission to implement laws promulgated by their respective assemblies. Among other things Eritrea was also given greater control over setting up industries in the region, (ii) education; and (iii) budget planning. In addition, Eritrea's composition of three administrative regions was seen as a recognition of the area's multi-ethnic population (Keesing's Record of World Events: November 1988 - Ethiopia). Unlike in the case of the other autonomous regions of the 1987 act, the autonomy concessions for Eritrea seem significant which is why we code an autonomy concession. [1987: autonomy concession]
- In 1991, when Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People's Republic of Ethiopia overthrown, the EPLF immediately established a provisional government in Eritrea. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference in July 1991 (The 'Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference') also established a transitional government in Ethiopia, which held talks with the EPLF as regards the status of Eritrea. The parties agreed to leave it to the Eritreans to decide over their future through a referendum on independence (Tesfaye 2002). [1991: independence concession]
- In the 1993 referendum, the Eritreans voted almost unanimously in favor of independence, making Eritrea an independent from Ethiopia in 1993. Since this had been agreed already in 1991, we do not code another concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- The Republic of Eritrea was declared in May 1993 (Minority Rights Group International). However, this was agreed upon with the center, which granted Eritrea independence. Thus this is not a unilateral declaration.

Major territorial change

- In 1950 Eritrea was turned over to Ethiopia, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date.
- In line with the codings of de-facto independence and regional autonomy, we code a major territorial change in 1991, when de-facto independence was established. [1991: establishment of de-facto state]
- In 1993 Eritrea became independent. [1993: independence]

Regional autonomy

- Between 1952 and 1962 Addis Ababa gradually stripped Eritrea's autonomous status through a "systematic erosion of Eritrean constitutional rights" (Iyob 1997: 89). It is hard to identify a specific year in which autonomy was abolished. Some sources even argue that there had never been any real autonomy to begin with. EPR, for example, does not code the two Eritrean groups (Muslim Eritreans, Christian Eritreans) as regionally autonomous but as discriminated from 1952 onwards. Also Iyob (1997) claims that the federal and constitutional guarantees of Eritrean

autonomy were undermined early on. Based on these sources, we do not code regional autonomy in this period.

- In 1991 Eritrea achieved de-facto independence, hence we code regional autonomy from 1992-1993. [1992-1993: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- Caspersen (2012) defines Eritrea as a de-facto state from 1991 onwards, when the EPLF took control of the province of Eritrea and the transitional government was installed. De-facto independence ended when the country also gained de-jure independence in 1993. Following the first of January rule, we therefore code de-facto independence as of 1992. [1992-1993: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Independence has clearly been the dominant claim by the 1970s (International Crisis Group 2009; Iyob 1997; Minority Rights Group International; Negash 1997), however, there is a bit of ambiguity as regards the movement's early period. The International Crisis Group identifies a radicalization of the EPLF, which first fought for regional autonomy and only later changed its goal to independence. This is also confirmed by Heraclides (1991: 180), who claims that the movement's demand at the early stage was "not necessarily independence" and by Negash (1997: 36), who states that "by the 1970s all Eritrean armed opposition organizations had modified their political demands to that of complete independence". On the other hand, there are sources that describe the movement's primary goal as "to secure Eritrean independence from Ethiopia" (START; also Minority Rights Group International) from the beginning. We code independence as the dominant claim throughout. Note that there has already been significant support among Eritreans for independence before Eritrea's merger with Ethiopia in 1952 (see Yohannes 1991: 133). [1956-1993: independence claim]
- Splits and internal divisions of the Eritrean self-determination movement were mostly between Christians and Muslims, urban and rural elements or socialists and nationalists and were accentuated in different views on how an independent Eritrea should look like but did not significantly affect the movements claim as regards independence or autonomy.

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Eritreans
<i>Scenario</i>	1:n
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Christian Eritreans; Muslim Eritreans
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	53010000; 53011000

- EPR distinguishes between Muslim and Christian Eritreans, which in combination make up the Eritreans. Christian and Muslim Eritreans do not differ with regards to the power status coding in EPR. Thus the EPR codes are used, with three minor changes. First, EPR changes the Eritreans' status from discriminated to self-exclusion in 1991 but we retain the discriminated code for 1991 since the Mengistu regime was ousted only after Jan 1, 1991. Second, EPR's self-exclusion code in 1992 becomes a powerless code in our scheme. Finally, EPR does not code 1993; however, we found no evidence that the Eritrean's power status changed after January 1, 1992. Thus we use the 1992 code also for 1993. [1958-1991: discriminated; 1991-1992: powerless]
- The sum of the respective EPR group sizes (.03 + .03) yields the group size of Eritreans. [1958-1993: .06 (group size)]

Territory

- The two Eritrean groups in EPR made up 6% of the Ethiopian population. For the year 1990, this amounts to 2,882,000. The autonomous region of Eritrea in the same year had a population of 3.273 million (World Bank). According to MAR, >75% of the Eritreans resided in Eritrea (see gc7 in phase I-IV release). [concentrated]
- The Eritreans claimed the autonomous region of Eritrea or what today is the country of Eritrea. The territory adjoins an international land border (Sudan and from 1977 onwards also Djibouti) and does have access to the Red Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code one field just off the coast of Eritrea (PRIMKEY: OF111PET). No date of discovery is indicated. The closest other hydrocarbon reserve is OF320PET, approx. 170 km away, which was discovered in 1976. [oil/gas: 1958-1976: no; 1977-1993: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR the Eritreans did not have ethnic kin outside Ethiopia. The Minorities at Risk data codes the Afar in Djibouti as ethnic kin of the Eritreans, but we found no evidence for “close ethnic bonds”. [no kin]

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Oromos

Activity: 1973-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Oromos migrated from Somalia and Eastern Ethiopia in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. They occupied all of what is now southern Ethiopia and became the dominant power in that region. This expansion brought them into conflict with the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002).
- In the mid-nineteenth century, Tewodros II initiated the creation of a modern multi-ethnic empire, which would unite Ethiopia and end the supremacy of the Oromos. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Oromo, along with several other peoples in the Horn of Africa, were conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Addis Ababa, in traditional Oromo territory, was made the capital in order to ensure Oromo loyalty (Gudina 2007; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
- The Oromo have always viewed the Amhara as colonizers. The Oromo were enslaved and their productive lands were expropriated and given to Amhara settlers (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). This internal colonialism came along with the attempted creation of “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Oromos had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007).
- In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization and revoked the limited autonomy of the two Oromo regions of Jimma and Wallaga (Bulcha 1997).
- An attempted Oromo secession in 1936 was ended by the invading Italians, who many Oromo saw as liberators from Amhara domination (Minahan 2002). However, after the Allies liberated Ethiopia in 1941, Haile Selassie regained his throne, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and continued the settlement of Amharas on Oromo lands. The Oromo faced retaliation for their collaboration with the invading Italians. In order to ensure the domination of the Amhara culture and language, Haile Selassie banned the Oromo language (Minahan 2002; UNPO 2008). Given the discriminatory stance of the Haile Selassie regime against the Oromo population, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]
- No concession or restriction was found in the ten years before movement onset.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). However, we do not code a concession since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship

that continued the discrimination of the Oromo (HRW 2005).

- In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People's Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 ('Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference') established a transitional government in Ethiopia. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) became part of the new ruling coalition government but increasing hostilities with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which dominated the government, made the OLF withdraw from the government in 1992. The OLF's participation in the coalition government concerns power access at the center and is thus not coded. However, with the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
- A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the state of Oromia, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The constitution also granted the right of secession and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007) [1994: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy as of 1995, which is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Oromo as regionally autonomous following the federalization reform and the establishment of an autonomous ethnic state. [1995-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There are several organizations representing the Oromo, including the Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Oromo (IFLO), the Oromo Peoples Liberation Front (OPLF) and the Oromo People's Democracy Organization (OPDO). However the OLF seems to be the dominant representative of the Oromo, which is why we code the claim of the Oromo in accordance with the claim of the OLF. The sources are very clear on the OLF's goal. According to Minahan (2002) the OLF led a separatist campaign with the aim of establishing an independent Democratic Republic of Oromia. The independentist claim is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 201) and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which all see a clear secessionist claim behind the OLF's rebellion. The OLF's political program also stated that the

organization's main objective would be "the realisation of national self-determination for the Oromo people and their liberation from oppression and exploitation in all forms". [1973-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Oromos
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Oroma
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	53006000

Territory

- The Oromos make up 85% of Oromia's population (Minahan 2002: 1468). This amounts to 20.097 million Oromos (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 23.5 million Oromos in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. In addition to Oromia, there are larger Oromo concentrations in the Dire Dawa and Harar regions. [concentrated]
- The Oromo claim an independent Democratic Republic of Oromia. According to Minahan (2002: 1468), this comprises the present states of Oromo, Dire Dawa and Harar and is very similar to the Oromo settlement polygon in GeoEPR. The territory adjoins an international land border (Kenya), but does not have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- MAR notes "close kindred in more than one country", referring to the Oromos in Kenya. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1468), who additionally mentions Oromo communities in neighboring Somalia. The Kenya census of 2009 estimates slightly less than 250,000 Oromos in Kenya, which makes them large enough to be coded. [kin in neighboring country]

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Tigreans

Activity: 1975-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Tigray was the center of influence in the reestablishing of the Ethiopian Empire (Abyssinia) under Emperor Teodros II and its successor Emperor Yohannes in the nineteenth century, after the empire had undergone a process of decentralization that devolved power to numerous independent units (Berhe 2009; Minorities at Risk Project). However, as a result of internal force and manipulation but also due to external interventions, the subsequent decades brought a shift in the locale of power southwards and away from the Tigreans to the rivaling Amhara.
- The new Ethiopian leaders, Emperors Menelik II (1889-1913) and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974), did not attempt to mitigate the state of Tigray but instead employed a policy of deliberate and systematic neglect to weaken and demoralize its population.
- When British forces liberated Ethiopia from Italian occupation during World War II, Haile Selassie was reinstalled as emperor and started to centralize power within his own ethnicity, leading to Tigrean resentments and rising Tigrean demands for more autonomy (Minahan 2002). However, their demands were not only ignored but met with a harsh response. When open resistance broke out in southern and eastern Tigray and the region was declared independent in the early 1940s (Woyane rebellion), Haile Selassie's forces in collaboration with the British Royal Air Force devastated the region crushed the rebellion (Behre 2009).
- As a punishment for the rebellion, the Tigreans were targeted by various discriminatory and repressive acts: Tigrean land was confiscated and distributed to loyal gentry, regional power was taken away from hereditary leaders and given to loyal administrators and a new taxation system was imposed that "cost the peasants five times more than they had paid under the Italians" (Erlich 1981: 219, also cited in Behre 2004: 572).
- In addition to increased centralization and neglect of Tigray, Amhara domination also manifested itself in cultural discrimination of Tigreans. Tigrigna, spoken by more than 75% of the population, was banned and forbidden in schools and courts in the 1940s and was replaced by Amharigna, which was only spoken by 12.3 per cent of the males in Tigray (Stavenhagen 1996; Berhe 2009). Given the discriminatory stance of the Haile Selassie regime against the Tigrean population, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]
 - o Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 295-296), in contrast to this account, suggest that the Tigreans retained a certain level of autonomy after the 1940s, but the above-mentioned sources are more detailed and trustworthy.
- No concession or restriction in the ten years before movement onset was found.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime was "even more brutal than the imperial administration in its dealings [...] with regard to the Tigrayans and other marginalized nationalities whose demand was self-determination" (Behre 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of "rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind" (Berhe 2009: 163). Radical Tigreans were imprisoned in early 1975 and Tigray was declared a military zone as regime forces invaded Tigray and devastated towns, villages and farmland in order to combat the insurgency. Furthermore, in order to hinder mobilization and destabilize ethnic and social relations, Tigrean

farmers were resettled. Since we do not code one-sided violence nor forced resettlement, these events are not coded.

- In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent, the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country's internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden. The Tigray nationalist movements dismissed the initiative as “insignificant” (Keller 1991: 242). Kefale (2013: 29) also considers the act as window dressing and states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime [...] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. Hence, we do not code a concession.
- In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). [1991: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1978: establishment of de-facto state]
- [1991: de-facto state abolished]

Regional autonomy

- Follows the coding of de-facto independence. [1979-1991: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- In the process of seizing power at the center, the TPLF took over the entire Tigre region (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minahan (2002), Ethiopian forces had been driven out of 90% of Tigre by 1978. In their attempt to mobilize the Tigrean population and to isolate Tigray from the regime, the TPLF introduced land reforms and reforms that aimed at equality of women and Muslims in a previously Christian-patriarchal dominated society. Furthermore, they set in place elected people’s councils’ (baitos) that administered villages and confirmed laws and directives presented by the TPLF. Due to this “monopolization of power in Tigray by the TPLF” (Berhe 2009: 281) by 1978, we code de-facto independence as of 1979, following the first of January rule [1979-1991: de-facto independence]

Claims

- TPLF removed all rival anti-government groups in Tigray such as the TLF, EDU and the EPRP from Tigray between 1975 and 1978, which is why we consider the TPLF’s claim as dominant. When the TPLF was founded, the goal of self-determination was mostly understood as autonomy within a federal, poly-ethnic Ethiopia. When violence escalated, an ultra-nationalist section

within the TPLF that proclaimed secession emerged ('Manifesto 68') and brought along a split in the Tigrean national movement. However, according to Berhe (2004: 591), this extreme position "was relinquished straightaway, since it had no popular support" and in 1978 already, the aim of secession was dropped. We therefore code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1975-1991: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tigreans
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Tigry
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	53009000

Territory

- The Tigreans make up 94% of Tigray's population (Minahan 2002: 1896). This amounts to 3.719 million Tigreans (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 5.5 million Tigreans in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]
- The Tigrean claim the historical province of Tigray or what is today the Tigray Region (Minahan 2002: 1896). The territory adjoins an international land border (Sudan), but has no access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) the Tigreans do not have ethnic kin groups. Minorities at Risk and Minahan (2002: 1896) report a significant Tigrean community in Eritrea, but since Eritrea gained independence only after the movement came to an end this is not coded. [no kin]

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Western Somalis

Activity: 1948-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Nomadic tribes had been living autonomously in the Ogaden desert since ancient times. The territory was officially part of Somali sultanates (Ifat Sultanate and Adal Sultanate). When the Adal Sultanate expanded, it came into conflict with the Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia in 1529, setting off centuries of sporadic warfare with the Christian Ethiopian kingdom (Minahan 2002).
- In the mid-nineteenth century, Tewodros II initiated the creation of a modern multi-ethnic empire, which would unite Ethiopia. In 1887, the Ethiopians conquered Harar, which was the traditional capital of Western Somali clans and was henceforth used as a base for the Ethiopian colonization of the Ogaden region. In 1887, the Ogaden was conquered by Menelik II and came under the control of an Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire (Abyssinia). Resistance to the Ethiopian occupation was finally crushed in 1920. (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The Ethiopian rulers engaged in internal colonialism and an attempted creation of “one Ethiopian nation” through cultural subjugation and Amharisation. The Amharic language became the only language in court, administration and education. Non-Amharic speakers such as the Somalis had to depend on interpreters (Gudina 2007). In 1930, Haile Selassie became emperor and continued the nation-building process and the linguistic and religious homogenization. He embarked upon a policy of centralization (Bulcha 1997).
- When the Italian military invaded and occupied Abyssinia in 1936, the Ogaden region was administered as part of the Italian East African Empire (Italian Somaliland). Only five years later, the allied forces liberated Ethiopia and the Somali-inhabited areas, including the Ogaden, were put under British military administration (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002). We code a prior autonomy restriction in 1936 due to the colonization. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- After the Second World War, the Allied forces established the Four Power Commission (Britain, United States, Soviet Union, and France) to decide on the future of Italy’s colonial possessions. The claims presented to the Commission were divergent: Britain proposed a united Somalia under British trusteeship, Ethiopia wanted control over Ogaden and Somali clans were divided between advocates of a “Greater Somalia” and those who wanted to remain with Ethiopia. Britain discarded its vision of a united Somalia and, against heavy Somali opposition, the Ogaden territory was incorporated into Ethiopia in 1948. This detachment from its kin is coded as an autonomy restriction, particularly since the Ogaden Somali people became a minority in an increasingly centralized Ethiopian state. [1948: autonomy restriction]
- In 1954, the last parts were returned to Ethiopia, where Haile Selassie regained his throne after the Second World War, started to centralize power within his own ethnicity and, following the concept of Amharization, further diminished the status of all languages other than Amhara (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002). [1954: autonomy restriction]
- In 1974 the monarchical structure collapsed, Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship. The new regime adopted the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which states that “each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political,

economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its own organs” (Gudina 2007: 12). Theoretically a concession, we do not code this act since it is very clear that the concession is pure window dressing. The new regime was “even more brutal than the imperial administration” with regard to demands for self-determination by marginalized nationalities (Berhe 2004: 574). Any movement that pursued some sort of regional autonomy and self-determination was targeted by the Derg, the Military Committee, which followed a policy of “rigid centralism of the Stalinist kind” (Berhe 2009: 163) and evolved into a brutal dictatorship that repressed the Somali population through forced relocation and military offensives (HRW 2008).

- In an effort to defuse nationalist discontent (and most likely anticipating the Derg’s possible defeat) the National Shengo (parliament) on Sept. 18, 1987, approved a draft government proposal to redraw the country’s internal boundaries, replacing the existing provinces with five autonomous and 24 administrative regions. The autonomous regions were named as Eritrea, Tigre, Assab, Dire Dawa and Ogaden (Minorities at Risk Project; Van der Beken 2012). Kefale (2013: 29) states that these measures “were not intended to provide administrative and political autonomy, as the military regime [...] continued to centralize power”. Furthermore, there was no linguistic autonomy granted as Amharic remained the working language. Hence, we do not code a concession.
- In 1991 Mengistu was ousted and the government of the People’s Republic of Ethiopia overthrown. The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991 (‘Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference’) established a transitional government in Ethiopia. With the end of the civil war and the ousting of the Derg, a process of decentralization was initiated. The Transitional Charter which worked as an interim constitution acknowledged the right to self-determination for nations and set forth the goal of establishing regional and local administrations based on ethnic lines (Aalen 2002; Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). This change from a unitary to a federal government is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
- Although the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* (ONLF) was not part of the coalition government under the EPRDF, it won the first regional election with 60 percent of the regional parliamentary seats. In February 1994, the regional assembly voted to exercise the “right to self-determination” for the Somali Region. As a consequence, the federal government removed the regional president and his deputy. A large part of the regional administration was replaced and a new EPRDF affiliate party, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL), was formed. This is coded as an autonomy restriction in 1994. The replacement of the elected ONLF regional president and his administration with EPRDF-loyalists clearly diminished the level of self-determination of the Somali. The restrictive character of this act is confirmed by Human Rights Watch (2008): the ESDL won a majority in the regional parliament in the 1995 elections but eventually lost credibility due to the popular perception of it being an EPRDF puppet. The repeated removal of regional presidents paired with the presence of powerful TPLF/EPRDF “technical advisors” reinforced the Somali perception that the “regional administration has little real power and that the autonomy promised by ethnic federalism has been a hollow pledge” (HRW 2008: 25). [1994: autonomy restriction]
- A new constitution was ratified in December 1994. The constitution provided for an ethnically based federal system and the establishment of nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states, among which the Somali Region, and two chartered cities (Gudina 2007; Minorities at Risk; Minority Rights Group International). The constitution also granted the right of secession and the deployment of state representatives to the Council of the Federation (Ayenew 2002; Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher 2007). We do not code a concession since the reform has not been implemented in the Somali region; rather the center has sought to undermine Somali autonomy by placing puppet regimes in the region (see above).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Ogaden territory was handed over to Ethiopia in 1948 and 1954, implying host changes. [1948, 1954: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

- The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. But regional autonomy for the Western Somalis is not given (see above). This is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Somali (Ogaden) as discriminated and not regionally autonomous, despite the federalization reform and the establishment of an allegedly autonomous ethnic state.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The idea of “Greater Somalia” had already evolved during Italian occupation in the mid-1930 and, according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, has found fertile soil in the Ogaden region (even before Somali independence in 1960). UCDP states that the Western Somali movement also engaged in “irredentist agitation” when the Ethiopian government launched its first systematic attempts to collect taxes in the region in the 1960s. In 1975, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was founded. Minahan (2002) and Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) state that in 1981 the WSLF announced that it was seeking an independent Western Somali state rather than unification with Somalia. From this we infer that the claim had been irredentist prior to 1981. The irredentist claim in the early years of the WSLF’s activity is confirmed by the Minority Rights Group International, which sees an irredentist claim of the WSLF particularly during the Ethio-Somali War of 1977/1978. Following the first of January rule, we thus code irredentism as the dominant claim until 1981, when independence was declared the organization’s main goal. [1948-1981: irredentist claim]
- We have seen above that independence was declared the main goal of the WSLF in 1981. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was formed in 1984 from a split in the WSLF and became the leading Somali rebel organization. In the first local and regional elections in 1992, the ONLF won by a wide margin. In his initial statement, the ONLF leader pledged to establish an “independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its people” (UCDP). Independence thus seemed to continue as the dominant claim also under the ONLF. In 1994, numerous Somali organization denounced the secessionist intentions of the ONLF, stressed their continued cooperation with the transitional government and re-oriented towards Ethiopian political life. Together, these organizations formed the Ethnic Somali Democratic League (ESDL), which won a majority in the regional parliament in the 1995 elections. However, despite electoral success, the ESDL soon lost credibility as it was often perceived as an EPRDF puppet. The same is true for the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP) which was formed in 1998 through the merger of the ESDL with moderate factions of the ONLF (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project). The Somali claim hence seems a bit ambiguous, with different organizations pursuing different goals. However, given the very close ties between the ESDL and later the SPDP with the ruling EPRDF, we consider the ONLF as the main representative of the Somali self-determination movement and hence code independence as the dominant claim. [1982-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Western Somalis
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Somali (Ogaden)
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	53008000

Territory

- Somalis make up 95% of the population of the Somali Regional State (Minahan 2002: 2065). This amounts to 4.055 million Western Somalis (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 4.075 million Western Somalis in the whole of Ethiopia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]
- The Western Somalis the Somali Region, one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. The Somali region also covers a large part of the traditional territory of Ogaden. The territory adjoins an international land border (Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti) and does not have access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code one field in Ogaden (PRIMKEY: ET001PET). The field was discovered in 1972, which is why we code oil/gas from 1973 onwards. [oil/gas: yes from 1973]

Kin

- According to EPR there are kin groups in three adjoining countries (Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti). Also see Minahan (2002: 2065) and MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

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FRANCE

Alsatians

Activity: 1969-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Treaty of Versailles after World War I ceded Alsace-Lorraine back to France, after almost fifty years of “Germanization” following the annexation by the Prussians/Germans in the war of 1870/1911. The new French administration, although at first welcomed by the Alsatians, “proved as harsh and restrictive as that of the Germans” (Minahan 2002: 88). However, this was mostly forgotten when American and French troops liberated the Alsace in 1944 and ended the four-year intermezzo of Nazi occupation and terror.
- Again, as in the interwar period, the French government promoted assimilation in order to further distance the Alsatians culturally from their partly German identity. The most far-reaching policy in this direction comprised the 1945 ban of the Alsatian dialects in the local schools (Minahan 2002). [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding.
 - o In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). Although defeated in referendum, the 1969 proposal constitutes an autonomy concession. The rejection is not coded as a restriction since it was not initiated by the central government but was the result of a popular vote. [1969: autonomy concession]
 - o In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Alsace) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000). However, after the failed decentralization attempt in 1969 (rejected in the April 1969 referendum), 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing's Record of World Events:

- Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
- When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (Alsace is made up of two departments: Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. [1982: autonomy concession]
 - A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
- Moreover, there were a number of concessions on language.
- In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages (German) and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
 - In 1991, the Strasbourg municipal authorities decreed that the Alsatian dialect has to be viewed on all street signs. Given the unilateral character of this decision and the negative reaction in the rest of France that denounced this move as an act of “Teutonic takeover” (Minahan 2002), this event is not coded as a concession.
 - In 1992, the Ministry of Education agreed to the use of German/Alsatian language in education. Bilingual German and French classes were introduced and the number of schools providing German language instruction was also increased (Bister-Broosen and Willemyns 1998). Meanwhile, it has to be noted that both German and the Alsatian dialect (Elsasserditsch) continue to lack a legal status. Furthermore, French remains the language of public administration, most education and most media (Minority Rights Group International). Nonetheless, the introduction of schooling in German is a significant cultural rights concession. [1992: cultural rights concession]
 - Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” Yet we found evidence that this was the case already before 1997 (see above).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Given the centralized nature of the French state as described above, regional autonomy of the Alsatians is not given, despite some limited devolution of powers.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The most prominent claims of the Alsatian movement encompass “greater autonomy, the unification of the Alsatian lands, and protection and recognition of the unique Alsatian dialects and culture” (Minahan 2002: 90). Even though there have also been claims for an independent Alsace, the dominant claim is by far that of devolution and increased cultural (predominantly linguistic) autonomy. This is in line with the program of the party ‘Unser Land’ and its predecessors ‘Union du Peuple Alsacien’ and ‘Fer’s Elsass’, which promote decentralization and bilingualism [1969-2012: autonomy claim].
 - o Note: the start date is coded in 1969, which is when the Movement of Alsace Lorraine was founded, which called for “a free Alsace-Lorraine within a European federation” (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 21). It is somewhat ambiguous whether this should be read as an autonomy or an independence claim. At least in the movement’s first years (before the formation of autonomist parties such as the Union du Peuple Alsacien (UPA) in 1988), one could thus also code an independence claim. However, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 21) in the very next sentence refer to at least parts of the movement as “autonomist” and other evidence suggests that the claim for autonomy was dominant (see above).
 - o Note too: with Strasbourg being the a center of European integration, the nationalist sentiments of Alsatians increasingly occurs in the form of a pro-European nationalist movement that preaches subsidiarity and the advent of a ‘Europe of the regions’ that limits the traditional nation-state’s influence while strengthening the regions. This stands in stark contrast to the success of the extreme right, anti-European Front National in Alsace-Lorraine.

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Alsatians
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- According to EPR the metropolitan French exercise monopoly power (all other groups are excluded from power). Alsatians are not considered politically relevant, suggesting a powerless coding (if Alsatians were actively discriminated against they were included in EPR). The evidence we found supports such a categorization. Alsatians enjoy equal political rights to metropolitan French, but representation in the national executive is token at best. In particular, throughout the movement's existence, both the French president and the French prime minister consistently were non-Alsatians. Thus, we code the Alsatians powerless throughout. [1969-2012: powerless]
- According to Minahan (2002: 85) there were approximately 2.2 million Alsatians in France. According to the World Bank, France's total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [1969-2012: .0356 (group size)]

Territory

- The Alsatians predominantly live in the historical region of Alsace-Lorraine (as defined above). In this region, they make up 75% of the population (Minahan 2002: 85). This amounts to 2.216 million Alsatians (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 2.237 million Alsatians in the whole of France in that same year. [concentrated]
- As noted above, the most prominent claim (apart from cultural autonomy) is "greater autonomy [and] the unification of the Alsatian lands" (Minahan 2002: 90). The latter encompasses what is today the French region of Alsace and the Moselle Departments (region Lorraine) and the territory of Belfort (region Franche-Comté). The territory adjoins international land borders (Germany, Switzerland) but has no access to sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code two fields in Alsace (PRIMKEY: FR004PET, FR005PET). FR004PET was discovered in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 86), the Alsatians are descendants of early Germanic peoples, and are closely related to the Luxembourgers and Germans in neighboring parts of Germany. [kin in adjacent country]

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Basques

Activity: 1963-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The northern Basques were incorporated into the French kingdom in 1601 and enjoyed considerable autonomy until the French revolutionary government revoked all regional autonomy arrangements and dissolved the historical provinces in 1790. The French part of the Basque country was merged with neighboring Béarn in order to establish what today is the département Pyrénées-Atlantiques. Increasing centralization, attempts to assimilate the Basques and the abrogation of ancient rights fueled Basque nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth century. The restrictive attitude towards Basque nationalism continued into the Fourth Republic, when Basque nationalists were imprisoned for threatening state security. However, the 1951 Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages (and later Corsican, Tahitian and Melanesian) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Légglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). Based on this, we code a prior concession. [prior concession]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated in Paris. However, there were three acts of decentralization in 1972, 1982 and 2004 (and one act of failed decentralization in 1969) that devolved power to the sub-state levels. Given that the French Basque territory only forms part of a département (Pyrénées-Atlantiques), we need to ask to what extent these acts of decentralization affected the Basques’ level of autonomy. As of 2011, Pyrénées-Atlantiques had a population of 650,000 of which 289,000 (almost 45%) live in the *pays Basque* (INSEE). Given the proportional character of the electoral process in the départements, we can legitimately assume that the Basques have a significant influence on the department’s government. We thus code the 1982 and the 2003/2004 acts as concessions. The acts of 1969 and 1972 (see comments for the Alsatians or the Bretons), however, only concerned the regions and are thus not coded as a concessions (given the numerics – Aquitaine, the respective region, has a population of 3.2 millions – the Basques’ influence on the regional level seems too small).
 - o When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated (PR) governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. [1982: autonomy concession]
 - o A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a

rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]

- In addition, we code a concession specifically on language in 1982:
 - o In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
- Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” We do not code another concession because the 1982 act appears much more significant. Note: despite some advances, the Basque language (Euskera) does not have any legal status and the language of public administration and most education has remained French (Minorities at Risk Project). Beck (2005: 118) states that the position of Euskera in administration and courts is “at a zero level”.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- While the Basques across the border have managed to achieve a large measure of autonomy from Madrid, devolution in France is not significant enough to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Unlike its Spanish counterpart, the French Basques are not as cohesive nor is there a common political program or consensus on the movement’s objectives. Agreement only concerns the need

to promote the recognition and protection of their language and culture (Watson 2003). The group however disagrees on the level of autonomy it should seek as well as the means to do achieve it. Only a minority seeks a unified, separate Basque state, whereas it seems that “political autonomy to protect and promote group culture” and the establishment of a separate Basque department (Iparralde) is the dominant claim among French Basques (Minorities at Risk Project, Minahan 2002). [1963-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Basques
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Basques
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	22002000

Territory

- The Basque are concentrated in the French Pays Basque. We could not find information on the exact number of Basque in the French Pays Basque but according to Minahan (2002: 283), there are 73% Basques in the entire Basque country in Spain and France, making it very likely that they also constitute a majority in the French part alone. Further evidence in this direction comes from the Minorities at Risk data and Weidmann (2009), where the Basque settlement in France is represented by one cluster and the territorial concentration index (SPATCONC) is 1 and the population dispersion index (POPCLDIST) is 0. We thus code the Basques as regionally concentrated [concentrated]
- The Basques claim the French Basque (Iparralde) territory that consists of the three historic territories Labourd, Nieder-Navarra and Soule that form part of the département Pyrénées-Atlantiques. The territory adjoins an international land border (Spain) and has access to the Atlantic Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code one field that overlaps with the French Basque country (FR010PET). The field was discovered in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The Basques have kin in Spain (EPR; Minahan 2002: 283; MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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Bretons

Activity: 1957-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Bretons, in union with France since 1532, lost all administrative and cultural autonomy following the French Revolution and the reorganization by the French revolutionary government. During Nazi occupation in World War II, the Bretons were granted cultural and linguistic rights and were placed under separate administration. Once liberated, these concessions were quickly withdrawn by the French authorities with the goal of assimilating the Bretons. The Breton nationalist movement was discredited and repressed and several of its members were arrested as collaborators (Minahan 2002). The centralized French state was set in place and the use of the Breton and Gallo language in school was forbidden. However, the 1951 Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan (Hossay 2004: 408). This allowed a minimal presence of these four minority languages (and later Corsican, Tahitian and Melanesian) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30), thus ending the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). [1951: cultural rights concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding.
 - o In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). Although defeated in referendum, the 1969 proposal constitutes an autonomy concession. The rejection is not coded as a restriction since it was not initiated by the central government but is the result of a popular vote. [1969: autonomy concession]
 - o In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Brittany) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000). However, after the failed decentralization attempt in 1969 (rejected in the April 1969 referendum), 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local

- professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing's Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]
- When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. While the regions also benefited from devolution, Cole (1998: 122) calls the départements (Brittany is made up of four departments: Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, Côtes-d’Armor) “the clear victors” of this act of decentralization, given that they were granted “larger budgets, more staff and more service delivery responsibilities”. While the 1982 act devolved some power to the regions, the establishment of Brittany as a political region also reinforced the cross-cutting of the ancient Breton homeland as the department of Loire-Atlantique, historically a part of Brittany, was integrated into another region (Pays de la Loire). While this could also be coded as a restriction, we value the act of devolution and the establishment of Brittany as a political region more decisive in increasing the Breton’s level of autonomy and thus code the event as a concession. [1982: autonomy concession]
 - A new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs. We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
- There was also some movement regarding language:
- In 1975 the French government announced that it would begin subsidizing Breton language courses in state schools (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 52). We do not code this smallish change. Breton language courses had already been possible under the 1951 Deixonne act (see above).
 - In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Légise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
 - Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” This was, however, already possible under the 1951 Deixonne act and the 1982 Savary Circular (see above). We do not code another concession..

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Given the centralized nature of the French state as described above, regional autonomy of the Bretons is not given, despite repeated acts of devolution.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- After World War I, Bretons presented a petition to U.S. president Woodrow Wilson calling for an independent and sovereign Brittany. However, the claim for secession has ever since lost most of its popularity. The Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) that had been formed in 1957 is widely described as federalist (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51).
- Moreover, the principal Breton party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB – Breton Democratic Union) has always been more regionalist than separatist, therefore promoting devolution, and more (cultural) autonomy within a federal French state (Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 307). In addition, one of the major demands of the Breton nationalist movement includes the reunification of historic Brittany – currently divided between Brittany and the Pays-de-la-Loire - into a single administrative region. The Party for the Organization of a Free Brittany (Parti pour l'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre, POBL) was a bit more extreme in its demands and regarded “Breton independence a possibility” (Schrijver 2006: 255). However, the party never got much support in elections. The militant and violent Front de Libération de la Bretagne and the Armée Républicaine Bretonne caused media attention and “public sympathy for the detainees and amnesty movements” (Schrijver 2006), but experienced less support than the more moderate UDB, which is also the only regionalist party to ever win seats in parliaments (Cole and Loughlin 2003). The radical left-wing Emgann and the far-right Adsav enjoy only minority support. [1957-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Bretons
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- In EPR Bretons are considered irrelevant. Metropolitan French are considered to have monopoly power, 1946-2013. By implication, the Bretons should be coded powerless (by definition, all other ethnic groups are excluded if one group has monopoly power; on the other hand, if Bretons were discriminated against, they would be included in EPR). We did not find evidence that would suggest otherwise. After the Second World War, Breton language and culture were suppressed.

Reece (1979) went as far as labelling Brittany an internal colony of metropolitan France. However, there is no evidence of active political discrimination as defined in EPR. Since the advent of the Fifth Republic, Bretons often held ministerial posts. But according to Reece (1979) these are best regarded as token, in particular since Breton ministers in fact often were non-Bretons ‘parachuted’ by the Gaullist into Breton constituencies. We did not find evidence that would justify a power upgrade in the post-1980 period. In particular, French presidents and Prime ministers were consistently non-Breton. Thus, we code the Bretons as powerless throughout. [1957-2012: powerless]

- According to Minahan (2002: 323), there were approximately 2.8 million Bretons in France in 2002. According to the World Bank, France’s total population was 61.8 million in 2002. [1957-2012: .0453 (group size)]

Territory

- The Bretons are concentrated in historic Brittany, where they make up 72% of the population (Minahan 2002: 323). This amounts to 2.625 million Bretons (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 2.825 million Bretons in the whole of France in that same year. [concentrated]
- One of the major demands of the Bretons is the reunification of historic Brittany as it existed in Ancien Régime France. The territory encompasses the current region of Brittany and a small part of Pays-de-la-Loire. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but it has access to the Atlantic Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- In the most recent version of the Minorities at Risk data, the Bretons are no longer included. In versions I-IV, the Bretons are included and, referring to the Celtic Peoples in the United Kingdom, are coded as having “close kindred in one country”. We follow MAR and code ethnic kin in a neighboring country as the United Kingdom is within 150 statute miles proximity. [kin in neighboring country]

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Corsicans

Activity: 1967-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Originally, Etruscans settled in Corsica. The island was overtaken step by step by the Romans starting in 259 B.C., and then overrun by German vandals in the 5th century. The island returned to nominal Roman suzerainty in A.D. 534, was taken by the Goths, then conquered by the Lombards in 725. Eventually, it came under the control of the Germanic Franks. It was then ceded to the Holy See – the Holy See gave the island to the Republic of Pisa in 1047 – until the Ligurians of Genoa expelled the last of the Pisans in 1347. The Genoese rule was harsh and unpopular. The first “nationalist” Corse rebellion by Sampiero Corso ended with continued Genoese rule in 1567. In 1729, the tax-burdened Corsicans started a decade-long rebellion; Pasquale Paoli led the rebellion after 1755. Paoli achieved virtual independence and established a Republic, complete with national government and university (Minahan 2002: 487-488). The Genoese, unable to quell the rebellion, sold their rights to the island to the French in 1768 (Minahan 2002: 488). By 1770, the French had closed down all of the Corsican state institutions. The Corsicans rebelled once more during the French Revolution, and in 1793 drove the last French troops from the island. After a short interlude of British rule, the island was reconquered by Napoleon in 1796, fell to the British again in 1814, and then was ceded to the French at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 despite Corsican protests (Minahan 2002: 488). Fascist Italian troops occupied the island after the fall of France in 1940. An uprising in 1943, aided by the Free French forces, drove the Italians off the island. The triumphant Corsicans were very disappointed by the reimposition of French rule in 1945 (Minahan 2002: 489). When the Loi Deixonne recognized limited language rights for the Occitan, Basque, Breton and Catalan in 1951, Paris felt no pressure to add Corsican to this list, as Corsican nationalism was dormant (Hossay 2004: 408). We code a prior restriction due to the long-standing loss of political autonomy. [prior restriction]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- Traditionally, France has been a highly centralized state with most power concentrated at the center in Paris. However, there were limited movements towards decentralization that need to be reflected in the concessions/restrictions coding.
 - o In 1969, a proposal for regional reform was drawn up under General de Gaulle. Regional prefects were to be given new powers and new regional councils would take over responsibilities over matters such as education, transport, communications health, services and tourism. The proposal was rejected by the French people in a referendum in April 1969, despite the fact that a poll showed only 8 per cent actually opposing regionalization with 59 per cent in favor. The reform was rejected as the referendum was primarily seen as rather an “issue of confidence in the regime than as one of regional reform” (Schmidt 2007: 89). Although defeated in referendum, the 1969 proposal constitutes an autonomy concession. The rejection is not coded as a restriction since it was not initiated by the central government but is the result of a popular vote. [1969: autonomy concession]
 - o In 1956 22 administrative regions (among which Corsica) were created. This reform aimed to modernize the economy and did not effectively devolve political power to the sub-national level. Thus and initially, the regions did not possess any executive or

decision-making function but functioned largely as administrative units (Smith and Heywood 2000; Schmidt 2000). However, after the failed decentralization attempt in 1969 (rejected in the April 1969 referendum), 1972 saw the institutionalization of regional councils. Their main purpose was to give the existing economic regions of France legal status and qualified responsibility for economic, cultural and social planning, as well as a political and administrative focus in the form of regional councils and economic and social advisory councils - the former to be composed of the National Assembly and the Senate members of the region together with representatives of the appropriate departmental conseils-generaux, and the latter to be nominated by local professional, business and trade union organizations (Keesing's Record of World Events: Feb. 1974 - France). [1972: autonomy concession]

- When the socialists under François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 they implemented decentralization laws one year later in order to “give the state back to the people” (Jerome 2009; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 73). This Law on Rights and Liberties for Communes, Departments, and Regions (“*loi Defferre*”) consisted of several thrusts designed to move decision-making away from the central state. The former regional councils were transformed from administrative organs to subnational, democratically legitimated governments and the power of the president-appointed prefects were greatly diminished. The reforms included a Special Statute (‘statut particulier’) for Corsica which provided for a Corsican Assembly to be elected through proportional representation within six months. It also acknowledged to some extent the cultural specificity of Corsica (recognition of the “Corsican people”) (Hossay 2004: 415). [1982: autonomy concession]
- In 1991, French Senators rejected key portions of a bill that would have recognized the Corsicans as a separate nation (Hossay 2004: 421). However, there was a separate bill that recognized the Corsicans as a “people” and allowed for the teaching of Corsican in schools, as long as it was not mandatory (Minorities at Risk Project). Law 91-428 (*Statut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse*) granted additional powers to the assembly as regards economic, social and cultural development and with regard to the protection of the identity and the environment (Legifrance). Despite initial disappointment over the non-recognition of Corsica as a separate nation, we code this as a concession, since the net-transfer of competencies and cultural rights was certainly positive. [1991: autonomy concession]
 - In 1993, France’s constitutional court struck down the provision recognizing Corsicans as a “people”. Even if largely symbolic, we code this as a cultural rights restriction as case study evidence suggests that the ruling was important (MRGI). [1993: cultural rights restriction]
- On 22 May 2001 the French National Assembly adopted a law giving the local assembly in Corsica some powers to modify laws and decrees adopted by the central state and universalized the teaching of the Corsican language in all schools (Sanchez 2008: 660). [2001: autonomy concession]
 - However, in January 2002 the constitutional court again struck down a vital part of the legislation: the “experimental power to derogate from national laws” (MRGI). [2002: autonomy restriction]
- In 2003, the government called for a referendum in Corsica on whether or not they wanted a new territorial assembly and an executive body that would manage more of the island’s affairs. The proposal was not implemented as the referendum was (narrowly) rejected by the Corsicans (Sanchez 2008: 658). Nevertheless, this constitutes an act of concession by the government. Furthermore, a new round of decentralization reforms took place in 2003-2004. The constitutional reform of 2003 embedded the regions in the constitution and added decentralization as a rationale to the first article of the new constitution (“Son organisation est décentralisée”). The subsequently adopted 2004 Decentralization Act under Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin granted regions, départements and communes more financial autonomy, and far greater tax-raising powers in particular (Cole 2006). Furthermore, the law of August 13, 2004 strengthened regional competencies in the fields of economic development, spatial planning and cultural affairs.

- We code a single concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
- There were also concessions specifically on language:
 - o In 1951 the French government removed the ban on regional languages (Deixonne Act). This allowed a minimal presence of four minority languages (Basque, Breton, Catalan, Occitan) in public education and was “the first French legal disposition authorizing the optional teaching of regional languages” (Migge and Léglise 2012: 30) and ended the “century and a half of systematic attacks on the use of regional languages” (Ager 1999: 31). Corsican was added as of 1974. [1974: cultural rights concession]
 - o In June 1982, the Savary Circular on the teaching of regional languages was published. The circular extended the official jurisdiction of the Deixonne Act of 1951 to other regional languages and established 1) that the state should be responsible for the teaching of regional languages, 2) that the languages should be taught from kindergarten to university, with the status of a separate discipline and 3) that their teaching should be based on the expressed wish of both teacher and students (Ager 1999: 33). Education in regional languages was hereby “officially authorised for the first time within the public sector in France” (Rogers and McLeod 2007: 355). In 1982, the Deixonne Act applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican (from 1974) and Tahitian (from 1981). Four Melanesian languages were added in 1992. According to Bonnaud (2003: 56) and Migge and Léglise (2012: 30), other regional languages that benefited from this reform were Auvergnat, Gascon, Languedocien, Limousin, Niçart, Provençal, Vivaro-Alpin, Gallo, Alsace regional languages and the French-based Creoles spoken in La Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. [1982: cultural rights concession]
 - o Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that after a more liberal Socialist government took office in 1997, “a more tolerant policy allowed the teaching of Alsatian, Basque, Breton, and other regional languages in the nation’s schools.” This was, however, already possible under the 1951 Deixonne act, applied to Corse since 1974, and the 1982 Savary Circular (see above).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1991: Establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Following the first of January rule, we code regional autonomy as of 1992, which is also in line with the EPR coding that considers the Corsicans as regionally autonomous following the enactment of the statut particulier. [1992-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- We code the Corse movement as active from 1967 onwards, the year the Regional Front of Corsica (FRC) was founded. The group advocated Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399). In 1973, the Action for the Revival of Corsica (ARC) was founded. Despite its more radical methods, the ARC “always defined its actions in the framework of the French Republic [...] These men do not threaten the state. They struggle for a single thing: internal autonomy in the framework of the French Republic” (quoted in Hossay 2004: 411). This is confirmed by De La Calle and Fezi (2010: 399) who also call the group autonomist. The Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) was founded by radicals from the ARC in 1976. The FLNC’s aims were “the recognition of the national rights of Corsica, destruction of all the instruments of French colonialism, the foundation of a popular democratic power [...] [and] the right to self-determination’ (Hossay 2004: 412). These claims are more radical, but there are numerous indications in De La Calle and Fezi (2010) and Hossay (2004) that the FNLC never had majority support, or even more support than other groups advocating on behalf of Corsican issues, which is why we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. Additional evidence for this coding are the 1983 FLNC moderates who distinguished themselves from extremism and declared that “the independence that we demand may well be realized with and not against France” (Hossay 2004: 417). [1967-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Corsicans
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Corsicans
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	22003000

Territory

- The Corsicans are concentrated on the island of Corsica, where they make up 55% of the population (Minahan 2002: 486). This amounts to 143,550 Corsicans (in 2002), which is less than 50% of the 390,000 Corsicans in the whole of France in that same year. [not concentrated]
- The claimed territory comprises the island of Corsica. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Mediterranean Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- Neither EPR nor the Minorities at Risk data code the Corsicans as having ethnic kin. Minahan (2002: 486) mentions smaller Corsican communities in Italy and outside Europe, but these are too insignificant to be considered here. [no kin]

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GEORGIA

South Ossetians

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1922 South Ossetia was awarded Autonomous Oblast status (Jones 1997: 509). From the 1930s, there was a policy of Georgianization vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities. Most minority rights were restored after Stalin's death in 1953. From the 1960s there was a policy of affirmative action. By the 1980s, South Ossetians dominated the local party structures (Jones 2013: 44-45). Gorbachev initiated decentralization reforms, with the introduction of multi-candidate elections throughout the Union in 1988 that allowed for the local election of leaders (Brown 1996: 166, 179; Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
- However, beginning in 1989 Tbilisi initiated a series of downgrades, with the establishment of Georgian as the sole state language in 1989 (MAR; Jones 2013: 35, 45, 48-49; Wolff n.d.; George 2009: 110) and the disestablishment of the South Ossetian autonomy in 1990 (Jones 1997: 536; George 2009: 110-111; Jones 2013: 45; Minority Rights Group International). [1989: cultural rights restriction] [1990: autonomy restriction]
- Throughout 1991, Tbilisi imposed an economic blockade on South Ossetia (George 2009: 114; Wolff n.d.). [1991: autonomy restriction][prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In June 1992, Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia signed a formal cease-fire. The agreement also established a military buffer zone, and was followed by the deployment of an OSCE Observer Mission and Russian-led peacekeepers. The agreement did not lead to a formal resolution to the conflict (George 2009: 114; Jones 2013: 95), but did work reasonably while Shevardnaze was in power. Pragmatic considerations drove both sides to accept the status quo (Lynch 2004; Wolff n.d.). Georgia subsequently lifted the economic blockade it had upheld since 1991. After the war, the so-called Ergneti market emerged, a kind of economic free zone where Georgians, South Ossetians, and Russians sell their products without paying customs or taxes. While of course illegal under Georgian law, the Ergneti market was implicitly accepted by Tbilisi and even actively supported by Georgian law enforcers (George 2009: 138). [1992: autonomy concession]
- In a peaceful 2003 transition, the so-called "Rose Revolution", a new president – Mikheil Saakashvili – came to power. Among the most important of his goals was the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity (George 2009: 179). Saakashvili demonstrated willingness to engage in brinkmanship to achieve this goal (MAR). In particular, Saakashvili in 2004 closed the Ergneti market, the lifeline of South Ossetia's crumbling economy (George 2009: 167, 179), and thereby effectively imposed an economic blockade on South Ossetia (which is coded as an autonomy restriction). [2004: autonomy restriction]
- Moreover, Saakashvili initiated an attempt to re-take South Ossetia by force in the summer of 2004 (Minority Rights Group International), which is though not a restriction as defined in the codebook.
- After the failure of the 2004 attempt at retaking South Ossetia, Saakashvili changed his strategy and began to offer a re-instatement of autonomy to South Ossetia. After the war in the early 1990s, South Ossetia had showed some willingness to return to Georgia, under the condition that

Georgia re-establishes (and improves) their territorial autonomy status. At the time this demand proved unacceptable to the Georgian side (George 2009: 126-127). Saakashvili was the first president of Georgia to offer autonomy to South Ossetia (George 2009: 173). The first time Saakashvili initiated such a plan was in September 2004 at the UN General Assembly (Jones 2013: 146-147; George 2009: 180-181). [2004: autonomy concession]

- Saakashvili presented a modified proposal in 2005 (Jones 2013: 146-147; George 2009: 180-181). Still, Tbilisi's offers remained overly vague, and there were no steps taken towards implementation. Georgia's constitution does not acknowledge South Ossetian autonomy (while it acknowledges autonomy for Abkhazia and Ajara) and continues to refer to the 'Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia'. The South Ossetians rejected Tbilisi's offer. [2005: autonomy concession]
- Note: While offering autonomy, Saakashvili continued to engage in repressive brinkmanship. The Ergneti market remained closed, and the economic blockade thus in place. Moreover, Saakashvili began to secure ties with a former South Ossetian prime minister, Dmitri Sanakoev, and established an 'alternative' South Ossetian government with Sanakoev as head of government in the small piece of South Ossetian land that is effectively controlled by Georgia. Moreover, Georgia built-up its military forces, and there was aggressive rhetoric directed against South Ossetia. For instance, in 2006 Georgia's defense minister announced he would spend next New Year's in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital (George 2009: 181).
- The cease-fire agreement concluded after the August 2008 war initiated another round of negotiations under the auspices of the EU, OSCE, and the UN. It appears that the negotiations did not involve the status of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and were limited to security and humanitarian issues. There was limited, if any, success. The Ergneti market has remained shut, and it appears Georgia did not repeat its autonomy offer.
- Note: In post-Soviet Georgia there were some local government reforms of the non-federal part of Georgia (to which South Ossetia, at least de jure, belongs). However, these reforms changed relatively little in terms of decentralization, and are thus not coded (Jones 2013: 65, 146, 172-173; Wheatley 2004; Swianiewicz & Mielczarek 2010; George 2009: 169-170; also see the notes for the Armenians in Georgia).

Sovereignty declarations

- South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia on November 28, 1991 (Jones 2013: 274). MAR notes that the South Ossetian parliament at the same time decided to join Russia. Hence we code an irredentist declaration. [1991: irredentist declaration]
- According to Jones (2013: 94), following a referendum in early 1992 on independence and integration with North Ossetia, South Ossetia declared its independence from Georgia a second time in May 1992. [1992: irredentist declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1991, South Ossetia became part of newly independent Georgia, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
- [1992: establishment of de-facto autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Tbilisi had abolished South Ossetia's autonomous status in 1990. The regional autonomy code follows the establishment of de-facto independence. [1993-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- According to Caspersen (2012: 12), South Ossetia is de-facto independent 1992 onwards. Following the first of January rule, we code de-facto independence for 1993 onwards [1993-2012: de-facto independence]

Claims

- The South Ossetians declared independence from Georgia in late 1991. In January 1992 a referendum was held on independence from Georgia and integration with Russia. Minorities at Risk suggests that the South Ossetians have maintained their demand. With the election of Eduard Kokoity as president of South Ossetia in 2000, the demand for outright independence from Georgia (George 2009: 178) and joining Russia (MAR) solidified. [1991-2012: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	South Ossetians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Ossetians (South)
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	37206000

Territory

- Information on the South Ossetians' spatial concentration is contradictory. According to Minahan (2002: 1474) there are approx. 170,000 South Ossetians in Georgia, concentrated in the de-facto entity of South Ossetia and adjacent areas. Approx. 60,000 South Ossetians live in the separatist entity according to Minahan, where they make up 63% of the local population (as we will see, Minahan appears to report the figures from the 1989 census). MAR, on the other hand, suggests that most South Ossetians reside in South Ossetia, both in 1990 (see gc7 in phase I-IV release) and in recent years (see GC7 in phase V release).
- Our own research suggests that the South Ossetians cannot be considered spatially concentrated according to our rules before 1991, but thereafter. According to the Soviet 1989 census, there were approx. 165,000 Ossetians in the Georgian SSR, 65,000 of them in the former South Ossetian autonomous oblast, and they made up approx. 66% of the local population (Sordia 2009: 6). The evidence we collected suggests that the remaining approx. 100,000 Ossetians in Georgia mostly lived dispersed across Georgia. The largest community was in Tbilisi, the capital, with approx. 30,000. Other areas with higher concentrations of Ossetians include Borjomi and Akhmeta districts, each with about 10-15% Ossetians. Both these districts are not adjacent to South Ossetia. It has to be noted that there was a somewhat higher concentration in a number of districts adjacent to South Ossetia: Gori, Kaspi, and Qareli, though the Ossetians made up only 10-15% of the local population in these districts (Bondyrev et al. 2015: 35). Nevertheless, though we cannot be 100% sure, this suggests that the double 50% rule was not fulfilled before the war (i.e. we cannot fully preclude the possibility that there is an area consisting of South Ossetia plus some adjacent areas that would fulfil the criteria, but this appears unlikely).
- The situation changed as a result of the war that began in 1991 (Sordia 2009: 6). Many South Ossetians left Georgia, mostly for Russia (North Ossetia, in particular). Few returned after the war. The 2002 census in Georgia counted but 40,000 Ossetians (not counting South Ossetia). The number has become yet smaller as a result of the 2008 war. At the same time, many Georgians left South Ossetia as a result of the war (Sammut & Cvetkovski 1996). Though no reliable census

data is available for South Ossetia, the assumption is safe that there is spatial concentration since the war that broke out in 1991. Since we code the onset in 1991, we code spatial concentration from 1992 onwards. [1991: not concentrated, 1992-2012: concentrated]

- South Ossetia borders Russia (North Ossetia), but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The territory claimed (South Ossetia) does not appear to overlap with a hydrocarbon reserve, though PRIMKEY GG002PET comes very close (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The South Ossetians have transnational kin in Russia since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 (see EPR; Minahan 2002: 1474). The number of Ossetians in Russia (approx. 500,000) easily crosses the numeric threshold. We found no other kin (see e.g. MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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INDIA

Achiks (Garos)

Activity: 1992-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Garos, a Tibeto-Burman people, were incorporated into the British Empire in 1835 as part of the Assam province. The Garos lands were “partially excluded areas” under British jurisdiction, which later led to scheduled tribe status (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). Upon partition, the Garo lands were divided, with parts becoming part of Pakistan and others becoming part of Assam. In 1972, when Meghalaya split from Assam, part of the Garo land became part of the new state (Mihanan 2012: 85). The Garos are a Scheduled Tribe, included in the initial 8th Schedule of the Constitution in 1950. They had an autonomous district (and thus autonomy) since 1952. The scheduled tribes status and the autonomous district was transferred to Meghalaya in 1972 (India Ministry of Law and Justice); the Garos in Assam did no longer have scheduled tribe status/autonomy. The Garos are the second largest group in Meghalaya (around 20 per cent), and were active in the movement for the separation from Assam. Hence we code a prior concession. [prior concession]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 2002, the Garos in Assam were granted scheduled tribe status (Khan 2014). Scheduled tribe status confers the rights to a proportionate share in state employment and proportionate representation both in the national and sub-national parliament. Moreover, scheduled tribe status protects the “tribal” language and culture (Swarup 2011). [2002: cultural rights concession]
- Under the Meghalaya State Language Act of 2005, Garo became an associate official language of Meghalaya, thus allowing for education in the Garo language (Meghalaya Times 2005). Since it is the regional government which passed the legislation, in which the Garos participate, we do not code this event as a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The Garos make up around 20 per cent of Meghalaya and they participate in the regional government. Moreover, the Garos in Meghalaya have separate autonomy since there is a Garo

autonomous district council. Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). The Garos in Assam do not have an autonomous district council, despite local organizations calling for this status (Khan 2013). Nonetheless we code the Garos as regionally autonomous since a substantial number of Garos is located in Meghalaya. [1992-2012: regional autonomy].

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The dominant claim appears to be for the establishment of a separate Garo state. The Garo Hills State Movement Committee has been working for Garoland statehood since 1992 and enjoys the support of several parties and political groupings, such as the Garo National Council (Meghalaya Times 2013; also see the other group notes file). In addition, there is a movement in Assam advocating the establishment of an autonomous council akin to the one in Meghalaya (Khan 2013). [1992-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Achiks (Garos)
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75018000

- The Achiks (Garos) are one of India's indigenous (scheduled) tribes and thus form part of the EPR group 'Scheduled Castes & Tribes'. The Scheduled Castes and Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India's bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). Of course, this does not apply to all of the hundreds of indigenous groups associated with the umbrella Scheduled Tribes group and in particular not to the Garos. But the inclusion of an ethnic Garo in 1994 marks a clear difference to the situation before. Hence, we code the Garos as junior partners from 1995 onwards (1st of January rule), and powerless before. [1992-1994: powerless; 1995-2012: junior partner]
- According to the 2001 census, there are 889,000 Garos in India (Ethnologue), which in combination with the total tally (1,028,737,436) yields a group size estimate of 0.000864. [1992-2012: 0.0008 (group size)]

Territory

- The Garos are concentrated in Meghalaya's autonomous Garo hills district. Almost 700,000 out of the approx. 900,000 Garos in India settle in Meghalaya, and according to Haokip (2012) Meghalaya's Garos primarily settle in the Garo hills. According to the 2001 census the region's total population was approximately 900,000, rendering it very likely that the Garos, who are the region's titulars, also comprise the majority there. [concentrated]
- The autonomous Garos hill district, is landlocked and borders Bangladesh. The Garos also make claims for autonomy in Assam, which has an international border with Bangladesh, Myanmar,

and Bhutan. Yet the districts that this appears to concern (Kamrup and Goalpara, see Times of India 2013) are landlocked with no international border. [border: yes, seashore: no]

- We found no hydrocarbon reserves. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Encyclopedia Britannica, there are Garos also in Bangladesh. They make up 141,000 according to the Joshua Project. [1992-2012: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Assamese

Activity: 1979-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Prior to British colonialization, there was an Assamese Kingdom (Minahan 2002: 200). The partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 led to a chaotic situation in Assam. Some parts of Assam went to the newly created East Pakistan. Assam had to deal with a huge influx from neighbouring East Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 201). The Indian Constitution of 1949/1950 defines Assam as a state of the Indian Union, which has its own governmental structure (Britannica Academic Edition) and Assamese was recognized as an official language (though not at a par with Hindi or English). However, in the following decades the traditional Assam territory was downsized due to the creation of new states. The states of Nagaland (1963) and Meghalaya (autonomous status within Assam in 1969 and full separation in 1972) were carved out in the 1960s/1970s, and Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh were separated from Assam and became union territories in 1972 (Minahan 2002: 201; Encyclopedia Britannica). Since this implies the loss of traditional Assamese land, we code a (prior) restriction. [1972: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In December 1979 the central government imposed president's (direct) rule in Assam. [1979: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted in December 1980. [1980: autonomy concession]
- Due to increasing violence the Assam state government was dissolved in June 1981 and the central government again imposed president's (direct) rule (Minahan 2002: 202). [1981: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted in January 1982. [1982: autonomy concession]
- Only two months later, the center again imposed president's rule. [1982: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted in February 1983. [1983: autonomy concession]
- In 1985 an Accord was signed between the All Assam Students Union (AASU), a group that was mainly against Bengali immigration, and the central government. The agreement concerned issues such as immigration, economic development and more political autonomy for Assamese people (Minahan 2002: 202). The Accord also led to new elections in 1985, which resulted in the creation of an Assamese nationalist government. However, the ULFA was not content with the implementation of the accord and continued its armed struggle for independence (Minorities at Risk Project). [1985: autonomy concession]
- In the late 1980s the ULFA intensified its violent campaign against government forces. The rebels installed a parallel government, which went as far as to levy taxes on the tea plantations. Therefore, the central government imposed president's rule in the state and dissolved the government in November 1990. Subsequently the Indian army carried out two military operations and arrested around 7,000 suspected terrorists (Minahan 2002: 202; Minorities at Risk Project). [1990: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted in June 1991 (Minahan 2002: 202; Minorities at Risk Project). [1991: autonomy concession]
- In January 1991, the Minister of State for Internal Affairs banned the ULFA, the main separatist organization. Many ULFA members fled to Myanmar. The organization may have been banned

already in 1990 (Minorities at Risk Project). Party bans do not, however, constitute restrictions in the sense employed here.

- The violence intensified and by 1995 more than 300,000 people were living in refugee camps, and over 5,000 people had been killed from either side (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 120). The Assam state was declared a disturbed area, which gave the military broad powers to combat insurgents. The declaration of a state of emergency due to violence is not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook.
- In 2010 the ULFA split between those who want to negotiate with the central government and the rest. In 2011 the ULFA “pro talks” fraction renounced preconditions for talks with the central government, paving the way for a ceasefire with the government. In 2012 both sides were engaged in peace talks. However, these talks have not led to a peace agreement yet (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).

Sovereignty declarations

- Several sources speak of a ULFA constitution which names the organization’s objectives such as sovereignty from India (e.g., UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). We found no evidence of a unilateral sovereignty declaration, however.

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Assam has been an Indian state throughout, and the Assamese constitute almost fifty per cent of the local population. The center repeatedly imposed president’s rule; since president’s rule interrupts but does not abolish regional autonomy we code the Assamese as autonomous throughout. [1979-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The main organization associated with the movement, the ULFA, demanded secession from the Indian Union until 2011 when peace talks with the central government started (Minahan 2002; Rediff News 2013). In 2010 the ULFA split between those who want to negotiate with the central government and the rest. In 2011 the ULFA “pro talks” fraction renounced preconditions for talks with the central government, paving the way for a ceasefire with the government. According to some, at least the pro-talks faction thus gave up the claim for independence (UCDP). Yet part of ULFA continues to make claims for outright independence. Thus, we code a claim for independence throughout. [1979-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Assamese
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Assamese (non-SC/ST)
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75001000

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 199) the majority of the Assamese lives in Assam, where they also comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR and MAR. That said, whether the Assamese still comprise the majority across all of Assam is not fully clear as Talukdar (2008) notes that in the 2001 census the share of Assamese-speakers dropped to 49% due to an influx of Bengali speakers. However, most likely Assamese-speakers still make up an absolute majority of a somewhat smaller territory within Assam. [concentrated]
- Assam comprises an international border (with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan) but no seashore. The Assameses' settlement cluster in GeoEPR also borders Bhutan and Myanmar. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Assam includes oil reserves that were discovered in the late 19th century (PRIMKEY: IN002PET, IN005PET) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- No kin according to EPR and MAR. According to Minahan (2002: 199) there are "sizable" Assamese communities in neighboring Bangladesh and Bhutan, but these are under 100,000 (Joshua Project). [no kin]

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Hynniewtreps (Khasi-Jaintia)

Activity: 1992-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Khasis retained their independence throughout the period of northern state formation in India but were never centrally administered with a lot of infighting. They submitted to British authority in the 1820s but retained relatively broad autonomy. They became a “partially excluded” group in 1935, a status which implied some limited autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status. At independence, the Khasis wanted to form their own state together with the neighboring Garos. However, a part of the Khasi homeland came under the jurisdiction of Pakistan, and the rest was attached to Assam. Still, the Hynniewtreps had their own autonomous districts within Assam since 1952 (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). The Hynniewtreps were active in the “Meghalayan” movement agitating for the creation of a non-Assam dominated state. In 1972 (pre-autonomous status granted in 1969), the Hynniewtreps received a major concession when the hill state of Meghalaya was carved out from Assam (Minahan 2012); with a population share of around 50 per cent, the Hynniewtreps form the largest group in Meghalaya. Both the Khasis and the Jaintias continued to have their own autonomous districts (and scheduled tribes status), now within Meghalaya (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). We code a prior concession due to the creation of Meghalaya in 1972. [prior concession]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- Under the Meghalaya State Language Act of 2005, Khasi became an associate official language of Meghalaya, thus allowing for education in the Khasi language (Meghalaya Times 2005). Since it is the regional government which passed the legislation, in which the Hynniewtreps participate, we do not code this event as a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The Hynniewtreps are the largest of Meghalaya’s groups, making up around fifty per cent of Meghalaya’s population, and they appear represented in Meghalaya’s regional government, despite claims for Garo domination. In addition, both the Khasis and the Jaintias have had their own autonomous districts throughout the movement’s activities (Agnihotri 2010: C-124). Autonomous district councils have legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, but are sub-

ordinated to an ordinary state (Laishram 2013). Hence, we code regional autonomy throughout. [1992-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) aims to transform Meghalaya into a state exclusively for the Khasi tribe (i.e. breaking up the state along linguistic lines). They contend that the Garo are dominating the state (SATP). No other claim was found. [1992-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Hynniewtreps
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75018000

- The Hynniewtreps (Khasi-Jaintias) are one of India's indigenous (scheduled) tribes, and thus form part of the EPR group 'Scheduled Castes & Tribes'. The Scheduled Castes and Tribes are coded as junior partner throughout. However, until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India's bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribes member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo. He served until 1996. Since 1994, there has been consistent representation of the Scheduled Tribes in the national cabinet (Jayal 2006: 151, 158, 188). Evidently this does not apply to all of the hundreds of indigenous groups associated with the umbrella Scheduled Tribes group and in particular not to the Hynniewtreps. But in 2004, Paty Ripple Kyndiah, an ethnic Hynniewtrep/Khasi, attained cabinet rank. Thus, we code the Hynniewtreps as junior partners from 2005 onwards (1st of January rule), and powerless before. [1992-2004: powerless; 2005-2012: junior partner]
- According to the 2001 census, there are 843,000 Khasis in India and 243,000 Jaintias (Ethnologue), which in combination with the total tally (1,028,737,436) yields a group size estimate of .0011. [1992-2012: .0011 (group size)]
 - o Note: this figure matches rather well with Minahan's (2002: 985) figure of approximately 1 million Hynniewtreps in India.

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 985) almost all Hynniewtreps reside in the eastern part of Meghalaya, where they make up 88% of the local population. [concentrated]
- The claimed eastern part of Meghalaya borders Bangladesh, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- None found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 985) around 120,000 Khasis live in adjacent areas of Bangladesh. [kin in neighboring country]

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Mizos

Activity: 1947-1986

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Mizo tribal areas were conquered by the North-Indian Assamese in the early 19th century. The conquerors left the Mizos to live their traditional lives and extended rule through local chiefs. The British took over the region soon afterwards, and the Mizo Hills became a part of Britain in 1895. In 1936, the Lushan Hills (Mizo homeland) were officially declared an “excluded area”. Excluded areas were allowed to retain a certain limited extent of autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status, which implies the protection of tribal culture; the 1936 act confirmed a long-standing practice of indirect rule (Pudaite 2005: 158). Hence, we code a prior concession. [prior concession]
- We found no evidence for a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- Upon independence, a Mizo advisory council was set up. It seems that its powers were limited and hence we do not code a concession (Prudaite 2005: 162). Note that the Mizos had already enjoyed a certain degree of cultural protection due to their recognition as a scheduled tribe in 1936.
- In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mizos (India – Constitution – Schedules). The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1949: autonomy concession]
- In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state’s sole official language. The Mizo language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). [1960: cultural rights restriction]
- After riots, Assam’s language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [1961: cultural rights concession]
- In 1966, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was applied to Mizo areas. In line with the codebook, the declaration of a state of emergency is not coded.
- In 1971 it was decided that Mizoram would be separated from Assam and become a union territory. The change was implemented in 1972 (Cunningham 2014: 212; Minahan 2012). Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but do have a certain extent of autonomy since 1963 (Kumar 1991: 48-61). Separation from Assam was a major goal of the Mizo movement. [1971: autonomy concession]
- In 1976, the Mizo rebels accepted an offer of increased autonomy, but the ceasefire broke down three years later (Minahan 2002: 1272). [1976: autonomy concession]
- In May 1977, president’s rule was imposed upon Mizoram (Sinha 2007: 95). [1977: autonomy restriction]
- In June 1978, president’s rule was lifted. [1978: autonomy concession]
- Shortly thereafter, in November 1978, Delhi again imposed president’s rule (Sinha 2007: 96-97). [1978: autonomy restriction]

- President's rule was lifted in May 1979. [1979: autonomy concession]
- In 1980, Mizoram was declared a "disturbed area" (Minahan 2012: 1272). The declaration of a state of emergency is not coded in line with the codebook.
- In 1986, an agreement for statehood was reached. The peace agreement was implemented in early 1987, when Mizoram became a full-fledged Indian state (Minahan 2012: 1972). [1986: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- After the capture of Aizwam, Mizo rebel leaders declared the independence of Mizoram on July 6, 1966 (Minahan 2002: 1271; Prudaite 2005: 165). [1966: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1947, Mizoram became part of India, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
- In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mizos. The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural autonomy. The first elections were held in 1952 (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). [1952: establishment of regional autonomy]
- In 1972, Mizoram was separated from Assam and became a union territory (Minahan 2012). Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but do have a certain extent of autonomy since 1963 (Kumar 1991: 48-61). [1972: sub-state secession]
- In 1987 Mizoram attained statehood, implying much-increased autonomy. However, Mizoram was separated from Assam already in 1972. Moreover, the movement ended in 1986. Hence, we do not code a major change.

Regional autonomy

- See above. [1953-1986: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1946, the Mizo Union was formed (initially named the Mizo Common People's Union). While the Mizo Union favored remaining in India, a secessionist group, the United Mizo Freedom Organisation (UMFO), split from the Mizo Union in July 1947 (Prudaite 2005: 161-162). It is not fully clear to what extent the UMFO continued to agitate for separate independence after the partition; given the ambiguity we code the most radical claim, independence. In 1953, after the creation of the Mizo Autonomous District Council, the UMFO began to call for statehood (Prudaite 2005: 164). Based on this, we code an independence claim until and including 1953 (first of January rule), and a sub-state secession claim as of 1954. [1947-1953: independence claim; 1954-1961: sub-state secession claim]
- The Mizo National Famine Front was founded in 1959 to combat the famine in the area. It received very significant support. In 1961 it changed its name to the Mizo National Front (MNF), and thus became a political organization. The MNF declared independence as its goal. In 1966 the MNF led an insurgency against the government and declared independence (Prudaite 2005: 165). In 1986, when a peace accord was signed and Mizoram was granted statehood, the MNF

officially renounced the goal of secession and it transformed into a political party. Based on this, we code an independence claim from 1962 to 1986 (first of January rule). [1962-1986: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Mizos
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Mizo
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75012000

- Note: EPR does not consider Kashmir as part of India until 1949. Thus EPR's group size estimate becomes slightly smaller for 1949 onwards. However, Kashmir had accessed India in 1947, thus we consider it part of India and apply the 1949 groupsize codes also for 1947-1948. [1947-1948: 0.001 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1268) an absolute majority of the Mizos lives in Mizoram, where they comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR and MAR. [concentrated]
- Mizoram/the Mizos settlement pattern borders Myanmar and Bangladesh, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The settlement pattern according to GeoEPR does not overlap with a reserve. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR, the Mizos have ethnic kin in neighboring Myanmar. Myanmar gained independence only in 1948, but in line with the codebook we code kin throughout.
 - o This matches with MAR, according to which the Mizos have "close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base". MAR mentions the Chin in Myanmar and the Jumma (Chittagong Hills People) in Bangladesh as the two largest kin groups. Myanmar and Bangladesh are also the two countries with Mizo communities mentioned by Minahan (2002: 1268). [1947-1986: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Nagas

Activity: 1947-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Nagas once occupied a much wider area than at present, but gradually lost the lowlands to successive waves of invaders. The Naga tribes, often warring among themselves, never developed a state system (Minahan 2002: 1329). The British made first contact with the Nagas in 1832. The encounter was violent, which prompted the British to withdraw and ignore the Nagas for nearly two decades. After much conflict, the various Naga chiefs signed treaties with the British in 1881 that allowed the British to add their tribal lands to the colonial governments of Assam and Burma (Minahan 2002: 1330). In a memorandum sent to the Simon Commission, the Nagas had demanded to remain under direct British rule – the British failed to respond (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 3). In 1935, the Nagas were excluded from the Indian reform scheme and treated as an “excluded area” (Kotwal 2000: 754; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). Excluded areas were allowed to retain a certain limited extent of autonomy and led to scheduled tribe status, which implies the protection of tribal culture (Pudaite 2005: 158). Hence, we code a prior concession [prior concession]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before 1947.

Concessions and restrictions

- Upon India’s independence, the Nagas were contending for separate independence. In 1947 (1945 according to Minahan 2002: 1330, but Minahan seems mistaken; see Kotwal 2000: 756), Gandhi met with Naga leaders and, according to the Naga side, declared that “I do not believe in forced unions. If you [Nagas] do not wish to join the Union of India, nobody will force you to do that” (Minahan 2002: 1330). Whether Gandhi actually made this statement is ambiguous, as Kotwal (2000: 756) argues that no Indian leader ever confirmed Gandhi’s statement. In any case, the new Indian government refused to recognize Naga independence and sent in the army to crush the separatist movement. In late June 1947, shortly before India’s formal independence, the then-governor of Assam and representatives of the Naga National Council signed the Hydari Agreement (see SATP). The agreement gave the Nagas relatively far-reaching autonomy within Assam (with judicial, executive, and legislative competencies; in particular, land and taxation matters were put in the hands of the Nagas). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1947 due to the set-up of an autonomous region within Assam. Note that the Nagas interpreted the agreement as giving them the right to secede from India within the next ten years. This interpretation was disputed from the Indian side (Franke 2006: 212; Kotwal 2000: 757). [1947: autonomy concession]
- In 1951 the Nagas conducted a referendum on independence. Prime Minister Nehru dismissed the Nagas’ claim for independence as “completely unwise, impracticable and unacceptable” (cited in Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). Subsequently the Naga National Council (NNC) organized a civil disobedience campaign. The Indian government reacted by arresting the NNC leaders. It sent large numbers of police and soldiers into the region and, critically, abolished the Nagas’ local tribal councils (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). [1952: autonomy restriction]
 - o Note: Hewitt & Cheetham do not give evidence as to whether the local tribal councils were restored before the set-up of the NHTA in 1957 (see below). We found no evidence in this direction either.

- Beginning in 1953, the Assamese and the central government passed a series of “security” laws which aimed to legitimize the (violent) counter-insurgency against the Nagas. The regulations constitute severe restrictions of the Naga’s physical integrity rights. However, the Nagas’ autonomous status was left untouched, and it does not seem that cultural rights were affected. Hence, while the laws clearly constitute acts of repression, they do not represent restrictions in the sense of the codebook, and are not coded.
 - o In 1953 the Assamese government enacted the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 5). The provisions were sweeping, and among other things affected the freedom of movement and freedom of association as well as the right to physical integrity. Following the 1953 act, an executing officer needs no proof except his own personal “opinion” to proceed against a suspect. Inhabitants of an “area” could also be “collectively” fined in any manner that the “authority” thought fit. Police could arrest without warrant. No suits or other legal proceedings were allowed against any officer acting under the act (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 9-10).
 - o In 1955 security laws was tightened again. The 1955 act allowed the Assamese government to declare any area “disturbed”; furthermore it allowed any magistrate or police officer of sub-inspector rank to fire upon or use force to the extent of causing death, if he “thinks” such a step is necessary to maintain “public order” (for more see Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 10).
 - o In 1958 the Indian government enacted the Armed Forces Act, which allowed the security forces wide powers in Nagaland, which were widely abused (Minahan 2002: 1331; Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 6).
 - o In 1961 the Nagaland Security Regulation Act was passed. The act put more sweeping powers in the hands of police and civilian authorities, including the rights to using force to the causing of death if an officer suspects a person was likely to commit an act of “looting” in a riotous situation; control the production, sale, and purchase of any commodity – including transport, modification, repair, etc.; evict any person from their own property, which could be confiscated/requisitioned; enable the governor to take a range of additional actions, which included the arbitrary relocation of villages (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 12).
 - o In 1995, the Indian government declared the state of Nagaland a “disturbed area”, thus empowering the armed forces to take drastic measures to regain control (Minahan 2002: 1332).
- In 1957, an agreement was reached between Naga leaders and the Indian government. The agreement involved the creation of a single separate region of the Naga Hills, the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA). The NHTA was separated from Assam and became a union territory directly administered by the central government, but with a large degree of autonomy (Kumar 2007: 19). [1957: autonomy concession]
- In 1960, India signed an agreement with the Naga People’s Convention (NPC), one of the Naga organizations contending for increased self-determination. The 16-point agreement stipulated that Nagaland would become a fully-fledged Indian state within three years (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16). In December 1963, Nagaland became inaugurated as an Indian state (with special rights: customary laws would continue to be applicable and laws passed by Parliament do not apply to the state unless ratified by the local legislature, see Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16). [1960: autonomy concession]
 - o Note that the Naga National Council (NNC) and its leader, Phizo, considered the agreement invalid. Note also that the Naga state did not include all areas claimed by the NNC (Franke 2002: 78; Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 16).
- In 1975, the first pro-separatist government in Nagaland was dismissed by the central government and president’s rule imposed (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 17; Hoshi 2013). [1975: autonomy restriction]
- President’s rule was lifted in 1977 (Hoshi 2013). [1977: autonomy concession]
- In 1988, president’s rule was imposed in Nagaland (Hoshi 2013). [1988: autonomy restriction]
- In January 1989, president’s rule was lifted (Hoshi 2013). [1989: autonomy concession]

- President's rule was again imposed upon Nagaland in April 1992 (Hoshi 2013). [1992: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule lasted until April 1993 (Hoshi 2013). [1993: autonomy concession]
- In January 2008, president's rule was again imposed upon Nagaland (Hoshi 2013). [2008: autonomy restriction]
- In March 2008, president's rule was lifted (Hoshi 2013). [2008: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On August 14, 1947, the Naga leaders of the NNC declared Nagaland independent of India and Burma, one day before the date set for Indian independence (Chasie and Hazarika 2009: 4; Kotwal 2000: 756; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 201). [1947: independence declaration]
- March 22, 1956, the Naga National Council set up a parallel government – the Federal Government of Nagaland – and hoisted up its flag (Kotwal 2000: 1958). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 201) note that there was also a declaration that Nagaland is a sovereign republic. [1956: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1947, Nagaland became part of India, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
- In late June 1947, shortly before India's formal independence, the then-governor of Assam and representatives of the Naga National Council signed the Hydari Agreement (see SATP). The agreement gave the Nagas relatively far-reaching autonomy within Assam (with judicial, executive, and legislative competencies; in particular, land and taxation matters were put in the hands of the Nagas). [1947: establishment of autonomy]
- In 1957, an agreement was reached between Naga leaders and the Indian government. The agreement involved the creation of a single separate region of the Naga Hills, the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA). The NHTA was separated from Assam and became a union territory directly administered by the central government, but with a large degree of autonomy (Kumar 2007: 19). In 1963, the area became a fully-fledged Indian state. [1957: sub-state secession]

Regional autonomy

- Shortly before independence in 1947 the Nagas were granted autonomy within Assam, in 1957 Nagaland became a union territory separate from Assam and with a large degree of autonomy, and in 1963 Nagaland became a fully-fledged Indian state (see above). Based on this, we code regional autonomy from 1947 onwards (autonomy was established with independence, thus the first of January rule is not applicable). [1947-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Upon independence Naga leaders declared independence (see above). Franke (and others, see Franke 2006: 77, 212) estimate that by 1949, a majority at least within the Naga National Council (NNC), the most important Naga self-determination organization, favored immediate independence. In 1956, the NNC set up a parallel government. In 1957, a faction of the NNC was co-opted and subsequently formed another, more moderate Naga self-determination organization,

the Naga People's Convention (NPC). The NPC demanded separation from Assam and unification of Nagaland under central rule (Franke 2006: 78). The NPC does not, however, appear to have had majority support within the Naga movement. In 1975, part of the (at the time still independence-minded) Naga National Council agreed to keep the solution of the Naga question within the Indian framework (Kotwal 2000: 758). With this, the dominant claim appears to have shifted towards securing increased autonomy and the incorporation of additional territories into the Naga state (the latter is the more radical claim, which is hence coded) (Minorities at Risk Project). Based on this, we code an independence claim from 1947 to 1975, and a sub-state secession claim from 1976 onwards. [1947-1975: independence claim; 1976-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Nagas
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Naga
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75014000

- Note: EPR does not consider Kashmir as part of India until 1949. Thus EPR's group size estimate becomes slightly smaller for 1949 onwards. However, Kashmir had accessed India in 1947, thus we consider it part of India and apply the 1949 groupsize codes also for 1947-1948. [1947-1948: 0.002 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1328), an absolute majority of the Nagas reside in Nagaland, where they comprise an absolute majority. This matches with information from GeoEPR, Weidmann (2009), and MAR. [concentrated]
- The Naga territories border Myanmar, but have no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The Assam oil field discovered in the late 19th century overlaps with Nagaland/the Naga polygon in GeoEPR (PRIMKEY: IN002PET) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Both the Minorities at Risk data and Minahan (2002: 1328) note kin in neighboring Myanmar in the Naga Hills of the Sagaing Division. Information on the Naga population of Myanmar is very scarce and estimated to be at 200,000 (Kachin News 2009). Myanmar gained independence only in 1948, but in line with the codebook we code kin throughout. [1947-2012: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Rajbangsis

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Rajbangsis established several small kingdoms at the foot of the Himalayas in the 13th century. These were consolidated into the Koch dynasty in 1511. Part of the kingdom was taken over by Muslim Mughals at the end of the 16th century. The remaining part survived as a small kingdom, Cooch Behar. Cooch Behar was incorporated into the British Empire as a princely state (Minahan 2012). Cooch Behar formally acceded India in 1949/1950 (sources differ) and became a district of West Bengal (Das 2011; Nandi 2014: 578). This implies a loss of autonomy.
- Today there are Rajbangsis in West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya (Minahan 2002: 1564). The Rajbangsis were not recognized as a scheduled tribe (contrary to Minahan 2002: 1567; see Nandi 2014: 582; Das 2011). In Assam the Rajbangsis became subject to the Assamese' assimilationist policies: in 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state's sole official language. The Rajbangsis' language was denied a separate status (Bhattacharjee 2012). After riots, Assam's language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). Thus we code a prior concession. [prior concession]
- We do not code a restriction or concession in the ten years before the start date. According to Choudhury (2014: 212), the Assamese government in 1986 passed a law that required Assamese as a compulsory "third language" in schools. We deem this too minimal to be coded as a restriction. More intriguing appears Choudhury's report that there was a new regulation that made Assamese a requirement for obtaining any government job in Assam. However, the source appears a bit dubious and this could not be verified using other sources. Thus we do not code a restriction.

Concessions and restrictions

NA

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The movement that emerged in the early 1990s mainly demands a separate state, Kamatapur, to be carved out of West Bengal and Assam. Some elements in the militant wing of the movement (KLO) made also demands for independence, but this is not the dominant claim (Nandi 2014; Das 2011; Minahan 2002: 1567-1569; SATP; Barma 2007). [1991-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Rajbangsis
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- According to Nandi (2014: 582) the Rajbangsis have scheduled caste status, but Das (2011) notes that not all Rajbangsis have scheduled caste status. According to Minahan (2002: 1564) there are 2.645 million Rajbangsis in India. According to the World Bank, India's total population was 1,077 million in 2002. [1991-2012: 0.0025 (group size)]
- We found no evidence suggesting that the Rajbangsis were included in the national government. [1991-2012: powerless]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1564) a majority of the Rajbangsis is located in North Bengal, but they do not comprise the absolute majority of the local population (only 48%). This is certainly borderline, and it is possible that a slightly different drawing would result in a higher number. Yet, Minahan is the best source we could find, thus we do not code the Rajbangsis as concentrated. [not concentrated]
- According to Minahan (2002: 1564), the territory that is claimed by the Rajbangsis (Kamatapur) borders Bangladesh and Nepal, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Minahan provides a rough estimate of the territory that is claimed (Kamatapur). The territory identified by Minahan appears to include a hydrocarbon reserve (PRIMKEY = IN008PET) (Lujala et al. 2007). The date of discovery is unknown; the closest reserve, approx. 250 km away (PRIMKEY IN009PET), was discovered in 1992. [oil/gas: 1991-1992: no; 1993-2012: yes]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1564), there are around 200,000 Rajbangsis in Bangladesh and 105,000 in Nepal. [kin in neighboring country]

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Santhals (Assam)

Activity: 1996-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India's largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the "Jharkhandis" movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam. The Santhals in Assam (approximately 240,000, see below) are migrants that came in mainly to work on tea plantations (Minahan 2002: 1649).
- In 1960, Assam enacted the Official Languages Act, which stated that Assamese would become the state's sole official language (the Bodos speak their own language) (Bhattacharjee 2012).
- After riots, Assam's language law was changed so that: i) local bodies can alter the official language of their area, ii) communication between the state capital and the hill districts continues to be in English along with Assamese, iii) at the state level the use of English was continued along with Assamese, and iv) the protection of linguistic minorities was strengthened (Baruah 1999: 105). [prior concession]
- In 1993, the Bodos were granted an autonomous council. The accord left the question of the precise territorial jurisdiction open (Nath 2003: 537) and Assam refused to implement the agreement properly (Nath 2003: 538). The first council elections were held only in 2003 after yet another agreement (see below) (Singh 2014). According to UCDP, the signing of the 1993 accord with the Bodos triggered an "ethnic cleansing" campaign by local Bodos directed against local Santhals. The 1993 accord promised that "all localities with over 50% Bodos will be included in the BEC [Bodoland Executive Council]" which led various Bodo groups to try to reach the target by removing non-Bodos from the territory they claim. The main target were the local Santhals as "they were seen as 'tea people', immigrants brought by the British and Indians, taking away land, resources and jobs from the native Bodos" (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). While an important driver for the Santhals movement in Assam, the Bodos' ethnic cleansing campaign does not represent a restriction as defined here.

Concessions and restrictions

- The Santhals in Assam made claims for autonomy within Assam and for scheduled tribe status. Scheduled tribe status does not necessarily imply autonomy, but always some limited form of cultural protection and positive discrimination. Until 2012, the last year we cover, the Santhals in Assam had not been granted autonomy nor scheduled tribe status (see e.g. Ministry of Tribal Affairs).
- By way of the 92nd Constitutional Amendment in 2003, the Santhali language was included in India's eighth schedule. This implies official status (though not at a par with Hindi and English), preferential treatment and protection of the language (Brass 1974; Mallikarjun 2004). This reform may be due to the fact that Jharkhand (where a much higher number of Santhals lives) attained statehood in 2000. Nevertheless, it represents a cultural rights upgrade for the Santhals in Assam too. [2003: cultural rights concession]
- In 2003 the Bodos were granted more autonomy (Nath 2003: 533) but not the Santhals.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Santhal militants in Assam appear to be mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos, but have also made claims for scheduled tribe status and, in some cases, an autonomous status within Assam (which appears to be the dominant claim in terms of self-determination as we define it) or even separate statehood for the Santhals. [1996-2012: autonomy claim]
 - o In the 1980s and 1990s Assam's Santhals were involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos that resulted from the Bodos' desire for an autonomous homeland. There were Bodo campaigns to drive out the incoming Santhals, sometimes described as ethnic cleansing. In response, the Santhals organized and formed several militant outfits. They primarily fought the Bodos for land, but it appears they also made some separatist claims. Minahan (2002: 1650-1651), for instance, reports that the split-up of Assam (with Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunchal Pradesh separating in the 1960s/1970s) and the conflict with the Bodos triggered a Santhal separatist movement. According to Minahan (2002: 1651-1652) "Santhal leaders chalked out a plan to form a separate Santhal homeland in Assam by force. The proposed homeland, called Adivasiland, stretched from the Sankoch River in Kokrajhar District to the Panch River and the Indo-Bhutanese border to the southern railway line north of the Brahmaputra River." Note that Minahan writes of an autonomous status within Assam, thus not implying full separation from Assam. Minahan also notes that the Santhals have demanded scheduled tribe status.
 - o We found a number of Santhal militant groups in Assam, and at least some of them appear to have had separatist goals. First, the Birsa Commando Force (BCF), which was formed in 1996-1997. START classifies this group as "nationalist/separatist", arguing that the BCF has demanded an independent state in Assam (not India, implying autonomy within Assam). CDPS India also notes that the creation of a separate Adivasi land ranges among the BCF's claims. Hussain (2004) and Wars in the World (2012) as well confirm that the BCF is a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Finally, Sentinel Assam (2013) also suggests that the BCF has had separatist goals. However, separatism appears not BCF's primary goal. START notes that "the BCF is mostly a protection outfit for Santhals" and only "technically a separatist group." In addition, the BCF has made claims for scheduled tribe status, which the Santhals in Assam lack.
 - o A second Santhal militant group is the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), which also appears to have made some separatist claims. The ACF was formed in the second half of the 1990s "with the purported objective of protecting the Adivasi (tribal) people of Lower Assam through an armed revolution" (see SATP). START classifies the ACF as

“nationalist/separatist”. However, according to START they “do not explicitly demand a separate state for Adivasis.” Hussain (2004) confirms that the Cobras are a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam.

- Another Santhal outfit is the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), which was formed in 2006 and primarily demands scheduled tribe status for the Santhal community in Assam (SATP). The claim for scheduled tribe status is confirmed by CDPS India. Sentinel Assam (2013) and Wars in the World (2012), however, while confirming that the AANLA advocated schedule tribe status, suggest that the AANLA made claims also for a territorial council, which appears to mean an autonomous status within Assam.
- Another group that apparently has made separatist claims is the Adivasi People’s Army (APA) (Sentinel Assam 2013; Wars in the World 2012). Mohan (2011), for instance, suggests that APA demands the set-up of an Adivasi autonomous council in Assam. APA was formed in 2011 according to TRAC.
- There are many more Santhal outfits but it is not clear whether all have also espoused separatism. For instance, there is the National Santhali Liberation Army (NSLA), formed in 2005. This group represents an umbrella organization uniting several of the above-mentioned groups (CDPS India). The NSLA’s aims are not clear.

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Santhals (Assam)
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India’s largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the “Jharkhandis” movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam. According to the 2001 census, there were approximately 240,000 Santhal-speakers in Assam, a marked increase compared to the 1991 census that had counted only approximately 140,000 Santhal-speakers in Assam (Talukdar 2008). According to Talukdar, the increase is the result of the inclusion of Santhal in the list of scheduled languages and not in-migration. Thus we draw on the higher 2001 figure. According to the 2001 census India’s population was 1,028,737,436 in 2001. [1996-2012: 0.0002 (group size)]
 - Note that Minahan’s (2002) figure differs but appears to be wrong. According to Minahan (2002: 1648), there are approximately “890,000 Santhals in northeastern India and neighboring countries, concentrated in the state of Assam, but with sizable communities in the neighboring districts of the states of Meghalaya and Tripura, and in Bangladesh and Nepal.” All other sources we consulted (see above) suggest that the total number of Santhals is much higher (UCDP, for instance, reports a population of approximately 10 million). Furthermore, the movement relates to Santhals in Assam only. Thus we do not draw on the figure provided by Minahan.
- The Santhals are a tribal people. They speak their own language, Santhal, and are divided religiously, with Hindu, Christian, and animist communities (Minahan 2002: 1648-1649). The Santhal-speakers are not separately coded in EPR. Most Santhals (in particular in Jharkhand, where they are concentrated) enjoy scheduled tribe status and accordingly are included under the header of EPR’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes group. Contrary to other places, the Santhals in Assam do not have scheduled tribe status. Thus they do not form part of EPR’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes group. In 2004-2006, the Santhals had representation in the national cabinet, when Shibu Soren (an ethnic Santhal) was minister for coal (Encyclopedia Britannica). However, Soren is a Santhal from Jharkhand and not a Santhal from Assam. We found no evidence of

representation of Assam's Santhals in the national executive and this movement relates exclusively to Santhals from Assam. Thus, a powerless code best represents this group's power access. [1996-2012: powerless]

Territory

- The Santhals in Assam are a relatively small group of migrants that came to Assam to work on tea plantations. Minahan (2002) remains ambiguous as to whether they can be considered territorially concentrated. The information we found suggests that the Santhals do not form a majority in the four districts where most of them reside according to Minahan: Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, and Nalbari (see Indian censuses). Our coding is in line with MAR. [not concentrated]
- The claimed territory as indicated in Minahan does not contain an international border and also no seashore. [border: no; seashore: no]
- The claimed territory as indicated in Minahan includes one reserve (PRIMKEY IN002PET), discovered before the movement started (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Referring to kin groups in Nepal and Bangladesh, the Minorities at Risk data codes the Santhals as having "close kindred across a border". This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 1648), who mentions Bangladesh and Nepal as two other countries with sizable Santhal populations. The Santhal community in Bangladesh amounts to 157,000 (Tribalzone) and to roughly 40,000 in Nepal (Nepal Census 2001). [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Telanganas

Activity: 1969-1973; 1989-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Telanganas are an ancient Hindu dynasty. Their settlement area was overrun by Muslims in the 14th century, which split the Andhrans into two groups. In 1724, a Mugal general, Asaf Jah, declared Hyderabad independent and named himself prince. Meanwhile, the Telugu-speaking Andhrans were ruled by the British. The Telanganas organized for the first time politically in the form of the Telengana State Congress, formed in 1938. In 1941, Telengana leaders tried to overthrow the Muslim rulers and establish a communist state. When India and Pakistan became independent, the Muslim prince wavered between independence and joining Pakistan. The Telanganas rose against the prince and the Indian government used the opportunity to intervene (Minahan 2002: 1872). In 1948, Hyderabad joined the Indian Union as Hyderabad State. The 1949 constitution lists Telugu as an official language, though not at a par with Hindi or English. In 1956, the Telanganas lost separate statehood when Hyderabad was incorporated into Andhra Pradesh to form a linguistically homogenous state of Telugu speakers (Minahan 2002: 1872). The Telanganans were given assurances regarding revenues, education, and positions in local government. These assurances were planned to run out in 1969 (Minahan 2002: 1872). Nonetheless, we code a prior restriction due to the loss of separate statehood in 1956. We found no evidence of a concession or restriction in the ten years before the first start date. [1st phase: prior restriction]
- The prior restriction also applies to the second phase of activity as we found no evidence for a concession/restriction between 1956 and 1989. [2nd phase: prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- We found no concessions or restrictions until 2012 (Telangana attained statehood only in 2014). This is in line with Haragopal's (2010) detailed account of Telangana's political movements, which does not make mention of any concession. One thing to mention is that the guarantees regarding revenues, education, and positions in local government given to the Telanganas back in 1956 when Hyderabad was merged with Andhra Pradesh ran out in 1969. However, we do not code a restriction since this was foreseen in 1956. Still, it is worth noting that there were widespread protests that the guarantees should be continued, but also about a lack of implementation in the first place. 1969 was also when the Telengana People's Association was founded (Minahan 2002: 1872).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Minahan (2002: 1872) reports that the Telenganas felt discriminated against “in government”. He writes that Telugus from the Andhran part had advantages in government and education. But he also reports that an important nationalist leader, M. Chenna Reddy, was elected governor of the region in the 1970s. The Telenganas made up about 40% of Andhra Pradesh. And the Telangana region is known as a “stronghold of Congress” (Minahan 2002: 1873). This makes it unlikely that the Telenganas did not have any meaningful say over Andhra Pradesh’s affairs. Thus, they are coded with regional autonomy throughout. [1969-1973: regional autonomy; 1989-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Demands appear focused on separation from Andhra Pradesh throughout (Minahan 2002: 1872-1874). [1969-1973: sub-state secession claim; 1989-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Telanganas
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Telugu (Non-SC/ST/OBCs)
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75020000

- The Telenganas speak Telugu, the language that is spoken throughout Andhra Pradesh and today’s Telangana. Thus, they form part of EPR’s Telugu group. According to Minahan, there are 31.4 million Telenganas as of 2002. Minahan’s figure appears plausible: according to the 2011 census, Telangana has a population of 35.2 million. According to the World Bank, India’s total population was 1,077 million in 2002. [1969-1973: .0292 (group size); 1989-2012: .0292 (group size)]
- The Telugus are coded as junior partner in EPR. While the Andhra-part of Andhra Pradesh seems to have advantages in terms of representation, the Telangana region is known as a “stronghold of Congress” (Minahan 2002: 1873) and we found no evidence that the Telenganas would be systematically excluded. Hence, we adopt the junior partner code, though noting that the evidence upon which this is based is rather scarce. [1969-1973: junior partner; 1989-2012: junior partner]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1869) the Telenganas easily make up an absolute majority of the Talangana region, where also most of them live. [concentrated]
- Telangana includes no international border and no seashore. [border: no; seashore: no]
- Today’s Telangana state marginally includes reserve PRIMKEY = IN012PET. The date of discovery is unknown. PRIMKEY IN013PET, the closest reserve (70km), was discovered in 1978, and nearby offshore reserves in 1979 (PRIMKEY OF134PET). [oil/gas: 1969-1973: no; 1989-2012: yes]

Kin

- The Telanganas are a regional grouping of Telugu speakers. For the Telugus, EPR codes kin groups in Mauritius and Myanmar. According to Stutsch (2005: 102), the largest Telugu community outside of India is in Malaysia and numbers but 30,000. Note: we would not code Telugus as a whole as kin anyway because this is a movement by parts of the Telugus against other Telugus. [no kin]

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Tripuris

Activity: 1949-2012

General notes

- Starting in the 1950s, Tripuras has experienced a significant influx of Bengali refugees due to the situation in East Pakistan. Thus, the Tripuris became a minority in their own lands, and the regional governments that existed from 1963 onwards were dominated by Bengalis from the 1970s (Minahan 2002: 1918). Still, the Tripuris appear to have had a certain influence over the regional government, and thus seem affected by changes in Tripuras' autonomy level. Thus, we code such changes as concessions and restrictions.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Originally migrated from China, the Tripuris, converted to Hinduism, established state structures in Northeastern India in the 7th century. In the 15th and 16th century, the Tripuris spread their rule across the surrounding (predominantly Bengali Muslim) areas. In 1625, the Bengalis overran Tripura and incorporated it as a dependency into the Mughal Empire. The Tripuris expelled the Bengalis again and retained precarious independence until the 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1917). When the British took Tripura, the Tripuris were at first allowed to retain nominal independence with tributary status. In 1765, the Mughals tried to carve out a piece of Tripura and bring it outside the British purviews; the British reclaimed the area in 1803, and the Tripuris established direct treaty relations with the British, becoming a separate district of British Bengal. In 1905, Tripura was attached to West Bengal and Assam. During WWI and WWII, the Tripuris supported the British. When India prepared for independence, it was proposed that Tripura be attached to Assam, which the Tripuris resisted on historical grounds. The area was deemed too small to be an independent state. Hence, Tripura remained under nominal British rule when India and Pakistan became independent in 1947 (Minahan 2002: 1918). We code a prior restriction due to the long-term loss of autonomy. [prior restriction]
- We found no evidence of a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- A sharp influx of Bengali refugees led the Tripuris to fear Pakistani annexation and they went to Delhi for aid. The king signed the Tripura Merger Agreement in 1949, which paved the way for union with India, though with official protection for the Tripura cultural and political autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1918). Until the merger with India, Tripura had been a princely state under (nominal) British dominion, though with a substantial degree of autonomy; after the merger Tripura became a part C state, meaning that it was henceforth centrally administered and lost its autonomy (Das 2001: 224-225). [1949: autonomy restriction]
- In 1956, part C states were renamed "union territories" and territorial councils introduced. The reform implied some decentralization with regard to administration, but no devolution of legislative powers (see Das 2001: 226-227; Kumar 1991: 44-45). We do not code a concession.
- By way of the 1963 Union Territories Act, union territories gained significant autonomy and, in particular, legislative powers (Kumar 1991: 48-61). The territorial councils were replaced with a legislative Assembly and a council of ministers (Das 2001: 226-227). [1963: autonomy concession]
- In the early 1950s, Muslim refugees began entering the fertile Tripuri valleys illegally, driving the Tripuris into the mountains. Due to the refugee influx, the Bengalis began to dominate the Tripura government. In 1968 the Congress government in Tripura declared Bengali as the official language, reduced the tribal reserves by 300 sq miles, and evicted tribal peasants from Dambur Valley for dam construction (Ghosh 2003: 229). By this, the Tripuris' autonomy was reduced

(reduction of tribal reserves) as well as their cultural rights: Kokborok, the Tripuris' first language, was downgraded relative to the Bengali language. [1968: cultural rights restriction, autonomy restriction]

- In 1968, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was applied to Tripura (Rajagopalan 2008: 16). In line with the codebook, declarations of martial law are not coded.
- In 1971, Tripuras was granted statehood; it became a full-fledged Indian state in January 1972 (Minahan 2002: 1918). [1971: autonomy concession]
- In 1971, president's rule was established in Tripuras. [1971: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was ended in March 1972. [1972: autonomy concession]
- President's rule was established in Tripuras in November 1977 (Keesing's Record of World Events: December 1978). [1977: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted in January 1978. [1978: autonomy concession]
- In 1978, Kokborok, the Tripuris' language, was recognized as Tripuras' second state language (Minorities at Risk Project). We code this as a concession even if it was enacted by Tripura's own regional government, given that it was increasingly Bengali-dominated. [1978: cultural rights concession]
- In 1979, the Tripuris received their own autonomous district within Tripuras with the passage of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) Act through the Indian parliament (Rajagopalan 2008: 26). The majority ethnic group in Tripuras, the Bengalis, opposed the set-up of the autonomous district. [1979: autonomy concession]
- The Tripura autonomous district was established in 1982. In 1985 it was upgraded when it came under the ambit of the 6th schedule to the Indian constitution (Rajagopalan 2008: 26). [1985: autonomy concession]
- In 1988 Tripuri rebels signed an accord with the federal government. The agreement promised to address various tribal concerns including migrations from Bangladesh, the loss of tribal lands to Bengali settlers, and greater participation of tribals in the state administration (Minorities at Risk Project). MAR argues that the accord was not fully implemented, but does not imply that there was no implementation. [1988: autonomy concession]
- In 1993, another agreement was signed between Tripuri rebels and the Indian government. It contained reiterations of the 1988 agreement (these are not coded again) as well as cultural concessions, including the codification of tribal laws, setting up a cultural development center, using cultural Tripuri place names, and language guarantees (Rajagopalan 2008: 28). [1993: cultural rights concession]
- In March 1993, president's rule was established in Tripuras (Minorities at Risk Project). [1993: autonomy restriction]
- President's rule was lifted again in April 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
- In 1997, India sent troops into Tripura, after the extremist TMV factions made demands that included declaring as "migrants" anyone who had entered Tripura after 1949 (to curb Bengali power at the ballots). The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was imposed in 1997, giving the police and military extensive powers. The Bengali-dominated areas were excluded (Minorities at Risk Project). Declarations of a state of emergency are not coded.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- In 1947, Tripuras de-facto became part of India, implying a host change. 1947 is not coded, however.
- In 1949 Tripura formally acceded India and the autonomous kingdom was abolished. [1949: loss of autonomy]

- In 1963 Tripuras got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Tripuras attained substantial autonomy. [1963: establishment of autonomy]
- Since the 1963 reform is coded as a major change, the attainment of statehood in 1972 is not coded as another major change.

Regional autonomy

- Until abolishment of princely state in 1949, but this is not coded because Tripuras was not formally integrated with India.
- In 1963 Tripuras got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Tripuras attained substantial autonomy. In 1972 Tripuras became a state. In 1982, the Tripuris received their own autonomous district within Tripuras. The Tripuris form a minority within Tripuras (as of today around 30 per cent), while the Bengalis constitute the majority group. As of the 1970s the Bengalis began to dominate Tripuras and the Tripuris became underrepresented in the regional government. Thus the autonomy code is somewhat ambiguous in the 1970s/early 1980s (before the Tripuris were granted their own autonomous district). We retain the autonomy code since the Tripuris appear to have retained a certain influence (Minahan 2002: 1918). Hence we code autonomy from 1964 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1964-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Initially the Tripuras claim was for increased autonomy by attaining statehood for Tripuras. In the 1960s demands began to be issued for the creation of an autonomous tribal district within Tripuras (Minorities at Risk Project). The TUJS (Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti) was formed through the amalgamation of several parties/organizations in the mid-1960s. Their original demands were (a) the creation of an autonomous district council for the tribes under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, (b) the restoration of tribal lands from the non-tribals which were illegally transferred, (c) the recognition of Kokborok language, and (d) the adoption of the Roman script (Ghosh 2003: 229). [1949-1978: autonomy claim]
- In 1978, the first avowedly independentist organization was founded, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV). In 1991, part of the TNV began advocating for Tripuri Tribal statehood within India (Minahan 2002). It seems that claims are largely centered around increased tribal autonomy, the expulsion of Bengalis from Tripuras (or a reduction in their rights), and the safe-guarding of Tripur culture (SATP; Ghosh 2003, Rajagopalan 2008). Nonetheless, the independence claim is significant and thus which claim is to be considered dominant is somewhat ambiguous. Thus, we code the most radical claim (independence) from 1979 onwards. [1979-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tripuris
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Indigenous Tripuri
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75007000

Territory

- Starting in the 1950s, Tripuras has experienced a significant influx of Bengali refugees due to the situation in East Pakistan. Thus, the Tripuris became a minority in Tripura as a whole (Minahan 2002: 1918; MAR). Nevertheless, we code them as concentrated throughout. It appears likely that the Tripuris continue to form a majority in rural, western areas of Tripura (Minahan 2002: 1918, also see GeoEPR). In the tribal district established in the 1980s the Tripuris are close to an absolute majority (Mahato & Deb n.d.); hence it is easily possible that they form a majority in a significant share of the district. [concentrated]
- Tripura borders Bangladesh but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The territory claimed (Tripura) contains reserves, PRIMKEY: IN006PET, IN007PET (both discovered in 1972) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes from 1973-2012]

Kin

- Both MAR and Minahan (2002: 1915) code kin in neighboring Bangladesh. According to Minahan (2002: 1915), around 100,000 of the approximately 1.52 million Tripuris live in Bangladesh. [1949-2012: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Uttarakhandis

Activity: 1976-2000

General notes

- Until 2000, when it became a state of its own, Uttarakhand had been part of Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttarakhand makes up a tiny part of Uttar Pradesh and since the Uttarakhandis were “marginalized” within both India and Uttar Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 1975; Tillin 2011), it seems likely that the Uttarakhandis did not have substantial influence over Uttar Pradesh’s government. Hence, changes in Uttar Pradesh’s autonomy status (e.g., the imposition of president’s rule) are not coded as concessions or restrictions since they do not directly affect the Uttarakhandis.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Pushed by the Aryans into the hill country, the indigenous peoples were mixed with Tibetans; they were divided into a number of small states in the twelfth century, often warring among themselves. The Panwar dynasty united the hill tribes in 1517, leading to three centuries of prosperity and stability. Silk worms imported from Nepal and Tibet began a tradition of silk production that continued for over 200 years. Mughal emperors moved into the area in the 16th century; the hill states retained their independence but became tributary states to the Mughal court (Minahan 2002: 1976-1977). The two states of Kumaon and Garhwal (the two largest hill states) were united in 1624, but the region slid into anarchy in the late 18th century after wars with Tibet and Nepal. Gorkhas invaded in the early 19th Century, beginning a serious pattern of deforestation. The Uttarakhandis, to escape the ravaging Gorkhas, left their terraced fields and silk worms and escaped to the higher altitudes (Minahan 2002: 1977). The British feared that the Gorkhas would unite with the Sikhs to the west to resist British influence, and sent troops to aid the Uttarakhandis. The British annexed all of Kumaon and half of Garhwal. A small princely state was maintained for the descendants of the Garhwal kings (Minahan 2002: 1977). Organized British loggings for the industrial revolution heavily impacted the area. Large tracts of virgin forests were cleared and then given to immigrants from the overcrowded lowlands. This provoked demonstrations and riots. Kumaon and Garhwal became very active in the Indian independence movement. It should be noted that demands for Uttarakhandi statehood were first advanced during this period, but by the Congress Party; there was no Uttarakhandi statehood movement at this time; similarly, proposals for Uttarakhandi statehood were brought forward at the Indian legislature in 1952 by national parties, which were supported by the Uttarakhandis, but no independent movement existed. Garhwal and Kumaon were two Divisions of Uttar Pradesh. (Minahan 2002: 1977). The ancient trade routes with Tibet were closed in 1950 because of the Chinese occupation of Tibet; however, the brief Indian war against China led to well-developed roads into Uttarakhand, which made deforestation all the easier. Many Uttarakhandi families were dislocated (Minahan 2002: 1978). The deforestation issue led to the emergence of a separatist movement in the 1970s. We code a prior restriction due to the repeated but never implemented proposals for a separate Uttarakhand state. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 2000, Uttarakhand attains statehood through the Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Bill (Minahan 2002: 1980). [2000: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [2000: sub-state secession]

Regional autonomy

- Until 2000 when it became a state of its own (this is not coded given the first of January rule: the movement ends in 2000), Uttarakhand had been part of Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttarakhand makes up a tiny part of Uttar Pradesh and since the Uttarakhandis were “marginalized” within both India and Uttar Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 1975; Tillin 2011), it seems likely that the Uttarakhandis did not have substantial influence over Uttar Pradesh’s government. Hence, we do not code regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Several organizations demanded statehood separate from Uttar Pradesh; there were calls for independence, but these appear to come from marginal groupings (Minahan 2002: 1978-1979; Tillin 2011; Moller 2000). [1976-2000: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Uttarakhandis
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Hindi (Non SC/ST OBCs); Other Backward Classes (Castes); Scheduled Castes & Tribes
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	75005000; 75016000; 75018000

- We code the Uttarakhandis as junior partners for several reasons. First, the Uttarakhandis are mostly Hindu (Minahan 2002), and the Hindus have always been (over-)represented in the national executive (Jayal 2006: 152-153, 157). Second, Minahan (2002: 1975) notes that most of them belong to the lower castes, though Wikipedia suggests that a significant part also belongs to the upper castes. Hence, they form part of the Hindus (non SC/ST), the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and the Scheduled Castes. All three groups are coded as included in EPR (though the OBCs are only coded from 1977 onwards). In line with EPR, Jayal (2006: 154, 158) shows that not only the Upper Castes, but also the lower Hindu castes were consistently represented in the cabinet (note: the cabinet is the smaller, more powerful sub-set of India’s executive, the Council of Ministers), and that their representation has even increased since independence. Furthermore, India’s North, where Uttarakhand (and Uttar Pradesh, from which it separated) is located, is also well-represented (Jayal 2006: 155, 159). Finally, we also found evidence for an Uttarakhandi in the union cabinet: N.D. Tiwari served as foreign minister in 1986-1987. [1976-2000: junior partner]

- According to Minahan (2002: 1975), there are 7,370,000 Uttarakhandis in 2002, which in combination with the Worldbank estimate of India's total population in 2002 (1,077 million) yields a group size estimate of .0068. [1976-2000: .0068 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1975), almost all Uttarakhandis are located in Uttarakhand, where they make up more than 80% of the local population. [concentrated]
- Uttarakhand borders Nepal and China, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1975) there are Uttarakhandi communities in neighboring areas of Nepal and Tibet as well as in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. We found no evidence suggesting that they cross the numeric threshold. [no kin]

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INDONESIA

Acehnese

Activity: 1950-2005

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Despite Dutch colonialization, the Aceh Sultanate had been able to keep hold of its 500 year lasting autonomy until 1873 when the Dutch colonial government declared war on Aceh and set off the longest and bloodiest war in Dutch colonial history (Minahan 2002: 27). Dutch military rule was finally established in 1903, when the Sultanate surrendered. However, the collective identity and experience of Acehnese was reaffirmed and resistance continued nevertheless until World War II. A mass uprising in March 1942 brought down the Dutch regime shortly before the Japanese occupied Sumatra. Japanese forces arrived in Aceh on March 12 (Bertrand 2004: 165).
- Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Dutch attempts to regain control of their colonies in the East Indies were again met with fierce resistance by the Acehnese that finally resulted in inclusion as an autonomous state in a united, federal Indonesia in 1949. Rejecting the incorporation at first, Acehnese ended up accepting and even endorsing it, as they were promised (and granted) widespread autonomy (Minahan 2002: 27; Graf et al. 2010). Although efforts to turn the country into a unitary state quickly emerged and aggrieved the Acehnese, we code a (prior) concession since Aceh was granted autonomy in 1949. [1949: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). Despite the unitary form of government, the provinces retained some autonomy. However, Aceh's provincial status was removed in 1950. Aceh was included in the larger Province of North Sumatra (Graf et al. 2010; Minahan 2002). [1950: autonomy restriction]
- The Indonesian government reinstated Aceh's provincial status and gave back military regional command in late 1956 in order to undermine the nationalist movement and appease the rebellion that had broken out three year before (Minahan 2002: 27; Bertrand 2004: 167). The Minorities at Risk Project gives 1957 as the year of the concession. However, our own research suggested that Law No. 24/1956 on the *Establishment of Autonomy of Aceh Province and the Amendment to the Regulation of North Sumatra Province Establishment* was passed in 1956. [1956: autonomy concession]
- In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1957: autonomy concession]
- In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno's system of "Guided Democracy", the regions were stripped from most of their powers (Ferrazzi 2000: 67; Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). However, in contrast to the other regions, Aceh was not only able to retain its autonomy, but even to increase it. In 1959 and in response to Acehnese rebellion, the central government granted Aceh the status of a "special region/territory" with considerable autonomy in customary law, religious and educational affairs (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 27; Aspinall 2007: 252; Bertrand 2004: 167). Furthermore, a council of religious scholars was established in order to maintain the dominance

of Islamic principles in all aspects of Acehese social life (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 12). [1959: autonomy concession]

- Under Suharto's (1965-1998) New Order, a centralized government was steadily established, following the regimes advocacy of "unity and nationalism" (Ferrazzi 2000: 67-68). Suharto tightened the constraints on Aceh continuously and made its special status fade rapidly due to centralization of political, economic and military power. We code three "New Order" restrictions: the first coincides with Suharto's take-over in 1965, which initiated the end of Aceh's autonomy, the second in 1971 due to a particularly notable act of economic centralization (see below), and the third in 1974 to coincide with the "autonomy" law (see below). [1965: autonomy restriction]
- In 1971, large reserves of liquified natural gas (LNG) were discovered in Aceh (Lhok Seumawe). Immediately, Jakarta took over the management of the exploitation, and established industrial enclaves where most of the LNG reserves were located (Bertrand 2004: 170). [1971: autonomy restriction]
- While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). According to Kell (1995: 32), the 1974 law on regional administration "laid the ground for a tightening of central control over the composition of regional administrations" and was the very legislation that defined the theoretical extent of Acehese autonomy. We consider this "antidote to disintegrative forces" as one of the most relevant acts in a series of restrictions under Suharto and therefore code a restriction in 1974. [1974: autonomy restriction]
- In November 1999, the newly elected president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, held talks with the Free Aceh Movement. With demands for an independence referendum similar to East-Timor mounting, he declared his willingness to allow such a referendum, but stepped back only a few days later, saying that the options in the referendum would only consist of greater autonomy and the status quo (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 12). No such referendum was ever held. However, at this point a decentralization process had been initiated already. In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions (unlike the 1974 law), but similar to the 1974 "New Order" legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
- A cease-fire agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2000. It was widely regarded as a humanitarian rather than as a political agreement and was signed by the secessionist in the hopes that the human rights violations would end (Minahan 2002: 30). The MoU is not coded as a concession as it did not include devolution of powers and did not affect the autonomy status of the Acehese.
- In August 2001, President Megawati Soekarnoputri enacted the Law on Special Autonomy for the Province Naggro Aceh Darussalam (NAD). It offered broad autonomy to the Province of Aceh and a greater share of income from its natural resources, previewing a 70 per cent share for Aceh's oil and gas revenues (Wenmann and Krause 2009). Furthermore, it granted Aceh the right to establish its local government in line with local traditions and to base the legal system on the Sharia. [2001: autonomy concession]
- Due to difficulties with the implementation of the 1999 decentralization laws, the 1999 laws were revised and replaced with two new laws in 2004. The 2004 legislation enhanced the provinces' autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
- Increasing international pressure led to the signing of another MoU between the central government and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in August 2005. The MoU granted "widespread autonomy to the province, greater control over the province's natural resources, increased participation in reconstruction efforts [Aceh was hit hardest by the 2004 Tsunami], GAM decommissioning, amnesty for GAM fighters, and the establishment of a Truth and

Reconciliation Commission”. The implementation of the MoU is monitored by a Monitoring Mission with participation from the EU and ASEAN (Minorities at Risk Project). [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- Minahan (2002: 27) notes an independence declaration in February 1950, but we did not find any supportive evidence; moreover, the dominant claim at the time was for autonomy. Hence, we do not code a declaration in 1950.
- A declaration of independence was issued on December 4, 1976 (Aspinall 2007: 255). Supported by a large portion of the population, Aceh separatist leader Hassan di Tiro proclaimed independence of Aceh one month later on 4 January 1977 (Minahan 2000: 28). The government responded with repressive measures, killing several leaders of the Free Aceh Movement. Since the official document was issued in December 1976, and since all other sources refer to this date, we code an independence declaration in 1976. [1976: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Aceh was incorporated into independent Indonesia in 1949. This was before the start date and is thus not coded.
- Aceh was merged with North Sumatra in 1950. [1950: sub-state merger]
- In 1956 Aceh regained province status. [1956: sub-state secession]
- Aceh’s special autonomous status was eroded with Suharto’s take-over. [1965: abolishment of regional autonomy]
- The 1999 decentralization laws went into effect January 1, 2001. [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Aceh was granted the status of an autonomous republic upon incorporation in Indonesia in 1949. This status was removed only one year later but reinstated in 1956. In the intermediate six years, the Aceh rebellion emerged in which the Acehnese rebels “were not able to seize power in Aceh” (Graf et al. 2010). Following the first of January rule, we therefore code regional autonomy for 1950 and again as of 1957. Aceh’s autonomy became toothless with Suharto’s take-over in 1965. [1950: regional autonomy; 1957-1965: regional autonomy]
- January 1, 2001, the 1999 decentralization laws went into effect; the same year Aceh was granted a special autonomy statute. [2001-2005: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In the initial phase, the Aceh movement was focused on religion and the Darul Islam, its main organization, did not seek to separate Aceh from Indonesia but rather aimed to make Indonesia an Islamic state (Aspinall 2007: 245). With the defeat of Darul Islam and the granting of a special autonomy status, the Acehnese leaders “agreed to ‘regionalise’ their demands”, gave up the country-wide battle over shari’a and turned to the question of Aceh’s autonomy (Aspinall 2007: 252). Minahan (2002: 27) also states that autonomy was the dominant claim in 1958. Speaking of the 1953-1962 insurgency, Ross (2005: 39) states that: “[...] Aceh was the site of a 1953-62

rebellion led by Teungku Daud Beureueh. Importantly, the rebellion did *not* call for Acehese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam in the national government.” [1950-1976: autonomy claim]

- In the 1970s, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Free Aceh Movement, emerged and replaced Islam with nationalism as the ideological basis. The organization sought Aceh’s complete independence (also confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project), as illustrated by the 1976 declaration of independence (Aspinall 2007: 255). The claim for independence was emphasized in 1999, when over 100,000 Acehese demanded a referendum on secession (Minahan 2002: 29). In 2005 GAM renounced its separatist intentions (e.g. TRAC; Ansori 2012). [1977-2005: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Acehnese
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Acehnese
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	85001000

Territory

- The Acehese are concentrated in the region of Aceh, where they make up 90% of the population (Minahan 2002: 25). This amounts to 3.96 million Acehese (in 2002), or almost all Acehese in the whole of Indonesia in that same year (3.97 million). Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]
- The Acehese movement claims the territory of the special region of Aceh. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Andaman Sea/Bay of Bengal. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code two offshore fields off the coast of Aceh (PRIMKEY: OF136PET and OF135PET) and a large onshore field (PRIMKEY: ID008PET) on mainland Aceh. The latter was discovered in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- No kin according to EPR and MAR I-IV. The only main source that mentions kin groups is the more recent MAR V, which states that the Acehese have “close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base” without giving details where this group lives. Additional research (see Missbach 2011) has shown that there is indeed a significant Acehese community in Malaysia. According to Missbach (2011) the number of Acehese in Malaysia remains unknown, but certainly exceeds the 24,000 that are often mentioned. Nevertheless, the number of Acehese in Malaysia seems to not exceed 100,000. [no kin]

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Melayus

Activity: 1950-1975; 1999-2012

General notes

- The movement relates to Malays located in Riau, a province of Indonesia where Malays form a relative majority. Note that there are also Malays in other provinces, in particular in South Sumatra, where they also form a relative majority.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Prior to colonization, Riau provided a safe haven for traders and sailors. A period of rivalry between the Dutch, Portuguese, and British lasted until the 19th Century. The Treaty of London, signed in 1824, gave the Dutch control of all territories south of Singapore (Minahan 2002: 1226). The last sultan of Riau was crowned in 1841 and deposed by the Dutch in 1857, when he began threatening colonial interests. The area remained restive (the Dutch introduced plantation agriculture, producing rubber, palm oil, sisal, and quinine – forced labor and population displacement were a frequent occurrence). A serious rebellion against the Dutch rule erupted in 1911 (Minahan 2002: 1227). Riau was occupied by the Japanese military forces during WWII but returned to Dutch control in 1946. Between 1945 and 1950 the Melayus attempted to re-establish the Riau sultanate. The Dutch, however, turned down the Melayus' demand. Before leaving the country, in 1949, the Dutch imposed a federal system in Indonesia (Ferrazzi 2000: 66). Riau was among the last provinces to be incorporated into independent Indonesia (in 1950). Riau became an autonomous Indonesian province. Hence, for the first phase, we code a (prior) concession. [1949: autonomy concession] [1st phase: prior concession]
- There were autonomy restrictions in 1959 and 1974 (see below), hence we code a prior restriction for the second phase. [2nd phase: prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Dutch imposition of a federal system was widely objected in Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia returned to a unitary form of government (Ferrazzi 2000: 66-67). While the provinces retained some autonomy, the return to a unitary form of government is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1950: autonomy restriction]
- In 1957, Jakarta introduced legislation which granted the regions increased autonomy, including the right to elect its own leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1957: autonomy concession]
- In 1959 Sukarno declared a state of emergency and ended parliamentary democracy. Under Sukarno's system of "Guided Democracy", the regions were stripped from most of their powers. In 1959, Sukarno returned to the 1945 constitution, which – since the constitution does not explain what regional autonomy means – effectively meant that the extent of regional autonomy from now on depended on the will of the President (Ferrazzi 2000: 67). Other reforms, enacted in the same year, further weakened the regions (Kimura 2013: 47-48; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1959: autonomy restriction]
- Under his "New Order" (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). We code two "New Order" restrictions: the first coincides with Suharto's take-over in 1965, and the second in 1974 to coincide with Suharto's "autonomy" law (see below). [1965: autonomy restriction]
- While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the

provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Hence, we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]

- In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 “New Order” legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
- The implementation of the decentralization laws was tricky and chaotic, mainly due to an indeterminate allocation of competencies between the provincial and the district level. The 2004 enhanced the provinces’ autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
- In 2004, the Riau Islands Province was separated from Riau province. While opposed by the Riau government, Riau Islanders appear to have not only endorsed, but actively lobbied for partition (Jakarta Post 2002). Both provinces have a (relative) Malay majority. We do not code either a restriction or a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1999 the Riau province issued a declaration of sovereignty (Nordholt 2008: 8). [1999: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- Riau became part of Indonesia in 1950 and an autonomous province. [1950: host change (new); establishment of regional autonomy]
- In 1959 Sukarno returned to a heavily centralized system, whereby the regions were stripped from most of their powers (see above). [1959: abolishment of regional autonomy]
- The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces (including Riau with its Melayus majority) significant autonomy (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]
- In 2004, the Riau Islands Province was separated from Riau province. This is not coded as a major change as two majority Malay entities have remained.

Regional autonomy

- See above. [1950-1959: regional autonomy; 2001-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Both in the first and the second phase, the dominant calls were for increased autonomy. The Free Riau Movement entertained some talk about independence; however, a vote in the inofficial “Riau People’s Congress” for independence did not pass (Crouch 2010: 95). The only instance that could be read as an outright independence demand was in April 1999, when over 1,500 Melayus gathered in Pekanbaru to demand that the Indonesian government honor a promise to

return 10% of all of Riau's oil revenues to the province. Riau leaders threatened that they would fight for independence if this did not happen (Minahan 2002: 1228). We do not consider this a call for independence in line with Crouch (2010: 95), who argues that the threat was purely strategic and that increased political and economic control over the region are the actual goals of the Free Riau movement. [1950-1975: autonomy claim; 1999-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Melayus
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant/n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Malay
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	85017000

- The movement relates to Malays located in Riau, a province of Indonesia where Malays form a relative majority. Note that there are also Malays in other provinces, in particular in Sulawesi/Celebes, where they form an absolute majority, and in South Sumatra, where they form a relative majority. EPR does not code Malays in Riau, but all Malays in Indonesia (and only 1999-2013). Hence, the Melayus form a regional branch of the Malays. According to EPR, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004, when the government became much more ethnically inclusive. The Malays were thus clearly excluded until and including 2004. In line with EPR, we found no clear-cut evidence of discrimination; hence, the Melayus are coded as powerless in 1950-1975 and 1999-2004. In 2004, the Indonesian executive became much more ethnically inclusive. In particular, some Malays were included into the cabinet. This is reflected in EPR: the Malays are coded as junior partner from 2005 onwards. To reflect the more inclusive style of government, we also code the Melayus as junior partner from 2005 onwards. [1950-1975: powerless; 1999-2004: powerless; 2005-2012: junior partner]
- According to Minahan (2002), there are 3.945 million Melayus living in Riau and neighboring provinces. Combined with the World Bank's 2002 population estimate of Indonesia (215 million), this yields a group size estimate of .0183 (EPR estimates Malay's population share at 3% – however, this includes Malays living in provinces other than Riau). The changes due to the annexation of West Papua and East Timor are not reflected because they are negligible. [1950-1975: .0183 (group size); 1999-2012: .0183 (group size)]

Territory

- The Melayus are concentrated in the Province of Riau, where they make up 72% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1225). This amounts to 3.221 million Melayus (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 3.945 million Melayus in the whole of Indonesia in that same year. [concentrated]
- The Melayus claim the territory of the Province of Riau. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Malacca Strait. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code an offshore field off the coast of Riau (OF139PET) and a large onshore field (ID009PET) in mainland Riau. The latter was discovered in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The Melayus are ethnic Malays (see Minahan 2002: 1225). EPR codes ethnic kin due to the Malays in Malaysia. [kin in neighboring country]

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Papuans

Activity: 1963-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The island of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been inhabited for at least 50,000 years. Before colonization, the island was structured into autonomous villages without central authority, where each small tribe developed its own distinct culture and language (Minahan 2002: 2053). The Portuguese landed on the island in 1527. For a long time, there was no interest among colonizers in PNG. The Dutch laid claim to the coastal region west of the 141st meridian in 1828, while the Germans and British controlled the East. The Dutch restricted migration from the overcrowded Indonesian islands (with the exception of political exile), and penetration into the island proceeded slowly, as did missionary activity. A sense of Papuan unity slowly developed (Minahan 2002: 2054). The Japanese invaded the northern part of the territory in 1942 and held it until 1944; brutal killings and forced labor left the Papuans with an enduring sense of distrust against Asians. They cheered for the return of the Dutch in 1945. When the Dutch administration was forced to recognize Indonesian independence in 1949, they refused to relinquish control of Papua as long as the Papuans wished them to stay. A Dutch plan for West Papuan independence in 1959-1960 was blocked by Indonesia's communist and Third World supporters in the UN General Assembly (Minahan 2002: 2054). [1959: independence concession]
- In April 1961 the Dutch created a Papuan legislature and granted a degree of self-government (Minahan 2002: 2055). December 1, 1961, the West Papuans declared their independence (Minahan 2002: 2054). [1961: autonomy concession]
- In early 1962, Indonesia's Sukarno initiated a military campaign to incorporate West Papua into Indonesia and thereby "end Dutch imperialism". Unwilling to plunge in yet another war (the Dutch had fought a war against Indonesia in 1945-1949), the Dutch accepted American mediation. In September 1962, the New York Agreement was signed, which required authority to be transferred to the United Nations until May 1, 1963, when the territory would be transferred to Indonesia, pending a plebiscite to be held no later than 1969 on West Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. In accordance with the agreement, the UN handed over West Papua to Indonesia on May 1, 1963. Papua became a "quarantine territory" in September (Minahan 2002: 2054; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319). With the New York Agreement and subsequent incorporation into Indonesia the Dutch promise of self-government and independence was broken. Hence, we code an independence restriction. [1962: independence restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- With the transfer to Indonesia in 1963, Papua lost the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Dutch. [1963: autonomy restriction]
- Under his "New Order" (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). We code two "New Order" restrictions: the first coincides with Suharto's take-over in 1965, and the second in 1974 to coincide with Suharto's "autonomy" law (see below). [1965: autonomy restriction]
- The New York Agreement foresaw an "act of self-determination" to be completed before 1969. In 1969, the Suharto regime organized the "Act of Free Choice", a "referendum" on West Papua's incorporation into Indonesia in which a handpicked 1,026 elders had to openly discuss incorporation until a unanimous consensus was found. The Act of Free Choice was recognized by

the UN, and West Papua became Indonesia's 26th province (van der Boek and Szalay 2001: 77). The New York Agreement had foreseen a free expression of will of *all* West Papuans. With the "Act of Free Choice", the West Papuans were deprived of the independence referendum they were promised (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 319), hence we code an independence restriction. [1969: independence restriction]

- While restricting provincial autonomy, the Suharto regime entertained a rhetorical focus on regional autonomy. The key legislation was a 1974 law designed to greatly enhance the autonomy of second-tier units (followed-up by a 1992 law). There was little, if any progress with implementation, however (Ferrazzi 2000: 70-71). At the same time, the reform made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government, and contained further provisions aimed to weaken regional autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 73; Kimura 2013: 50). Hence, we code a restriction. [1974: autonomy restriction]
- In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, but similar to the 1974 "New Order" legislation, the focus was once more on district autonomy. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001 (Ferrazzi 2000: 75; Bell 2003; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 2). [1999: autonomy concession]
- In 1999, President Habibie enacted a law which divided Papua, formerly a single province, into three provinces, a move widely considered as part of a divide-and-rule policy (Encyclopedia Britannica). [1999: autonomy restriction]
- The partition was met by strong opposition, and was annulled in 2000 by Habibie's successor, Abdurrahman Wahid (Encyclopedia Britannica). [2000: autonomy concession]
- In October 2001, the Indonesian government passed a special autonomy bill that officially changed the name of the province to "Papua" and permitted greater self-rule. According to the 2001 law, the governor must be an ethnic Papuan and priority in employment and opportunity must be given to ethnic Papuans. In addition to the standard regional legislative assembly, Papua received a special Papua People's Assembly made up of native Papuans. The consent of the special Papuan assembly is required for passing certain types of regulations and for choosing the governor (Bell 2003: 128). Still, West Papuan leaders rejected the overture as "too little, too late" – they had not been consulted in advance (Minahan 2002: 2057). [2001: autonomy concession]
- Implementation of the 2001 bill was slow, but there were moves towards implementation. However, in 2003, Jakarta revived the idea of partitioning Papua and decided to split the province of Papua into three, the provinces of Papua, West Irian Jaya, and Central Irian Jaya. This can be seen as part of a divide and rule policy (independentist sentiment is weaker in West Irian Jaya, see International Crisis Group 2006: 4), and was fiercely opposed by the Papuan independence movement. Neither the local residents nor the local government were consulted (Encyclopedia Britannica), as is required in the 2001 autonomy bill (Human Rights Watch 2007: 16). A main problem was that the 2001 special autonomy law applied only to one province, Papua (International Crisis Group 2006: 2). Hence, the partition decreased the scope of the 2001 law. [2003: autonomy restriction]
- In 2004, the constitutional court ruled that the partition of Papua into three provinces was unlawful and contradicted the 2001 autonomy bill. While this blocked the creation of the third province (which can be considered a concession), the court at the same time recognized the creation of West Papua as a "fait accompli" (since we coded the 2003 policy we do not code this as a restriction) (Human Rights Watch 2007: 16). The same year and due to difficulties with the implementation of decentralization laws, the 1999 laws were revised and replaced with two new laws in 2004. The 2004 legislation enhanced the provinces' autonomy by establishing a clear hierarchy. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, the 2004 reform introduced direct elections to provincial and district heads (prior to 2004, provincial and district heads were appointed; Pan 2005; Simutapang 2009: 8-9). [2004: autonomy concession]
- In 2007, the governors of the two Papua provinces agreed to extend the special autonomy arrangement to both provinces, meaning that also the newly created West Papua would come under the Special Autonomy Bill. The central government gave green light in 2008, when it officially extended the autonomy bill to West Papua (Jakarta Post 2008; UNDP 2011: 2). [2008: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- According to Minahan (2002: 2055), leaders of the Papuan movement signed the Serui Declaration, a unilateral declaration of independence for West Papua, on December 9, 1975). It seems, however, that Minahan got the year wrong; most sources indicate the declaration was signed in 1971 (e.g. Pacific Scoop 2014). [1971: independence declaration]
- A special congress called in June 2000 issued another declaration of independence (Minahan 2002: 2055; New York Times 2000). [2000: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- With the transfer to Indonesia in 1963, Papua lost the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Dutch. [1963: abolishment of autonomy; host change (new)]
- The 1999 decentralization laws, implemented on January 1, 2001, gave the provinces significant autonomy, which was further extended with the 2001 special autonomy bill (see above). [2001: establishment of regional autonomy]
- In 2003 Papua was partitioned into two provinces. This is not coded as a major change since the Papuans retained majorities in the two provinces.

Regional autonomy

- Papua lost its autonomy with the transfer to Indonesia, hence we do not code autonomy in 1963. We code autonomy from 2001 onwards (see above). [2001-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Despite small dissenting factions, there has been a lot of consensus behind the goal of independence. The focus is on securing a UN-supervised referendum on independence (Minahan 2002: 2057). [1963-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Papuans
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Papuans
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	85013000

- EPR codes the Papuans only as of 1964. The 1964 power access code (discriminated) as well as the population estimate (.007) applies to 1963 as well, given Indonesia's annexation of Papua. [1963: discriminated; 1963: group size of .007]

Territory

- The Papuans are concentrated in West Papua, where they make up 52% of the population (Minahan 2002: 2052). This amounts to 1.158 million Papuans (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 1.16 million Papuans in the whole of Indonesia in that same year. Regional concentration is also confirmed by MAR. [concentrated]
- The Papuans claim the territory of West Papua which administratively is divided into West Papua Province and the Papua Province/Special Region of Papua. The territory adjoins an international land border (Papua New Guinea) and has access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code several offshore field off the coast of West Papua (OF163PET, OF165PET, OF166PET) and three onshore fields (ID030PET, ID029PET, ID028PET) overlapping with West Papua. The earliest discovery was in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR (scenario 1:1) codes a kin group in neighboring Papua New Guinea. This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 2052) and the Minorities at Risk data which also codes the Papuans in Papua New Guinea as the largest and only kin group. EPR only codes the Papuans relevant as of 1964, one year after West Papua's incorporation in Indonesia. However, ethnic kin in an adjoining territory (Papua New Guinea was rule by Australia) was also present in 1963, which is why we code ethnic kin throughout. [kin in neighboring country]

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ITALY

Lombards

Activity: 1982-2012

General notes

NA

Autonomy status prior to movement activity

- As a result of the Second Italian Independence War against the Austrian Empire, Lombardy was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in 1859. The fascist years under Benito Mussolini brought an increase in central control and reduced local and regional authority. The 1948 Republican constitution (Art. 131) created five 'special' regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 'ordinary' regions, among which also Lombardy. While four of the five autonomous regions with special statute were immediately set up (all except for Friuli-Venetia Giulia) and were granted significant autonomy, the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute (among which Lombardy) was not implemented until the 1970s. Despite an enormous and deliberate delay, we code a (prior) concession as in 1970 the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place (in 1977) (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minahan 2002). We code a single concession in 1970 as this is the year when the process was initiated. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After the fall of the 'First Republic', several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a "case of failed federalization" (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that significantly improved the regions' level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordinon and Cerniglia (2008):
 - o In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provincial president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al. 2010: 125). [1993: autonomy concession]
 - o Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a "stabilization and strengthening of regional governments". However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.
 - o In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the 'stato' and the 'regioni'. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005). [1997: autonomy concession]
 - o In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 'Ordinary Status' regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed.

By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament. [1999: autonomy concession]

- The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national laws were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
- In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Euronline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change. The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). Although defeated in referendum, the 2005 reform constitutes an autonomy concession. The reversal one year later was due to a referendum and is thus not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook. Moreover, the reversal had little to do with the proposed devolution reforms, as argued above. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On September 15, 1996, Umberto Bossi declared the independence of the Federation of Padania at a rally in Venice. The first Padanian government is inaugurated (Minahan 2002; Bishai 2009). Since we code the Lega Nord as the dominant representative of the self-determination movement in that year, we code this act, even if targets a territory that is much larger than the homeland of the Lombards. [1996: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Despite devolution, the regions’ level is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- During the Lega Lombarda's formative period, there was only a very weak regional Lombard identity and thus only very limited electoral success. In this period, the party advocated cultural, economic and political self-determination and demanded increased autonomy for its culturally and ethnically distinct region that it regarded as financially exploited by a corrupt central state. The Lega Lombarda's proposal comprised a federalized state with three macro-regions (Padania in the North, Etruria in the center and a Repubblica del Sud in the south). [1982-1996: autonomy claim]
- It was with an increase in electoral support in the early 1990s and the formation of the Lega Nord that the latter radicalized its demands. With many other parties taking on the topic, federalism lost its mobilizing power and the Lega its unique position in that regard. As of 1996, it advocated secession of the northern region (Padania) and changed its name from "Lega Nord – Italia federate" into "Lega Nord - Per l'indipendenza della Padania". Following the first of January rule, we code independence as the dominant claim as of 1997. [1997-2000: independence claim]
- In 2000, after a defeat in the 1999 European election, the Lega gave up the path of isolation and returned to promoting devolution (Ignazi 2008; Moreau 2011). [2001-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Lombards
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Italians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	32501000

- EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Sudtirolo in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group 'Italians', which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate. However, given the Lombardy's influence in Italian politics due to its demographic size, its economic power, the important position of the city of Milan, and the fact that the Lombardy has in the relevant years provided two Prime Ministers (Spadolini, Craxi) and many ministers in various cabinets is evidence for the group's executive influence. We therefore code the Lombards as senior partner throughout. The fact that the regionalist Lega Nord was part of the governing coalition in the years 1994-1996, 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 provides further evidence for the executive influence of Northern autonomist groups. [1982-2012: senior partner]
- According to Minahan (2002: 1109), there are 8,221,000 Lombards, which corresponds to a group size of 0.144228 (given the total population of 57.06 million in 2002 provided by the Worldbank). [1982-2012: .1442 (group size)]

Territory

- The Lombards are concentrated in Region of Lombardy, where they make up 77% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1109). This amounts to 6.97 million Lombards (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 8.221 million Lombards in the whole of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]
- The Lombard self-determination movement has issued claims for both the Region of Lombardy and Padania as a whole. Since we do not code one northern movement but different movements for different parts of the northern movement (Lombards, Piedemontese, Ligurians etc.), we focus on the constituent territories of Padania, thus the Region of Lombardy for the Lombards. The territory adjoins an international land border (Switzerland) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The polygon of the Po Basin petroleum field (PRIMKEY: IT002PET) overlaps with the Lombard territory (Lujala et al 2007). It was discovered in 1945 (or before). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- We code the presence of ethnic kin since the EPR group of the Swiss Italians can be considered direct kin of the Lombards (see Minahan 2000: 429). According to Minahan (2002: 1109) there are also “sizeable” Lombard groups in France and Germany and overseas communities in the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. [kin in neighboring country]

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Piedmontese

Activity: 1977-2012

General notes

NA

Autonomy status prior to movement activity

- Piedmont was the leading force in the uniting of Italy in 1848 and 1859, so when the newly united kingdom of Italy was established, Turin was named its first capital in 1861. Only nine years later, however, the Italian government was transferred to the more central city of Rome, a move that resulted in a loss of prestige and power to the Piedmontese.
- The fascist years under Benito Mussolini brought an increase in central control and reduced local and regional authority.
- The 1948 Republican constitution (Art. 131) created five ‘special’ regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, among which also Piedmont. While four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (all except for Friuli-Venetia Giulia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute (among which Piedmont) was not implemented until the 1970s. Despite an enormous and deliberate delay, we code a (prior) concession as in 1970, the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place (in 1977) (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minahan 2002; Duina 1999). We code a single concession in 1970 as this is the year when the process was initiated. [1970: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After the fall of the ‘First Republic’, several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a “case of failed federalization” (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions’ level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008):
 - o In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provincial president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al. 2010: 125). [1993: autonomy concession]
 - o Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a “stabilization and strengthening of regional governments”. However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.
 - o In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005). [1997: autonomy concession]

- In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament. [1999: autonomy concession]
- The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national laws were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
- In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Euronline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change. The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). Although defeated in referendum, the 2005 reform constitutes an autonomy concession. The reversal one year later was due to a referendum and is thus not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook. Moreover, the reversal had little to do with the proposed devolution reforms, as argued above. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On September 15, 1996, Umberto Bossi declared the independence of the Federation of Padania at a rally in Venice. The first Padanian government is inaugurated (Minahan 2002; Bishai 2009). Since we code the Lega Nord as the dominant representative of the self-determination movement in that year, we code this act, even if targets a territory that is much larger than the homeland of the Piedmontese. [1996: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Devolution is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Similar to the neighboring Lega Lombarda, the Piemonte Autonomista and the Union Piemontèisa, advocated cultural, economic and political self-determination and increased autonomy for the region of Piedmont that it regarded as financially exploited by a corrupt central state. [1977-1996: autonomy claim]
- It was with the integration of the Northern regionalist parties and an increase in electoral support in the early 1990s that the movement radicalized its demands. With many other parties taking on the topic, federalism lost its mobilizing power and the Lega Nord its unique position in that regard. As of 1996, the party advocated secession of the northern region (Padania) and changed its name from “Lega Nord – Italia federate” into “Lega Nord - Per l’indipendenza della Padania”. Following the first of January rule, we code independence as the dominant claim as of 1997. [1997-2000: independence claim]
- Already in 2000, and after a defeat in the 1999 European election, the Lega gave up the path of isolation and returned to promoting devolution (Ignazi 2008; Moreau 2011). [2001-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Piedmontese
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Italians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	32501000

- EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Sudtirolo in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, many of the Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that all these movements are also dominant is of course not accurate. However, the Piedmont has significant influence in Italian politics due to its economic power and the important position of the city of Turin, which is also reflected in the appointment of numerous ministers and one Prime Minister from the Piedmont. We therefore code the Piedmontese as junior partner throughout. The fact that the regionalist Lega Nord was part of the governing coalition in the years 1994-1996, 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 provides further evidence for the executive influence of Northern autonomist groups. [1977-2012: junior partner]
- According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of the region of Piedmont amounts to 4,357,663 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the population of Piedmont makes up a population share of 0.07463. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002), who states that there are approximately 3,750,000 Piedmontese in Italy in 2002. With Italy’s population totaling 57.06 million in that same year according to the World Bank, we thus code a population share of 0.0657. [1977-2012: .0657 (group size)]

Territory

- The Piedmontese are concentrated in Region of Piedmont, where they make up 77% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1510). This amounts to 3.29 million Piedmontese (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 3.75 million Piedmontese in the whole of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]
- The Piedmontese self-determination movement has issued claims for both the Region of Piedmont and Padania as a whole. Since we do not code one northern movement but different movements for different parts of the northern movement (Lombards, Piedmontese, Ligurians etc.), we focus on the constituent territories of Padania, thus the Region of Piedmont for the Piedmontese. The territory adjoins international land borders (Switzerland, France) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- The polygon of the Po Basin petroleum field (PRIMKEY: IT002PET) overlaps with the Piedmont territory (Lujala et al 2007). It was discovered in 1945 (or before). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1510) there are Piedmontese communities in France, Switzerland, North America and South America. However, these are too small to be coded here. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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South Italians

Activity: 1996-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Kingdom of Naples, established in 1282 by the Angevins, and the Kingdom of Sicily, formed in 1130, were merged in 1816 by King Ferdinand to form the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The territory was included in the newly founded Italian Kingdom in 1861. This step was welcomed by many Southerners as it swept the unpopular Bourbon regime from power in Naples (Minahan 2002: 1349). At the unification of Italy, a highly centralized administrative structure was adopted. The Italian Kingdom proclaimed a Tuscan dialect from Florence as the national language (Minahan 2002:1991).
- Under the fascist dictatorship, there was extreme centralization and regional powers very limited. In 1922, the fascist government launched a campaign to eradicate Italian's regional languages (Minahan 2002:1991).
- The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five 'special' regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 'ordinary' regions, among which the southern regions of Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. While four of the five autonomous regions with special statute were immediately set up (all except for Friuli-Venetia Giulia) and were granted significant autonomy, the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute was not implemented until the 1970s. In 1970, regional self-government was finally granted and the governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of functions took place (Baldi and Baldini 2014). The regions became operational in 1972 and according to D'Atena (2013), Baldi and Baldini (2014) and Bilancia et al. (2010), effective powers began to be transferred to the regions with ordinary status in 1977.
- The Southern self-determination movement makes claims for the southern part of the Italian Peninsula (Mezzogiorno, Ausonia), which is tantamount to the territory that had been part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). In terms of today's administrative division, this includes the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. In the absence of any concessions or restrictions to the southern territory as a whole, we code the regional decentralization reform of 1993 as a concession. This reform altered the level of self-determination of all the above regions.
 - o In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provincial president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al. 2010:125). [1993: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a "stabilization and strengthening of regional governments". However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- The self-determination movement comprises the southern part of the Italian Peninsula (Mezzogiorno, Ausonia), equal to the territory that was part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). In terms of today's administrative division, this

includes the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. In the absence of any concessions or restrictions to the southern territory as a whole, we code the various regional decentralization reforms of the 1990s and 2000s. These reforms altered the level of self-determination of all the above regions.

- After the fall of the 'First Republic', several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a "case of failed federalization" (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions' level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008).
 - o In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the 'stato' and the 'regioni'. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005). [1997: autonomy concession]
 - o In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 'Ordinary Status' regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the 'Ordinary Status' regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament. [1999: autonomy concession]
 - o The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was "certainly the most federalist" reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete "as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved". In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national laws were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
 - o In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change. The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who "had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform" (Bull 2007: 106). Although defeated in referendum, the 2005 reform constitutes an autonomy concession. The reversal one year later was due to a referendum and is thus not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook. Moreover, the reversal had little to do with the proposed devolution reforms, as argued above. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Sicily is the only southern region with special statute. Special statute regions can be considered autonomous (since 1948). However, the Sicilians make up only around 25% of the Southern Italian population. Thus we do not code regional autonomy. Devolution to ordinary regions is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The start date of the movement is coded in 1996 when the Lega Sud Ausonia (Southern League) was formed. The Southern League, despite some vices for independence, primarily advocates more autonomy, as indicated by their program (Lega Sud Ausonia 2013). The party is not represented in any provincial assembly nor in the regional, national, or European parliament. The Movement for Autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA 2015) was founded in 2005. Unlike the Southern League, the party managed to obtain a few seats in the 2008 general election and joined the Berlusconi cabinet. The MpA hence replaced the Southern League as the dominant representative of the Southern self-determination movement. Since the MpA also favored autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie 2015), we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1996-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	South Italians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Italians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	32501000

- Unless a group is a distinct linguistic minority, such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Sudtiro, in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1, EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group. As a consequence, there is no distinction between Northern and Southern Italians and the latter's autonomy movement does not have a separate EPR group but is part of the EPR group 'Italians'. 'Italians' are coded as dominant throughout. To infer that the Southerners are also dominant is of course not accurate.
- Nevertheless, the Southerners do have some influence on Italian politics, which is also reflected in the appointment of several ministers from the south and the election of Giuliano Amato (Sicilian origin) as prime minister in 2000. We therefore code the Southerners as junior partner throughout. The fact that the regionalist MpA was part of the Berlusconi IV Cabinet from 2008-

2011 provides further evidence for the executive influence of the southerners. [1996-2012: junior partner]

- According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of all southern regions (Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo) amounts to 18,969,891 in 2012. With Italy's population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the Southerners would make up 0.32 of the country's total population. However, since this number is not related to ethnic identity, we follow Minahan (2002), who states that there are 11.8 million Neapolitans/Southern Italians in Italy in 2002. With Italy's population totalling 57.06 million in that same year (according to the World Bank), we code a population share of 0.2068. [1996-2012: .2068 (group size)]

Territory

- The South Italians are concentrated in Ausonia, where they make up 77% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1347). This amounts to 11.098 million South Italians (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 11.8 million South Italians in the whole of Italy in that same year. [concentrated]
- The South Italians claims Ausonia, which comprises the southern part of the Italian Peninsula and the territory that was part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). Administratively, this refers to the regions of Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, and Calabria. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Mediterranean Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code several offshore field off the coast of Southern Italy (PRIMKEY: OF186PET-OF189PET) and three onshore fields overlapping with Ausonia (PRIMKEY: IT004PET, IT007PET, IT008PET). The earliest discovery was in 1945 (or before). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Minahan (2002: 1347) mentions communities in France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and several American countries. According to the 2000 US Census, there are approx. 85,000 Americans of Sicilian birth or ancestry, which makes it likely that the numeric threshold is met (the South Italian movement comprises also areas other than Sicily). The same can be said about the Italians in France: There are around 4 million people of Italian ancestry and 174,000 Italian citizens in France. Again, the numeric threshold is likely met. [kin in neighboring country]

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Tuscans

Activity: 1987-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- For most of the sixteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was ruled by the Medici. After the death of the last Medici grand duke, Gian Gastone, in 1737, Tuscany was assigned to Francis of Lorraine, initiating the rule of the Habsburg-Lorraine rulers. Their rule was followed by take-overs of the House of Bourbon-Parma, the House of Bonaparte and again by the House of Habsburg-Lorraine. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany ceased to exist in 1859 and in a plebiscite in March 1860, the Tuscans voted overwhelmingly (95%) for union with Sardinia. Tuscany formally became part of the new Italian state with the proclamation of the kingdom on February 18, 1861 (Encyclopedia Britannica).
- After the unification of Italy, a highly centralised administrative structure was adopted. The Italian Kingdom proclaimed a Tuscan dialect from Florence as the national language (Minahan 2002:1991). Florence was named capital of Italy in 1865 but was replaced by Rome only six years later.
- Under Mussolini's rule, centralization was extremely high and regional powers very limited in general. In 1922, the fascist government launched a campaign to eradicate Italian's regional languages (Minahan 2002:1991).
- The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five 'special' regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 'ordinary' regions, among which Tuscany. The acknowledgment of Tuscany as a territorial entity constitutes a clear concession, despite the fact that the promise of limited autonomy to the 15 regions with ordinary statute (among which Tuscany) was not implemented until 1970, when regional self-government was finally granted. The governing bodies of the regions were finally elected for the first time and a limited transfer of function took place (Baldi and Baldini 2014). The regions became operational in 1972 and according to D'Arena (2013), Baldi and Baldini (2014) and Bilancia et al. (2010) effective powers began to be transferred to the regions with ordinary status only in 1977. We code a concession in 1970 since this is when the process was initiated. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- After the fall of the 'First Republic', several regional reforms and a major constitutional reform were initiated in the mid-1990s that brought about a revival of the federal idea. However, many of these reforms can barely be described as decentralizing, making Italy a "case of failed federalization" (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 87). Nevertheless, there are some laws and reforms that do significantly improve the regions' level of autonomy. We follow a list of Baldini and Baldi (2014: 100f), who name all major decentralization reforms and their consequences. The same acts of decentralization can also be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008):
 - o In 1993, law no. 81 was passed, which strengthened local self-government of the regions established in the constitution. The law introduced direct elections for sindaci (mayors) and the presidenti di provincia (provincial president), which had previously been appointed by the central government (Bilancia et al. 2010: 125). [1993: autonomy concession]
 - o Law no. 43 in 1995 established a new electoral law for regional assemblies in regions with ordinary status. According to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 11) the law led to a

“stabilization and strengthening of regional governments”. However, since no additional powers were devolved, we do not code this as an act of concession.

- In 1997 the Bassanini laws were passed and established a new relationship between the ‘stato’ and the ‘regioni’. More competencies were devolved to the regions. These included a number of policy making areas such as economic development, labor market, agriculture, transport and trade, education, public investment, industrial and energy sector, environment and infrastructure (Bilancia et al. 2010: 126; Haussmann and Sauer 2007: 176; OECD 2005). [1997: autonomy concession]
- In 1999, direct election for the regional presidents was introduced in the 15 ‘Ordinary Status’ regions. Furthermore, the procedure for approving regional statute was changed. By means of a special regional law, the ‘Ordinary Status’ regions now adopt their own statuto, approved by the regional and no longer the national parliament. [1999: autonomy concession]
- The 2001 constitutional reform, initiated by a centre-left government and confirmed by popular referendum, added federal principles to the constitution and was “certainly the most federalist” reform of all adopted to date (Baldini and Baldi 2014: 99). Many (fiscal) competences and responsibilities were transferred to the sub-state levels. We code this as a concession. Note though that, according to Baldini and Baldi (2014: 99), the process of constitutional reform remains incomplete “as central institutions have continued to rule as if it had not been approved”. In order to implement articles 117, 118, 119 and 120, several national laws were adopted in 2003 (Law No. 131, the so called La Loggia law), in 2005 (Law No. 11, the so called Buttiglione law) and in 2009 (the financial provisions in Law No. 42) (Bilancia et al. 2010). Since these acts only concerned the implementation of principles that were already lined out in the 2001 constitution, they are not coded. [2001: autonomy concession]
- In 2005 another major federalizing reform of the constitution was initiated (reform of the reform) in order to further devolve powers to the sub-state level, mainly in education and health (Eironline 2005). Article 138 of the constitution provides for a confirmative referendum on constitutional revisions when either a fifth of the members of one of the houses, 500,000 voters or five regional councils request it. Using all three methods, the center-left successfully pushed for a referendum held on 25 June 2006. The proposal was defeated with only the regions of Lombardy and Veneto voting in favor of the reform. The powers for the regions remained at the level of the reform of 2001. Since the reform also incorporated changes to the constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the prime minister (The Economist 2006), there was strong opposition against the change. The referendum, as much political as it was constitutional, was by many also seen as an opportunity to punish the Berlusconi-Bossi axis and the reform was thus also opposed by people who “had long believed in constitutional reform but were simply opposed to this specific reform” (Bull 2007: 106). Although defeated in referendum, the 2005 reform constitutes an autonomy concession. The reversal one year later was due to a referendum and is thus not coded as a restriction in line with the codebook. Moreover, the reversal had little to do with the proposed devolution reforms, as argued above. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On September 15, 1996, Umberto Bossi declared the independence of the Federation of Padania at a rally in Venice. The first Padanian government is inaugurated (Minahan 2002; Bishai 2009). Since we code the Lega Nord as the dominant representative of the self-determination movement in that year, we code this act, even if targets a territory that is much larger than the homeland of the Tuscans. [1996: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Devolution is too limited to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There is only very little evidence on the claim of the Movement for Tuscany (Movimento per la Toscana, MpT). While some argue that the movement was not even political and rather a “cultural, debating and historical society” (Tambini 2001: n.d.), the MpT is also described as regionalist and autonomist (Lega Nord Toscana). Since there is no evidence of a secessionist claim we code autonomy as the dominant claim in the early years of the movement’s activity. This is also in line with the fact that the MpT, renamed Tuscan Alliance (Alleanza Toscana, AT) in 1988, was part of the Lega Lombarda-Alleanza Nord coalition in the 1989 European Parliament Elections and joined the Lega Nord in 1991. At this stage the Lega Nord also advocated cultural, economic and political self-determination and a federalized state with three macro-regions (Padania in the North, Etruria in the center and a Repubblica del Sud in the south). [1987-1995: autonomy claim]
- As of 1996, the Lega Nord (now the dominant autonomist party in Tuscany) radicalized its claim and advocated secession of the northern region (Padania) and changed its name from “Lega Nord – Italia federate” into “Lega Nord - Per l’indipendenza della Padania“. Following the first of January rule, we code independence as the dominant claim as of 1997. [1997-2000: independence claim]
- In 2000, after a defeat in the 1999 European election, the Lega gave up the path of isolation and returned to promoting devolution (Ignazi 2008; Moreau 2011). [2001-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tuscans
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Italians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	32501000

- EPR codes Italians as a homogenous group and does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Italians, or between different constituents of the Padania movement; unless they are a distinct linguistic minority such as the Aostans, Friulians or Alto Adige-Suditrol in which case they have an EPR group corresponding 1:1. As a consequence, most Northern Italian autonomist movements in the SDM data set do not have a separate EPR group but are incorporated in the EPR group ‘Italians’, which are coded as dominant throughout.
- The Tuscans have significant influence on Italian politics, which is also reflected in the appointment of numerous ministers and Prime Ministers (Lamberto Dini, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and, more recently, Matteo Renzi). We therefore code the Tuscans as junior partner throughout. The fact that the regionalist Lega Nord was part of the governing coalition in the years 1994-

1996, 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 provides further evidence for the executive influence of Northern autonomist groups. Note: we do not assign a senior partner code because the Lombards have somewhat more influence (see the “Lombards” entry). [1987-2012: junior partner]

- We lack data on the number of people self-identifying as Tuscans. Thus, we have to draw on Tuscany’s population. According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (istat.it), the population of the region of Tuscany amounts to 3,672,202 in 2012. With Italy’s population totaling 59.394 million in that same year, the population of Tuscany makes up a share of 0.0618. Because not all residents of Tuscany will self-identify as Tuscans, we use the rounded figure of 0.06. [1987-2012: .06 (group size)]

Territory

- Since we could not find information on the territorial concentration of Tuscans we focus on the distribution of the Tuscan dialect. The population speaking Tuscan is very much congruent with the boundaries of Tuscany, as several sources indicate (see e.g. Languages of the World 2010). We found no better data on ethnic self-identification, but it appears likely that the threshold for territorial concentration is met. [concentrated]
- The Tuscan movement is predominantly cultural. Territorial claims have been made by the Tuscan Alliance (Alleanza Toscana, AT) as part of the Lega Lombarda-Alleanza Nord. These claims included more self-determination for both the Region of Tuscany and Padania as a whole. Since we do not code one northern movement but different movements for different parts of the northern movement (Lombards, Piedmontese, Ligurians etc.), we focus on the constituent territories of Padania, thus the Region of Tuscany for the Tuscans. The territory does not adjoin an international land border and has access to the Mediterranean Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code several hydrocarbon fields on Tuscan territory (PRIMKEY IT002PET, IT003PET, IT005PET). The earliest discovery was in 1945 (or before), which is why we code oil/gas throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- We could not find evidence of kin groups of the Tuscans outside Italy. We do not code Italians in other countries as kin because this movement is directed against an Italian-dominated government. [no kin]

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MACEDONIA

Macedonian Albanians

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The 1980s saw assimilationist campaigns and repeated acts of repression against ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. For instance, in 1983, teachers in Tetova were disciplined and dismissed from the League of Communists for not observing certain regulations concerning the use of Macedonian in official paperwork. In December 1986, a registrar in Tetova was expelled for registering names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment” (Poulton 1993: 80). Repression appears to have intensified towards the end of the decade. According to Milosavlevski & Tomovski (1997), in the late 1980s, the Albanian language was removed from public sight, and Albanian families were prohibited from naming their children with Albanian names. Also, Albanian families were prohibited from having more than two children. In 1988, a ban was introduced on restricting the selling of land in western Macedonia to ethnic Albanians. This was to prevent ethnic Albanians buying land, thereby creating ethnically pure areas (Poulton 1993; Bennett 1994). Hence, there was a cultural rights restriction due to the events in the late 1980s (we code it in 1988). [1988: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1990 Macedonia’s constitution was amended. The amendment redefined the state from a “state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish nationalities” to a “national state of the Macedonian people” without making mention of Albanians (Poulton 2000). [1990: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The 1991 constitution of independent Macedonia did not make mention of the ethnic Albanians as a constituent national group, a status that dissatisfied the Albanians (Zahariadis 2003: 262). Bennett (1994) quotes a PDP member saying: “In 1944, when Macedonia was created by Tito, both Albanians and Macedonians started out on an equal footing, but now we are treated like second class citizens”. Furthermore, the new constitution disadvantaged the Albanians with regard to language (e.g. no use of Albanian with state authorities), education (no higher education in Albanian) and the use of national symbols (e.g. limited use of Albanian flag) (Karajkov 2008). Thus, the Albanians’ cultural rights were restricted. [1991: cultural rights restriction]
 - o Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 178) note that the Macedonian Albanians, citing discrimination in higher education, established their own Albanian university in Tetovo (in 1994). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 178), the Macedonian government has declared the university illegal. It only recognized the university after the Ohrid agreement (see below). We do not code a separate restriction because the declaration of the university as illegal/non-recognition of the university (it has continued working, it appears, despite non-recognition) appears very much related to the 1991 constitution, which did not provide for higher education in Albanian.
- In July 1997, violence erupted (3 deaths) when the Macedonian government took down the Albanian flag from the town hall in Gostivar, resulting in widespread demonstrations (Koppa 2001; Karajkov 2008). Due to this contested display of the Albanian flag in Gostivar, Tetova and other towns, which is perceived as a separatist act by the Macedonian government, the

Constitutional court forbade the use of Albanian flags. As a consequence, the parliament adopted a law on the restricted use of the Albanian flag (BBC 2012). [1997: cultural rights restriction]

- In July 1999, Macedonia's foreign minister announced that country's Albanian minority will be allowed to have a university where instruction will be in their own language (Naegele 1999). In 2000, the Albanian-language Tetovo University was legally recognized (Cunningham 2014: 216). [1999: cultural rights concession]
- In 2001, political violence escalated when ethnic Albanian rebels (the National Liberation Army, NLA/UCK) attacked Macedonian police stations and military posts in northern and western Macedonia. The relations between Albanians and Macedonians deteriorated, and between 70 and 250 people died during the armed clashes (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The civil conflict ended with the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001. The Ohrid agreement involved various features of consociationalism, such as a minority veto in parliament regards key decisions, proportional representation in the public administration, autonomy in the form of municipal decentralization, as well as concessions on language (Bieber 2005). With regard to autonomy, the local self-government sketched out in the Ohrid agreement is limited in nature, especially with regard to legislation and unified institutions, but it still constitutes some form of territorial self-government for the Albanian community (Bieber 2005). The number of competencies exercised at the municipal level was significantly increased, aiming to provide the local level greater control over the management of their own affairs (Lyon 2011; Kreci & Ymeri 2010). With regard to cultural rights, the Ohrid Agreement reduced the threshold for the official use of languages other than Macedonian in municipalities from 50 to 20 percent (Lyon 2011). As a result, Albanian has acquired official status in 29 of 85 municipalities in total (Turkish, Serbian, Romani, and most recently Vlach also acquired official status in a few municipalities). Moreover, the Albanian-language University of Tetovo has been recognized by Macedonian authorities." (BBC 2012; Minority Rights Group International). It is somewhat ambiguous whether the Ohrid agreement should be coded as an autonomy concession or (merely) a cultural rights concession. We code it as a cultural rights concession since there was devolution but not to regions but to municipalities. [2001: cultural rights concession]
- With regards to the Ohrid agreement, it has to be noted that "[...] ethnic Albanians who live in areas where they do not constitute 20 per cent of the population [still] face problems with language use in public administration and access to education in their mother tongue. Ethnic Albanians are often victims of hidden discrimination, including by public officials" (Minority Rights Group International).
- To further implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, the Macedonian parliament in 2004 initiated legislation on redrawing local boundaries in order to give the Albanians more local autonomy in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic Macedonian nationalists initiated a referendum against this legislation, but the referendum failed due to low voter turnout (BBC 2012). We do not code a concession since the legislation implements the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, which was coded already. Moreover, the reform did not effectively increase the level of Albanian self-rule, for instance, the Albanians are still underrepresented in the police or military, even in the municipalities where they predominate.
- In July 2005, the Macedonian parliament passes a law which gave Albanians the right to fly the Albanian flag in districts where they form the majority (BBC 2012). [2005: cultural rights concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In January 1992, Macedonian Albanians organized a unilateral referendum on their autonomy (Engström 2003). The Macedonian government denied the validity of the poll (Bennett 1994; Lund 2005). We found no evidence for a declaration in the context of the referendum, however, except for a marginal declaration of independence proclaimed three months after the referendum: in April 1992, the breakaway Republic of Ilirida was proclaimed in the town Struga, which, however, did not receive popular support (Ramet 1997; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). We do not code the declaration since it came from a marginal faction.

Major territorial change

- Macedonia attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

- The Ohrid Agreement devolved certain competencies to municipalities; devolution to a region was specifically avoided (Bieber 2005; Minorities at Risk Project). The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the police and the military provides suggestive evidence of the lack of regional autonomy: the Albanians claim that even in areas dominated by ethnic Albanian, the police force remains overwhelmingly ethnic Macedonian. The situation in the military is the same where the proportion of the ethnic Albanian in the ranks is estimated at 25 percent, while in the officer corps it is even lower (Minorities at Risk Project). Hence we do not code regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Claims vary from moderates who are committed to the unity of the Macedonian state and demand “non-territorial autonomy in the political sphere” (Ackermann 2000: 61-62), to radicals who wish to secede from Macedonia in order to unify with Kosovo and / or Albania (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 178). However, support for outright separation is low among the popular Albanian politicians. For instance, when comparing the situation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia in 1999, Arben Xhaferri, the leader of one of the more radical Albanian parties, the DPA (PDSH), stated that Albanians in Macedonia have been politically but never administratively separate and therefore, “it is impossible to talk of reshaping the borders in Macedonia” (Minorities at Risk Project). The majority of Albanians favor a solution in the middle between these two extreme positions: regional autonomy (Bajrami 2009). In particular, it has to be noted that the majority of the NLA/UCK insurgents fighting against the Macedonian authorities in the civil conflict in 2001 were not secessionists and did not demand independence, in contrast to the Albanian insurgents in Kosovo. Their major aim was a better representation of Albanians in the Macedonian government, that is “human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and constitutional reforms” (Daskalovski 2004: 61). Based on this, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1991-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Macedonian Albanians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Albanians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34302000

Territory

- The majority of Macedonia’s Albanians are concentrated in western Macedonia (MRGI). They form more than 75% of the local population in their “regional base” according to MAR. Further evidence comes from Macedonia’s 2002 census. The 2002 census counted 509,000 Albanians.

Macedonia is divided into eight statistical regions. There were 223,000 Albanians in the Polog region, where Albanians make up 73% of the local population. An additional 82,000 Albanians were in the Southwestern region, where Albanians make up 37% of the local population. Combining the two, 60% of the Albanians lived in those two regions, and they made up 56% of the local population. [concentrated]

- The claimed territory (western Macedonia) borders Albania, Yugoslavia (as of 2008: Kosovo). No seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- In neighboring Albania, in Yugoslavia (mainly Kosovo), and after 2008 also in Kosovo (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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MEXICO

Mayans

Activity: 1987-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Mayans developed the highest culture of pre-Columbian America, reaching their apex between 600 and 900 A.D. (Minahan 2002: 1215). In the 9th and 10th centuries, Toltec invaders from central Mexico overran the Yucatan peninsula (Minahan 2002: 1215). A federation of three city-states in the late thirteenth century began a long period of stability and prosperity, which crumbled around 1440 when a fierce civil war ended the federation (Minahan 2002: 1215). The Spanish launched an expedition against the Mayans in 1513-35, and the last Mayan strongholds fell to the Spanish in 1546 (Minahan 2002: 1216). By 1839 the Central American states had broken away from Spain, including Yucatan. Subsequently indigenous groups lost the right to limited self-government they had enjoyed under colonial rule, and Mexico's long-standing policy of assimilation began (Peña 2006: 282-283). Mexican troops ended the Yucatan secession in 1843 but failed to reclaim other regions. A rebellion against the cruel European and Mestizo landlords erupted in 1847, which evolved into a brutal civil war, known as the War of the Castes that lasted until 1848. A part of the peninsula remained under Mayan control until 1902. There was another revolt in 1910, and after some initial successes, the Mayans withdrew to the inaccessible areas of the Quintana Roo (Minahan 2002: 1216). During the revolution and civil war in Mexico from 1914 to 1919, Felipe Carillo (with active Mayan involvement) effectively separated the region from the weak Mexican state and declared independence on April 3, 1916, as the "Socialist Republic of Yucatan" (Minahan 2002: 1216). The Mayans again rebelled in 1923, and an alliance of Mayan and Mestizo leaders again declared Yucatan independent from Mexico on July 3, 1924. The rebellion was quickly crushed and Yucatan returned to Mexican control. Yucatan was administratively divided (Minahan 2002: 1217). We code a prior restriction given the Mayans' long-standing loss of autonomy. We found no restriction or concession in the ten years up to the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- The 1991 constitution recognized that "Mexico is a multicultural nation based originally upon its indigenous peoples", promising the promotion and development of indigenous culture and an end to assimilationist policy (Peña 2006: 287). However, the policy change was largely rhetoric in nature (Peña 2006: 288), thus we do not code a concession.
- February 17, 1996, the EZLN (Zapatistas) and Mexican officials signed the first phase of the San Andres Accords, designed to end the uprising in Chiapas. The accord dealt with Indian rights and culture, and implied governmental recognition of the indigenous right to land and autonomy, including control over natural resources, economical rights, and the election of their leaders (Minorities at Risk Project). We code it even though implementation was very slow (see below) since the San Andres Accords constitute a very significant promise. [1996: autonomy concession]
- In subsequent years the peace process stagnated, and the central government did not take steps to implement the agreement until 2001. We code a restriction in 1997 to reflect the lack of implementation. [1997: autonomy restriction]

- In 2001, the federal government enacted an amendment to the constitution and an indigenous rights law. The 2001 law was based on the San Andres Agreements. However, while bringing some improvements compared to the 1991 constitution, the final version constituted a very watered down version of the San Andres Accord, and was met by massive protest from the side of the EZLN and other indigenous rights groups. Most of the 1996 points that were agreed upon between the EZLN and the Mexican government were revoked (Hernandez 2002; Peña 2006: 291-293). Since the 2001 law went significantly below the 1996 agreement, we code an autonomy restriction. [2001: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- In late 1994, the Zapatistas began to create unilaterally declared autonomous regions and municipalities. The State Council for Indian and Peasant Organizations (CEOIC) and Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC) declared the creation of seven ethnic regions within Chiapas on October 12, 1994 (Mattiace 1997: 52). [1994: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1994: establishment of de-facto independence]

Regional autonomy

- Given de-facto independence we code regional autonomy from 1995 onwards. [1995-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- January 1, 1994, a Zapatista rebel group that was composed largely of Mayan Indians seized the mayor's office in San Cristobal de las Casas, a municipality in Mexico's southern-most state, Chiapas (Minorities at Risk Project). Starting in late 1994, de-facto autonomy arrangements were established by means of civil disobedience or violence in the state of Chiapas (Mattiace 1997: 45). The Zapatistas (EZLN) claimed that there are at least 38 such "autonomous" municipalities, and two "autonomous" regions. The EZLN is strongly supported by Mayans (Minorities at Risk Project). Other organizations claim to have established de-facto autonomies in another six regions of Chiapas. While only some of the claim territories can be considered de-facto independent from Mexico (in particular those in the Highlands, the North, and the East of Chiapas), the territory controlled by indigenous, in particular Mayan, organizations seems substantial (Trejo 2002: 6-7). The autonomous municipalities continued to operate up to 2012, hence we code de-facto independence from 1995 onwards, following the first of January rule. It has to be noted though that the Zapatistas never declared independence from Mexico, and have emphasized that they seek an autonomous status within Mexico rather than secession (Trejo 2002: 7). Furthermore, the majority of Mayans lives outside the de-facto independent territories, which makes this code somewhat ambiguous. [1995-2012: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Claims have been for increased autonomy throughout. According to Jung (2003), the Mexican Mayans demands include bilingual education, the right to local and regional autonomy, and to communal land as the basis of the cultural reproduction of the group. The main organization associated with the Mayan movement, the Zapatistas, began to call for autonomy in 1994 (Hewitt

& Cheetham 2000: 329). Initially the Zapatistas focused more on redistribute demands, without specifying that they were speaking mainly on behalf of indigenous peoples (Jung 2003: 454-455). However, in August 1994, the Zapatistas began to focus more on indigenous rights (Jung 2003: 458). It has to be noted that there were calls for autonomy already before the Zapatistas began their campaign, though prior to 1994 the goal of autonomy was pursued only by a small minority of the indigenous movement in Mexico (Mattiace 1997: 44). Also, note that even if the Zapatistas and other organizations entertain their own, de-facto independent autonomous regions, they emphasize that they do not seek secession but an autonomous status within Mexico (Trejo 2002: 7; Minahan 2002: 1217). Organizations representing indigenous groups other than the Mayans also support the call for autonomy, as evidenced by an April 1996 meeting where it was agreed to launch a nation-wide movement for indigenous rights, including increased autonomy and the preservation of Indian culture (Minorities at Risk). Meanwhile, the exact contours of autonomy (whether on a regional or rather on a communal basis) are debated (Mattiace 1997: 44). [1987-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Mayans
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Maya
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	7002000

Territory

- According to MAR, the Mayans have a regional base. However, less than 50% of Mayans are located in the regional base (see the variable gc7 in phase I-IV and GC7 in phase V). This matches with information from Minahan (2002: 1213). [not concentrated]
- The contours of the claimed territory are not fully clear, but claims appear focused on areas in the southeastern part of Mexico, where most Mayans reside, in particular in Chiapas, but also in other southeastern states, including Yucatan, Campeche, and Tabasco. The coding of int. borders/seashores/oil and gas reserves bases on the areas with the highest Mayan concentration identified in Minahan (2002: 1213) and GeoEPR. Those areas border Guatemala, Belize, the Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- There are reserves in Mexico's southeast, though none of the onshore reserves appears to overlap with Mayan territories as indicated in Minahan or GeoEPR. There are also offshore reserves in the larger area (PRIMKEY: OF232PET), but not in direct contiguity with Mayan territories as indicated in Minahan or GeoEPR (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR there are kin groups in three adjoining countries (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador). In Guatemala alone, there are several million Mayans. MAR suggests the same. Additional evidence comes from Minahan (2002: 1213), who mentions kin groups in Guatemala, Belize, Western Honduras, and western El Salvador. [ethnic kin in neighboring country]

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MOLDOVA

Gagauz

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The history of the territorial belongings of Gagauzia is relatively complex: it has been part of Russia, Romania, the Ottoman Empire, and Moldova. In 1906, the Gagauz leaders had declared their homeland (then part of Tsarist Russia) an independent state, but the revolt was quelled within two weeks (Minahan 2002: 632). After World War II, Moldova again became part of the Soviet Empire after being part of Romania in the inter-war period. Under Soviet rule, the Gagauz were allowed to use their language, but publications had to use the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1986, there was a concession on the Gagauz demands for protection of Gagauz culture: the Gagauz were granted the right to use their language in TV and radio broadcasting (Minahan 2002: 633-4). [1986: cultural rights concession]
- In 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). However, local choice of leaders had little effect for groups without an autonomous status as the respective regions' decision rights were very limited. Hence, this is not coded as a concession.
- In 1989, Moldova's Supreme Soviet adopted a new language law (Sato 2009: 144; Chinn & Roper 1995: 296-300; Neukirch 2001; Vahl & Emerson 2004). Moldovan (using Romanian script) was made the official language. Public officials as well as those with high positions in the private sector were required to acquire facility in both Russian and Romanian by 1994 (later this was postponed to 1997). The 1989 language law can be considered a decrease in the Gagauz' cultural rights. Arguably the critical provision was that public officials and certain people in the private sector needed to be able to communicate in Romanian within five years (Neukirch 2001); the Gagauz speak their own language, and typically Russian as their second language. We code a (prior) restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]
- In August 1990 the Gagauz Khalk unilaterally declared the separation from the Soviet Republic of Moldova, and the creation of its own Soviet Socialist Republic (Minahan 2002: 634). In response, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet dissolved and outlawed the Gagauz self-determination organization, the Gagauz Khalk. In addition, troops were sent in to prevent the elections the Gagauz Khalk had unilaterally called for October (Hewitt and Cheetham 2002). These repressive acts do not constitute restrictions as understood here, and hence they are not coded.

Concessions and restrictions

- After independence, Moldova chose the zero-option, meaning that citizenship is automatically granted to all residents of Moldova at the time of independence (if they wish to have Moldovan citizenship). This is not coded as a concession since it concerns the access dimension and not autonomy.
- The Moldovan efforts to bring the Gagauz attempt at secession under control continued after Moldovan independence in 1991, but by early 1992 the Moldovan government's authority in the region had practically ceased to exist. In 1994 Moldova grants Gagauzia far-reaching autonomy. The 1994 constitution contained an article on territorial autonomy in Gagauzia, and in December

the organic act establishing the Gagauz autonomy was adopted (Minority Rights Group International). Autonomy was implemented in 1995. The Gagauz legislature was granted law-making competencies in areas of culture, education, and taxation (Minahan 2002: 635). Furthermore, Gagauzia was granted the right to secede from Moldova if Moldova were to lose sovereignty (i.e. join Romania) (Haines 2014). We code a concession on territorial autonomy in 1994. [1994: autonomy concession]

- In the 2000s the Gagauz autonomy was granted the right of legislative initiative in national parliament. However, this had little effect given that such an initiative requires a majority in the national parliament so that it becomes national law (Protsyk 2011: 8). We do not code it as a concession. From 2002 onwards there were repeated allegations of central government interference in the affairs of the Gagauz autonomy, in particular in connection with the resigning of Croitor, the governor of Gagauzia, in 2002. Probably more relevant, a set of constitutional amendments in July 2003 abolished the Gagauz' right to declare independence if Moldova loses sovereignty (i.e. joins Romania). Moreover, the new constitution stated that Gagauzia's land and resources belong to the Moldovan people while simultaneously constituting the "economic basis" for the Gagauz people (Haines 2014). [2003: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- Gagauzia declared its independence on August 19, 1991 (Chinn & Roper 1995: 301). This is coded under the header of Moldova since Moldova was effectively independent after the failed August coup. [1991: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Moldova attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
- [1991: establishment of de-facto state]
- [1994: revocation of de-facto state]
- [1995: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Gagauzia was de-facto independent from 1991 onwards. Since the establishment of de-facto independence coincided with Moldova's independence, we code de-facto independence from 1991 onwards. Moldova granted far-reaching autonomy in 1994, and the autonomy was established in early 1995 after a referendum in March (Minority Rights Group International). Though formally there was no autonomy between late 1994/early 1995, the autonomy legislation was on its way and hence we code autonomy throughout. [1991-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- Gagauzia was de-facto independent from 1991 onwards. Since the establishment of de-facto independence coincided with Moldova's independence, we code de-facto independence from 1991-1994. [1991-1994: de-facto independence]

Claims

- There are some indications that the Gagauz claim radicalized after the failed August coup in 1991. An independence referendum was held in December 1991, turning out a wide majority for independence (Katchanovski 2005: 885). King (2000: 217), on the other hand, argues that the effective demand was for autonomy. There is thus some ambiguity concerning the dominant

claim following the August Coup, which arguably is when Moldova won independence. Given that a referendum was held only a couple of months after, we code an independence claim for 1991 (and 1992, see below). Minahan (2002: 634) notes that extreme nationalists were outflanked in 1992, moving the dominant claim back to territorial autonomy within Moldova. The main focus of the Gagauz movement remains on gaining more autonomy (Katchanovski 2005: 85; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 192). Hence, we code an autonomy claim for 1993 onwards. [1991-1992: independence claim; 1993-2012: autonomy claim].

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Gagauz
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Gagauz
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	35904000

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 630) approx. 95% of all Gagauz in Moldova are located in the Republic of Gagauzia, where they make up more than 80% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. Note that the Gagauz republic is not spatially contiguous as there are some exclaves, but the threshold is very likely to be met also if we just considered the main body. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory (Gagauzia) borders Ukraine (see Minahan 2002: 630), but not the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There are reserves, PRIMKEY MD002PET (discovered in 1957) and PRIMKEY MD002PET (1963) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- No kin according to EPR.
- The Minorities at Risk data (MAR V), on the other hand, codes “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base.” This appears to Gagauz groupings in Ukraine (35,000), Bulgaria (20,000), Greece (20,000), and Russia (10,000) mentioned by Minahan (2002: 630). None of these groupings crosses the threshold. We found no other evidence for close kindred. [no kin]

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MOROCCO

Riffians

Activity: 1958-1959; 2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Rifians are Sunni Muslims (like the Arabs) but speak their own language, Rifian, a dialect of the Berber language. At various times the Riffians had autonomous states, most recently under French colonial rule (Minorities at Risk Project). In 1904 Spain and France divided Morocco into spheres of influence. Much of the Riffian zone was assigned to the Spanish. Spanish rule was repressive and caused significant opposition (Minahan 2002: 1589). In the early 1920s the Riffians rose against the Spanish/French/Moroccans and proclaimed their own independent state. The rebellion was crushed in 1926 (Minahan 2002: 1590). Upon independence in 1956, Morocco's government embarked on an Arabization policy. The autonomy the Riffians had enjoyed under the French was not continued. Morocco's constitution forbids political parties based on language or region. Arab was adopted as the sole official language. Outsiders were appointed to head the Riffian region (Minahan 2002: 1590; Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 85-86). Thus, we code a (prior) restriction for the first phase. [1956: autonomy restriction] [1st phase: prior restriction]
- The 1958 rebellion led to harsh repression. A failed Riffian coup in 1971 again led to severe repression. The Riffian language was purged (Minahan 2002: 1590). In the 1990s repression became somewhat weaker. In 1990, the king announced that Berber will be taught in primary schools (Minorities at Risk Project; 1994 according to Minahan 2002: 1591). According to Minahan (2002: 1591) the program was never fully implemented, however. According to Minorities at Risk, Morocco's government commended Berber-language television and radio news broadcasts in 1994. 1997 saw a repressive backlash when the Moroccan government introduced new measures outlawing Berber names and restricting Berber children to approved Arab and Muslim names (Minahan 2002: 1592).
- A new king came in in 1999. According to Minahan (2002: 1592) little changed. Minorities at Risk, on the other hand, notes that the pressure on the Riffians eased somewhat: "difficulties have subsided significantly since the turn of the century." "In 2003, the Moroccan government authorized Tamazight to be taught in the Moroccan schools; in 2004, the first Berber language textbook was introduced; and in 2006, the Moroccan Minister of Education announced that children as young as fourth graders would be taught the Berber language." In line with MAR, Minority Rights Group International reports that Morocco's government began introducing instruction in the Berber language to first-year pupils in 2003. [2003: cultural rights concession]
- In response to the Arab Spring, the king ordered constitutional changes in 2011. The new constitution grants more powers to the prime minister and parliament, but the king still retains veto power over most government decisions (BBC Monitoring). Critically, the Berber language attained official status by way of the new 2011 constitution. [2011: cultural rights concession] [2nd phase: prior concession]
- Note: there have been "regionalization" reforms (in 1997 in particular), but de-facto Morocco has remained highly centralized. Regional governors are appointed by the center. Under the 1997 regionalization law the Rif homeland became divided into multiple prefectures. There are no (prior) concessions on autonomy.

Concessions and restrictions

NA

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Morocco attained independence in 1956, implying a host change. This was before the start date and is thus not coded.

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1958 the Riffians rose in rebellion against the Moroccan state. Various demands were raised, including the return of al-Khattabi (a former Riffian rebel leader) to Morocco, inclusion in the national cabinet, more favourable economic policies and language rights, but also regional autonomy (Maddy-Weitzman 2011: 85-86). [1958-1959: autonomy claim]
- In the second phase both demands for autonomy and independence are made (in the latter case in particular by the Rif Independence Movement); which claim is dominant could not be established and hence we code the more radical claim, independence. [2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Riffians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Berbers
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	60001000

- The Riffians are a Berber group. Thus, they form part of EPR's Berbers. According to Minahan (2002: 1587), there were approximately 2,600,000 Riffians in 2002. According to the World Bank, Morocco's population was 29.3 million in 2002. [1958-1959: .0887 (group size); 2012: .0887 (group size)]
- EPR codes the Berbers as powerless throughout. While there has been Berber participation in Morocco's government, the highest authority is clearly the (Arab) kings (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 1591). [1958-1959: powerless; 2012: powerless]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1587), approx. 75% of the Riffians live in the Rif region of northern Morocco, where they make up approx. 75% of the local population. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory as indicated by Minahan (2002: 1587) borders the Mediterranean Sea and Spain's African exclaves (in particular Ceuta and Melilla). [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The Riffians are a Berber group and are thus subsumed under EPR's Berbers. For the latter, EPR codes several numerically significant kin groups in Algeria, Niger, Mali and Libya. In addition, Minahan (2002: 1587) reports "substantial" Riffian populations in Algeria and France. The number of Riffians in France is unclear, but even the lower numbers (128,000 as provided by Joshua Project) would cross the threshold. We found no estimate of the number of Riffians in Algeria, but it appears to be few. [kin in neighboring country]

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Saharawis

Activity: 1975-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Western reaches of the Sahara desert were claimed by several “states” prior to the 8th century, though the area did not really engage their active interest. Western Sahara was then conquered by the Arabs. In the 10th century Western Sahara fell to Morocco. Though the Western Saharawis nominally were Moroccan subjects, there was little contact between the Saharawis and the Moroccans (Minahan 2002: 1624). In 1860, the sultan granted Spain rights to the region, and Spain established two protectorates in 1884. The colonial administration was confined to coastal areas and oases until 1934 Minahan 2002: 1624. Prior to 1934, the Saharawis de-facto had not known supratribal authority (Hodges 1983: 28). January 10, 1958, Western Sahara was made into a Spanish province with its own governor in El-Ayoun (Hodges 1983: 33). In response to growing pressure for decolonization, the Spanish government in 1966 promised the UN that it would eventually allow self-determination in the region, a promise that was never kept (Minahan 2002: 1625). The promise of self-determination was made to rebuff the Mauritanian and Moroccan claims on Western Sahara in the hope that they, the Spanish, could reap the benefits of Western Sahara’s phosphate wealth themselves. Evidence for the hollowness of the promise is that the same year (that is, 1966) the Spanish authorities “succeeded in persuading 800 *shioukh* to address a petition to the United Nations, in March 1966, supporting continued union with Spain” (Hodges 1983: 44). Spain continued to make meaningless ‘concessions’. In 1967, Spain established an all-Saharawi territorial assembly, which however had no real powers, in particular no legislative powers (Hodges 1983: 37). Given the Spanish unwillingness to implement their rhetoric commitment to Saharawi self-determination, from 1967-1973 the UN General Assembly called on Spain every year to conduct a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara. Spain did not take steps towards implementation until 1974, when the Spanish government unveiled plans for the installment of self-government in Western Sahara and only one month later announced that a referendum would be held in the first six months of 1975 (Hodges 1983: 43-44, 54). However, faced with fierce Moroccan opposition against the holding of an independence referendum, Spain shortly thereafter rowed backwards, shelved the autonomy statute and postponed the referendum. In sum, 1974 first saw significant autonomy and independence concessions, and then autonomy and independence restrictions. Thus, we code a prior restriction. [1974: autonomy concession; independence concession; autonomy restriction; independence restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In November 1975 Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords. In a radical reversal of its previous policy, Spain thereby transferred to Morocco the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara, and to Mauritania the southern third (Hodges 1983: 55). With the Madrid Accords, the Spanish promise for self-determination and the holding of a referendum on independence became obsolete. In August 1974 Spain had promised a referendum on independence to be held in the first half of 1975; shortly thereafter Spain had postponed (but not cancelled) the referendum (see Hodges 1983). [1975: independence restriction]
- In 1979, Mauritania gave up its claim to the southern territories. The southern regions were promptly annexed by Morocco (Rothermund 2006: 125). [1979: independence restriction]

- In 1980, Morocco began to build a border wall to separate the territories it controlled from the POLISARIO-controlled territories, protect its own civilians and important phosphate mining operations. By 1988, the wall was 1,000 miles long; today it is almost 2,000 miles long (Pazzanita 1994: 275; MRGI). [1980: autonomy restriction]
- In 1988, Morocco and POLISARIO agreed to hold an independence referendum (Stephan and Mundy 2006: 7). This constituted a very significant promise and there were steps towards implementation. Thus we code a concession on independence. [1988: independence concession]
 - o Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 320) claim the referendum agreement was in 1991, but this appears to be wrong.
- In August 1991, King Hassan called on the UN to delay the referendum, which had been planned for January 1992, for four months. The referendum has since been delayed over and over again. The Moroccan side has continued to reject the holding of an independence referendum ever since (Minahan 2002: 1626). [1991: independence restriction]
- In 2000, Sahrawis founded the Western Saharan Section of the Forum for Truth and Justice (FVJ) in Al-'Ayoun. This was a branch of the national Moroccan organization that focused on the issue of past political prisoners and "disappearances" of King Hassan's regime. The FVJ's Sahara Branch was the first ever Sahrawi-led organization dealing with rights issues - the Moroccan government banned it three years later, claiming it had committed acts of "separatism." Since that time, the political space for Sahrawi activism in the Western Sahara has been extremely curtailed. (Stephan and Mundy 13)
- In June 2001, an autonomy plan introduced by the UN (the so-called "Baker Plan") was accepted by Morocco, but not by the Saharawis (Minahan 2002: 1628). The plan was rejected by POLISARIO. A second version of the plan envisioned a five-year phase of autonomy followed by a referendum on independence. This was rejected by Morocco because it saw its territorial integrity threatened. In 2005, King Mohammed declared that Morocco was willing to offer the Western Sahara "enhanced autonomy" under Moroccan sovereignty. The offer was repeated, for example, in 2007 at the United Nations. According to Stephan & Mundy (2006: 18), the autonomy promises were largely rhetorical and there have not been steps taken towards implementation; hence we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- On February 27, 1976, Saharawi rebel leaders declared the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Minahan 2002: 1626). [1976: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1975, parts of the Saharawi land came under Moroccan control. [1975: host change (new)]
- In 1979, Mauretania gave up its claim to the southern territories. The southern regions were promptly annexed by Morocco (Rothermund 2006: 125). [1979: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Ever since 1974, independence has been the goal of POLISARIO, the major organization associated with the Saharawi movement (Hodges 1983: 53). In 1976, Saharawi rebel leaders declared independence. In negotiations, Sahrawi leaders have repeatedly demanded independence (Minahan 2002; Stephan & Mundy 2006). [1975-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Saharawis
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1/Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Sahrawis
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	60003000

- EPR codes the Saharawis only as of 1976; the 1976 codes are applied also to 1975. [1975: discriminated; 1975: .016 group size]

Territory

- Reliable data on the population of Western Sahara is very difficult to get by, as there has not been a census since the 1970s. According to a 1974 census conducted by the Spanish colonial authorities there were 74,000 Saharawis and approximately 20,000 Spanish. Most likely the actual number of Saharawis was considerably higher, yet even this deflated figure suggests that the Saharawis were territorially concentrated before Morocco's annexation. In subsequent years, the share of Western Saharawis decreased significantly, both due to Moroccan colonization and Saharawi refugees leaving the area. The first big refugee push came in 1975-1976 (about 50,000) (MRGI). Today, according to UNHCR estimates, it is more than 90,000, primarily in Algeria. In 1980, Morocco began to build the border wall to separate the territories it controlled from the sparsely populated POLISARIO-controlled territories. Morocco maintained a force of 100-200,000 there (MRGI). By 1995 more than 100,000 Moroccans had settled in the area (Minahan 2002: 1627). MRGI suggests that has been even more by 1991. According to Minahan, the Saharawis make up but 35% in recent years. In sum, it is pretty clear that the Saharawis lost their majority status at some point after the Moroccan annexation, though it is not clear when (this departs from MAR, but MAR appears to be wrong). Given the big refugee wave in 1975-1976 and that Morocco soon started to resettle Moroccans, some date in the mid to late 1970s or early 1980s appears to reflect the collected information best. [1975-1979: concentrated, 1980-2012: not concentrated]
- Land border with Mauritania, seashore (Atlantic Ocean). [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- EPR codes ethnic kin in Mauritania during the Mauritanian occupation of parts of the Western Sahara; based on EPR figures the number of Saharawis in Mauritania was narrowly above the 100,000 threshold. Note, again, that reliable data is very difficult to get by. [1975-1979: kin in neighboring country]
- MAR also codes kin due to Saharawis in Mauritania, as well as Algeria (refugee camps). As noted above, the UNHCR estimates that the number of Saharawi refugees is approx. 90,000, though the Algerian government and POLISARIO claim it is more than 150,000 (see Minahan 2002: 1623). Basing on the UNHCR figures, we do not code kin beyond 1979, the year Mauritania left the Western Sahara region. [1980-2012: no kin]

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MYANMAR

Kokang

Activity: 1958-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, several ethnic groups (among which the Shans) were promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states “should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary” (Maung Maung 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State and the Kayah State were given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein 1958).
- Following the Panglong Agreement of 1947 the Kokang were incorporated into the Union of Burma as part of the Shan State. This implies a concession for the Kokang. After World War II and as a reward for their armed resistance to the Japanese, the British had recognized Kokang as a full-fledged Shan State, or sawbwasship, an entity ruled by a local ruler (Seekins 2006). Thus, as opposed to many other ethnic groups in the Shan state, the Kokang continued to have some significant self-determination as they had their own sawbwasship and were therefore allowed to continue their feudatory rule in their area. [prior concession]
 - o Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession and thus probably implied that the Kokang’s autonomy was increased.
 - o Note: The Panglong Agreement foresaw the right to secession for the Shan state after a 10-year period. The majority group in the Shan state, the Shan, were the primary beneficiary of this rule, thus we code an independence concession only for the Shan.

Concessions and restrictions

- The autonomy of the Shan sawbwas was undermined when the central government, in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, set their territories under military administration in the 1950s. The sawbwas’ defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 2003). In 1959, the Kokang were the only sawbwas resisting incorporation into the Union’s political structure. When faced with threats of military action, however, the Kokang gave in and agreed to relinquish their powers (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1959: autonomy restriction]
 - o Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that.
- As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). Since the Kokang are Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1698), this is coded as a cultural rights concession. [1961: cultural rights concession]
- The Kokang’s semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group

International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Kokang after 1959. [1962: autonomy restriction]

- The Kokang are Mandarin speaking. Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
 - o Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
- When the Communist Party of Burma, which has been active in the Shan state since 1968, collapsed in 1989, Kokang was assigned as the autonomous First Special Region of the northern Shan State of Burma. At the same time, a temporary ceasefire was negotiated and, as part of the agreement, the Kokang received development aid and were promised no interference in drug trafficking, their main source of revenue. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were “allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories”. According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were “quasi-states within the state”. As with all other Special Regions, we code this as an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. [1989: autonomy concession]
- The 2008 constitution established six new self-administered areas: five zones (Danu, Kokang, Naga, Pa-O, Pa Laung) and one division (Wa).
 - o While there appear to be some efforts to develop autonomous principles, this process is hindered by decades of centralization and top-down governance (OECD 2013; Ghai 2008; Myanmar Times 2014).
 - o Overall, the Kokang’s autonomy was not increased relative to the 1989 concession. To the contrary, the 2008 constitution sharply decreased the Kokang’s autonomy.
 - o Namely, the constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an “attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the country” (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor).
 - o Like many other ethnic minority groups, the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF. As a consequence low-scale violent conflict erupted as government troops occupied Kokang (Kokang incident).
 - o In August 2009, the Kokang’s autonomy was eliminated (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2008: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- In 1948 Kokang became part of newly independent Burma, implying a host change. But this was before the start date.
- [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
- [1971: establishment of de-facto independence]

- [1989: abolishment of de-facto independence]
- [1989: establishment of regional autonomy]
- [2009: revocation of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- As a result of the Panglong Agreement, the Kokang enjoyed regional autonomy until 1959. [1958-1959: regional autonomy]
- When the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces with ethnic minority leaders who became integrated into the CPB (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan state territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB's commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter's dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). We hence code regional autonomy due to de-facto independence as of 1972 (first of January rule).
- After 1989, the Kokang enjoyed self-government as an autonomous First Special Region until the military junta violated the ceasefire agreement, occupied the territory and eliminated the autonomy in August 2009 ('Kokang incidence'). The coding of autonomy gets further support by the fact that the Kokang have always maintained their own armed forces and were not restricted in their cultural rights. The Kokang Defence Army (KDA), which was later integrated into the CPB, was established in 1958. When the CPB dissolved in 1989, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) emerged as its successor. [1972-2009: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 (South 2008). We code this as de-facto independence. [1972-1989: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Since the Kokang Defence Army was to a large extent integrated into the forces of the CPB and the Shan State Army, it is difficult to determine an individual claim for the Kokang. The period from 1958 to 1989 is thus coded along the lines of the overarching goals of the Shan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), which was autonomy until 1962 and the establishment of an independent state from 1963 onwards [1958-1962: autonomy claim] [1963-1989: independence claim].
- When the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was formed in 1989, its manifesto explicitly pointed out that the MNDAA will not demand secession from the union (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). We code a claim for devolution. [1990-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Kokang
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Chinese
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77503000

- The Kokang are ethnic Chinese, and thus form a branch of the EPR group 'Chinese'. The Kokang territory is located in the northern part of the Shan State. Although they are ethnically different from the Shan, their access to central state power is closely related to that of the Shan. However, contrary to the Shan, the Kokang were not not conceded junior partner status in the Panglong

agreement of 1947 (unlike the Shan) and are hence powerless (there is no evidence of discrimination as it is coded for the Chinese group as a whole in Myanmar). From 1959, the Bamar dominated the central state; all other groups became discriminated, excluded themselves from central state power, or were simply powerless. In particular, in 1959 the Shan territory was subjected to military rule in an effort to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces and to persecute the Shan underground resistance. Since the Kokang sawbwaship was part of the Shan state, discrimination affected not only the Shan, but also the Kokang. 1960 onward the Shan, and with them the Kokang, are considered powerless (at times the Shan as well as the Kokang self-excluded themselves from the central state, see above). Note that the Kokang incident of 2009 is not considered evidence of explicit and targeted discrimination against the Kokang. [1958: powerless; 1959: discriminated; 1960-2012: powerless]

- Information about the Kokangs' population size is scarce. According to the UNODC, the Kokang region is home to some 106,000. With a country population of 55,746,253 (the CIA World Factbook), the Kokang make up about .0019 of the total population. [1958-2012: .0019 (group size)]

Territory

- According to the UNODC, the Kokang region is home to some 106,000 people, a population which is "predominantly Chinese". There is no information of Kokang people in other places of Myanmar, Kokang refugees have almost exclusively fled across the border to China. [concentrated]
- The Kokang claim the Kokang sawbwaship in the northeastern corner of the Shan State (Kokang Self-administered Zone). The territory adjoins an international land border (China) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The Kokang are ethnic Chinese (Mandarin-speaking Han), and thus form a branch of the EPR group 'Chinese'. According to EPR there are Chinese kin groups in no less than twelve countries (including China, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia). [kin in adjacent country]

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Shan

Activity: 1948-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Shan dominated what is current-day Burma from the thirteenth century onwards. In the early seventeenth century, however, the Shan territory was conquered by the ethnic Burman forcing the Shans to retreat to their mountain homelands, where they diffused into over 30 states that were ruled by a feudal structure and led by Sawbwas/Saophas. The authority of the Burmese king was recognized (Minahan 2002, Minority Rights Group International).
- Under British colonial rule, the Shan states existed as protectorates but were relatively autonomous in internal affairs. As of 1920, these various Shan states were brought together to form the Federated Shan States ("1919 Act of Federated Shan States"), which eventually led to the establishment of the Shan State under the 1948 Constitution of the now independent Burma (Sakhong 2004).
- In the process of negotiating independence from Britain, the Burman political leaders sought to win the participation of the minorities in a common political union. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Shan (among others) were thus promised political authority in their own autonomous national states as well as the right to secede after ten years (Williams and Sakhong, 2005; Silverstein 1958). On the basis of the principles outlined in the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution stipulated a Union composed of National or Union States. It followed the idea that these states "should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary" (Maung Maung, 1989: 170). In addition, the Shan State (together with the Kayah and for a time the Kachin State) was given the right to secession after a 10-year trial period (Silverstein, 1958). [1947: autonomy concession, 1947: independence concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note: Panglong could be seen as a continuation of colonial policy, but is often described as a concession and thus probably implied that the Shans' autonomy was increased.

Concessions and restrictions

- The newly established Federal Union, however, was only federal in name but unitary in practice. The spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence. In the late 1950s, the Shan became increasingly disgruntled with encroaching central rule, making the theoretical option of secession a real alternative among the Shan population. In order to preempt this scenario, and in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, the central government removed the autonomy of the Shan sawbwas in 1959 and set their territories under military administration. The sawbwas' defense forces were no longer controlled by local rulers and the sawbwas were being sidestepped by General Ne Win. With this, The Shans' right to secession was effectively revoked, too (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project). [1959: autonomy restriction, 1959: independence restriction]
 - o Note: While the above narrative suggests that centralization had started before 1959, we did not find a good date to code a restriction before that.
- As part of a "Burmanisation campaign", Buddhism was declared the official state religion in 1961 (Sakhong 2012: 5). Since the Shan are Buddhists (Minahan 2002: 1698), this is coded as a cultural rights concession. [1961: cultural rights concession]

- The Shans' semi-autonomous status as promised in the Panglong Agreement was definitely abrogated after General Ne Win's coup d'état in 1962 (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). This nullified whatever little autonomy had remained with the Shan after 1959. That same year, the Shan territory was occupied by Burmese forces and its political elite was arrested or murdered. [1962: autonomy restriction]
- The Shan language is a Tai language and part of the Sino-Tai language group and has been a core issue of the Shan nationalist movement (Minahan 2002). Minority languages were targeted as part of the Burmanization campaign that was initiated after the 1962 coup. In 1965, a single education system was introduced and all schools came directly under the authority of the state. Only Burmese was allowed as a medium for instruction (Aye and Sercombe 2014) and the government prohibited the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools (Lwin 2011). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1965. [1965: cultural rights restriction]
 - o Note: The 1966 Education Act had required schools in minority areas to teach minority languages until the second grade (Aye and Sercombe 2014). But this was more of a token concession, given the generally very restrictive stance towards minority languages at the time (Aye and Sercombe 2014; Lwin 2011; Hlaing 2007). We do not code a concession.
- When the Communist Party of Burma, which has been active in the Shan state since 1968, collapsed in 1989, the Shan State Army signed a ceasefire with the government that granted them the Special Region 3, Shan State. According to South (2011: 13), the ceasefire groups were "allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories". According to Kudo (2013: 291), the special regions were created for ethnic ceasefire groups where they were allowed to maintain an autonomous territory and to hold soldiers and arms, they were "quasi-states within the state". As with all other Special Regions, we code this as an autonomy concession in the year the ceasefire was signed. Note that, despite the ceasefire with the Shan State Army, other Shan groups continued their armed opposition against the government. The Shan State National Army (SSNA) surrendered in 1996 and the Shan State Army - South command (SSA-S) signed ceasefires in 2006 and 2011. However, none of the agreements with these groups included autonomy provisions. [1989: autonomy concession]
- The 2008 constitution envisaged the incorporation of armed militias into the state hierarchy. This Border Guard Force (BGF) program was implemented in 2009 in an "attempt to neutralize armed ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army's control over all military units in the country" (Sakhong and Keenan 2013: 1). The BGF consist of ethnic soldiers but are controlled by the government. The BGF program effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). Like many other ethnic minority groups, the Shan groups rejected the government proposal to transform into a BGF - with the exception of SSA-N brigade 3 and 7, which transformed into a BGF (BNI). As opposed to the Kokang, whose territory was occupied by the military forces in an attempt to deter others, the Shan have so far successfully resisted the proposal. Nevertheless, the intention to limit the Shans' autonomy is evident, and the government attempted to implement the measure. Thus we code a restriction. [2008: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1993, Khun Sa, head of the Mong Thai Army and heavily involved in opium trafficking, declared an independent Shan state with himself as president. Since his declaration was rejected by Shan leaders, we do not code this event.
- On April 17, 2005, the Shan Interim Council (SIC) published a declaration of independence. Since the SIC did not gain support from any mainstream Shan party (South 2008), we do not code this event either.

Major territorial change

- In 1948, the Shans became part of newly independent Burma. [1948: host change (new)]

- [1959: revocation of regional autonomy]
- [1971: establishment of de-facto independence]
- [1989: abolishment of de-facto independence, establishment of regional autonomy]
- [2009: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de-facto independence]

Regional autonomy

- Despite the quick abrogation of the autonomy concessions in the Panglong Agreement, the Shan still enjoyed some autonomy in the early years of Burmese independence. This is confirmed by EPR. We thus code regional autonomy from 1948 until autonomy was officially canceled and the Shan territory set under military administration in 1959. [1948-1959: regional autonomy]
- In the late 1950s, several Shan rebel organizations took up arms in order to resist increasing centralization and the new military government under Ne Win. Thus when the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded northern Burma, they quickly joined forces. In 1971, the communist army had gained control over almost all of the Shan territory (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Almost all of the CPB's commanders were from minority groups such as the Wa, Kokang, Chinese, Kachin, Shan or others (Lintner 1990). The Shan State was ruled by the CPB until the latter's dissolution in 1989. Callahan (2007) defines this as a period where authority of the military junta is limited and there appears to be near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders (South 2008). We hence code regional autonomy as of 1972 (first of January rule). [1972-1989: regional autonomy]
- After the collapse of the CPB in 1989, the Shan State Army signed a ceasefire with the government that granted them the Special Region 3, Shan State. As outlined above, the ceasefire groups were "allowed to retain their arms and granted de facto autonomy, control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory, and the right to extract natural resources in their territories" (South 2011: 13) and were hence "quasi-states within the state" (Kudo 2013: 291). We thus continue the coding of regional autonomy.
- In 2009, the Myanmar government moved to implement the BGF program discussed above, which effectively meant the end of significant autonomy (South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor). [1990-2009: regional autonomy]
- However, the Shan successfully resisted the BGF program, which is coded as the onset of de-facto independence (implying continued regional autonomy). [2010-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- As outlined above, the CPB period saw near devolution of power to former insurgent leaders after 1971 and until 1989 (South 2008). We code this as de-facto independence. [1972-1989: de-facto independence]
- As discussed above, the Shan successfully resisted the BGF program in 2009; this is coded as the onset of de-facto independence. [2010-2012: de-facto independence]

Claims

- As a consequence of the feudal structure under the Sawbwas prior to independence, the early period of the Shan self-determination movement was dominated by localized interest groups that were loyal to clan, kin and patron. A common claim is therefore hard to isolate. It was only in the 1950s, when the concept of pan-ethnic community loyalty against the central state emerged (Brown 1988). Given that the Shan signed the devolutionary Panglong Agreement, we assume that autonomy was supported by most group members at that time. In 1959, some Sawbwas went into open secessionist revolt, when the central government refused to discuss the option of Shan secession and, in its efforts to dislodge Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma, set the Shan territories under military administration. However, as Brown (1988) lines out, most

of the Sawbwas continued to advocate Shan autonomy as promised by the Panglong Agreement of 1947. Secession, they argued, was only pursued if these demands were not met. In this first period, we thus code autonomy as the dominant claim. [1948-1962: autonomy claim].

- With the military coup of 1962, the secessionist rebellion escalated. Many sawbwas now openly advocated secession and militant Shan organizations were formed (such as the Shan State Army) with the aim of establishing an independent Shan state (Brown 1988; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
- With the decline of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Shan movement split into different factions, such as the MNDAA (Kokang), the UWSA (Wa) or the Shan State Army - North command (SSA-N), some of which heavily involved in drug trafficking. Many of those groups signed ceasefire agreements with the government or were integrated into its armed forces. The Shan State Army - South command (SSA-S), however, continued the armed opposition in pursuit of independence (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). At a 2000 conference, a majority of the delegates still favored an independent, federal Shan state over the option of membership in a Federal Union of Burma (Minahan 2002). Following the first of January rule, we therefore code independence as the dominant claim as of 1963. [1963-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Shan
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Shan
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77509000

Territory

- The Shan are concentrated in the Shan State, where they make up 48% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1697). Other major communities are the Burmese, Karenni, Wa, Kachin, and Chinese. These are mostly concentrated in certain regions, e.g. the Kachins in the north, the Karenni in the south, the Wa in the northeastern Wa division, the Chinese in Kokang, and the Burmese in the west. In the remaining territory, the Shan very likely make up a majority. We code them as not spatially concentrated nevertheless since the Shan in the Shan state (approx.. 2.13 million) are less than 50% of the entire Shan population in Myanmar (4.445 million). There are also significant Shan settlements in Kachin and Sagaing state (see GeoEPR) and in major cities. [not concentrated]
- The Shan claim an independent state along the borders of the Shan State as defined in the Panglong agreement (see administrative unit in GeoEPR). The territory adjoins international land borders (Thailand, Laos, China) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are several kin groups in neighboring countries (Shan and Thai in Thailand, the Lao in Laos, and the Thai-Lao in Cambodia). This is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk data that codes “close kindred in more than one country”, mentioning the Shan in China and Thailand as the two largest kin groups. According to Minahan (2002: 1697), there are about one million Shans in Thailand and Laos and 1.15 million Shans in China. [kin in neighboring country]

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NAMIBIA

Basters

Activity: 1990-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Basters have a history of autonomy. Before World War I, under German colonization, the Germans recognized Baster autonomy (however, fighting broke out in the early 20th century between Basters and Germans; see Kjaeret & Stokke 2003: 585). After World War I, Namibia (then: South-West Africa) was mandated to South Africa. In 1923, the South Africans replaced the Baster magistrate with a white. For the next 50 years, the colored Basters were discriminated against and ruled by a white magistrate until the 1970s, when they gained autonomy as South Africa carved up Namibia into ten 'homelands' (Minahan 2002: 293). Under the Namibian peace plan, the South African authorities had to repeal all discriminatory legislation, which included Baster autonomy. In the ensuing constitutional drafting process (that begun in 1989), the Baster representative (Kaptein Diergaardt) advocated a federal Namibia under which the Basters could keep their autonomous institutions. Diergaardt's bid for a federal Namibia was turned down, and he subsequently left the assembly (Kjaeret & Stokke 2003: 586). The resulting constitution, adopted shortly before Namibia's independence on February 9, 1990, left no room for Apartheid-style homelands (Minahan 2002: 593-4). Already in November 1989 (and thus four months prior to Namibia's formal independence), the South African administrator (Louis Pienaar) had announced the dismantling of the Baster autonomy, and had instructed the Baster Kaptein (Hans Diergaardt) and Baster parliament to step down (Beresford 1989). Despite a Supreme Court ruling issued prior to Namibia's independence, Diergaardt and companions refused to do so, and occupied the administrative buildings. We code a prior autonomy restriction due to the dismantling of the Basters' autonomy in 1989. [1989: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Namibia's constitution, adopted less than a month before Namibia's independence, limited the Basters' cultural rights as it declared English the only official language; this meant the end of Afrikaans education and administration in Rehoboth, the Basters' homeland (Minahan 2002: 294). [1990: cultural rights restriction]
- According to Kjaeret & Stokke (2003: 586): "In 1992, the Namibian territory was divided into new administrative regions that replaced the previous homelands (Simon 1996). According to the Delimitation Commission's report, this was crucial for the integration process in Namibia (Republic of Namibia 1991; Tötemeyer 1992). Today, Rehoboth Gebiet is split between two new regions, Khomas and Hardap. Within the Baster discourse, this is not perceived as an administrative reform to enhance national integration and administrative capacity, but as an attempt to oppress the Rehoboth Basters by breaking the Rehoboth Basters' territorial identity (John McNab, personal communication). The black Namibian government's border changes are seen as a politically motivated act to hinder mass mobilisation and political self-determination among the Rehoboth Basters: 'They have a very good reason for cutting Rehoboth in two, because then they divide the people. And then the power is divided' (Kaptein Hans Diergaardt, personal communication). 'It is somewhat ambiguous whether the splitting of the Rehoboth Gebiet into two entities should be considered a loss of autonomy since the administrative

divisions have relatively little power anyway. Still, the policy can be seen as a restriction because it was aimed against Baster mobilization and very much opposed by the Baster elite. There is further ground to code a restriction in 1992. Beginning in April 1992, the property belonging to previous homelands (including communal land in Rehoboth, the Baster homeland) was transferred to the Namibian state. The Basters brought the issue to the courts; in 1993 a court ruled in their favour. However, in 1995 the government won its appeal against the decision, which was confirmed by the Namibian Supreme Court in 1996 (Kjaeret & Stokke 2003: 586-7; Minority Rights Group International; Suzman 2002). The Basters continue to reclaim their land, but were unsuccessful in their endeavor until the end of 2012 (see the 2012 UNPO declaration, which reaffirms the Basters' claim on their land). [1992: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- Two days before Namibia's formal independence, on March 19, 1990 (we still code this under the header of Namibia since Namibia was effectively independent), Hans Diergaardt unilaterally declared the Rehoboth Gebiet independent under the constitution of 1872. It is a bit ambiguous whether independence or autonomy was declared; we follow Minahan (2002: 293) and code it as an independence declaration. [1990: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1990, the Basters became part of Namibia. [1990: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

- The Basters' autonomous status was abolished in 1989, thus no regional autonomy under Namibia.

De-facto independence

- Until September 1990 (six months after Namibia's independence), Hans Diergaardt and companions occupied the local administrative buildings (Minahan 2002: 393), but no evidence was found that they exerted de-facto control over some territory. Hence we do not code de-facto independence.

Claims

- Prior to Namibia's independence, the Basters threatened they would secede from Namibia if their claim for autonomy is not respected (Minahan 2002: 293; Suzman 2002). Upon independence, the Basters' leader, Kaptein Hans Diergaardt, declared Rehoboth independent. However, the independence claim appears to have given way to a more moderate autonomy claim soon after. In 1992, the Rehoboth Assembly declared the Basters an indigenous people and demanded all rights to which indigenous peoples are entitled to according to the Namibian constitution. This suggests a moderation of the earlier independence claim. This is the first clear evidence for moderation we have found. In a 2012 UNPO declaration, the demand for autonomy was reaffirmed. Hence, we code an independence claim in 1990-1992 (in accordance with the first of January rule), and an autonomy claim for 1993 onwards. [1990-1992: independence claim; 1993-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Basters
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Baster
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	56501000

Territory

- According to MAR, the Basters have a regional base, and more than 75% of the Basters are located there. This matches with information from Minahan (2002: 290), according to whom approx. 60% of the Basters are located in Rehoboth Gebied, where they make up more than 90% of the local population. [concentrated]
- No land border, no seashore (Minahan 2002: 290). [border: no; seashore: no]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- EPR does not code kin. MAR, on the other hand, codes “close kindred across a border”, referring to the Coloureds in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Basters are descendants of Afrikaners and Khoi women, and could thus also be described as “Coloureds.” [kin in neighboring country]

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NEPAL

Madhesi (Terai People)

Activity: 1951-1959; 1985-2012

General notes

- The term Madhesi refers to people living in the Terai; languages spoken by Madhesi include Hindi and Urdu (Kantha 2010: 157).

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Discrimination against Madhesi, as well as against other non-Brahmins, has a long history in Nepal (Hachhethu 2007: 9; International Crisis Group 2011). Ever since Nepal was created, it has been controlled by Brahmins and Chhetris, which form about 30% of the national population (The Economist 2012). The Madhesi did not enjoy territorial autonomy prior to 1951 (or at any point later), and their cultural rights were severely restricted. Nepali was (and remains) the only official language of Nepal, and the Madhesi have suffered from the imposition of Nepali as the only official language and medium of education (Hachhethu 2007: 9). There is a long-standing policy of denial and Nepalization, and until 1958 Terai people “were required to stop at the border town of Birganj to obtain [a] passport before proceeding to Kathmandu” (Yavad 2005: 1). Nepali-speakers did not need a passport to proceed to Kathmandu. The Madhesi belong to the three groups which have been marginalized by the state (the other two being the Janjati and the Dalit). Overall, Madhesis are severely discriminated against (Kantha 2010: 159). Hence, for the first phase we code a prior restriction due to the long-term discrimination against Madhesis, but without having identified a restriction in the ten years before the first start date. [1st phase: prior restriction]
- Between 1960 and 1990, the Nepalese state attempted to assimilate the 100-plus ethnicities of Nepal into a pan-Nepali identity through language, schooling, and legal directives. “These policies codified the cultures of upper caste Pahadis, legalizing systematic discrimination and under-representation in the government of any in Nepal who did not have this lineage. This policy was enforced rigorously; discussion of ethnic difference or inequality was a jailable offence until 1991. Overall, this suggests that the high degree of discrimination against Madhesis present already in the 1950s has yet increased. Again, we code a prior restriction due to the long-term discrimination against Madhesis, but without having identified a restriction in the ten years before the second start date. [2nd phase: prior restriction]
- Two further policies are worth mentioning, which are not, however, coded (in accordance with the codebook).
 - o First, the citizenship legislation of the 1960s discriminated against non-Nepali speakers (including the Madhesi) since command of Nepali was inserted as a prerequisite for obtaining citizenship. This resulted in many Madhesi being denied citizenship, and obtaining citizenship is a core demand of the Madhesi movement. Citizenship is required for acquiring land, which is important for Madhesis, most of which are farmers (Yadav 2005: 8). Since the denial of citizenship relates more to access to the polity than autonomy or cultural rights, we do not code a restriction.
 - o Second, there was a government-sponsored resettlement program in the mid-1980s, which financed migration of Pahadis to the Terai in an attempt to solidify control over the valuable agricultural and industrial region. Architects of the program viewed Terai citizens as ‘conquered people’ or illegal Indian migrants with no land rights” (Miklian 2012). Regarding the relocation policy, Yadav (2005: 7) and Hachhethu 2007: 8) note that the Nepali government seeks to weaken the Madhesis by relocation of Hill peoples to the Terai plains. Hachhethu (2007: 8) argues: “[...] migration from the hills has been

propagated as the state's concerted plan to assimilate the Madheshis into the fold of hill culture and to establish hill political dominance in the Tarai. Certainly the Nepali state encouraged migration from south of the border in the past and from hill to the Madhesh since the 1950s which served the interest of small hill elites. Land and forest are the two major resources of the Madhesh that have been distributed disproportionately in favour of the hill people. One cannot deny the fact that hill migration was used as one of the instrument for homogeneous model of Nepalization which has adverse impact in the Madhesh so far its cultural uniqueness, economic interest and political power structure are concerned. Four major factors – end of malaria, land reform act of 1964, launching of several resettlement projects in the Madhesh, and construction of the East-West highway – led to flow of hill dwellers into the Madhesh.” However, in accordance with the codebook, relocation policies are not coded.

Concessions and restrictions

- Democratization began in 1990 and opened some room for the Madhesis to articulate their demands. The 1990 constitution embraced multilingualism and multiculturalism, and granted recognition to several languages, including Tarai languages. However, these changes were cosmetic and did not lead to actual policy changes, in particular not to the recognition of languages other than Nepali (Kantha 2010: 159). For example, the Supreme Court voided a decision to experiment with the introduction of Maithali as official language in a Terai district in 1990. After all, Nepal remained a unitary state with Nepali as the sole official language (International Crisis Group 2011: 5). This was reaffirmed in 1999, when the Supreme Court declared illegal the use of any language other than Nepali in local government bodies (International Crisis Group 2011: 5). The ‘cosmetic’ embracement of multilingualism and multiculturalism in the 1990 constitution is not coded as a concession.
- The post-1990 governments did take some action on the citizenship issue (citizenship is denied to many Madhesis since the command of Nepali is a prerequisite). A few thousand passports were distributed in 1997. A more liberal Citizenship Act was passed in 1999. However, the Supreme Court declared the latter unconstitutional (Hachhethu 2007: 9). In 2007 1.5 million passports were distributed in the Terai through door-to-door visits (Hachhethu 2007: 9). Since the denial of citizenship relates more to access to the polity than autonomy or cultural rights, we do not code a concession or restriction.
- Following the 2006 Janandolan II uprising, the transitional government made some concessions to the Dalit, women, and the Janjatis, but the Madhesis were left out (in particular, the introduction of secularism in 2006 (reiterated in the 2007 interim constitution, see Letizia 2012: 66) does not constitute a concession since the Madhesis are Hindus). Their primary individual rights demand – the recognition of languages other than Nepali – remains unaddressed.
- This contributed to the 2007 and 2008 Madhesi uprisings, which led to two peace agreements and to changes to the interim constitution (which, despite lobbying by various ethnic group leaders, had not made mention of federalism). In particular, a commitment to federalism was included, though there is more resistance against the demand for a single Madhes (One Madhes) region (Miklian 2012; International Crisis Group 2011). It is doubtful, however, whether the agreements can really be interpreted as a true autonomy offer. There appears to be significant opposition against federalization. The constituent assembly, tasked with the drafting of a new constitution, was unable to adopt a constitution within four years, and was dissolved in 2012. Thus, Nepal remains federalist on paper only (The Economist 2012; International Crisis Group 2011). We do not code a concession because the autonomy offer is too vague and because implementation has not even started.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The dominant self-determination claim of the Madhesis (they have other claims, such as inclusion in the central government and eviction of non-Madhesis from the Terai region) is the federalization of Nepal. This is true for both the early phase of contention in the 1950s and the later phase starting in the 1980s (Hachhethu 2007; Miklian 2012). Writing on the recent developments in 2007 and onwards, Miklian (2012) notes that: “The UDMF’s [United Democratic Madhesi Front’s] goal is to rectify generations of discrimination through the creation of an autonomous state of Madhes that is free of direct rule by the traditional power elites in the capital of Kathmandu” as well as “[t]he principal demand calls for the ‘liberation’ of the entire Terai by redrawing the region into a single autonomous unit called Madhes that will have the right to self-determination under Nepal’s yet to be finalized federal system. This demand is known in common parlance as ‘One Madhes’ in Nepal.” In very recent times, there is also some talk about secession, but at least for the time being, this appears a minority view (Miklian 2012). [1951-1959, 1985-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Madhesis
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Madhesi
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	79005000

Territory

- The term Madhesis relates to Hindus and, depending on the interpretation, also Muslims, from Nepal’s South (the plains or Terai region). According to Sijapati (2013: 159), the Madhesis have a strong geographical concentration: most live in a narrow strip of 10 districts in the central and eastern Terai (Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha, Saptari, Sunsari, and Morang), where they comprise more than 80% of the local population. This is the best estimate we could get by; data for earlier years could not be found, though Sijapati (2013: 166) suggests that the ethnolinguistic composition has remained relatively constant since the 1950s. [concentrated]
- The claimed Terai area borders India, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups. Sijapati (2013: 166), on the other hand, suggests that there is ethnic kin across the border in India. The Madhesis are often (pejoratively) referred to as Indians in Nepal (many speak Hindi, others Urdu). [kin in neighboring country]

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NICARAGUA

Sumos (Mayangnas)

Activity: 1974-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Nicaragua's Atlantic coastal indigenous peoples, including the Miskitos but also the Mayangnas, had far-reaching autonomy until the mid-19th century, when the British established colonial rule. The semi-autonomous colonial entity was dominated by the Miskitos, and the Mayangnas faced harsh repression and discrimination (Hannum 1996: 204). In 1894 Nicaragua annexed the territory, and the Miskitos lost their autonomous status (though some communal land grand titles had been granted by 1905, see Minorities at Risk Project). Mestizo immigration and assimilation pressure followed, though the Atlantic coast region continued to be relatively isolated from the rest of Nicaragua and many indigenous communities continued to exercise de-facto control over their territories (Minority Rights Group International; Hannum 1996: 205-207). On balance, this leads us to code a prior restriction, though there seems not to have been a restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Nicaragua's inaccessible coastal region had been relatively isolated and left to its own devices until 1979, when the Sandinistas took over government. The Sandinistas aimed to extend the state's reach into the region; furthermore, they denied indigenous land rights, which historically had at least de-facto been accepted (Hannum 1996: 208; Minorities at Risk Project). Moreover, the Sandinistas' literacy campaign, initiated in 1979, had an exclusive focus on Spanish, which alienated indigenous groups, in particular the Miskitos, according to Minority Rights Group International (also see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 198). The imposition of Spanish does not seem to constitute a new policy, however, since there had been long-standing assimilationist pressure and policies. Still, the combination of the literacy campaign with the land rights policy and the centralizing tendencies of the Sandinistas make us code an autonomy restriction in 1979. [1979: autonomy restriction]
- In 1984, the Sandinistas and MISURATA, the main indigenous organization, began negotiations on an autonomy solution, the Sandinistas' policy was reversed. MISURATA dropped out of the negotiations in 1985, but the autonomy process continued (Hannum 1996: 224). The 1986 constitution recognizes the Nicaraguan people as "multi-ethnic" and provides for autonomous indigenous governments to be established by law. In 1987, the Sandinista government adopted the Statute of Autonomy for the Atlantic Coast Regions which promised (very limited) autonomy, land rights and the status of regional official languages for indigenous languages as well as certain educational guarantees (Hannum 1996: 212, 216-217, 224; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 198). We code an autonomy concession in 1984, which is when the autonomy process was initiated. [1984: autonomy concession]
- However, various sources indicate that successive governments deliberately delayed the implementation of the autonomy statute and that no meaningful autonomy emerged (Minority Rights Group International; IWIGA 2011; Unger 2010; Minorities at Risk Project). In particular, in 1990, the Violeta Chamorro government began to reassert central control over the Atlantic coast through the Regional Development Institute, and the central government – in violation of

the autonomy statute – continued “its unilateral handling of the Caribbean Coast natural resources”. Another example is that the regulation of communal property was not ratified until 2003. To reflect the delayed and partial implementation, we code an autonomy restriction in 1990. [1990: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Given the partial implementation of the 1987 autonomy statute (see above), no meaningful autonomy has been established.

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Various sources (Barocco 2011; Hannum 1996; Greer et al. 2010; Unger 2010) indicate that the Mayangnas movement lobbies for land rights and regional autonomy. [1974-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Sumos (Mayangnas)
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Sumos
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	9305000

Territory

- According to MRGI, the Sumos live in an isolated area in northern Nicaragua: “There are now approximately 8,000 Mayagna consisting of three separate peoples each with a distinct identity. These are the Twahka, the Panamaka and the Ulwa all of whom still speak related dialects of a common Mayagna language and mainly live in villages along the rivers of the RAAN [Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte] in some of the region's most isolated areas.” GeoEPR also suggests that the Sumos are concentrated. [concentrated]
- It is not entirely clear what territories they claim; based on the settlement polygon in GeoEPR, the area borders Honduras, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- No kin according to EPR, though it has to be added that there are small Sumos communities across the border in Honduras (approx. 1,000, see Joshua Project). This does not cross the numeric threshold, of course. We found no other evidence for a larger group that would qualify as kin. [no kin]

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NIGER

Toubou

Activity: 1994-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Niger became a colony within French West Africa in 1922. When the colonial rulers put in place a tax system that taxed the trade of Toubous and Tuareg, the two groups resisted violently. Their efforts were met with scorched-earth tactics that killed and expelled many Tuareg and Toubou (Minority Rights Group International).
- The French colonial rule left in place a highly centralized system of governance “that conflicted with the Tuareg and the Toubou ways of life” (Suso 2010: 34). Not only were they excluded from access to central power but they were also forced to give up their nomadic way of life and adopt a sedentary agriculture community. [prior restriction]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. In particular, the democratization process in the early 1990s did not bring about a change in the level of autonomy of the Toubous.

Concessions and restrictions

- A ceasefire agreement was signed between the Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara (FARS) and the Nigerien regime in November 1997. The agreement contained an amnesty for rebel fighters, an exchange of prisoners and the integration of the rebel fighters into the national armed forces. The agreement was upheld until September 2001, when renewed fighting broke out. However, since none of the above measures increases the level of autonomy, this event is not reflected in the coding (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
- In 1998, there was another cease-fire agreement between the Nigerien government and the Front démocratique du renouveau (FDR) which contained similar measures as the agreement with FARS. Apart from providing for a ceasefire, the accord contained a general amnesty, repatriation and the integration of the FDR forces into the regular armed forces. Again, since none of these measures implies an increase in the level of autonomy, this event is not reflected in the coding (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- As mentioned above, Niger inherited highly centralized government structures from French colonial rule, making any form of devolution of power improbable. The absence of regional power for the Toubou is confirmed by the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman et al. 2010), which codes them as powerless both with regard to central power and regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There were two separate Toubou movements involved in the conflict. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, they both aimed at the establishment of an autonomous zone in eastern Niger that stretches from Diado in the north and Zinder in the south to the Chadian border in the east. Idrissa and Decalo (2012) and Carment (2012), on the other hand, describe the Toubou as an irredentist movement that wants reunification with its kin in Chad, Libya and Sudan. Carment (2012), examining the situation of the Toubou in neighbouring Libya, dismisses such claims for secessionism and irredentism as a mere bargaining strategy to extract concessions from the centre. In light of their small population, their geographic dispersion, their low concentration in large urban centres and the resulting low mobilization capacity to effectively mobilize for secession, such claims do not seem credible. Nevertheless, the claim for union with the ethnic kin in Chad, Libya, and Sudan is the dominant SD claim, despite it not being very credible. We code this as an independence claim as the Toubou want to form their own, independent state together with Toubou from other countries rather than merge with an already-existing state. [1994-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Toubou
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Toubou
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	43605000

Territory

- Information on the Toubou settlement is scarce. They constitute a small minority in Niger. According to Minority Rights Group International they are predominantly found in the Kaouar and Djado areas and “control the salt pans, acting as intermediaries between the Kanuri population of the oases and the Tuareg overlords.” We code them as regionally concentrated since we could not find evidence of another group making up a majority in the Toubou regional base. GeoEPR also codes them as regionally concentrated (though GeoEPR applies a lower threshold). [concentrated]
- The Toubou claim a territory in eastern Niger that stretches from Diado in the north and Zinder in the south to the Chadian border in the east. The territory adjoins an international land border (Chad) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Lujala et al. (2007) code a hydrocarbon field overlapping with the Toubou lands (PRIMKEY: NG001PET), which was discovered in 1975. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there are kin groups in neighboring Chad (>100,000) and Libya (<100,000). [kin in neighboring country]

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NIGERIA

Northerners

Activity: 2002-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity (2002)

- Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced various degrees of decentralization. The country started off as a federation devolving a considerable amount of legislative and executive power to its three regions: the Northern, Western, and Eastern Region (Deiwiks 2011). Following the Biafran war, political power was mostly concentrated in the hands of the federal government at the expense of the sub-state entities (Mustapha 2004). The Second Republic from 1979-1983 again saw some meaningful devolution of power to the regions that also included autonomy for the country's northern states. After 15 years of centralization following the re-imposition of military rule between 1984 and 1999, the Fourth Republic again put in place some degree of decentralization through federal structures. However, it remains disputed in how far the Fourth Republic was really decentralized, as Obiyan and Amuwo (2012) consider Nigeria a unitary state with significant amount of power remaining at the central state. Nevertheless, there was a trend towards increased territorial autonomy for the northern states. Moreover, in 1999 several northern states adopted Sharia law (Harnischfeger 2008). Note that the Northerners movement's primary aim is for the establishment of an Islamic state. While it seems that Sharia law has not been fully implemented, we consider this sufficient to code an initial cultural rights concession (as well as an autonomy concession due to the 1999 decentralization). [1999: autonomy concession; 1999: cultural rights concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- From its emergence, the movement has been persecuted by the central government. Forest (2012) mentions force as the only government strategy in response to Boko Haram. According to a report by Amnesty International, the Nigerian police and anti-terrorist units are responsible for hundreds of extra-judicial killings and disappearances related to the state's counter offensive. No concessions or restrictions are coded for the period of movement activity.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- It has been outlined above that with the end of military rule and the inception of the 4th Republic in 1999, decentralization returned to the agenda. However, there is disagreement among scholars as regards the federal character of the system: Obiyan and Amuwo (2012: 103) state that President Obasanjo (1999-2007) has turned Nigeria “into a unitary constitutional state where the centre reserves the right to remove elected leaders by reckless deployment of soldiers and mobile policeman from the barracks”. Furthermore, the fiscal regime is hyper-centralized and promotes the economic hegemony of the central government. Suberu (2010), on the other hand, emphasizes the federal character of the current system by highlighting the devolution of significant policy-making competences to constituent states and the representation of constituent states in the federal government through the establishment of a robust upper legislative chamber. Further evidence for a federal character comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman et al. 2010), which codes several groups as regionally autonomous as of 1999. In line with the latter, we code the Northerners as regionally autonomous for the period of activity. [2002-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Both the International Crisis Group and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia state that Boko Haram’s principal goal has been to break away the areas around Kanamma, Yunusari and Toshiya from Nigeria and to establish an Islamic state in the north with strict adherence to Sharia. The claim is thus coded as independence throughout movement activity. [2002-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Northerners
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- There are two, in part cross-cutting ethnic cleavages in Nigeria, a linguistic and a religious one. The groups covered in EPR (Hausa Fulani, Yoruba, Igbos etc.) are linguistic groups. What we termed the ‘Northerners’ relates to Muslims in Nigeria, and thus to the religious cleavage. Boko Haram, the main organization associated with the movement, “draws its fighters mainly from the Kanuri ethnic group” (BBC 2014), but has also many Hausa among its members (International Crisis Group). From 2002-2007 the Northerners are coded as junior partner since the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was a Christian Yoruba and the vice-president a Muslim Fulani (Mustapha 2004). From 2008-2010, the Northerners are coded as senior partner since in 2007, Umaru Yar'Adua, a Muslim Hausa-Fulani, was elected president of an ethnically balanced government that also included Christian representatives (US State Department Human Rights Reports 2007-2013). From 2011-2012, the Northerners are again coded as junior partner since Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian Ijaw, assumed office in 2010, with a Muslim Hausa, Sambo, as vice-president (US State Department Human Rights Reports 2007-2013). [2002-2007: junior partner; 2008-2010: senior partner; 2011-2012: junior partner]
- Regarding group size we rely on the CIA World Factbook, according to which Nigeria’s Muslim population makes up about 50% of the total population. [2002-2012: .5 (group size)]

Territory

- The 'Northerners' relate to Muslims in Nigeria. These are concentrated in the Northern Region (>90% Muslims), most states in the Central Belt Region (over 50% in all states except Benu and Plateau), and several states in the Western States. [concentrated]
- The Northerners want to break away the areas around Kanamma, Yunusari and Toshiya in northern Nigeria (UCDP). Other sources mention a much larger territory encompassing all northern states with Muslim majorities. Irrespective of this, the claimed territory adjoins an international land border (Niger, Chad Cameroon), but does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The 'Northerners' relate to Muslims in Nigeria; Muslims in neighboring countries (especially Niger, Chad, Benin) can be considered close kindred. [kin in neighboring country]

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PAKISTAN

Baluchis

Activity: 1947-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Baluchis' homeland is divided between Pakistan and Iran. The Baluchi region was occupied by the British in the early 19th century. Baluchistan was divided into a northern British protectorate (Kalat) and tribal states. The Baluchis retained considerable autonomy under resident British advisors. There were multiple uprisings from Baluchi activist groups. In 1947, three of the four Baluch regions joined Pakistan. Kalat joined Pakistan in 1948 (see below). We code a prior concession since the British had allowed the Baluchis considerable autonomy during the colonial period. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Under the British, the Baluchis had enjoyed considerable autonomy. With the accession to Pakistan, Baluchistan lost much of its autonomy (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 577). While federal in name, Pakistan had an effectively unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Note: part of Baluchistan (Kalat) only joined Pakistan in 1948, thus we code a second restriction in 1948. [1947: autonomy restriction]
- Upon the partition of India, there was a serious possibility that part of Baluchistan would attain separate independence. According to Minority Rights Group International, on August 4, 1947, an agreement was signed between the British and Pakistan governments to recognize Kalat state (around a quarter of the Baluchis' homeland) as a free and independent state. Siddiqi (2012: 59), in contrast, suggests that the agreement was ambiguous in its recognition of Baluchi independence, though unambiguous in Pakistan's recognition that the Baluchis would retain autonomy in independent Pakistan. August 15, the Khan of Kalat declared independence (Minority Rights Group International). At this time, the fate of the remaining three quarters of British Baluchistan was already decided: they would join Pakistan (Siddiqi 2012: 59). Sensing military action against Kalat, the Khan finally decided to merge Kalat with Pakistan in March 1948 (Siddiqi 2012: 60). This implied a loss of autonomy. [1948: autonomy restriction]
- In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Baluchis speak Baluch). [1948: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Baluchistan was merged with West Pakistan, implying a further reduction of the already very limited autonomy (Wasim 2012; Titus & Swidler 2000: 51). [1955: autonomy restriction]
- Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system in 1970, Baluchistan attained provincial status and was thereby granted limited autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). [1970: autonomy concession]
- In 1971, Islamabad agreed to negotiations over increased sovereignty for Baluchistan, but then arrested Baluch leaders when they arrived to negotiate. Suspecting Baluch intentions to follow Bangladesh's lead in secession, Pakistani authorities then clamped down on Baluch nationalist and autonomist organizations (Minahan 2002: 258). Crackdowns are not coded as autonomy restrictions.

- In 1972 martial law was lifted and governor's rule that had been invoked since the end of the One Unit system in 1970 was lifted. [1972: autonomy concession]
- In 1973, Bhutto dismissed Balochistan's provincial government and installed governor's rule (Mushtaq 2009: 291; Titus & Swidler 2009: 60). [1973: autonomy restriction]
- In 1974 governor's rule was lifted. [1974: autonomy concession]
- But shortly thereafter re-instated. [1974: autonomy restriction]
- In 1976, the Sardari tribal chief system was abolished (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 577). [1976: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1976 Balochistan's government was reinstated (Mushtaq 2009). [1976: autonomy concession]
- Yet shortly thereafter, when Zia took over from Bhutto in 1977, he re-instated martial law and governor's rule throughout the country. All provincial assemblies were dissolved (Adeney 2007: 114). [1977: autonomy restriction]
- Only in 1985 governor's rule was lifted again (Adeney 2007: 114). [1985: autonomy concession]
- In 1999, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. New strongman Musharraf introduced governor's rule in all provinces (Rizvi 2000: 213). The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1999: autonomy restriction]
- The traditionally centralist military went on to further limit provincial autonomy (Minahan 2002: 259; Mushtaq 2009: 291). In 2001 the military regime enacted the Local Government Ordinance, a plan to devolve powers to the local (rather than the regional) level (Mezzera et al. 2010: 10). The devolution plan essentially was an exercise in domestic public diplomacy meant to strengthen the military regime. Various provisions ensured that there was no real devolution. In contrast, the law even strengthened the ties between the centre and the local governments (Mezzera et al. 2010: 39). Since the law bypassed the provinces, all provinces except Punjab perceived the devolution plan as a manoeuvre aimed at increased centralization (Grare 2013: 11). [2001: autonomy restriction]
- Governor's rule was lifted in 2002. [2002: autonomy concession]
- The 17th Amendment to the constitution, enacted in 2003, implied further centralization (Mushtaq 2009: 291). [2003: autonomy restriction]
- In 2008 governor's rule was installed in Balochistan. [2008: autonomy restriction]
- In November 2009, the government presented to parliament a 39-point plan for a more autonomous Balochistan, the so-called "Balochistan Package". Among other things, the package promised greater provincial control over natural resources and a reform of the federal resources allocation mechanism. The Pakistani parliament adopted the Balochistan Package in December 2009. It was, however, never implemented because all major stakeholders in the Baloch nationalist movement had formally rejected the plan (Grare 2013: 12). Still, the Balochistan Package constitutes a significant autonomy offer, and is hence coded as a concession. [2009: autonomy concession]
- After the end of Musharraf's rule president Zardari went on to reverse some of the centralizing policies of his predecessor. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the constitution was adopted, which devolved authority to the provinces, among other things. Competencies concerning the regulation of marriages, contracts, firearms possession, labor, educational curriculums, environmental pollution, bankruptcy and 40 other diverse areas were devolved to the provinces. The 18th amendment also promised the regions increased financial resources (Cookman 2010). [2010: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared Kalat (around a quarter of Balochistan) independent (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2012: 258); however, Kalat was not fully integrated with Pakistan (this came only in 1948), thus we do not code this declaration.
- In 1958, the Khanate of Kalat again declared Balochistan independent from Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 258). [1958: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1947, the Baluchi territory became part of Pakistan. [1947: host change (new)]
- The Baloch territories had enjoyed considerable autonomy under the British, which was lost upon the merge with Pakistan. We code major changes in 1947 and 1948 to reflect the fact that the Khanate of Kalat only joined Pakistan in 1948. [1947, 1948: revocation of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if Balochistan has had provincial status for most of 1947-2012. This follows EPR practice.
 - o Arguably, the Khanate of Kalat retained some autonomy until its accession in 1948, but most Baluch territories had already joined Pakistan in 1947. Thus we do not code autonomy in 1947/1948.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Demands vary from increased autonomy to outright secession, and it is not fully clear which is dominant (and at which points in time). In 1947, Kalat declared independence, but the remaining three quarters of Balochistan seem to have acceded Pakistan without such contention. Titus & Swidler (2000) suggest that the drive for independence was rather marginal. Grare (2013: 5), on the other hand, notes that many of the most active organizations favor independence. Minorities at Risk is quite ambiguous by saying on the one hand that “[t]he demands of most Baluch groups, conventional and militant, center on Baluch autonomy and Baluch control over resources, although some radical Baluchis demand full independence”, but on the other hand noting the “violent separatism of the 1970s” which “apparently had disappeared” by the late 1990s. Ahmad (2014) suggests that since 1947 there has always been an at times more and at times less popular independence movement, which has become increasingly popular in recent years. Since we are unable to identify the dominant claim, but have sufficient evidence that there has been a significant independence movement throughout, we code an independence claim from 1947-2012. [1947-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Baluchis
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Baluchis
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77001000

- When Pakistan gained independence, only parts of the Baloch territories had formally been part of Pakistan. The Khanate of Kalat formally joined Pakistan only in March 1948, thus the group size should increase in 1949. This is not reflected in EPR, which applies the same group size (1%) in 1947-1949. We found no population estimate of the Khanate of Khalat. The Khanate of Khalate comprises about a quarter of the Pakistani Baluchistan. Thus for 1947-1948 we use a group size estimate of .0075. [1947-1948: .0075 (group size)]
- EPR codes the Baluch as powerless in 1947-1948; this can be retained. [1947-1948: powerless]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 255), the majority of Pakistan's Baluchis is located in Balochistan, where they comprise approx. 70% of the local population. MAR also suggests that they are spatially concentrated in Balochistan. [concentrated]
- Balochistan borders Afghanistan and Iran, as well as the Gulf of Oman. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- There are reserves (Lujala et al. 2007): PRIMKEY PK004PET (discovery date unknown), PRIMKEY PK003PET (unknown), PRIMKEY PK005PET (1952), PRIMKEY PK009PET (1959), and PRIMKEY PK002PET (1976). PK003PET and PK004PET are close to PK005PET, thus we code oil from 1953 onwards. [oil/gas: 1947-1952: no; 1953-2012: yes]

Kin

- There are numerically significant Baloch groups in neighboring Iran and Afghanistan according to both EPR and MAR, as well as Minahan (2002: 255), who furthermore mentions kin in Gulf States, India, and Turkmenistan. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Pashtuns (Pathans)

Activity: 1947-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1707 the Durrani Sultanate of Afghanistan was formed, thus uniting the Pashtuns. The British took hold of the eastern bit of the Pashtun territory in 1849, thus dividing the Pashtun territory (Minahan 2002: 1538). The Pashtun lands became a source of continual threats to British control. A key problem had been that the border between Afghanistan (a British protectorate since the Second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878-1880) and British India was not demarcated. Thus, in 1893, the UK forced Afghanistan to agree to a demarcation line (the Durand line). Having failed to militarily subdue the Pashtuns, in 1901, the British created a semi-autonomous region for the Pashtuns, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Minahan 2002: 1539). Waziristan, another Pashtun territory, was not even considered part of British India and thus more or less left to its own devices, though formally under British sovereignty (Barfield 2007: 1, 4).
- The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 introduced provincial democracy in India, but the NWFP was excluded from the experiment and traditional tribal rule continued (Minahan 2002: 1539). Only later, the first elections were held (not clear when, but there were elections in the 1930s and 1940s).
- The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India's partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947. In the run-up to the partition, the Afghan government had proposed a referendum to be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where most of Pakistan's Pashtuns live, involving the options of joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, or separate independence. In July 1947, a referendum was indeed held, but it involved only two options: joining India or joining Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1540-1541). The vote came out in favor of Pakistan. Thus the NWFP became part of Pakistan, upon promises that its autonomy would be upheld. Waziristan was merged with Pakistan, too.
- The granting of a referendum could be seen as a concession, but contrary to the wishes of the claimants it did not include the options they desired. Thus we do not code a concession due to the referendum. Nevertheless, we indicate a prior concession due to the set-up of the semi-autonomous NWFP in 1901. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- With the accession to Pakistan, the NWFP entered a highly centralized system and lost much of its autonomy. While federal in name, Pakistan effectively had a unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). [1947: autonomy restriction]
 - o Note: parts of the Pashtun territories, including Waziristan, still retained a high share of autonomy as they became a federally-administered area, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in continuance of British policy.
- In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Pashtuns speak Pashto). [1948: cultural rights restriction]

- In 1955, the NWFP lost provincial status and was merged with West Pakistan (One Unit system) (Wasim 2012). [1955: autonomy restriction]
- Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system in 1970, the North West Frontier Province re-attained provincial status and thereby limited autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). [1970: autonomy concession]
- In 1972 martial law was lifted and governor's rule that had been invoked since the end of the One Unit system in 1970 was lifted. [1972: autonomy concession]
- In February 1975 governor's rule was installed in NWFP. The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1975: autonomy restriction]
- Governor's rule was removed in May 1975. [1975: autonomy concession]
- When Zia took over from Bhutto in 1977, he re-instated martial law and governor's rule throughout the country. All provincial assemblies were dissolved (Adeney 2007: 114). [1977: autonomy restriction]
- Only in 1985 governor's rule was lifted again (Adeney 2007: 114). [1985: autonomy concession]
- Governor's rule was installed in February 1994. The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1994: autonomy restriction]
- Governor's rule was lifted again in April 1994. [1994: autonomy concession]
- In 1999, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. New strongman Musharraf introduced governor's rule in all provinces (Rizvi 2000: 213). The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1999: autonomy restriction]
- The traditionally centralist military went on to further limit provincial autonomy (Minahan 2002: 259; Mushtaq 2009: 291). In 2001 the military regime enacted the Local Government Ordinance, a plan to devolve powers to the local (rather than the regional) level (Mezzera et al. 2010: 10). The devolution plan essentially was an exercise in domestic public diplomacy meant to strengthen the military regime. Various provisions ensured that there was no real devolution. In contrast, the law even strengthened the ties between the centre and the local governments (Mezzera et al. 2010: 39). Since the law bypassed the provinces, all provinces except Punjab perceived the devolution plan as a manoeuvre aimed at increased centralization (Grare 2013: 11). [2001: autonomy restriction]
- Governor's rule was lifted in 2002. [2002: autonomy concession]
- The 17th Amendment to the constitution, enacted in 2003, implied further centralization (Mushtaq 2009: 291). [2003: autonomy restriction]
- Minorities at Risk furthermore notes that the central government imposed economic blockades against NWFP and FATA in the name of "counter terrorism". We found no sufficient evidence as to when these blockades were initiated but the autonomy restrictions coded in 2001 and 2003 should reflect this.
- After the end of Musharraf's rule president Zardari went on to reverse some of the centralizing policies of his predecessor. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the constitution was adopted, which devolved authority to the provinces, among other things. Competencies concerning the regulation of marriages, contracts, firearms possession, labor, educational curriculums, environmental pollution, bankruptcy and 40 other diverse areas were devolved to the provinces. The 18th amendment also promised the regions increased financial resources (Cookman 2010). Furthermore, in 2010 the NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (Achakzai 2010) [2010: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- Minahan (2002: 1540) reports a Pashtun declaration that declared an independent Pushtunistan in the NWFP on September 2, 1947. According to Minahan, the declaration was part of a "terrorist campaign" initiated by Pashtun nationalists shortly after Pakistan's independence that was quickly suppressed by Pakistani troops. Pakistan had attained independence in mid-August 1947. We found no other source that notes this declaration, but given the quite detailed narrative in Minahan, we nonetheless code it. [1947: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- The Pashtuns became part of Pakistan in 1947, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
- Furthermore, with the accession to Pakistan, the formerly reasonably autonomous NWFP was stripped of most of its autonomy (see above). [1947: revocation of autonomy]
 - o Note: the federally administered FATA, populated mostly by Pashtuns similarly to the NWFP, though retained its autonomy.
- While the NWFP re-gained some of its autonomy with the abolishment of the One-Unit system in 1970, autonomy has remained too limited to warrant the coding of a major change.

Regional autonomy

- While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Only the federally administered areas (FATA) retained autonomy, where only a minority of the Pashtun population resides (FATA had a population of roughly 3 million in 1998 and the former NWFP a population of roughly 28 million as of 2014). Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if the NWFP has had provincial status for most of 1947-2012. This follows EPR practice.

De-facto independence

- According to Minahan (2002: 1540), Pakistan's control of the Pashtun areas has been rather limited, but not to an extent that would suggest a de-facto independence coding. In particular, Pakistan was in control of strategic assets such as streets and garrisons.

Claims

- The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India's partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947. Khudai Khidmatgar was unwilling to recognize the result of the 1947 referendum, which led to the merger with Pakistan, given the omission of the options of separate independence and union with Afghanistan. Minahan (2002: 1540) reports that Pashtun nationalists declared the Pashtun territories independent shortly after Pakistan's independence. Thus, we code an independence claim in 1947. [1947: independence claim]
- Soon after the partition, when it realized that an independent Pushtunistan is unattainable, Khudai Khidmatgar shifted its demand to autonomy within Pakistan (Ghufar 2009: 1098; Mushtaq 2009: 283; Khan 2003: 12-13). Nevertheless, in 1948 it was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. However, Pashtun demands for regional autonomy resumed shortly and "thereafter played a vital role in [the Pashtuns'] relationship with the central government" (Minahan 2002: 1540). While Pakistan's government fears Pashtun irredentism, for the most part representatives of the movement and in particular the National Awami Party have restricted themselves to autonomy claims (see e.g. Khan 2003: 13; Achakzai 2010). MAR describes the Pashtuns as autonomist, too, and so does Minahan (2002: 1542). [1948-2012: autonomy claim]
 - o Note: we do not code a sub-state secession during the one-unit system because there effectively was no autonomous sub-state to separate from.

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Pashtuns (Pathans)
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Pashtuns
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77004000

Territory

- Though his figures are in part incompatible, Minahan (2002: 1536) clearly suggests that an absolute majority of Pakistan's Pashtuns are located in Pakistan's northwest, where they comprise an overwhelming majority of the local population. This is in line with information provided by MAR. [concentrated]
- The Pashtun territories border Afghanistan and China, yet there is no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There are reserves on the Pashtun territories in Pakistan (Lujala et al. 2007): PRIMKEY PK001PET (discovered in 1915) and PRIMKEY PK002PET (1976). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there is numerically significant kin in Afghanistan; MAR and Minahan (2002: 1536) suggest the same. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Saraikis (Bahawalpuris)

Activity: 1969-2012

General notes

- The movement relates to a linguistic group in Pakistan, the Saraikis, and in particular to, Bahawalpur a region within the Saraiki homeland. The Saraikis make up about ten per cent of Pakistan's population. According to Javaid (2009), the Bahawalpuris make up about half of the Saraiki population, or about 5.6 per cent of Pakistan's population. Thus many Saraikis also live in adjacent provinces and some make claims for a larger Saraikistan encompassing not only the former Bahawalpur.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The kingdom of Bahawalpur, largely populated by Saraikis, allied with the British in the early 19th century, a tie that grew stronger as the Saraikis began to rebel against the Bahawalpur king (Minahan 2012: 284). Prior to the partition of India, Bahawalpur was a princely state. Upon partition, Bahawalpur decided to merge with Pakistan through a supplementary instrument of accession. In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Bahawalpuris speak Saraiki). Bahawalpur was granted province status in 1951. Bahawalpur had a provincial assembly, an election commission, a provincial secretariat, revenue board, an independent public service commission, a high court and government's printing press with defined provincial boundaries and there were more than 40,000 state employees. In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Bahawalpur was merged with West Pakistan, though with a promise that it would regain provincial status if the One-Unit system were to be abolished (Wasim 2012). We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system, Bahawalpur was merged with Punjab in 1970, despite the 1955 promise that it would regain provincial status if the One-Unit system were to be abolished (Wasim 2012). [1970: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- Bahawalpur was part of West Pakistan (province) until the abolition of the system in 1970, whereupon it was merged with Punjab. It is a "division" of Punjab, but this does not come with noteworthy powers (Javaid 2009). Note that Pakistan's provinces cannot be considered autonomous either, since while federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009).

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Throughout, the Saraikis demanded their own province as well as increased provincial autonomy (Javaid 2009; Wasim 2012; Abbasi 2013). Since Pakistan's regions do not have a significant degree of autonomy, this is best translated as a claim for increased autonomy. Note that the movement is divided over the territorial contours of a Saraiki province. While some make claims for the reinstatement of the Bahawalpur province, others contend for a larger Saraikistan that would also include parts of neighboring provinces. [1969-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Saraikis (Bahawalpuris)
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Punjabi
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	77005000

- In EPR, the Saraiki-speakers are merged with the Punjabi-speakers to the Punjabi group, which is coded as senior partner throughout due to its influential position in particular in the army (the most important player in Pakistan). The Saraikis are less influential in Pakistan's politics, according to Roofi & Alqama (2013: 158). Also Umbreen (2009: 44, 48) suggests that the Saraiki-speakers, including those in Bahawalpur, are under-represented in the Pakistani government. Still, the Saraikis appear to have a certain influence. Critically, the Saraiki-speaking areas, and in particular Bahawalpur, are well represented in the Pakistani army, which ruled the country directly or indirectly for most of the time since independence (Fair & Nawaz 2011). Hence, we code the Saraikis as junior partner throughout. [1969-2012: junior partner]
- According to the 1998 census, 10.5% spoke Saraiki as their first language. [1969-2012: .105 (group size)]
 - o Note: this matches rather well with Roofi & Alqama (2013: 158), according to whom the Saraikis make up about 15 per cent of the Punjabi group and thus about ten per cent of Pakistan's population.
 - o Also similar: Minahan (2012) reports an estimate of about 15.2 million Saraikis. Pakistan's total population in 2012 was approximately 180 millions according to the World Bank.

Territory

- Population data is somewhat difficult to get by. We consulted fine-grained data from the 1998 census (see United States Census Bureau). We found that a majority of the Saraikis (approx. 14 million in total, more than 11 million in the named districts) resides in the following contiguous districts: Bahawalpur (rough estimates of the number of Saraiki speakers in millions in brackets: 1.5), Rahim Yar Khan (2), Muzaffargarh (2.3), Rajanpur (0.8), Multan (1.9), Lodhran (0.8), Layyah (0.7), and Dera Ghazi Khan (1.3). The total population of these eight districts was 16.3 million; Saraiki-speakers made up 69% of the local population. [concentrated]
- Saraikistan (and in particular the Bahawalpur area) borders India, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- A number of the named Saraiki districts overlap with reserves (Lujala et al. 2007). The Dera Ghazi Khan district overlaps with PRIMKEY PK002PET, discovered in 1976. The Rahim Yar Khan district overlaps with PRIMKEY PK008PET, discovered in 1957. Multan district overlaps with PRIMKEY PK006PET, discovered in 1984. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- There are Saraiki-speakers in neighboring India, though their number is too limited (70,000 according to Ethnologue). The umbrella Punjabi group in EPR, of which the Saraikis form part, has kin according to EPR, the Punjabi Sikhs, but they speak Punjabi and not Saraiki. [no kin]

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PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Bougainvilleans

Activity: 1975-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After World War II, the islands of Bougainville and Buka, both former German colonies and occupied by Japanese forces during the war, were returned to Australian administration. Bougainville had already been ruled by the Australians in the interwar period (Minahan 2002).
- Exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation caused grievances among the Bougainvilleans, who opposed the mining operations stipulated in the 1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement (Minahan 2002).
- With independence within reach and protest against the highly centralized Australian colonial government and its mining industry increasing, there was growing talk about a possible secession of Bougainville from PNG or union with the Solomons. In 1968 nationalists proposed a referendum on the options available to the islands: independence, autonomy or union with the neighboring British Solomon Islands. The colonial government and the Constitutional Planning Committee refused to hold the referendum, but in response to increasing Bougainvillean nationalism responded by reluctantly recognizing the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government and by granting the island limited autonomy in 1973 (Ghai & Regan 2006; Minority Rights Group International). [1973: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Both the Australian as well as the soon to be PNG government rejected the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government's proclamation of independence (Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Republic of North Solomons). So when PNG became independent a few days later, one of its first actions was the suspension of the provincial government of the North Solomons and withdrawal of any grant payments (Minahan 2002; Ghai & Regan 2000). [1975: autonomy restriction]
- In early 1976, Bougainville accepted PNG sovereignty and signed the 'Bougainville Agreement', which included constitutionally entrenched autonomy arrangements for Bougainville within Papua New Guinea (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 50). Despite this, Bougainville remained de-facto independent, suggesting that the agreement was not (fully at least) implemented. But the 1976 agreement constitutes a very significant (and mutually agreed) autonomy offer to a de-facto entity. It is thus coded as a concession in line with the codebook. [1976: autonomy concession]
- Mounting grievances over the rapid expansion of the mining industry made the pressure for secession resurface in the late 1980s. As peaceful protests and demands for financial compensation were ignored, the Bougainvilleans rebelled. The recently-emerged Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) destroyed mining infrastructure and forced the closing of the Panguna copper mine in 1989. The national government responded with a total blockade of goods and services to the province in May 1990, which led to the unilateral declaration of independence of Bougainville by the BRA and the Bougainville Interim Government (Ghai & Regan 2006; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). The blockade was only lifted with the 1998 ceasefire (see below). [1990: autonomy restriction]

- When the PNG government changed in 1994, a new peace initiative was initiated. It included a ceasefire agreement, the deployment of the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force and the establishment of a Bougainville Transitional Government in March/April 1995 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). We do not code this act since the BTG was appointed by the Papua New Guinean central government and with the BTG's Premier, Theodore Miriung, being murdered in 1996 the peace accord became a "complete failure" (UNPO).
- In 1998 a cease-fire was signed. Subsequently the economic blockade was lifted (which is coded as a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook). We found no evidence for a concession on autonomy apart from the lifting of the blockade (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). [1998: autonomy concession]
- Under the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001, the government forces had to withdraw from the island and the region of Bougainville was granted a high level of autonomy. Competencies were divided between the national government and the autonomous Bougainville government, while the latter was granted some sort of fiscal self-reliance. Furthermore, the PNG government established a Bougainville Provincial Government and agreed to a referendum on independence 10 to 15 years after the first autonomous Bougainville government was elected. As of June 2014, the referendum has not been held. (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia) [2001: autonomy concession; 2001: independence concession].
- In December 2004, a new constitution was adopted. It established Bougainville as an 'autonomous region' possessing 'higher autonomy' within PNG. This included wide-ranging powers with regard to all fields except defence, foreign affairs and finance (Minority Rights Group). [2004: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- Two weeks before Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia in 1975, the Bougainville provincial government voted in favor of a separate state (Republic of the North Solomons) and proclaimed the independence of Bougainville. Although, technically, the proclamation happened prior to independence, we code this event since PNG by that time had been effectively independent. [1975: independence declaration]
- In 1990 the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the Bougainville Interim Government again unilaterally declared independence (Ghai & Regan 2006; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International). [1990: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In line with the coding of de-facto independence, we code major territorial changes 1975 (for the revocation of autonomy and the establishment of de-facto independence, shortly before PNG's independence, as well as a host change) and in 1998, when de-facto independence ended. Since regional autonomy concessions had no effect in the period of de-facto independence, we code its establishment in 1998. [1975: revocation of regional autonomy, establishment of de-facto independence, host change (new)] [1998: abolishment of de-facto independence, establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- We code regional autonomy from 1975-1998, given that Bougainville was de-facto independent. With the 1976 'Bougainville Agreement', the PNG government offered constitutionally entrenched autonomy arrangements for Bougainville within Papua New Guinea. The offer was implemented and became effective when de-facto independence came to an end in 1998 (Ghai & Regan 2006), hence we code regional autonomy throughout. [1975-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- Caspersen (2012) defines Bougainville as a de-facto state from PNG independence in 1975 until the end of hostilities in 1997. Since this status had existed prior to independence, the first of January rule makes us code from 1975 onwards. We code an end of de-facto independence only in 1998, when the ceasefire was signed and violence ended, thus one year later than Caspersen (2012). [1975-1998: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Two weeks before Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia in 1975, the Bougainville provincial government voted in favor of a separate state and proclaimed the independence of Bougainville (Republic of the North Solomons). Minahan (2002) and Minority Rights Group International argue that separatist sentiment declined after the 1976 autonomy grant. However, Caspersen (2012) describes Bougainville as de-facto independent from 1975-1997, suggesting that the claim for independence was upheld. Secessionism revived and resurfaced in 1988 when dissatisfaction over the limited benefits from the mining industries combined with protests against environmental degradation escalated and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) was established. Its goal was outright secession from the state of Papua New Guinea, as the declaration of independence in 1990 illustrates (Ghai & Regan 2006; Minahan 2002, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In the peace process starting in mid-1997, the Bougainville movement was divided. One faction was led by Joseph Kabui and advocated secession. It was opposed by a coalition of groups that supported stronger autonomy within PNG and was led by John Momis. The two rival groups reached a compromise in June 1999 which involved dropping the demand for early independence in return for an agreement that this issue will be dealt with through a referendum among Bougainvilleans later on (Regan 2002; Ghai & Regan 2006). However, the claim for independence was never dropped; we hence continue to code independence as the dominant claim. The currently still active secessionist Bougainville Independence Movement, led by Francis Ona who has refused to join the peace process, has only limited popular support (Ghai & Regan 2006). However, despite agreeing on it, also moderate nationalists do not see autonomy as a lasting solution (Minahan 2002). We therefore code secession as the dominant claim throughout. We hereby follow Ghai & Regan (2006), who claim that the peace agreement was only reached because the PNG movement conceded that “the issue of independence would be kept alive and revisited through a referendum”. [1975-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Bougainvilleans
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- Papua New Guinea is not coded in EPR. In the early years of movement activity, the group neither had access to central state power nor was it openly and systematically discriminated against, hence a powerless code. In 1997, Amnesty International published a report on human rights violations in Bougainville in the context of the civil war. The report mentions deliberate or indiscriminate killings of civilians, torture and sexual abuse and unlawful detention as a response to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army's (BRA) unilateral declaration of independence. As of 1990, there was also a complete economic and communications blockade of the province as well as restrictions on access to the island. A report of the UN Secretary General on Human rights violations in Bougainville gives further evidence of targeted discrimination. In 1996 there were new discriminatory acts, when the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) set in place new restrictions on

the movement of civilians and the amount of food items that civilians were able to purchase. However, given the de-facto independent (self-exclusion) status of the Bougainvilleans, we continue to code a powerless status in line with the codebook (rather than “discriminated”). Also after 1997, the Bougainvilleans continued to be excluded from central state power. The Bougainvilleans are thus coded as powerless throughout. [1975-2012: powerless]

- According to Minahan (2002: 317), there were around 200,000 Bougainvilleans in 2002. Given the entire country’s population of 5.66 million that same year, the population share totals .035336. [1975-2012: .0353 (group size)]

Territory

- The Bougainvilleans are concentrated on the Bougainville Island (the Autonomous Region of Bougainville), where they make up 93% of the population (Minahan 2002: 317). This amounts to 188,000 Bougainvilleans (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 200,000 Bougainvilleans in the whole of Papua New Guinea in that same year. [concentrated]
- The Bougainvilleans want the independence of the Bougainville Island as the Republic of the North Solomons. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- The Minorities at Risk data codes the Bougainvilleans as having close kindred in the Solomon Islands (Melanesian Peoples). There are >500,000 Melanesians in Solomon Island. [kin in adjacent country]

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PHILIPPINES

Moros

Activity: 1968-2012

General notes

- The history of the Moro insurgency is a complex one, and led to numerous peace negotiations, initiatives and agreements, most of which were not fully implemented. The process can be described as “two steps forward, one step back.” The summary tries to capture the most important peace initiatives.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Moros have a history of independence and resisted the Spanish attempt at colonialization. However, Moro autonomy did not outlive the American administration; by 1913, the US military had effectively subdued Moro resistance, leading to the abolishing of the Moro’s sovereignty (Tuminez 2007: 78; Minahan 2002: 1323). Before the Philippines were granted independence in 1946, Moro leaders petitioned the US government several times (1921, 1924, and 1935) to keep Mindanao separate from the Christian Philippines, but the demand was turned down (Tuminez 2007: 78). In 1905, the US administration declared all unregistered lands as public land, opening the possibility of Christian migration into Mindanao. Resettlement programs began in 1911 and were continued by the independent Philippines, and brought in significant numbers of Christian settlers into Mindanao. Today, Muslims make up the majority in only a (small) part of Mindanao (Tuminez 2007: 78; Gutierrez & Borrás 2004: 7-8). Freedom of religion is constitutionally protected in the Philippines ever since the American administration took over in 1898 (Boyle & Sheen 1997: 233), and some Muslim children were allowed to visit Muslim schools. Indeed, McKenna (1998: 133) notes that one could observe a surge in mosque-building and the establishment of Islamic schools (madrasahs) in the 1960s. But there was a clear policy of assimilation vis-à-vis the Muslim minority (Noble 1976: 406). Minority Rights Group International notes that language, religion, and educational policies discriminate against Moros and indigenous peoples, given that until recently schooling was entirely in English and Tagalog (Moros speak dialects of Malay, see Minahan 2002: 1322) with a Christian-slanted curriculum. Tagalog and English remain the only languages up to today. According to Tuminez (2007: 80): “[b]y the 1960s, Moros were clearly a second-class minority in the Philippines. National textbooks did not cover their history, and the majority population denigrated Moro culture and religion.” Mindanao did not have territorial autonomy after independence. However, it enjoyed a certain amount of de-facto autonomy with traditional Muslim rulers in power until Ferdinand Marcos assumed power in 1965 (Hewitt & Cheatham 2000: 197). [1965: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In the late 1960s, President Marcos passed a series of laws that legitimized the expropriation of Muslim-owned private lands by the government to meet the demands of Christian settlers and farmers. Many Muslims lost their lands (Islam 2003: 201; Walter 2009: 172). We do not code this as a restriction since the expropriations concerned private land, and are hence difficult to reconcile with our definition of an autonomy restriction.
- In response to the Communist and the Moro insurgency, President Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1972 (Tuminez 2007: 80; Walter 2009: 180). According to Noble (1976: 411-412), the declaration of martial law led to centralization, leaving power almost exclusively in the

(Christian) hands of the Marcos regime. Political parties, including Muslim political parties, were prohibited (McKenna 1998: 157). We code an autonomy restriction in 1972 due to the centralization of powers. [1972: autonomy restriction]

- In 1976 (negotiations began in January 1975 upon strong petroleum pressure by Muslim countries), the Moro rebels and the Marcos regime, under the aegis of the Libyan Government, signed a comprehensive peace agreement – the Tripoli agreement – which promised the Moros autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities. The agreement respected Philippines sovereignty and territorial integrity (foreign policy, national defense, and mines and mineral resources would be under the central government), but promised the Moros far-reaching autonomy: autonomy over the judicial system, education, administration, the economic and financial system, special regional security forces, a legislative assembly, and an executive council, as well as the allowance of Sharia law. Furthermore, it was agreed to establish a provisional government to be appointed by the President (Santos 2005; Tuminez 2007: 80; Walter 2009: 183; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 197). The autonomy offer was very significant; hence we code an autonomy concession. [1976: autonomy concession]
- Talks on the implementation of the Tripoli agreement began in February 1977, and soon broke down over widely disparate interpretations of the agreement. Marcos moved to implement the agreement unilaterally and under his own terms, principally by creating two special autonomous regions, one for Central Mindanao and the other for Sulu. Marcos insisted on a broad plebiscite on Moro autonomy (in accordance with the Philippine constitution), which though was not foreseen in the Tripoli agreement, and violated Moro interests because they no longer comprised the majority in most of Mindanao due to the Philippines' long-standing policy of resettling Christians to Mindanao (Santos 2005; Walter 2009: 184). The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the core vehicle of the Moro insurgency at the time, explicitly opposed Marcos' 'implementation' of the agreement. According to McKenna (1998: 168), "the 'autonomous' regional governments devised by the Marcos administration in the South have been aptly described as 'essentially hollow, and productive of cynicism, frustration, and resentment (Noble 1983: 49). The governing bodies of the nominally autonomous regions were cosmetic creations with no real legislative authority and no independent operating budget. They were headed by martial law collaborators and rebel defectors, many of whom were datus and all of whom were absent from the province more often than not, usually in Manila pursuing separate careers or looking after business interests. By 1983, the regional governments had developed a layer of bureaucracy that employed a number of college-educated Muslims, but the great majority of Muslims were completely unaffected by the new regional administrations.'" Since Marcos' implementation of the Tripoli Agreement fell way short of what was agreed, we code an autonomy restriction in 1977. [1977: autonomy restriction]
- In 1981, Ferdinand Marcos lifted martial law, and in 1984 the Philippines army began to withdraw from Mindanao to fight the communist insurgency. Still, little appears to have changed as Muslims loyal to the regime remained in power in Mindanao (McKenna 1998: 163, 234). We do not code a concession.
- After the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the new President Corazon Aquino promised to implement the Tripoli agreement and opened talks with the MNLF, leading to the Jeddah Accord in January 1987. The Jeddah Accord deviated from the Tripoli agreement, and promised the Moros (in line with their demands) autonomy over 23 provinces all in all, "subject to democratic processes" (Santos 2005: 7-8). The 1987 accord set the broad road to autonomy. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created in 1989, and this time, autonomy was also implemented (Walter 2009: 187). We code an autonomy concession in 1987, since this is when the Jeddah Accord was signed, which paved the road to autonomy. [1987: autonomy concession]
- The new Philippines constitution, ratified in 1987, did not only set out the broad road to autonomy, but also defined what is meant by the notion of the "democratic processes" by explicitly demanding the holding of a plebiscite before autonomy is granted to a province. This passage was fiercely opposed by the Moros, given the Christian majority in much of Mindanao due to the government's relocation policies, and can be seen as a unilateral act with the aim to curb the geographical scope of Moro autonomy (Santos 2005: 7-8). This could be conceived an autonomy restriction, but we deem the requirement of a plebiscite too ambiguous to be coded.

Unsurprisingly, the vote which was held in 1989 (neither the MNLF nor the MILF played any role in the design or conduct of the vote) resulted in only four provinces joining the ARMM. Thus, the resulting autonomous region was much smaller compared to the one envisioned in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and, critically, the earlier Jeddah Accord that was signed in 1987, which had promised autonomy over 23 provinces (Tuminez 2007: 80; McKennan 1998: 246). Hence, we code an autonomy restriction in 1989. [1989: autonomy restriction]

- Aquino's successor, Fidel Ramos, began new negotiations with the Moro separatists soon after assuming power, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement with the MNLF (at the time still the dominant separatist organization) in 1996: the Jakarta agreement. The 1996 agreement promised the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and paved the way for the demobilization of the MNLF army (Tuminez 2007: 81). Furthermore, it led to the establishment of a transitional Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development in October 1996, chaired by the former MNLF commander Nur Misuari, and finally to the expansion of autonomy in 2001 (Santos 2005: 8; Tuminez 2007: 81; Minahan 2002: 1325). [1996: autonomy concession]
- However, once again, the Philippines government did not stick to its promises, and resorted to a "unilateral" implementation of the peace agreement. First, it did not provide the resources it had promised for the Southern Philippines Development Council. Then, the Estrada government (1998-2001), which had initially been conciliatory, began to take a hard stance on the Moro separatists and in 2000 initiated a policy of 'all-out-war' against what by then was the most important Moro separatist faction, the MILF (Walter 2009: 192). Waging war is not, however, a restriction as defined in the codebook.
- Arroyo succeeded Estrada after the latter's removal from office in January 2001. Arroyo initially took a somewhat more conciliatory approach. Still, the Arroyo administration appears to have not adequately consulted with the Moro leaders before passing the new Organic Act for Mindanao, Republic Act 9054 in March 2001 (Tuminez 2007: 81-82; Santos 2005: 16), and the end result appears to fall short of what was promised earlier on. The 2001 agreement formally restricted Moro representation in the central government to "as far as practicable" and "whenever feasible". Concerning regional autonomy, the 2001 Act failed to grant Mindanao fiscal independence – Mindanao essentially remained fiscally dependent on the central government despite limited powers of taxation. In 2001, more than 95 per cent of Mindanao's budget came from the central government. Also in other areas, the extent of devolution did not match up to earlier promises. Critically, the expansion of the geographical scope of the Mindanao autonomy was once again made subject to plebiscite. Predictably, this led to only one new province joining the ARMM (the Tripoli agreement, which the 1996 Jakarta Agreement promised to fully implement, promised 13; see Tuminez 2007: 81; Santos 2005: 16). We code an autonomy restriction in 2001 since Manila's implementation of the 1996 peace deal again fell short of what it had earlier promised. [2001: autonomy restriction]
- After completion of the peace negotiations with the MNLF, President Ramos began to negotiate with the second important Moro rebel organization, the MILF, in 1997 (Santos 2005: 17). This led to a provisional peace agreement in 2012 (an earlier provisional agreement was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008), which though was not much more than a general framework. In 2014 a comprehensive agreement was reached, promising the establishment of a new autonomous entity called "Bangsamoro". Since the 2012 agreement was rather loose and provisional, we do not code a concession. We would code a concession in 2014, but 2014 is beyond the temporal scope of our data set.

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1974, Nur Misuari, the chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), issued an independence declaration (Man 1974) [1974: independence declaration]
- In January 2012, the MNLF appears to have issued another independence declaration. By 2012, the main organization representing the movement was MILF and not MNLF (see below under 'claims'), but MNLF continues to be a significant player. Hence we code an independence declaration in 2012. [2012: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1989, the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was adopted, and the entity was officially established in 1990. The entity is much smaller compared to the one envisaged in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and also falls short of the competencies promised back in 1976. However, this time there was at least some actual devolution (Walter 2009). [1990: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- In 1989, the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was adopted, and the entity was officially established in 1990. The entity is much smaller compared to the one envisaged in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and also falls short of the competencies promised back in 1976. However, this time there was at least some actual devolution (Walter 2009). We code regional autonomy for 1991 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1991-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- The rebels controlled certain areas of Mindanao, but the Philippine government does not appear to have fully lost control (e.g., Mindanao participated in the 1986 elections, and Marcos successfully installed leaders loyal to his regime in Mindanao). Hence, we do not code a period of de-facto independence.

Claims

- According to Santos (2005: 6) the dominant claim articulated by the Moros has oscillated between independence and autonomy since the inception of the movement in 1968. From 1968 to 1976 when the Tripoli agreement was signed, independence was the movement's agenda. Hence we code an independence claim until and including 1976, following the first of January rule. [1968-1976: independence claim]
- The signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 1976 represents a major juncture in the Moro campaign since it coincided with a moderation of the Moro National Liberation Front's (MNLF) claim. Autonomy and implementation of the Tripoli agreement became the movement's major claim (see Santos 2005: 7). [1977-1998: autonomy claim]
- After Marcos' failure to implement the 1976 Tripoli agreement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from the most important organization fighting for Moro sovereignty, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF; see Tuminez 2001: 81). The MILF is more radical in its demands, and aims at an independent Islamic state. After the 1996 Jakarta agreement, the MNLF was significantly weakened by internal divisions and the 'unilateral', incomplete implementation of the agreement by the centre. According to Santos (2005: 3) and Tan (2003), the MILF became the main bearer of the Moro movement at least since the Estrada administration took over in 1998. Thus, we code an independence claim for 1999-2010, following the first of January rule. [1999-2010: independence claim]
- The MILF continued to be the most important organization associated with the Moro movement after 2010, with the MNLF still weakened by factionalism. But in 2010 the MILF dropped its independence claim and now aspires at autonomy (Teves 2010). Hence, we code an autonomy claim for 2011-2012, following the first of January rule. [2011-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Moros
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Moro
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	84003000

Territory

- The Moros constitute a minority in what they generally see as their homeland (see Minahan 2002: 1321), but the threshold is fulfilled if we look at a more narrowly defined territory.
 - o The Moros make up a majority in the five provinces which constitute the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM): Sulu (98.32%), Tawi-Tawi (96.83%), Lanao del Sur (94%), Maguindanao (81.73%), and Basilan (79.56%). Combined, there are 3.236 million Morors in the ARMM (2010 Census). The second Muslim-majority region is SOCCSKSARGEN, which adjoins the ARMM and which has an estimated Muslim population of around 2 million. Combined, ARMM and SOCCSKSARGEN make up a majority of the entire Muslim population in the Philippines, which is why we code them as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Moros want self-determination for a Muslim state consisting of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan and the Sulu archipelago. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups. However, according to Minahan (2002: 1322), the Moros are closely related to the peoples from nearby Borneo, in particular the Dayaks (approx. 6 million). Moreover, Minahan (2002: 1321) estimates that there are between 300,000 and 500,000 Moros in Malaysia and Indonesia. [kin in neighboring country]

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RUSSIA (USSR)

Abkhaz

Activity: 1977-1978; 1988-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- When the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921 Abkhazia was awarded with the status of a Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR). In 1931 its status was downgraded, and Abkhazia became an ASSR under Georgian administration (Jones 1997: 509). From the 1930s, there was a policy of Georgianization vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities. Most minority rights were restored after Stalin's death in 1953, and there was a policy of affirmative action since the 1970s (no exact date was given in the sources), which led to much increased influence of the Abkhaz over their regional government (Jones 2013: 44; Minority Rights Group International). [1970: autonomy concession] [1st phase: prior concession]
- In 1978 the Abkhaz received an autonomy concession, thus we code a prior concession for the second phase. [2nd phase: prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In December 1977, 130 Abkhaz intellectuals sent a petition to Moscow, demanding the separation from the Georgian SSR and association with the Russian Federation. In 1978 there were demonstrations and further petitions (Jones 1997: 510). Moscow, together with Tbilisi, made concessions in an attempt to calm the situation, ranging from increased investment in the region to an increase in the number of leading positions allocated to the Abkhaz, and increased autonomy for the Abkhaz ASSR in the fields of science, education and the media (Coppieters 2004). The demand for separation from Georgia, however, was rejected (MAR). [1978: autonomy concession]
- In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections to party secretaryships and legislatures at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev's reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

- According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs) – such as Abkhazia. Notably, certain Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk Oblast were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]
- While it led to decentralization at the Union level, in Georgia, perestroika initiated a phase of Georgianization, with several policies that explicitly discriminated against minorities. In particular, in August 1989, Georgia publishes measures designed to increase the use of the Georgian language in all spheres of life (MAR). Georgia was one of only three Republics where the language of the titular language had had official status already prior to perestroika, but still this law constitutes a restriction since it made Georgian the only official language throughout Georgia (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis). According to George (2009: 110), the law made the use of Georgian mandatory for all administrative, party, and policy organs. According to Jones (2013: 35, 45, 48-49), the program was designed to increase the status of Georgian throughout the region, and implied a requirement of proficiency of Georgian for state employment also in autonomous entities. April 14 was made the Georgian language day. Thus, the 1989 language law restricted the language rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, and we code a cultural rights restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
 - o There were other measures in the direction of Georgianization, including programs for the promotion of Georgian history and the defense of historical monuments. A republican army was created, comprised by Georgians only. There was a policy of resettling Georgians to minority areas. An electoral law that was adopted in 1989 effectively prohibited ethnic, regionally-based parties from running in the elections (Jones 1997: 511-512). However, these measures do not change the self-determination status as defined in the codebook.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). The law appears not to have had immediate effects in the Georgian SSR due to its contrary language law and is thus not coded.
- In 1990 there was an additional measure which we do not code (see the ‘Tajiks’ entry).
- In June 1991, the first democratically elected president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, negotiated a power-sharing agreement with the Abkhaz. This agreement guaranteed disproportionate Abkhaz representation in the regional government by way of ethnic quotas (at the time the Abkhaz made up only 17.9 per cent of Abkhazia). Furthermore, the agreement set out consent of both Georgian and Abkhazian factions within the regional parliament for major constitutional and legislative changes (Coppieters 2004; Jones 2013: 95, 223). The consociational agreement implied increased autonomy for the Abkhaz, even if it was very short-lived, and is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In August 1990, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared sovereignty and separation from Georgia (Jones 1997: 513; Jones 2013: 44; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

Major territorial change

- In 1991, Abkhazia became part of Georgia, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- Abkhazia had the status of an ASSR in the USSR, the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Abkhaz as regionally autonomous in the Soviet Union. [1977-1978, 1988-1991: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The initial claim was for separation from the Georgian SSR and incorporation into the Russian Federation (Jones 1997: 510). In the second phase, the demand shifted to separation from Georgia and attainment of full Union Republic status (MAR). In 1989, 30,000 signatures were gathered to demand full Union Republic status. In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence from the Georgian Republic, claiming that the territory had been illegally annexed by the latter. In addition, the Abkhaz legislature called for the granting of full Union Republic status to the region, which it had briefly enjoyed between 1921 and 1930 (Jones 1997: 513; Jones 2013: 32). In light of this evidence, we code a claim for sub-state secession throughout. [1977-1978, 1988-1991: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Abkhaz
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Abkhaz
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36546000

Territory

- Most Abkhaz resided in the Abkhaz ASSR, though during the Soviet period they were clearly outnumbered by ethnic Georgians (18% vs 46% according to 1989 census). The Abkhaz made up the majority in one of Abkhazia's districts according to the 1989 census (Gudauti), but the Gudauti district harbored only approx. a third of Georgia's total Abkhaz population (30,000/90,000). This matches with information from MAR. [not concentrated]
- The claimed territory bordered the Russian republic and the Georgian republic, and thus had no international border. However, it had a seashore (Black Sea). [border: no; seashore: yes]
- Abkhazia overlaps with reserve PRIMKEY = GG001PET, which was discovered in 1975, before the movement started (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR notes no kin, though MAR does. Minahan (2002: 7) reports that there are approximately 35,000 Abkhaz in Turkey, which does not count as numerically significant. We found no other kin groups. [no kin]

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Altaians

Activity: 1989-2000

General notes

- The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast/the Altai Republic Republic, despite the fact that Altaians make up only about a third of Altai's population, (Fondahl 1997: 208). The Altaians' influence over the regional government is not fully clear. Titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Roeder (2007: 133) suggests that the Altaians' influence has diminished in the last years of the movement's activity, but was substantial at least in the initial years. Hence, they seem affected by changes in Gorno-Altai's sovereignty.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks created an autonomous homeland for the Altai, the Oirot Autonomous Oblast (Fondahl 1997: 206). It became the Gorno Altai Autonomous Oblast in 1948 (Fondahl 1997: 206-207; Minority Rights Group International). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. The post-World War II period saw significant industrialization. Slavic in-migration reduced the Altai to a minority within their own ethnic homeland. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued (Fondahl 1997: 201). There was a significant concession in the late 1980s, when Gorbachev initiated perestroika. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, it appears that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Gorno-Altai at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast, and hence appears unaffected by the reform. Hence, we do not code a concession.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous oblasts and okrugs (like Gorno-Altai) were not granted this right. However, note that the Altaians achieved republican status in 1991 (see below), and the Altai language thereby attained official status.
- In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21; Minority Rights Group International). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Gorno-Altai became independent of the Altai Krai. Moreover, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly

elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]

- At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia's 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia's 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
- The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. [1992: autonomy concession]
- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
- The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994,

Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). However, the Altai Republic did not sign a bilateral treaty with Moscow (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).

- The center began to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Altai never had a bilateral treaty.
- The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the 'power vertical', thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions' competencies. In Yeltsin's years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin's Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the 'anarchic' powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel'man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions' compliance with Moscow's legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia's military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow's control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel'man (2008: 10), "[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre". Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
 - o Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State

Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

Sovereignty declarations

- The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast declared sovereignty on October 25, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised itself to republican status, implying separation from the Altai Krai (Ross 2002: 21; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

Major territorial change

- Full republic status was granted in 1991 and fully implemented in 1992 (see above). [1992: sub-state secession]

Regional autonomy

- Gorno-Altai had the status of an Autonomous Oblast (under the administration of Altai Krai) until 1991, when it was upgraded to republican status. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). The Altai Republic has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note, however, that the Altaians make up only about a third of Altai's population (Fondahl 1997: 208). The Altaians' actual influence over the regional government could not be determined, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). In contrast, Fondahl (1997: 203) suggests that the influence of the Siberian peoples on their regional governments is limited. Roeder (2007: 133) suggests that the Altaians' influence has diminished in the last years of the movement's activity, but was substantial at least in the initial years. Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Altaians as regionally autonomous throughout (EPR does so, too). [1989-2000: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Siberian Cultural Center that was established in 1989, among other things, advocated increased autonomy for the Altaians, and the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast unilaterally proclaimed republican status in 1990, implying separation from the Altai Krai (Fondahl 1997: 207; Ross 2002: 21; Minahan 2002: 95). In light of this evidence, we code an autonomy claim in 1989-1990, and a sub-state secession claim for 1991-1992 (following the first of January rule). In 1992, the Gorno-Altai AO was upgraded to republic status, the highest status within Russia's matrioshka federal system. Thus, a claim for sub-state secession is no longer possible. For the movement's remaining years of activity we code an autonomy claim. [1989-1990: autonomy claim; 1991-1992: sub-state secession claim; 1993-2000: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Altaians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Altai
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36547000

Territory

- Most of the Altaians are located in the Altai republic (Minahan 2002: 91), yet they make up only about a third of Altai's population (Fondahl 1997: 208). From Minahan (2002: 91) it appears that the Altai live scattered throughout Altai. This suggests that the criterion that the group must make up an absolute majority of the local population is most likely not fulfilled. To confirm that there is no alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the threshold for spatial concentration, we consulted census data. We found only limited information, but what we found was sufficient to establish that the Altaians make up a majority in three adjacent districts (out of 10 plus the city of Gorno-Altaysk): Ongudai, Ust-Kan, and Ulagansky. The data we found did not give exact estimates of the number of Altai there, but it appears unlikely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met (the three districts have a population of approx. 40,000, and there are > 70,000 Altai). This case would profit from further research. [not concentrated]
- Altai has international land borders with Mongolia and China, and since 1991 with Kazakhstan, but no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- None found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups. Minahan (2002: 91) mentions “smaller communities” in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan but these are not substantial enough to be coded here. We found no other groups that would qualify as numerically significant ethnic kin. [no kin]

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Azerbaijanis

Activity: 1989-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Azerbaijan enjoyed a short period of independence in 1918-1920, after which it was reconquered by the Bolsheviks. The Azerbaijan SSR was established in 1920. Nakhichevan and Karabakh were subsequently merged with the Azerbaijan SSR, both as an Autonomous Oblast under Azeri administration. Initially, the Soviets granted the union republics relatively broad autonomy; this changed under Stalin's reign, when the Soviet Union became increasingly centralized (Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952; Dudwick 1997: 478). Even under Stalin, however, the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the 'nativization' policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians 'parachuted' in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were the only three Republics where the language of the titular nation had official status. In 1977/1978, there was an attempt to downgrade the status of the titular nations' languages. This sparked major protests in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, prompting Moscow to back down and not implement the downgrade (Minahan 1998: 120). Hence, we there was no restriction. Then, in 1988 the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de-facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- In July 1988 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet resolved in the favor of Azerbaijan the question whether the constitutional right to self-determination should override the requirement that a republic had to agree to border changes (which was cited by Azerbaijan; see Dudwick 1997: 486-7). In light of the rising tensions, however, in January 1989 Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under direct rule by Moscow (Suny 1993: 134; Dudwick 1997: 488; Hunter 1997: 445). We interpret this as an autonomy restriction since this implies that Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh was suspended, though noting that this is a somewhat ambiguous coding decision. [1989: autonomy restriction]
- There are two actions which allow us to code an autonomy concession in 1989. First, according to Solnick (1996: 224): "In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union

Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Second, in response to the imposition of direct rule in Karabakh, the newly-founded Azerbaijan Popular Front organized a general strike with the twin aim of dislodging the Republic's Communist leadership and returning Karabakh to Azerbaijani rule (Rutland 1994: 849). Azerbaijan began a rail blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989, which effectively put Armenia and Karabakh under siege (Dudwick 1997: 488). In November Gorbachev stroke a deal with Azerbaijan. November 28, 1989, the power of the local Soviet in Karabakh was restored, thus restoring Azerbaijan's administrative control over Nagorno-Karabakh (Suny 1993: 137; Dudwick 1997: 488; Hunter 1997: 443). In return Azerbaijan should end its rail blockade (Rutland 1994: 850). [1989: autonomy concession].

- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. This cannot be seen as a concession to the Azeris, given that the Armenian, the Azerbaijan and the Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation enjoyed official status already prior to this.
- In 1990 Moscow declared a state of emergency and ordered a military intervention in Karabakh and (a bit later) in Baku (Suny 1993: 137; Rutland 1994: 850). In Baku the intervention led to the death of dozens of protesters. In accordance with the codebook this is not coded.
- In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the 'Tajiks' entry for a more detailed account.
- Azerbaijan declared independence at the end of August 1991, which appears to have had the tacit approval of Moscow (MAR). The definite approval from Moscow came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. [1991: independence concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- Azerbaijan declared sovereignty on September 23, 1989 (Kahn 2000: 60). [1989: autonomy declaration]
- August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan declares independence, but not before checking with Moscow to ensure that Soviet troops would not pull out of the troubled areas before Azerbaijan could form a national guard (MAR). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus not unilateral in the sense employed here.

Major territorial change

- [1991: independence]

Regional autonomy

- Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin's reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of

centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Azeris as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-1991: regionally autonomous]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Initially the main organization linked to the Azeri self-determination movement, the Azerbaijan Popular Front, aimed at autonomy (Hunter 1997: 442-443). By late 1989, this began to change. A critical event contributing to the radicalizing demands was the bloody crack-down in Baku in January 1990. Calls for full independence from Moscow became louder (Minahan 1998: 26-27). In light of this evidence, we code an autonomy claim in 1989 and an independence claim in 1990/1991. [1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Azerbaijanis
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Azerbaijanis
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36509000

Territory

- The majority of Azerbaijanis resided in Azerbaijan, with a minority in other republics, in particular Georgia and Armenia. According to the 1989 census, more than 80% of Azerbaijan's population were Azerbaijanis (Hunter 1997: 439). This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]
- The Azeri republic bordered Iran and the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea is not considered a sea (see codebook). [border: yes; seashore: no]
- PRIMKEY AJ001PET (discovery unknown) and PRIMKEY AJ004PET (19th century). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Azeris in Iran (EPR, MAR), and Turks in Turkey (MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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Chechens

Activity: 1989-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Northern Caucasus fell to the Russians in the 18th century (George 2009: 75). After a prolonged war, Chechnya was fully incorporated into Tsarist Russia in the 19th century (Minority Rights Group International). Up until the Soviet policy of national delimitation, the Chechens' sense of national identity was weak at best (George 2009: 76). After 1917's October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. In 1934 the formerly autonomous Ingush were merged with the Chechens to form a single autonomous oblast. In 1936, the Chechen-Ingush region was upgraded to ASSR status (George 2009: 76). Accusing the Chechens of treason, the Soviets deported the whole Chechen people during the Second World War, along with other Caucasian groups (including the Ingush, the Karachais and the Balkars; George 2009: 76-77). Their autonomous status was abolished. In 1956 the deported peoples were allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99), that is, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). However, some territory that had once belonged to the Ingush remained with North Ossetia (George 2009: 87). "In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chechen leadership suffered periodic purges, and their Muslim religion remained the target of suppression and persecution (Minahan 2002: 440). In 1978 Soviet authorities permitted Mosques to reopen in Chechnya (Minorities at Risk Project). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). We code a prior concession since in December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On

Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as 'repressed peoples' (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: *On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples*. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. It did have some effects. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.

- According to Solnick (1996: 224): "In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises." And according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic).¹ [1989: autonomy concession]
- April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law 'On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation'. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as 'founders of the Union' (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), "the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR." On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR's sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev's move was aimed to weaken Russia's (and thereby Yeltsin's) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
- In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia's ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR's federal set-up anyway.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Chechnya-Ingushetia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. [1990: cultural rights concession]
- In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been

¹ According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded.

chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. The replacement of the centrally-appointed regional party secretaries (which de-facto yielded most of the power) with directly elected governors is tantamount to a reduction in the center's control over the regions. Chechnya, however, is a special case. Dudaev and his entourage had ousted the old Soviet nomenclatura shortly after the August Coup, and moved on to organize parliamentary and presidential elections, announced for October. Yeltsin had initially supported the ouster of the Communist forces in Chechnya (Roeder 2007: 314). However, fearing that the outright secessionist Dudaev would win the presidential election, Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet (unsuccessfully) attempted to stop the elections. Still, the removal of the centrally appointed Communist nomenclatura and replacement with a directly elected governor represents a significant autonomy offer, and is coded as a concession on autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]

- After the elections, the Russian Supreme Soviet declared the elections unlawful. A week later, Yeltsin introduced emergency law in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, removed Dudaev from power, replaced him with Moscow-loyal Akhmet Arsanov, and sent troops to Grozny. However, Chechen forces managed to block the troops at Grozny airport. Shortly thereafter, Russia's Supreme Soviet rescinded Yeltsin's decree and ordered the troops back (though the Chechens, notably, kept their weapons; Dunlop 1998: 116-120). According to Minority Rights Group International, Moscow subsequently introduced an economic blockade of Chechnya. In light of this, we code also an autonomy restriction in 1991. [1991: autonomy restriction]
- From this point on, Chechnya was de-facto independent. Negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful middle ground went nowhere, for the Chechens demanded independence and Moscow was unwilling to let the new Russian Federation splinter any further. Moscow moved back and forth from a hard stance and negotiation offers; for instance, in early March a high-ranking official signed an agreement which recognized Chechnya's independence and sovereignty, and at the end of the same month Moscow backed an attempted coup aimed at overthrowing Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 171). In turn, Moscow either offered significant autonomy or threatened invasion. The most significant autonomy offer came in 1992 with the Federal Treaty. The Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation, in which ethnic republics (like Chechnya) were granted far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. Chechnya, along with Tatarstan, refused to sign the Federal Treaty, despite lengthy negotiations. Despite Chechnya not signing the Treaty, it represents a significant autonomy offer, and is hence coded as an autonomy concession in accordance with the codebook. [1992: autonomy concession]
- Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had granted to the republics with the 1993 constitution, adopted in a popular referendum that December. The 1993 constitution implied a significant policy change: the introduction of a symmetric federation, in which no entity was granted more powers than others. The Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Of course, the reform did not as such apply to Chechnya, given that it has self-excluded itself from Russia. But at least, it affected Chechnya by signifying the terms and conditions under which it could reintegrate. The extent of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy was reduced, and thereby had an impact on Chechnya, too (Dunlop 1998: 185; also see Atrokhov 1999). Hence, we code an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
- In 1994, Moscow intervened militarily in Chechnya (this is not a restriction in the sense employed here). According to UCDP Conflict Encyclopeida, there were few serious efforts to negotiate a solution during the War. Russian and Chechen delegations met for peace talks on a few occasions, but the only notable result was reached with the Khasavuyrt Accord in 1996. The Khasavuyrt Accord was essentially a cease-fire agreement that called for demilitarization; it

ended the bloodshed. The Khasavuyrt Accord was followed-up with a formal peace treaty signed between Moscow and Chechnya in 1997. While ending the fighting, the peace agreements were vague and in particular, they left the issue at heart – Chechnya’s status – unresolved. In fact, the Khasavuyrt Accord established a moratorium on the question of Chechnya’s status for five years (George 2009: 82, 153; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Minahan 2002: 441; Atrokhov 1999). Negotiations over Chechnya’s status continued, though with little tangible results. Still, the Russian side repeatedly offered Chechnya far-reaching autonomy in return for its reintegration into the Russian Federation (Atrokhov 1999). Most significantly, in September 1997, Yeltsin signed a decree ordering the preparation of a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 74). Bilateral power-sharing treaties were introduced in early 1994 when Yeltsin signed such a treaty with Tatarstan’s Mintimer Shaimiev. Yeltsin had proceeded to sign such treaties with many other regions; they often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Chechnya, of course, refused to sign a bilateral power-sharing arrangement (Minahan 2002: 441; also see Söderlund 2006: 94); still Yeltsin’s autonomy offer was substantial and is hence coded as a concession. [1997: autonomy concession]

- In 1999, the Second Chechen War erupted, with Moscow’s stated ambition to end the insecurity in the region and bring back Chechnya under Russian control (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Though officially fighting terrorism, Russia also fought Mashkadov’s de-facto government, claiming that Mashkadov was not elected to his post in accordance with Russian legal norms. Moscow no longer recognized Mashkadov as Chechnya’s legitimate president (Orttung et al. 2000: 75). This is not, however, a restriction in the sense employed here. Then, in May 2000, Putin established president’s rule in Chechnya (Saradzhyan 2008). Putin moved to appoint a Moscow-minded local administration. In 2000, the Chechen president, Maskhadov, was removed from office and instead Moscow placed its own ethnic Chechen clients in power. Putin named Akhmad Kadyrov “interim civilian administrator” of Chechnya. Kadyrov had fought with Dudaev against Russia in the First Chechen War, but abandoned the cause in time. We code an autonomy restriction in 2000 due to Putin’s establishment of presidential rule. 2000 also saw the introduction of centralization reforms (see other active movements coded under Russia, e.g. the Altaians) [2000: autonomy restriction]
- In 2003, President Putin introduced a “peace plan”, which included a referendum on a new constitution for a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation with some local autonomy. Kadyrov delivered the constitution, popularly ratified in 2003, that formally re-integrated Chechnya into Russia in 2003 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Since the 2003 constitution re-established Chechnya’s autonomous status and ended presidential rule, we code a concession in 2003. [2003: autonomy concession]
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). The son of Akhmad Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov, was appointed president in 2007. [2004: autonomy restriction]
- In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. Also note that Putin rowed back in April 2013, ‘allowing’ the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). The latter would be coded as a restriction in 2013, but we are not coding 2013. We code an autonomy concession in 2012 due to the reinstatement of direct gubernatorial elections. [2012: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Since the declaration was adopted on the initiative of a Chechen congress, we attribute it to the Chechens only, and not to the Ingush. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
- Dudaev declared Chechnya independent on November 1 (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103; Roeder 2007: 314). [1991: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1991: erection of de-facto state]
- [2000: de-facto state abolished]

Regional autonomy

- The Checheno-Ingush Republic had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (with Ingushetia separating in 1992, it became the Chechen Republic). The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. The ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). In the late Soviet Union, the Chechens had increasing influence over their government; signifying their increased status, in 1989, the regional party secretary – an ethnic Russian – was removed from office and was succeeded by Doku Zavgaev, an ethnic Chechen (Dunlop 1998: 89). Chechnya was de-facto independent from 1991-1999, hence we also code regional autonomy in that period. Despite Chechnya’s de-facto independence, the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of Chechnya was left untouched until 2000, when Putin introduced president’s rule. It appears that presidential rule ended in 2003 with the new constitution and the election of (old) Kadyrov as president. Both Kadyrovs have acted as Putin’s prolonged arm in the region (George 2009: 156-157). Still, both have had significant autonomy (George 2009: 157). In line with general practice, periods of president’s rule are coded with continued regional autonomy (since autonomy was suspended but not abolished). [1989-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

- Dunlop (1998: 123) suggests that Chechnya quickly became de-facto independent after Dudaev’s election in October 1991. Chechnya began to withhold all federal taxes in 1992 (Orttung et al. 2000: 75; Dunlop 1998: 126). And according to Caspersen (2012: 12) Chechnya enjoyed de-facto independence from 1991 to 1999. Based on this, we begin to code de-facto independence in 1992, following the 1st of January rule. However, we extend the de-facto independence code to 2000 since i) Russian forces had not taken control of Grozny until February 2000, and by the most of Chechnya not until mid-2000 (Minahan 2002: 441; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), and ii) since Putin established presidential rule and removed Mashkadov (Chechnya’s president) only in 2000. [1992-2000: de-facto independence]

Claims

- Bart (Unity), the first Chechen self-determination organization, at an August 1989 Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, advocated the somewhat ambiguous idea of “a federal statehood of the peoples of the Caucasus” (Dunlop 1998: 90). Then, in November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). Already at the time, the Chechen national movement was divided. At the Congress, there were three factions, with the moderate one composed of the republican leadership advocating full sovereignty within the Soviet Union, and the two others full-fledged independence, either as a secular or as an Islamic state (Dunlop 1998: 93). It appears that in this initial face, the more moderate forces prevailed, given that at the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet in its sovereignty declaration did not claim independence, but increased autonomy. The declaration also unilaterally updated the republic’s administrative status to union republic, implying separation from the Russian Federation (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Hence, in the initial years we code a claim for sub-state secession.
- In the autumn of 1991, the leader of the independence-minded faction, Dudaev, mounted to power in Chechnya, and shortly thereafter declared Chechnya’s independence (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103). Dudaev’s claim for independence was not completely unambiguous. George (2009: 81), for instance, argues that Dudaev vocally promoted a policy of aggressive separatism, but at the same time signaled his willingness to remain within Russia. “While he repeatedly referred to Chechnya as an independent state free of Russian repression, he also explicitly stated that his goal was to share competencies with Russia, particularly economic and military powers” (George 2009: 81). According to George, the Chechens’ demands in effect matched those of Tatarstan. However, while George may well be correct in arguing that Dudaev might have been willing to accept some weak form of relation with Russia, Dudaev repeatedly insisted on Chechnya’s independence. Furthermore, Chechnya moved to erect a de-facto independent state. Hence, under Dudaev, the dominant claim shifted to independence. After the assassination of Dudaev in 1996, Aslan Mashkadov, a rebel leader, was elected president of Chechnya in 1997. Though he was more flexible compared to Dudaev, Mashkadov shared the latter’s goal of attaining independence for Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 72). The movement for independence continued after Chechnya’s de-facto state was crushed in 2000. In recent years, the Chechen movement has split into two factions. One faction continues to agitate for an independent Chechnya, while the other aims to establish an Islamic state encompassing the whole of the North Caucasus, of which Chechnya would only form part (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The claim of both factions, however, is for independence, if in a varied form. In light of this evidence, we code a claim for independence since Dudaev’s mounting to power, that is, as of 1992 (1st of January rule). [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Chechens
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Chechens
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36516000

Territory

- The majority of Chechens resided in the Chechen republic, though there are also some communities especially in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan. According to the 1989 census, the Chechens made up the majority of Chechnya’s population (Ormrod 1997: 103). Due to the Russian outmigration in the context of the Chechen wars and the split of Ingushetia in 1992, the

share of Chechens has increased in recent years to more than 90% in the 2002 and 2010 censuses. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

- The principal territory claimed by this movement is Chechnya, though in recent years there are also claims for an Islamic state encompassing the whole of the North Caucasus, of which Chechnya would only form part (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Chechnya borders Georgia and has no seashore. Thus before the dissolution of the USSR, Chechnya had no border and no seashore. After the dissolution, Chechnya had an international land border with Georgia.
- As argued above, in recent years there were also more encompassing territorial claims. 2007 can be used as a marker, since according to UCDP “[t]he proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate by ChRI-President Doku Umarov, on 7 October 2007 marked the movement's final departure from Chechen nationalism.” The territory claimed under the banner of the Caucasus Emirate is somewhat ambiguous. UCDP: “According to Umarov, the Russian Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria were provinces of the Caucasus Emirate. However, he did not define clear borders. Instead, all “historical lands of Muslims” should be reclaimed after the “expulsion of the infidels” and the introduction of Sharia law in the North Caucasus.” The North Caucasus borders the Black Sea, so we code seashore with 1 from 2008 onwards (1st of January rule). [border: no (1989-1991), yes (1992-2012); seashore: no (1989-2007); yes (2008-2012)]
- Chechnya includes a reserve, PRIMKEY = RS019PET, discovered in the late 19th century. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR codes no kin. The Minorities at Risk data provides mixed evidence. In the older versions (MAR I-IV) the Chechens are coded as having no close kindred, whereas in the more recent version (MAR V) the Chechens are coded as having “close kindred across a border”. According to MAR, Kazakhstan has approx. 100,000 while Jordan has approx.. 250,000). The figure for Jordan could not be confirmed, and the figure for Kazakhstan is ambiguous. According to a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Bhavna 2004) some 49,000 Chechens had officially lived in Kazakhstan by 1989. With the war in Chechnya an additional 30,000 (plus illegal immigrants) fled to Kazakhstan. Minahan (2002: 436) estimates that there are “100,000 [Chechens] in Central Asia, mostly in Kazakhstan.” There are other Chechen communities, but these do not count as numerically significant, including in Western Europe and the United States (Ghosh 2013). Based on this, we do not code ethnic kin. This is unambiguous for the period before the war. After the war, the Chechen population in Kazakhstan appears to come close to 100,000, though the best estimates we could find appear below the threshold. [no kin]

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Cherkess

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

- Note: from 1991 onwards the Cherkess movement demands separation from Karachai-Cherkessia. Still, the concessions/restrictions section includes concessions/restrictions to Karachai-Cherkessia as a whole. Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population, and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent). The Cherkess have had a certain level of power at the regional level throughout the movement's activity, though their share of power has decreased in recent years (see below). Hence it can be argued that increases/decreases in Karachai-Cherkessia's autonomy directly affect the Cherkess.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After 1917's October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic, with Karachai-Cherkessia subordinated to Stavropol Krai (Orttung et al. 2000: 196). Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. Then, in 1926, the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was split in two, that is, into a Karachai and into a Cherkess Autonomous Oblast. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities' initial years, Stalin's repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. During the Second World War, the Karachais (along with the Balkars) declared an independent state (Minahan 2002: 911). When the area was reconquered, the Karachais and the Balkars, as well as the Ingush and the Chechens were deported and their autonomous status abolished (in 1944). What used to be the Karachai AO was ceded to the Georgian SSR. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). The Karachais were merged with the Cherkess again, and the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was restored (hence, the previous status was not restored, but the unstable joint autonomous region that had existed between 1922 and 1926). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). Also, there was some relaxation with regard to restrictions on religion. And, critically, in December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

- Two further important reforms appear to have not affected the Cherkess. First, in 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, it appears that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Karachai-Cherkessia at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast. Second, April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (but not Autonomous Oblasts, like Karachai-Cherkessia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, note that Karachai-Cherkessia was soon to be upgraded to republican status, and subsequently Russian along with Abazian, Cherkess, Karachai, and Nogai became official state languages.

Concessions and restrictions

- In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Karachai-Cherkessia became independent from Stavropol Krai. Moreover, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected throughout Russia since 1991 – with the exception of Karachai-Cherkessia, where gubernatorial elections were postponed indefinitely. The incumbent head of administration, Khubiev (an ethnic Karachai), convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Only in 1999 were gubernatorial elections held. Still, the introduction of directly elected governors should be seen as an autonomy concession since it implies a significant autonomy offer by the center; it was regional forces (Khubiev) who prohibited the concession from taking effect, and not Moscow. Moreover, the institution of the centrally-appointed regional party secretary (who de-facto yielded most of the power) was abolished immediately in 1991. In the present case this all, of course, is primarily a concession to the Karachais (as the majority group in Karachai-Cherkessia), but still constitutes a measure of decentralization and is hence coded as a concession for the Cherkess as well. We code a concession in 1991 due to the status elevation and the introduction of gubernatorial elections. [1991: autonomy concession]
- At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia's 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia's 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Ortung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction

since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.

- In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). However, he withdrew the plan after a referendum in Karachai-Cherkessia on its unity, which turned out a majority against partition (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). We do not code this as a concession since Yeltsin's proposal appears to have never gone beyond planning stage. We do not code the referendum as a concession, either, since it was designed in a way to avoid partition.
- The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics (such as Karachai-Cherkessia) far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. [1992: autonomy concession]
- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
- The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). We have not, however, found evidence suggesting that Karachai-Cherkessia signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
- The center began to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Karachai-Cherkessia never had a bilateral treaty.
- The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the 'power vertical', thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions' competencies. In Yeltsin's years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin's Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the 'anarchic' powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel'man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked,

among other things, with overseeing the regions' compliance with Moscow's legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia's military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow's control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel'man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]

- Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel'man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
- In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. Also note that Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). The latter would be coded as a restriction in 2013, but we are not coding 2013. We code an autonomy concession in 2012 due to the reinstatement of direct gubernatorial elections. [2012: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- Karachai-Cherkessia's November 1990 sovereignty declaration is attributed to the Karachais. The fact that a *Karachai* SSR (rather than a Karachai-Cherkessian SSR) was declared makes it likely

that Karachais played the decisive role in this process (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Minorities at Risk Project).

- October 24, 1991, Cherkess leaders proclaimed a Cherkess republic (Peters 1995: 208). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]
- In 1999 Cherkess leaders declared a Cherkess state separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (AFP 1999). [1999: sub-state secession declaration]

Major territorial change

- In July 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status, implying it separated from Stavropol Krai. The change was fully implemented in March 1992. [1992: sub-state secession]

Regional autonomy

- Between 1989 and 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia had the status of an Autonomous Oblast, subordinated to Stavropol Krai. In July 1991, it was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status, implying it separated from Stavropol Krai. Karachai-Cherkessia became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Union. Under Gorbachev and later Yeltsin, the Russian ethnic entities did have a certain level of regional power (see above, as well as Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The actual influence of the Cherkess over their regional government, however, is somewhat ambiguous, and increasingly ambiguous in recent years. Karachai-Cherkessia has two titular nationalities – the Karachais (around a third of the local population in 1989) and the Cherkess (around ten per cent in 1989) – and a significant Russian/Slavic population. In effect, Slavs made up a relative majority in 1989 (around 40 per cent). Titular nationalities generally had a privileged situation within their own republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). But according to Comins-Richmond (2002: 70; also see Richmond 2008: 122-123), the Karachais faced difficulties mounting to advanced positions within their own republic. In particular, the region's party secretary (de-facto the most powerful position) consistently was ethnic Russian from 1957 to 1991. In contrast, the Cherkess – despite their relatively small number – unambiguously had influence over the regional government prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Richmond 2008: 133). Pustilnik (1995) agrees that the region was dominated by Slavs, but notes that there still was an ethnic power-sharing system in place. After 1991, the tables turned and the Karachais mounted to a more influential position within the region (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76). EPR argues that the Karachai gained all power, and that the other titular nationality – the Cherkess – became powerless at the regional level. But other sources give credible evidence that an ethnic power-sharing system, though fundamentally re-negotiated and altered, has remained in place. According to Ormrod (1997: 112), in 1994 the parliamentary executive – in striking resemblance to the ethno-demographics – comprised 11 Russians, eight Karachai, four Cherkess, three Abazin, and three Nogai. There was though significant ethnic contention over ethnic representation at the regional level, in particular over elections to a regional presidency (direct elections to regional presidents were introduced in 1991). Elections to a new regional parliament were postponed indefinitely, and so were presidential elections. Khubiev convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Finally presidential elections were held in 1999, pitting an ethnic Karachai against an ethnic Cherkess. The elections threw the region into chaos, with violent protests and renewed calls for the separation of Cherkess, Russian (Cossack), and Abazian lands from the republic. Under dubious circumstances, the ethnic Karachai candidate, Vladimir Semenov, was elected president (Roeder 2007: 134-135; Orttung et al. 198-200). After a Muscovite intervention, the conflict was brought under control (Orttung et al. 2000: 201). A deal was struck, after which the presidency would go to a Karachai, while the prime ministry goes to a Cherkess and the vice-presidency and

parliament speaker position go to ethnic Russians (Fuller 2008). In 2008, the prime ministry went to an ethnic Greek, contrary to the prior deal (Radio Free Europe 2010a). Having caused massive protest, in 2010 an ethnic Cherkess was again named prime minister in 2010 (Radio Free Europe 2010b). Given this evidence that the Cherkess had a certain level of influence throughout, we code the Cherkess as autonomous from 1991 to 2012. [1991-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Cherkess activists have repeatedly demanded the unification of Circassian lands (comprised of Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabards, and Shapsugs) and the dissolution of Karachai-Cherkessia (Minahan 2002: 5, 447; Roeder 2007: 134; Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; Circassian World News Blog 2010; Ria Novosti 2010; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 149). No other claim was found. [1991-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Cherkess
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Circassians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36544000

- The EPR group 'Circassians' combines the Cherkess and the Abaza. The Circassians and thus both the Abaza and the Cherkess are powerless throughout. According to the Soviet Union's 1989 census, the Cherkess made up .02 per cent of the Soviet Union's population, and the Abaza .01. These figures are applied to 1991. For 1992 onwards, we draw on the 2010 census, according to which the Abazas and the Cherkess make up .03 and .05 per cent of Russia's population, respectively. [1991-2012: powerless; 1991: .0002 (group size); 1992-2012: .0005 (group size)]
 - o Note: this figure matches almost perfectly with Minahan (2002: 443), who reports an estimate of 76,000 Cherkess or a group size of .0005.

Territory

- Most Cherkess are located in the Karachai-Cherkess republic, where they make up around ten percent of the local population according to the 1989 census (this share has increased slightly due to Russian outmigration). Thus the Cherkess cannot be considered concentrated in the republic as a whole. The Cherkess primarily reside in the northwestern part of Karachai-Cherkessia, yet they do not form a majority there either (Minahan 2002: 443). District level data from the Russian 2010 census confirms this. [not concentrated]
 - o Around 73,000 Cherkess in Russia according to the 2010 census, 56,000 in Karachai-Cherkessia.
 - o 29,000 Cherkess in Kabardsky district (95% of the local population). This is the only district with an absolute majority, and only 40% of all Cherkess live there.
 - o Adyghe-Khabl'sky district: relative majority (39%), 6,000.
 - o Cherkessk, capital, 13%, 17,000
- The claimed territory comprises the northwestern part of the republic, either in the form of a stand-alone Cherkess republic or in a unified republic together with other Circassians, including the Kabards and the Adyghe (see above). The Cherkess lands have no international border and

no seashore (see Minahan 2002: 443). [border: no; seashore: no]

- The claimed territory overlaps with PRIMKEY RS017PET, discovered long before the movement started (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The Cherkess form part of the EPR group ‘Circassians’, which is coded as not having any kin groups. Minahan (2002: 443), on the other hand, argues that there are Circassians, including Cherkess, in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. Other sources (e.g. the UNPO) also mention that there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey (Ayhan 2005). Due to the Turkish Circassians, we code kin in a neighboring country before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and kin in non-neighboring country thereafter. [1991: kin in neighboring country; 1992-2012: kin in non-neighboring country]

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Evenks

Activity: 1989-2012

General notes

- The concessions/restrictions include changes in the Evenk okrug's status, though it has to be noted that the Evenks make up only 14% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Evenks are the titular nationality, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. Moreover, the movement's claim relates to this area, which provides further justification to code changes in the region's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Evenks autonomous okrug was established in 1930 (Orttung et al. 2000: 118). In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- Note that Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform in 1989 (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). The Evenk territory had the status of an autonomous okrug and hence appears unaffected by this reform.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like the Evenk territory) were not granted this right.
- In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
- Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996. The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Against the earlier promise of direct elections, the governors in Evenk autonomous okrug was appointed until 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 119). Since Yeltsin had

originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favour of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]

- Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia's 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia's 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
- The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. Ethnicities other than republics (like the Evenk autonomous okrug) were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
- The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), which implies an autonomy upgrade for the Evenks. Hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. Note that the upgrade led to an ambiguous situation as both autonomous okrugs and the oblasts/krais to which they were attached now had the same rights (Orttung et al. 2000: 236). [1993: autonomy concession]
- In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). The first gubernatorial elections were held in 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 119). [1995: autonomy concession]
- The 1996 law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Socioeconomic Development of the North of the Russian Federation” allowed small-numbered Russian peoples to establish relatively autonomous and self-governing structures. For instance, the Evenks established traditional structures known as “*obschinas*”. 1999 and 2000 law strengthened these rights (Donahue 2003). This initiative applies only to so-called “small numbered peoples”, which includes (among others) the Chukchis, the Evenks, the Itelmens, the Khanty, the Komis, the Koryaks, the Mansi, the Nenets, the Shors. Key components have not been implemented (IWGIA; Minority Rights Group International), thus we do not code a concession.

- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). In 1997, the Evenk autonomous okrug signed such a bilateral power-sharing treaty (Orttung et al. 2000: 120; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
- By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- The center began to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law had little effect (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
- The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the 'power vertical', thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions' competencies. In Yeltsin's years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin's Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the 'anarchic' powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel'man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions' compliance with Moscow's legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia's military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow's control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel'man (2008: 10), "[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre". Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute

an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]

- Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel'man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
- Following a 2005 referendum, Evenk was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). Given the Evenks' minority status within their entity and the strong political pressure to follow the official line, we code this as a restriction. [2005: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Following a 2005 referendum, Evenk was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). Since Evenkya had had an autonomous status within a larger federal unit, this is coded as "Revocation of autonomy" in line with the codebook. [2007: revocation of autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Evenk had autonomous okrug status until January 1, 2007, when it was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). Note that the Evenks made up only 14% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Evenks are the titular nationalities, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. We code regional autonomy until 2006, though noting that this requires further research. This follows EPR practice: EPR does not code the Evenks but codes ethnic groups with autonomous okrugs as autonomous even if they make up only a small share of the territory (see e.g. Chukots). [1989-2006: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Minahan (2002: 587) reports that a nationalist movement emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Minahan (2002: 587), “Evenki nationalism, which has developed since the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, presses for the production of new teaching materials in the Evenki language, creation of a cultural center in Tura, and enhancement of traditional economic activities. Activists support Evenki land claims, rights to traditional land use and resources, and a greater say in local government areas with Evenki populations. Evenk activists working for self-determination seek to revive the *obshchina* territorial system as the basis for territorial organization. Presentations by the Evenks to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples have emphasized the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. Since the late 1980s, the Evenks have demanded reforms to reverse the process of alienation from their lands, which in turn would improve their control over their own destiny.” A 2002 report by the Guardian (Brown 2002) discussing the implications of a proposed pipeline through Evenk territory suggests that the Evenks continued to make land claims. [1989-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Evenks
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- According to Minority Rights Group International, the Evenks numbered 35,527 in 2002. Minahan (2002: 583), on the other hand, reports that there are approximately 50,000 Evenks in the Russian Federation, noting that the Soviet census reports only speakers of Evenk. Since the differences are so small we draw on Minahan. For 1989-1991 we combine this figure with the total population of the Soviet Union (287 millions according to 1989 census), and for 1992 onwards with the 2002 census (145.2 million). [1989-1991: 0.0002 (group size); 1992-2012: 0.0003 (group size)]
- We found no evidence of inclusion in the national executive. [1989-2012: powerless]

Territory

- The Evenks make up but 14% of their okrug’s population according to the 1989 census (Fondahl 1997: 194). Minahan says the actual number is higher, but with 27% his estimate is below the threshold too. The Evenks have no spatially contiguous homeland within the okrug either (see Minahan 2002: 583). [not concentrated]
- The movement makes land claims in areas with concentrations of Evenks (see above). The exact locations of those is not clear, though Minahan (2002: 583) gives a rough estimate. Following Minahan, Evenk claims are not limited to areas within the Evenk okrug, but also relate to Evenk areas outside the okrug, including some at the border with China. The claimed territory does not include a seashore. [border yes; seashore: no]
- The territory as suggested by Minahan overlaps with several oil fields, including PRIMKEY RS056PET (discovered unknown), PRIMKEY RS067PET (discovered in 1977), and possibly PRIMKEY RS057PET (1985). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 583) there are 30,000 Evenks in northeastern China and a negligible number of Evenks in Mongolia. 30,000 is not numerically significant enough to be

coded. We found no evidence for other groups that could be considered close kin. [no kin]

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Far Eastern Slavs

Activity: 1991-2007

General notes

- The Far Eastern Slavs are descendants from ethnic Slav settlers (Ukrainians and Russian). Far Eastern Slavs are located in the Primorski and Khabarovsk Krai, in the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin Oblasts, as well as in Yakutia (Minahan 2002: 600). We code changes in the level of self-determination of all these regions as concessions/restrictions – except for Yakutia. Since this is an ethnic republic, concessions/restrictions are attributed to the respective titular nationality. Note that for the same reason, the Autonomous Okrugs sub-ordinated to the coded regions (e.g. Koryakia) are not coded (these are ethnic entities, too, and are separately coded).

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
- In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Siberia's non-ethnic regions hence appear unaffected.

Concessions and restrictions

- In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
- Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favour of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]

- Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia's 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia's 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since i) their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction, and ii) since presidential representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites and proved ineffective.
- The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
- The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). However, the constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions.
- In 1993, Yeltsin allowed for popular gubernatorial elections in Amur Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 23). [1993: autonomy concession]
- However, Yeltsin removed the popularly elected governor of Amur Oblast (Aleksandr Surat) from office only four months later. Subsequently, governors were again appointed in Amur Oblast until 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 23; see below). [1993: autonomy restriction]
- In 1995, Yeltsin allowed for gubernatorial elections in selected non-ethnic entities, including Primorskii Krai (winner in brackets: Yevgenii Nazdratenko; Orttung et al. 2000: 432). Later, but still in 1995, Yeltsin lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections altogether (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In 1996 gubernatorial elections were held in Khabarovsk Krai (Viktor Ishaev), in Kamchatka Oblast (Vladimir Biryukov), in Magadan Oblast (Valentin Tsvetkov), and in Sakhalin Oblast (Igor Farkhutdinov; Orttung et al. 2000: 225, 191, 318, 480). Also in Amur Oblast gubernatorial elections were once again allowed, but the 1996 elections were annulled due to electoral fraud. The elections were repeated in 1997, upon which Anatolii Belonogov was elected governor (Orttung et al. 2000: 23). Since the allowance to hold elections dates to 1995, we code a single concession in 1995. [1995: autonomy concession]
- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the

bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Khabarovsk Krai signed a bilateral treaty with Moscow in April 1996, followed by further agreements signed in July of the same year (Orttung et al. 2000: 224; Söderlund 2006: 94). Also Sakhalin Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in May 1996. The agreement dealt with land use, education, international economic ties, and other issues (Orttung et al. 2000: 481; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]

- Magadan Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in July 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 319; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
- Amur Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in May 1998 (Orttung et al. 2000: 23; Söderlund 2006: 94). Moreover, in 1998 Moscow gave Magadan Oblast increased autonomy for distributing funds, though the source does not make fully clear what this implied (Orttung et al. 2000: 319-320). But since Amur Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in 1998, we code an autonomy concession in this year anyway. [1998: autonomy concession]
- The center began to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- However, in June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law had little effect (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
- In June 1999 Yeltsin signed a decree which established a 15-year special economic zone in the city of Magadan, with tax exemptions and a favourable customs system (Orttung et al. 2000: 319-320). We do not code this because the agreement was confined to the local level.
- The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the 'power vertical', thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions' competencies. In Yeltsin's years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin's Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the 'anarchic' powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel'man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions' compliance with Moscow's legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia's military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow's control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel'man (2008: 10), "[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre". Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March

Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin's call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin's order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan's constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel'man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]

- Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel'man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
- In the name of administrative simplification, Putin moved to abolish certain ethnic entities in the early 2000s, promising improved economic performance. Following a 2005 referendum, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug was merged with Kamchatka Oblast in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). The merger implies the loss of Koryakia's autonomous status. We code this as an autonomy concession (for the Far Eastern Slavs, not the Koryaks and Itelmen) since the powers of the Slavic-dominated Far Eastern Slav governments over the formerly autonomous ethnically-based region was increased. [2005: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1993, one of the regions associated with the Far Eastern movement, Primorski Krai, unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264). [1993: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The Oblasts and Krai associated with the Far Eastern Slav movement are all federal subjects of the Russian Federation, and as such have invariably enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years (see above). [1991-2007: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The only demand we have found is for the establishment of one or more Far Eastern Republics, a measure that would increase the autonomy of the Far Eastern Slavs. For instance, in 1993 the Primorski Krai unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264). And Viktor Ishaev, the governor of Khabarovsk Krai, called for the creation of a Far Eastern Republic in 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 223). We code an autonomy claim throughout. [1991-2007: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Far Eastern Slavs
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Russians; Ukrainians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36501000; 36502000

- The Far Eastern Slavs are descendants from ethnic Slav settlers (Ukrainians and Russian). Far Eastern Slavs are located in the Primorski and Khabarovsk Krai, in the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin Oblasts, as well as in Yakutia (Minahan 2002: 600). In 1991, the last year the Soviet Union existed, EPR codes the Russians as senior partner and Ukrainians as junior partner. In all remaining years, Russians are coded as dominant. Compared to European Russians, the access to central-state executive power is much more limited in case of the Far Eastern Slavs. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk, which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (e.g., Viktor Chernomyrdin, the longest-acting prime minister under Yeltsin, is from Orsk south of the Ural mountains). Hence, we code the Far Eastern Slavs as powerless throughout, though noting that this case would profit from more in-depth research. [1991-2007: powerless]
- Minahan (2002: 603) notes that the Far East's population is decreasing, but it is mostly European Russians which emigrate back to Russia's European part, and not the Far Eastern Slavs (also see Minakin 1995: 178). According to Minahan (2002: 600), there are about 6.1 million Far Easterners in Russia. Combined with Russia's population of 145.2 million in the 2002 census, this gives a group size of .042 for 1992-2007 and combined with the USSR's total population in the 1989 census (287 million) this gives the estimate for 1991, 0.0213. [1991: .0213 (group size); 1992-2007: .042 (group size)]

Territory

- >85% of the Far Easterners live in the Far Eastern region, where they make up almost 80% of the population according to Minahan (2002: 600). [concentrated]
- There is no international border but seashores (see Minahan 2002: 600). [border: no; seashore: yes]
- There are hydrocarbon reserves. PRIMKEY RS083PET (discovered in 1989), RS085PET (unknown), RS084PET (unknown) and an offshore reserve, PRIMKEY OF299PET (unknown). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- There are some Far Easterner communities in the US and Canada, but these are not numerically significant (Minahan 2002: 600). The real question is whether we should code ethnic kin due to Russians in places like Ukraine and the Baltics, or because of groups such as the Ukrainians in Ukraine. We do not code kin here because the primary identity marker here relates to region and because this movement is directed against a Russian-dominated government. [no kin]

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Ingush

Activity: 1970-2012

General notes

- Until 1992, the Ingush shared an autonomous region with the Chechens. The Chechens outnumbered the Ingush by four to one; according to the 1989 census the Chechens made up about 58 per cent of the local population, and the Ingush only about 13 (Ormrod 1997: 117). But the Ingush enjoyed titular status within the region, which implies a privileged position (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Hence, changes in the region's status affected not only the Chechens, but also the Ingush; accordingly, the concessions/restrictions coding includes concessions/restrictions to the Chechen-Ingush Republic until the two separated in 1992.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After 1917's October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. In 1934 the formerly autonomous Ingush were merged with the Chechens to form a single autonomous oblast. In 1936, the Chechen-Ingush region was upgraded to ASSR status (George 2009: 76). Accusing the Chechens of treason, the Soviets deported the whole Chechen people during the Second World War, along with other Caucasian groups (including the Ingush, the Karachais and the Balkars; George 2009: 76-77). Their autonomous status was abolished. The Ingush had suffered from Stalin's terror already prior to their deportation (Minahan 2002: 785). In 1956 the deported peoples were allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99), that is, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). We code a prior concession due to the right to return and the re-establishment of their autonomous status in 1956. We found no evidence for a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as 'repressed peoples' (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly

implemented, if at all. It did have some effects. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.

- A core demand of the Ingush movement is the restoration of the Prigorodny region, which upon the Ingush' deportation was amalgated with North Ossetia and has not been returned when the Ingush were rehabilitated in the 1950s. The conflict over the Prigorodny region came to a head in the early 1990s. In 1991, armed Ingush forces attempted to seize Ossetian homes in the Prigorodny region, and there were large-scale demonstrations demanding the return of the region. In response, the North Ossetian government imposed a curfew over the region, and began armed retaliation against the region. The conflict continued to escalate throughout 1992, leading to 600 deaths and dozens of thousands of internal refugees. In subsequent years there were negotiations with North Ossetia, but these primarily concerned the return of refugees (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137; Orttung et al. 2000: 375); the Prigorodny region remains part of North Ossetia. Hence, we do not code a concession related to the Prigorodny region.
- In 1978 Soviet authorities permitted certain Mosques to reopen in Ingushetia (Minahan 2002: 786). [1978: cultural rights concession]
- In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet changed the USSR's 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev's reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
- According to Solnick (1996: 224): "In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises." And according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like the Checheno-Ingush autonomous republic).² [1989: autonomy concession]
- April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law 'On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation'. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as 'founders of the Union' (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), "the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR." On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR's sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20)

² According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded.

suggests that Gorbachev's move was aimed to weaken Russia's (and thereby Yeltsin's) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

- In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia's ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR's federal set-up anyway.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Chechnya-Ingushetia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. [1990: cultural rights concession]
- In September 1990 the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet decided to suspend the right of Ingush to live in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 107-108). Throughout 1991, the Ingush resisted this demand (Ormrod 1997: 108). This measure contributed significantly to the escalation of conflict in 1992. By mid-1993, dozens of thousands of Ingush from the Prigorodny region had fled to Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 108). The denial to reside in a given territory constitutes a very strong restriction of group autonomy. [1990: autonomy restriction]
- In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. The replacement of the centrally-appointed regional party secretaries (which de-facto yielded most of the power) with directly elected governors is tantamount to a reduction in the center's control over the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
- Shortly after the August Coup, Dudaev and his entourage ousted the local Soviet government, and called parliamentary and presidential elections. Moscow opposed the election, fearing that secessionist Dudaev would mount to power. Moscow mounted an unsuccessful, half-hearted "coup" that was aborted after a few days, and then imposed an economic blockade on Chechnya (Minority Rights Group International). However, by that time Chechnya had already declared independence, leaving Ingushetia to its own devices. Thus, we do not code a restriction. Also, we do not code a restriction due to the introduction of presidential representatives, which occurred parallel to the introduction of directly elected regional governors (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
- In late 1991, Ingushetia announced that it would split from Chechnya. The Russian Federation did not, initially, recognize this change, but the Russian Supreme Soviet approved the separation in June 1992 (George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786; Ormrod 1997: 134). The same year, there was another significant concession to the ethnic republics, like soon-to-be Ingushetia: the March 1992 Federal Treaty. The Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. [1992: autonomy concession]

- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
- Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had granted to the republics with the 1993 constitution, adopted in a popular referendum that December. The 1993 constitution implied a significant policy change: the introduction of a symmetric federation, in which no entity was granted more powers than others. The Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). [1993: autonomy restriction]
- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral power-sharing treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. However, Ingushetia did not sign such a treaty (George 2009: 88; also see Söderlund 2006: 94).
- In 1993 a “free economic zone” was established in Ingushetia. This implied tax breaks, among other things (Minahan 2002: 787; Orttung et al. 2000: 134). The free economic zone was disbanded in 1997 (Minahan 2002: 787). [1993: autonomy concession; 1997: autonomy restriction]
 - o Furthermore, In December 1993, Yeltsin met with the governors of both Ingushetia and North Ossetia to negotiate a deal over the Prigorodny region conflict. The three signed a statement that foresaw that i) Ingushetia renounces its claims on the Prigorodny region, ii) that local armed units are disbanded, and iii) that North Ossetia allows the Ingush to live in the Prigorodny region and the many Ingush refugees the right to return (Ormrod 1997: 109). Note that North Ossetia had suspended the right of Ingush to live in the region back in 1990 (see above). In 1994 the parties signed the Beslan Agreement, which dealt with the Ingush refugees’ right to return (Ormrod 1997: 109). Implementation was slow. But over time a good share of the Ingush refugees were able to return. The grant of the right to return constitutes an autonomy concession (this comes in addition to the free economic zone established in the same year, see above).
- In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Ingushetia never had a bilateral treaty.
- In 1999, Moscow and Ingushetia agreed to a dual system of oversight of judicial appointments (George 2009: 88), but this appears too limited to code a concession.
- In 2000, Putin began his assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican

constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]

- Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel'man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
- In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. Also note that Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). The latter would be coded as a restriction in 2013, but we are not coding 2013. We code an autonomy concession in 2012 due to the reinstatement of direct gubernatorial elections. [2012: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Since the declaration was adopted on the initiative of a Chechen congress, we attribute it to the Chechens only, and not to the Ingush.
- In September 1991, Ingush representatives in a congress of Ingush deputies of all levels proclaimed the establishment of an Ingush ASSR within the RSFSR (Dunlop 1998: 108; MAR; George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]
- In 1993 Ingushetia aped Tatarstan and declared its sovereignty, indicating its interest to establish a federal relationship with the center on the basis of treaties (George 2009: 88). [1993: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1992: sub-state secession]

Regional autonomy

- The Checheno-Ingush Republic had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1992 Ingushetia became a Republic on its own. Ethnic entities like the Chechen-Ingush ASSR enjoyed a certain level of autonomy under the Soviets, at least after Stalin's reign (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Ingush used to be outnumbered by the Chechens in their common ASSR by about four to one, but the Ingush enjoyed titular status within the region, which usually implied a privileged position within (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Hence, we code the Ingush as autonomous during Soviet rule (note: this is in line with EPR). Having attained separate republican status, Ingushetia continued to have regional autonomy beyond 1991, though the extent varied over the years (see above). [1970-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Initially, the Ingush movement's claim was for the restoration of the Prigorodny region, meaning that the region should be separated from North Ossetia and amalgamated with the Chechen-Ingush Republic (sub-state secession claim). In 1970 there was an Ingush demonstration in the Prigorodny region demanding that the territory be ceded to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Minahan 2002: 785). Moreover, also in the 1970s, the Ingush petitioned the Soviet government to restore the Prigorodny region to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). Then, in the late 1980s, the Ingush began to agitate for their own national homeland. In 1988-1989, about 60,000 signed a petition calling for the formation of an autonomous Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). In March 1991 citizens rallied for the restoration of Ingush statehood within a separate Ingush polity. Protestors also demanded the return of the majority-Ingush region of Prigorodny. The Ingush appear to have upheld their claim for the restoration of the Prigorodny region after they had been granted their own homeland in 1992 (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 787). In 2006, the Ingush Parliament called on Moscow to return the disputed Prigorodny region to Ingushetia (Minority Rights Group International). In addition, Ingushetia's then-president Aushev demanded increased autonomy (Orttung et al. 2000: 132), but the Prigorodny claim appears dominant. Then in 2007, the Islamic insurgency emerged demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate spanning Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria spread to Ingushetia, supported by local Ingush groups, such as the Ingush Islamic Jamaats (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). It appears that the claim for an independent Ingushetia as part of the Caucasus Emirate has succeeded restoration of the Prigorodny region as the dominant claim. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession until 2007, and an independence claim for 2008 onwards, following the 1st of January rule. [1970-2007: sub-state secession claim; 2008-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Ingush
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Ingush
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36533000

Territory

- Until 1992, the Ingush shared an autonomous region with the Chechens. The Chechens outnumbered the Ingush by four to one; according to the 1989 census the Chechens made up about 58 per cent of the local population, and the Ingush only about 13 (Ormrod 1997: 117). However, the Ingush formed a majority in Ingushetia, the part that became a separate republic in 1992. According to Minahan (2002: 782), the Ingush make up about 80% of the local population (also see the 1970, 1979, 1989, 2002, and 2010 censuses. There are also some Ingush outside of Ingushetia, in particular in North Ossetia, though many of them were expelled in 1992. However, most Ingush are located in Ingushetia itself. The code matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]
- Initially, the claim was focused on North Ossetia's Prigorodny region; in the late 1980s/early 1990s there was also a claim for separation of Ingushetia from statehood. Both Ingushetia and the Prigorodny region borders Georgia, thus there is a claim to an international border since the dissolution of the USSR. No seashore. [border: 1970-1991: no, 1992-2012: yes; seashore: no]
- Ingushetia and the Prigorodny region overlap with PRIMKEY RS019PET, which was discovered in the late 19th century. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Minahan (2002: 782) mentions "sizeable Ingush population" in the Central Asian republic (particularly Kazakhstan), but these appear to be only a few thousand (Nichols 1997). EPR does not code kin. MAR does not code kin in older versions, while in phase V it does, but it is unclear to whom they refer (most likely though the Kazakh Ingush noted above). [no kin]

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Karakalpaks

Activity: 1989-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The affiliation of the Karakalpak territory changed multiple times during the Soviet period. In 1925, Karakalpakstan was granted the status of an autonomous region (autonomous oblast) as part of the Kazakh ASSR. In 1930, it was transferred to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, only to be joined to the Uzbek SSR in 1936. That same year, Karakalpakstan was elevated to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Uzbek SSR (Hanks 2000). In 1988 the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- Following the example of the Baltic Republics, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR adopted a language law that made Uzbek the official government language (Gleason 1997: 583-597); however, the law did not apply in Karakalpakstan, where local authorities were allowed to regulate the language status (Article 3 of the Uzbek language law, see Refworld). This change was confirmed half a year later by the Soviet government when it passed the All-Union Language Law on April 24, 1990. The Union law made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Karakalpakstan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Prior to this, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. We code a cultural rights concession in 1989 since this is when Karakalpakstan appears to have gained the right to legislate on language issues. [1989: cultural rights concession]
- According to Solnick (1996: 224): "In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs such as Karakalpakstan). [1989: autonomy concession]
- In 1990, a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric; hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the 'Tajiks' entry for a more detailed account.

Sovereignty declarations

- The Supreme Soviet of the Karakalpak ASSR issued a declaration of sovereignty in December 1990 (Minahan 2002: 924). The declaration included the right to and the possibility of independence from the Uzbek SSR or even the Soviet Union, but appears to not have directly called for outright separation, hence we code an autonomy declaration. [1990: autonomy declaration]

Major territorial change

- Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, implying a host change for the Karakalpaks. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- Karakalpakistan had the status of an ASSR in the USSR, the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Karakalpaks as regionally autonomous. [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- According to Minahan (2002: 924), the Karakalpak demanded separation from Uzbekistan and the creation of an autonomous Karakalpak republic within the Soviet Union. Hence, we code a sub-state secession claim. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim].

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Karakalpaks
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Karakalpaks
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36555000

Territory

- Most Karakalpaks are located in Karakalpakstan. According to Minahan (2002: 921), the Karakalpaks form a relative majority in the Karakalpak republic, but with 34% they do not form an absolute majority. We found no evidence suggesting that they would form an absolute majority in a smaller, spatially contiguous territory within the Karakalpak republic. [not concentrated]
- Karakalpakstan borders Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which became international land borders after the USSR's dissolution. Before there are no international land borders, and of course also no

seashore. [border: no; seashore: no]

- PRIMKEY: UZ003PET (discovered in 1964), PRIMKEY: UZ002PET (also 1964), and PRIMKEY: UZ001PET (unknown). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups (scenario 1:1). Minahan (2002: 921) reports “small Karakalpak communities” in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. While these are too small to be coded, the Karakalpak language is closely related to Kazakh, and some Kazakhs even consider the Karakalpaks as Kazakhs (see Minahan 2002: 921-922). Other than Kazakhstan, there are numerically significant Kazakh populations in China, Turkmenistan, and Russia. [kin in neighboring country]

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North Ossetians

Activity: 1990-2005

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The North Ossetians are concentrated in what today is the North Ossetian Republic, where they make up the majority. The region has come under Russian control in the late 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1476). After 1917's October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98), while at least in the initial years, the majority of posts were held by Russians (Minahan 2002: 1478). In 1936 the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was upgraded to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) status (Minority Rights Group International). Following the deportation of the Ingush in 1944, North Ossetia was enlarged with the Prigorodny region, a former Ingush land (Minahan 2002: 1478). When the Ingush were allowed to return in 1956, Prigorodny remained with North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
- And in 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law 'On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation'. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as 'founders of the Union' (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), "the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR."

On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR's sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev's move was aimed to weaken Russia's (and thereby Yeltsin's) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

- In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia's ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR's federal set-up anyway.
- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Ossetian subsequently attained official status at the regional level. [1990: cultural rights concession]
- In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Akhsarbek Galazov, an ethnic Ossetian, was elected North Ossetia's first governor in 1994. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
- At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin's eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia's 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia's 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
- The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources, the right to secede, and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries. [1992: autonomy concession]
- In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only

recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.

- The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
- The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). North Ossetia became the fourth Republic to sign a bilateral treaty in March 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 377; Ormrod 1997: 139; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1995: autonomy concession]
- The center began to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
- In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law had little effect (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
- The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the 'power vertical', thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions' competencies. In Yeltsin's years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin's Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the 'anarchic' powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel'man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions' compliance with Moscow's legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia's military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow's control over the regions. It was

not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel'man (2008: 10), "[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre". Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics' sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin's call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin's order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan's constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel'man 2008: 10-11). Overall, In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin's assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]

- Note that Putin's verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors' right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions' governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
- Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel'man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

- The Republic of North Ossetia declared sovereignty in July 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its administrative status, implying separation from the RSFSR (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- North Ossetia was an autonomous republic under the Soviet Union, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. North Ossetians form the majority in the region, and as such are well represented in the regional government. The region enjoyed significant autonomy, though the autonomy was curtailed with Putin assuming the presidency in 2000 (see above). [1990-2005: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The 1990 sovereignty declaration unilaterally raised the administrative status of North Ossetia, implying separation from the RSFSR. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1990-1991 (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim]
- Following the dissolution of the Union, the North Ossetian Republic was involved in a bargaining process with Moscow, demanding increased sovereignty (Ormrod 1997: 114, 116). [1992-2005: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	North Ossetians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Ossetes
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36527000

- In 1990-1991, there are two Ossetian movements, the South Ossetian movement in the Georgian SSR and the North Ossetian movement in North Ossetia, Russia. After 1991, the South Ossetian movement is active in Georgia, and the North Ossetian in Russia. Hence, in 1990-1991, we have a n:1 scenario, and for 1992 onwards we have a 1:1 scenario (note though that this figure includes South Ossetian refugees). The Ossetes are coded as powerless throughout, which applies to both North Ossetians and South Ossetians. [1990-1991: powerless]
- For the 1990-1991 group size, we draw on the Soviet Union's 1989 census. According to this, there were approximately 600,000 Ossetians in the USSR, 164,000 of them in the Georgian SSR (that is, in South Ossetia). Thus there were about 436,000 Ossetes in North Ossetians. We use this figure as an estimate of the number of North Ossetians. The USSR's total population is estimated at approximately 287 million in the 1989 census. [1990-1991: .0015 (group size)]

Territory

- The North Ossetians are concentrated in what today is the North Ossetian Republic, where they make up the majority (Minahan 2002: 1476). Their share in the republic's population increased from 53% in the 1989 census to 65% in the 2010 census. [concentrated]
 - o Note: until 1991 there were also Ossetians in Georgia; these are treated separately, see "South Ossetians". What we understand by North Ossetians here are Ossetians in the former RSFSR.
- The claimed territory (North Ossetia) borders Georgia, and thus has an international land border since the dissolution of the USSR, yet no seashore. [border: 1990-1991: no, 1992-2005: yes; seashore: no]

- North Ossetia overlaps with PRIMKEY RS019PET (discovery in late 19th century) (Fujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- The Ossetians have transnational kin in Georgia after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 (see EPR; Minahan 2002: 1474). The number of South Ossetians appears significant (164,000 according to the 1989 Soviet census; Minahan 2002: 1474 reports a similar number), though unclear in recent years due to the unstable situation in South Ossetia. There is no reliable data on the number of South Ossetians in South Ossetia (there were 65,000 in 1989; it may be fewer now), while in Georgia itself the number decreased from 100,000 in 1989 to 40,000 in the 2002 census. Estimates run that the number of Ossetians in Georgia has decreased further as a result of the 2008 war (Sordia 2009). Noting the ambiguity that the numeric threshold may no longer be met, we code kin throughout.
- We found no other kin (see e.g. MAR), and thus code kin from the dissolution of the USSR onwards. [1990-1991: no kin; 1992-2005: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Tajiks

Activity: 1990-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of 'national delimitation'. Tajikistan became an ASSR in 1924, under the administration of the Uzbek SSR. In 1929, Tajikistan was separated from Uzbekistan and was awarded full Union Republic status (Atkin 1997: 605). Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin's reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the 'nativization' policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians 'parachuted' in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). The Gorbachev era saw further decentralization, with the introduction of contested, multi-party elections throughout the Union in 1988 (however, the 1990 legislative elections in Tajikistan were nonetheless uncontested, see Atkin 1997: 610) and a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels in 1989 (Suny 1993: 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99). [1988, 1989: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, following the example of the Baltic Republics, in July 1989 the government of the Tajik SSR adopted a language law which gave Tajik primacy over Russian as the state language, even if it did not exclude the use of Russian. The law also called for the adoption of Tajik, rather than Russian or Russianized, personal and place names (Atkin 1997: 628). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations' languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]
- There were two further measures in 1990 to be mentioned. These measures affected all union republics and (only the second) all autonomous republics. First, April 3, 1990, a new law on secession was enacted, that made it more difficult for union republics to secede (Brown 1996: 289). Also, the Supreme Soviet reaffirms the supremacy of union law. If at all, this had limited consequences for the autonomy status, and we do not code this. Second, April 26, 1990, the

Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), “the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a restriction of the sovereignty of union republics. At the same time, we do not code this as a concession to ASSRs. Note that it was this policy which motivated Yeltsin to proclaim that “the autonomous [sub-units] can take as much sovereignty as they can swallow. We can agree to all of that. But they will have independently to answer, of course, for the well-being of their people. We make one condition: they will have to take part in a federation treaty with Russia. I underline: we will not let anyone pull Russia down” (Dunlop 1997: 36). Note that while tolerating sovereignty demands, Yeltsin also had a strong focus on the consolidation of central government power (George 2009: 55).

- In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Tajikistan’s independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- The Tajik SSR declared its sovereignty on August 25, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60; August 24, 1990, according to Atkin 1997: 628). [1990: autonomy declaration]
- The Tajik SSR declared its independence shortly after the August Coup, on September 9, 1991. This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus cannot be considered unilateral.

Major territorial change

- With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Tajikistan became independent. [1991: independence]
- Furthermore, some Tajiks became part of Uzbekistan. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Under Gorbachev, there was further decentralization. Hence, we code the Tajiks as regionally autonomous throughout. [1990-1991: regionally autonomous]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Tajik nationalist organizations sprang up in the last days of the Soviet Union. According to Atkin (1997: 606), the common themes included sovereignty, but not outright independence, even in 1991. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tajiks
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Tajiks
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36519000

Territory

- Most Tajiks were located in the Tajik SSR, and most of the rest in the Uzbek SSR. In the Tajik SSR, the Tajiks made up more than 60% of the local population according to the 1989 census (Atkin 1997: 605, 608). This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]
- The territory in question here is Tajikistan. The Tajik movement in Uzbekistan that claimed Tajik territories in Uzbekistan is separately coded. The Tajik SSR bordered Afghanistan and China, yet there is no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- PRIMKEY: TI001PET (discovered in 1908), as well as PRIMKEY TI002PET (1969), PRIMKEY TI003PET (unknown), PRIMKEY TI004PET (unknown), and PRIMKEY TI005PET (unknown) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Both EPR and MAR code ethnic kin due to the Tajiks in Afghanistan and China, as well as the Persians in Iran (only EPR). [kin in adjoining country]

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Uzbeks

Activity: 1988-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of 'national delimitation'. Uzbekistan was awarded with full Union Republic status in 1924 (Gleason 1997: 573; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 311). In 1929, Tajikistan was separated from Uzbekistan and was awarded full Union Republic status (Atkin 1997: 605, Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 311). Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin's reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the 'nativization' policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians 'parachuted' in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). We code a prior concession due to this but have not found a concession in the ten years before the start date. [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev's reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a separate concession. In 1989 the Uzbek electoral law was adjusted to conform to the new guidelines (Gleason 1997: 578). [1988: autonomy concession]
 - o Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People's Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
- According to Solnick (1996: 224): "In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with

Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Uzbekistan) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]

- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, following the example of the Baltic Republics, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR adopted a language law that made Uzbek the official government language (Gleason 1997: 583-597). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations' languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]
- In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the 'Tajiks' entry for a more detailed account.
- In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Uzbekistan's independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- The Uzbek SSR declared its sovereignty on June 20, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60; Gleason 1997: 580, 597). [1990: autonomy declaration]
- Shortly after the August Coup, on September 1, 1991, the Uzbek SSR declared independence (Gleason 1997: 598). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and thus this declaration cannot be considered unilateral.

Major territorial change

- With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Uzbekistan became independent. [1991: independence]
- Furthermore, some Uzbeks became part of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin's reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center's control loosened after Stalin's death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Under Gorbachev, there was further decentralization. Hence, we code the Uzbeks as regionally autonomous throughout. [1988-1991: regionally autonomous]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Uzbek nationalist organizations sprang up in the last days of the Soviet Union. According to Suyarkulova (2011: 134) and Gleason (1997: 579, the common themes included sovereignty, but not outright independence, even in 1991. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1988-1991: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Uzbeks
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Uzbeks
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36505000

Territory

- Most Uzbeks are located in the former Uzbek SSR (14/16..5 million in the 1989 census), though there are also significant populations elsewhere in the former USSR, in particular Kyrgyzstan. According to the Soviet 1989 census the Uzbeks formed a majority within the Uzbek SSR: approx. 70% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]
- The territory in question here is Uzbekistan. The Uzbek movement in Kyrgyzstan that claimed Uzbek territories in Kyrgyzstan is separately coded. The Uzbek SSR bordered Afghanistan, but had no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There is oil in Uzbekistan. PRIMKEYS: UZ001PET, UZ002PET, UZ003PET, UZ004PET, UZ005PET, and UZ006PET, and UZ001PET. The earliest discovery was in the 1930s (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR and MAR both note numerically significant kin in Afghanistan. [kin in neighboring country]

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Western Ukrainians

Activity: 1989-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Western Ukrainian movement relates to Ukrainians living in 7 Western Ukrainian Oblasts (Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, and Zakarpattya) demanding increased autonomy and cultural rights. Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence at the end of the First World War. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, Ukrainian nationalists seized the opportunity and took control of Western Ukraine (Galicia) and proclaimed the independent Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918. In Eastern Ukraine, nationalists proclaimed the independent Russian Ukraine, also in 1918. In 1919 the two Ukrainian states were merged, but in late 1919 the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine, and in 1920 the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed (note that a significant part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union only later; Transcarpathia, then part of Czechoslovakia, was annexed into Ukraine after the Second World War, and mainly catholic Western Ukraine, then part of Poland, as well). A period of harsh repression followed. In 1930, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned. Western Ukraine (under Poland) and Transcarpathia (under Czechoslovakia) were denied autonomy, despite earlier post-World War I agreements. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces. As a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets occupied Polish Western Ukraine in 1939, followed by harsh repression and deportations. Nazi Germany then invaded Ukraine, but was forced out by the Red Army in 1944. The Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR (Minahan 1998: 282-283). Ukraine as a whole can be considered autonomous during the Soviet period. However, the Ukrainian regions (oblasts) had very limited powers – Ukraine under Soviet rule was highly centralized (Wolczuk 2002: 68-69). Political liberalization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s allowed the Uniate church to function openly again after 1987, and received official sanction in 1988 (Minahan 2002: 2075). The Uniate Catholic church, to which many Western Ukrainians belonged, was absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church during Stalin's reign. Subsequently, the church operated underground, and became a major vehicle for Western Ukrainian nationalism. [1987: cultural rights concession] [prior concession].
- Note: in 1988 Moscow introduced contested elections throughout the Union (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179).. However, regions without autonomous status (such as the Western Ukrainian oblasts) profited relatively little from local leader choice because their regions' decision rights were very limited (Ukraine inherited a heavily centralized set-up from the Soviet period, see Wolczuk 2002: 68-69). Hence, we do not code a concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics,

including Ukraine, had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law (see Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations' languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]

- In 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was given autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283). This is not coded as a concession since in Western Ukraine, the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was dominant (Batt 2002: 160) and the Uniate church had been legalized already in the late 1980s (Minahan 2002: 2075). Moreover, there was a series of autonomy concessions to Union Republics, but these are not coded for the Western Ukrainians since they aim for autonomy for themselves. In late 1991, Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union. However, this is not coded as a concession since the movement is not about independence for Ukraine. The independence movement is coded separately.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- We do not code regional autonomy for two reasons. First, while Ukraine as a whole can be considered regionally autonomous, Ukraine itself was heavily centralized and thus the Western Ukrainians cannot be considered regionally autonomous. Second, the Western Ukrainians presumably participated in Ukraine's regional government, but make up only about 10% of Ukraine's population.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Western Ukrainian movement demanded decentralization of the Soviet Union and Galician autonomy (within Ukraine, it appears). While vehemently supporting independence of Ukraine as a whole, the movement did not seek the independence of Galicia (Wolczuk 2002; Minahan 2002: 2076) [1989-1991: autonomy claim].

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Western Ukrainians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Ukrainians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36502000

- The Western Ukrainian movement relates to Ukrainians living in 7 Western Ukrainian Oblasts (Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, and Zakarpattia) demanding

increased autonomy and cultural rights. Hence, the movement relates to a regional branch of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. EPR codes the Ukrainians as junior partners, and indeed, ethnic Ukrainians had considerable influence in the Politburo, even if clearly less than ethnic Russians. However, Ukrainians in the Politburo originate mostly from the traditionally more pro-Russian central or Eastern Ukraine, and not from the Western part. Moreover, members of the Politburo had to be loyal to Moscow and to grand Russia; thus, Ukrainians in the national executive can hardly be considered as representatives of the most nationalist of all Ukrainians, the Western Ukrainians. Minahan (2002: 2075) suggests that Ukraine's Western part was treated differently from the central and Eastern parts, too. For all these reasons, we code the Western Ukrainians as powerless in 1989-1991. [1989-1991: powerless]

- According to Minahan (2002: 2071), the Western Ukrainians make up about 14 per cent of Ukrainians living in Ukraine in 2002. If we use the relative 2002 figure and combine it with the share of Ukrainians (living in Ukraine) in the Soviet Union (roughly 13%, according to the 1989 census), we get a group size estimate of $.14 * .13 = .0182$. [1989-1991: .0182 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 2071), approx. 79% of the Western Ukrainians resides in Western Ukraine (Galicia), where they comprise 54% of the local population. [concentrated]
- Western Ukraine has land borders with several other countries, in particular Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and (after the dissolution of the USSR) Belarus. No seashore, however. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There are hydrocarbon reserves (Lujala et al. 2007): PRIMKEY UP001PET (discovered in 19th century), PRIMKEY UP002PET (unknown), and PRIMKEY UP003PET (unknown). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Minahan (2002: 2071) reports "smaller groups" of Western Ukrainians in Romania and Poland. The total number of Ukrainians in Poland at the time (1990) was approximately 300,000 according to EPR (EPR does not include the Ukrainians in Romania; they number approx. 50,000 according to censuses, but nationalists claim substantially higher figures). It is unclear how many would see themselves as Western Ukrainians, but given the close spatial proximity it appears likely that the threshold is met. [kin in neighboring country]

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SENEGAL

Casamançais

Activity: 1982-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Senegal and with it Casamance were first invaded by Portugal in the 15th century. Over the next centuries, France, the UK, and Portugal battled over Senegal. In the 19th century, Senegal fell to the French, and it remained a French colony until independence in 1960. However, the French only gained Casamance a bit later. Casamance, having unsuccessfully resisted colonialization, had its own colonial administration separate from Senegal until 1939. In 1939, it was integrated with Senegal, implying a loss of autonomy (Fall 2010: 5), accentuated by the centralizing tendencies of the Wolof-dominated government in Dakar (Minahan 2002: 398). Calls for separate independence or autonomy upon decolonization were ignored (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 61). After independence, the French and the Wolof language were promoted by Dakar, to the detriment of the other officially recognized national languages, including Diola (the Casamance movement is strongly associated with the Diolas) (Fall 2010: 10). In 1964, there was a controversial land reform which pre-empted the Diola from distributing their lands in the way they had done traditionally (Fall 2010: 12). Demands for self-determination grew intense after 1978, when a change in non-democratic regime led to a change in the manner in which the Casamance dossier was managed, as the new leader was less inclined to negotiate and more inclined to use repression. Large-scale expropriation of indigenous land in Casamance began in 1979 and a systematic denigration of Casamançais began through the imposition of Wolof in the media, education and administration. [1979: cultural rights restriction; 1979: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1982, there was a violent crackdown against protesters demanding self-determination and the leadership of the movement was imprisoned (Humphreys & ag Mohammed 2005). This does not, however, constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.
- In 1986, Casamance lost its status as an official language. Moreover, the region was placed under special governance with an army general appointed governor (Humphreys & ag Mohammed 2005). [1986: cultural rights restriction; 1986: autonomy restriction]
- In May 1991, the Bissau Accord was signed, a cease-fire agreement that did not, however, address the status of Casamance. Further agreements were signed in subsequent years, seemingly without addressing the status of Casamance (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
- The MFDC rebels signed a peace deal with the Senegalese government in 2001 and again in 2004 (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 401; Fall 2010; BBC 2004; IRIN 2001; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Ziguinchor Peace Agreement), but these peace deals did not (once again) address the question of Casamance's status.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1982 the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamancais (MDFC) was formed, which demanded independence (Minorities at Risk Project). The MDFC has remained an important player in the Casamance movement; however since the early 1990s, serious splits occurred within the movement, leading to the fragmentation of the movement (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 1992, the movement split into the Front Nord and the Front Sud; what according to Minahan (2002: 400) continued to be the major faction, the Front Sud, demanded independence. Further splits occurred in subsequent years, with some factions demanding independence and others autonomy (Minahan 2002: 400). In 1998, the MDFC offered to give up its independence claim in return for measures directed at the region's economic and social development (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 2003, the MDFC formally gave up its claim for independence, and began to demand autonomy within Senegal. Militant radicals, however, who by that time had acquired a significant role, continued to demand independence (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Fall 2010: 26-27). The fragmentation of the movement makes it difficult to determine the dominant claim from the early 1990s onwards, hence we code the most radical claim (independence) throughout. [1982-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Casamancais
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Diola
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	43305000

- The Casamance movement is strongly associated with the Diolas (Minorities at Risk Project; Fall 2010: 8), hence the 1:1 match.

Territory

- The Casamancais are concentrated in the historic region of Casamance, where the Diolas and the Bainouk (the groups most associated with the Casamancais movement) together make up 72% of the population (Minahan 2002: 396). This amounts to 998,000 Diolas and Bainouk (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 1.005 million Casamancais in the whole of Senegal in that same year. [concentrated]
- The movement demands self-determination for the historic region of Casamance, south of the Gambia, which consists of the administrative regions Kolda, Ziguinchor, and Sédhiou (created in

2008). The territory adjoins international land borders (Guinea-Bissau, Gambia) and has access to the Atlantic Ocean. [border: yes; seashore: yes]

- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there is one offshore field off the coast of Casamance (PRIMKEY: OF309PET). The field was discovered in 1967. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there are Diolas also in neighboring Gambia. The Diola make up around 10% of Gambia's population of 1.8 million in 2014 (see EPR). The kin group is thus large enough to be coded here. Further evidence comes from MAR; MAR codes "close kindred in more than one country" mentioning the Dioula in Guinea-Bissau and in Gambia as the largest kin groups. Also see Minahan (2002: 396). [kin in neighboring country]

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SLOVAKIA

Hungarians

Activity: 1993-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After the Second World War, Hungarians were discriminated in Czechoslovakia (Minority at Risk Project). The 1945 Government Program of Kassa implied the loss of citizenship, and the Hungarian language was removed from the public sphere. Then, in 1949, the Hungarians were granted the right to native language education. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1956 for the first time made a brief mention of the Hungarian minority, and the 1960 Constitution promised to ensure for all minorities education and culture in their native language. The 1968 constitution guaranteed the Hungarians' right to education in the mother language as well as representation in local bodies. In practice, however, these rights were ignored (Minority Rights Group International). In effect, Czechoslovakia's federalization in 1968 implied greater scope for Slovak nationalism (Hungarians in Czechoslovakia mainly lived in the Slovak part). According to the Minorities at Risk Project, "[n]ew policies of assimilation included progressive Slovakization of education, elimination of Hungarian place-names from signs, bans on using Hungarian in administrative dealings and in institutions and workplaces, and pressure to Slovakize Hungarian names." Shortly before Slovakia's independence, legislation reaffirmed the Hungarians' cultural rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, adopted in January 1991, prohibited all forms of discrimination and reaffirmed the right to education in the first language, which was already included in the 1968 constitution but not implemented. Similarly, while declaring Slovak the state language in Slovakia, Slovakia's parliament in 1991 recognized the right of minorities to use their language in official venues where they exceed twenty per cent of the local population. (Minority Rights Group International; Minorities at Risk Project). The 1992 Slovak constitution reaffirmed the Hungarians' cultural rights; at the same time, however, the Slovak government embroiled in increasingly anti-Hungarian rhetoric and discrimination against Hungarians. There were no moves to implement the rights granted by the constitution (Neuwahl 2000). We do not code these lip service concessions, given the continued lack of implementation. Instead we code a prior restriction due to the long-standing assimilationist pressure. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Following Slovakia's independence, new legislation required that all official documents (such as birth certificates) needed to be in Slovak. Hungarians needed to name their Children in Slovak (Minorities at Risk Project). [1993: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1994, the Slovak Parliament adopted a law which gave ethnic Hungarians the right to give their children Hungarian names (Minorities at Risk Project). The same year, the Slovak parliament passes a law allowing villages with at least 20 per cent Hungarian population to use bilingual signs (Minorities at Risk Project). [1994: cultural rights concession]
- The 1995 language law restricted the language rights of ethnic Hungarians as it not only reaffirmed the status of Slovak as the country's only official language, but also provided that Slovak was to be used also in commerce, the administration of religious bodies, and in communications between patients and physicians (Neuwahl 2000: 25). [1995: cultural rights restriction]

- The 1995 language law was in parts declared illegal by the Constitutional Court in 1997. The Court ruled that minorities had the right to use their mother tongue in official written contact with authorities (MAR). [1997: cultural rights concession]
- The 1999 law on Minority Languages gave ethnic minorities increased rights. The law allows the use of minority language in public administration at the local level where the minority's share in the local population exceeds twenty per cent (Neuwahl 2000: 26). [1999: cultural rights concession]
- With the approaching EU accession, Slovakia moved to implement the constitutional guarantee to be educated in the native language. In particular, in 2002 legislation expanded minority-language university courses; moreover, the Slovak government authorized the creation of a Hungarian-language university, which opened its doors in January 2004 (Minority Rights Group International). [2002: cultural rights concession]
- Mainly as a consequence of EU pressure, Slovakia moved towards regionalization in the late 1990s (Bryson & Cornia 2004). Slovakia re-introduced regional administrative sub-divisions in 1996 (Brusis 2003). The 8 provinces were devolved some limited powers in 2002. In particular, the 2002 reform introduced directly elected regional executives (before 2002, these were appointed by the government). Over time, the competencies of the regional governments were extended. In particular, the regions got the right to set region-specific tax rates mainly for the real estate tax in 2005. Note: regional competencies have though remained fairly limited (Bochsler & Szöcsik 2013). Furthermore, the regionalization efforts were put in question after the 2006 elections, when an anti-devolution government was voted into office (Bryson 2008). More importantly, the 2002 reform did not lead to significant autonomy for the Hungarian minority, who forms a minority in all provinces (Bochsler & Scöcsik 2013: 426). Calls for the formation of a Hungarian-majority region were rejected. The Hungarians did have some successes: for instance, the MKP (a Hungarian party) participated in the regional government of Nitra, a Slovak region. Nevertheless, overall regionalization had too limited effects on the Hungarians to code a concession.
- In 2009, Slovakia passed a new language law that discriminates against the Hungarian language. The use of languages other than Slovak was prohibited both in public (including singing in the street!) and in business (Schöpflin 2009). [2009: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Slovakia attained independence in 1993, implying a host change. [1993: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- While there have been some calls for secession, Minorities at Risk notes that most Hungarians favor autonomy. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 271-272) also note a claim for autonomy. Hence, we code a claim for autonomy throughout. [1993-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Hungarians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Hungarians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	31702000

Territory

- According to MAR, the majority of the Hungarians in Slovakia lives in Southern Slovakia. According to the 2001 census, they made up an absolute majority in a contiguous area in Slovakia's southernmost western and central areas. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory borders Hungary, but has no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- Areas with a Hungarian majority overlap with PRIMKEY LO004PET (date of discovery unknown) and PRIMKEY LO005PET (1996) (Lujala et al. 2007). PRIMKEY LO003PET borders LO004PET and was discovered in 1914, thus we code oil throughout. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- There is kin, obviously in Hungary, but also in Croatia, Romania, Serbia/Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Ukraine (according to EPR and MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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SOLOMON ISLANDS

Gwales (Guadalcanalese)

Activity: 1978-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The island of Guadalcanal (indigenous: Isatabu) was discovered in 1568 by the Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana. Previously a part of German New Guinea, Guadalcanal was annexed to the British Protectorate in 1899 in exchange for parts of Samoa that were given to Germany.
- The island of Guadalcanal experienced some fierce fighting as the United States started its first major offensive against the Japanese Empire in the Second World War (Guadalcanal Campaign). The United States had secured the island in February 1943, British administration was restored (Global Security).
- By establishing Local Councils, the British administration wanted to include Solomon Islanders in the governing process. The Local Councils were granted competencies in local administration, development, justice, health, education and agriculture. The Native Administration Ordinance of 1953 established the councils, among which also the Guadalcanal Council. The local government system and the council powers and functions were expanded in 1963 with the Local Government Ordinance (Solomon Islands Historical Encyclopaedia 2013). [prior concession]
- The Independence Constitution of 1978 installed a unitary system of government and did not grant the devolution of powers to the provinces that had been demanded by autonomist movements (Premdas et al. 1984). Since regional/provincial autonomy had not existed prior to independence, we do not code this as a restriction.

Concessions and restrictions

- The Provincial Government Act 1981 (PGA) established seven provinces (Malaita, Central, Makira, Western, Isabel, Temotu, Guadalcanal; two new provinces were added in 1991). It aimed at bringing decision-making closer to the people. According to Nanau (1997: 74, cited in Suluia 2012: 31), the new two-tier structure of government “provided devolution and de-concentration of authority to the lower levels of government [...], giving voice to local communities”. In each province a Provincial Assembly was created. We code an autonomy concession since the PGA of 1981 “formally instituted the decentralised system of provincial government in the Solomon Islands” (Suluia 2012: 2). Note though that the extent of decentralization remained limited. [1981: autonomy concession]
- The Provincial Government Bill 1996 repealed the Provincial Government Act 1981. The new act sought to replace the system of Provincial Assemblies, made up of elected members, with a system of Provincial Councils in which it was possible that the assembly could exclusively or predominantly consist of non-elected members (Corrin Care 1997). The act was considered undemocratic and unconstitutional by many provincial governments and was challenged successfully by the government of Guadalcanal in 1997 (The Minister for Provincial Government v. Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly). Overall, the 1996 bill did not however deviate much from the 1981 PGA in terms of centralization/decentralization (Nanau 1998: 195). Hence we do not code a restriction.
- As a consequence of the failure of the 1996 act, the parliament subsequently passed the Provincial Government Act 1997. The new PGA provided for provincial governments to generate

their own revenue, installed an Executive as the head of the Provincial Assembly and a Premier elected by a majority of Provincial Assembly members. Furthermore, new functions and powers of the provincial government were laid out based on scheduled 3 (final legislative powers of provincial governments, administrative functions), 4 (legislation subject to review by the national government) and 5 (transfer of other functions) (Suluia 2012). [1997: autonomy concession]

- Having agreed on a cease-fire in August 2000, the conflict parties (Gwales/Isatabu and Malaitans) signed the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) on 15 October 2000. The TPA, among other things, promised greater autonomy to all provinces and the Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces in particular (Kabutaulaka 2008: 101). The agreement furthermore provided for a general amnesty, disarmament and demilitarization and a restructuring of the Royal Solomon Islands Police. The indigenous Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) was established to assist in the implementation of the agreement. A first plan to implement these provisions was put together at a premiers' conference in November where it was decided that the government should adopt a "Homegrown State System of Government for Solomon Islands whereby each respective province should become a State with its own State Constitution" (Premiers' Millennium Conference Buala 2000b, cited in Scales 2008: 235). A draft Constitution Amendment (Creation of the Federation) Bill was passed in July 2001. Overall, implementation of the Townsville agreement remained patchy, and this continues to be a significant issue (Hewitt et al. 2008). Nonetheless, there was some movement towards more decentralization as a result of the Townsville agreement; thus we code an autonomy concession. [2000: autonomy concession]
- The Townsville agreement led to a constitutional reform process. Thus far this resulted in two draft federal constitutions in 2004 and 2009 (Mae 2010). Yet no definitive version has been passed.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Solomon Islands attained independence in 1978, implying a host change. [1978: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

- The decentralization process as initiated by the PGA of 1981 and 1997 and the 2000 Townsville agreement did not lead to devolution of functions and resources to the provinces that would be significant enough to warrant a regional autonomy code. According to Suluia (2012: 2), devolution has been minimal "leaving provinces to play a marginal role in the delivery of services" with provincial grants remaining at best static and with the central government maintaining most of the competencies and responsibilities. Schedule 3 of the 1997 PGA, thus powers that are fully devolved, concerns mainly administrative competencies, such as the licensing of local businesses, the protection of wild creatures, the codification and amendment of customary law, management of agriculture land, fresh water and reef fisheries, local shipping and the maintenance of roads, bridges, and harbours, waste disposal and fire protection, and the provision of water supply to rural communities. Functions such as education or health are not devolved. As a consequence, decentralization "has minimal impact in empowering the local government" (Suluia 2012: 75). Based on this, we do not code regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- With independence in sight, the Guadalcanal Council began to push for a federal system, demanding substantial devolution of powers. According to Kabutaulaka (2008: 101), the movement was quite aggressive in its push for federalism and the desire for autonomy “continued and was expressed publicly on various occasions in the post-independence period” (Kabutaulaka 2008: 101). Guadalcanal’s provincial government threatened secession on two occasions (1997 and 2006) but the threat is very likely to be a tactical manoeuvre in support of/opposition to new bills that would have increased/decreased the Gwale level of self-determination. There is no proper claim for independence. Thus we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1978-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Gwales (Guadalcanalese)
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- EPR does not include the Solomon Islands. Global Security states that the Malaitans “generally dominate the elected government and the business sector around Honiara”. However, with Ezekiel Alebua (1986-1989), the former Premier of Guadalcanal, and Derek Sikua (2007-2010) there have been two Gwale Prime Ministers. Since there is no information of systematic exclusion from central government (less alone any form of discrimination), we assume that in all other years, there also has been some sort of access to central government for the Gwales, who make up almost 20% of the total population. Ezekiel Alebua, for example, was the foreign minister in 1981-1982, Derek Sikua had ministerial posts between 1993 and 1998 and then again from 2003-2006. We thus code the Gwales as junior partner throughout. [1978-2012: junior partner]
- The official census distinguishes only between Melanesian, Polynesian, Micronesian Chinese, European and Others, thus disregarding distinctions between Gwale or Temotu identities. Since no information on the ethnic Gwale population could be found we need to rely on a relatively crude estimation. According to Overley (1999), “most of the population of Guadalcanal [...] is Gwale”, whereas the capital city of Honiara, which is also situated on Guadalcanal “is populated mainly with Malaitans”. According to the 2009 census, the population of Guadalcanal (which excludes the separately administered Capital Territory of Honiara) stood at 93,613. Given the Solomon Island’s total population (515,870) in that year, we code a population share of 0.1815. [1978-2012: .1815 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Overley (1999), “most of the population of Guadalcanal [...] is Gwale”. We found no evidence suggesting that a majority of the Gwales would live outside of Guadalcanal, thus we code them as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Gwales demand self-determination for the island of Guadalcanal. The territory does not adjoin an international land border and has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- We could not find evidence of kin groups of the indigenous Gwales outside the Solomon Islands. Although Gwales are Melanesians we do not code Melanesians in other countries as kin since this movement is directed against a Melanesian-dominated government. [no kin]

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Temotus

Activity: 2000-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- By establishing Local Councils, the British administration wanted to include Solomon Islanders in the governing process. The Local Councils were granted competencies in local administration, development, justice, health, education and agriculture. The Native Administration Ordinance of 1953 established the councils, among which also councils for the islands of Temotu. The local government system and the council powers and functions were expanded in 1963 with the Local Government Ordinance (Solomon Islands Historical Encyclopaedia 2013).
- The Independence Constitution of 1978 installed a unitary system of government and did not grant the devolution of powers to the provinces as demanded by autonomist movements (Premdas et al. 1984).
- The Provincial Government Act 1981 (PGA) established seven provinces (Malaita, Central, Makira, Western, Isabel, Temotu, Guadalcanal; two new provinces were added in 1991). It aimed at bringing decision-making closer to the people. According to Nanau (1997: 74, cited in Suluia 2012: 31), the new two-tier structure of government “provided devolution and de-concentration of authority to the lower levels of government [...], giving voice to local communities”. In each province a Provincial Assembly was created. We note a (prior) autonomy concession since the PGA of 1981 “formally instituted the decentralised system of provincial government in the Solomon Islands” (Suluia 2012: 2). Note though that the extent of decentralization remained limited.
- The Provincial Government Bill 1996 repealed the Provincial Government Act 1981. The new act sought to replace the system of Provincial Assemblies, made up of elected members, with a system of Provincial Councils in which it was possible that the assembly could exclusively or predominantly consist of non-elected members (Corrin Care 1997). The act was considered undemocratic and unconstitutional by many provincial governments and was challenged successfully by the government of Guadalcanal in 1997 (The Minister for Provincial Government v. Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly). Overall, the 1996 bill did not however deviate much from the 1981 PGA in terms of centralization/decentralization (Nanau 1998: 195). Hence we do not code a restriction.
- As a consequence of the failure of the 1996 act, the parliament subsequently passed the Provincial Government Act 1997. The new PGA provided for provincial governments to generate their own revenue, installed an Executive as the head of the Provincial Assembly and a Premier elected by a majority of Provincial Assembly members. Furthermore, new functions and powers of the provincial government were laid out based on scheduled 3 (final legislative powers of provincial governments, administrative functions), 4 (legislation subject to review by the national government) and 5 (transfer of other functions) (Suluia 2012). [1997: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- Having agreed on a cease-fire in August 2000, the conflict parties (Gwales/Isatabu and Malaitans) signed the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) on 15 October 2000. The TPA, among other things, promised greater autonomy to all provinces and the Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces in particular (Kabutaulaka 2008: 101). The indigenous Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) was established to assist in the implementation of the agreement. A first plan to implement these

provisions was put together at a premiers' conference in November where it was decided that the government should adopt a "Homegrown State System of Government for Solomon Islands whereby each respective province should become a State with its own State Constitution" (Premiers' Millennium Conference Buala 2000b, cited in Scales 2008: 235). A draft Constitution Amendment (Creation of the Federation) Bill was passed in July 2001. Overall, implementation of the Townsville agreement remained patchy, and this continues to be a significant issue (Hewitt et al. 2008). Nonetheless, there was some movement towards more decentralization as a result of the Townsville agreement; thus we code an autonomy concession. [2000: autonomy concession]

- The Townsville agreement led to a constitutional reform process. Thus far this resulted in two draft federal constitutions in 2004 and 2009 (Mae 2010). Yet no definitive version has been passed.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The decentralization process as initiated by the PGA of 1981 and 1997 and the 2000 Townsville agreement did not lead to devolution of functions and resources to the provinces that would be significant enough to warrant a regional autonomy code. According to Suluia (2012: 2), devolution has been minimal "leaving provinces to play a marginal role in the delivery of services" with provincial grants remaining at best static and with the central government maintaining most of the competencies and responsibilities. Schedule 3 of the 1997 PGA, thus powers that are fully devolved, concerns mainly administrative competencies, such as the licensing of local businesses, the protection of wild creatures, the codification and amendment of customary law, management of agriculture land, fresh water and reef fisheries, local shipping and the maintenance of roads, bridges, and harbours, waste disposal and fire protection, and the provision of water supply to rural communities. Functions such as education or health are not devolved. As a consequence, decentralization "has minimal impact in empowering the local government" (Suluia 2012: 75). Based on this, we do not code regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Temotu movement was initiated in August 2000 when the Province Executive announced its intention to secede at the provincial capital of Lata (Meesa 2004). Independence continued to be the dominant claim. The province's Premier, Gabriel Teao, said that his government would continue to pursue independence (Radio Australia 2012). BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2006) reports that the Temoutu provincial government repeated its threat to secede in 2006. [2000-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Temotus
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- EPR does not include the Solomon Islands. Global Security states that the Malaitans “generally dominate the elected government and the business sector around Honiara”. None of the eleven Prime Ministers has Temotu origins but we have found evidence of several ministers from Temotu Province: Commins Mewa was Minister for Justice and Legal Affairs from 2010 to 2011, Patten Oti was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2006 until 2007 and Michael Maena also has a ministerial post. Since there is no information of systematic exclusion from central government (less alone any form of discrimination), we assume that in all other years, there also has been some sort of access to central government for the Temotus. We thus code the Temotus as junior partner throughout. [2000-2012: junior partner]
- The official census distinguishes only between Melanesian, Polynesian, Micronesian Chinese, European and Others, thus disregarding distinctions between Gwale or Temotu identities. Since no information on the ethnic Temotu population could be found we need to rely on the relatively crude assumption that the population of the Temotu province is entirely of ethnic Temotu origin. According to the 2009 census, the population of Temotu stood at 21,362. Given the Solomon Island’s total population (515,870) in that year, we code a population share of 0.0414. [2000-2012: .0414 (group size)]

Territory

- As argued out above, we make the relatively crude assumption that the population of the Temotu province is entirely of ethnic Temotu origin. Since there is no evidence of majority Temotu population living outside the Temotu province, we code them as regionally concentrated. Note that the Temotu territory consists of several islands, but this can be seen as spatially contiguous in the sense used here. [concentrated]
- The Temotus demand self-determination for the province of Temotu. The territory does not adjoin an international land border and has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- We could not find evidence of kin groups of the indigenous Temotus outside the Solomon Islands. Although Temotus are Melanesians we do not code Melanesians in other countries as kin since this movement is directed against a Melanesian-dominated government. [no kin]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Ndebele

Activity: 1982-1986

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Under the apartheid system up to the 1970s, the Ndebele had not enjoyed administrative authority or provision of land and were distributed across the Transvaal province and sections of the Bophuthatswana and Lebowa homelands (Bantustans).
- Two regional authorities (Ndzundza and Mnyamana) were established for Ndebele groups in 1974 and 1977 and were then merged to form the Ndebele Territorial Authority later in 1977 (Abel 1995). The inhabitants were often (violently) displaced from other areas of the country. The underlying purpose of the “homeland policy” was the expatriation of black citizens. Thus we do not code a concession. Instead, we code an autonomy restriction because of the mass deportations of Ndebeles, in line with the codebook. [1974: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]
- In 1981, the KwaNdebele was declared a self-governing territory, which cannot be considered a concession, however, since no real powers were devolved (Minahan 2002; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000).

Concessions and restrictions

NA

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1982, the chief minister of KwaNdebele declared that the self-governing homeland would seek to become independent in 1986. This statement of intent, which also lacked majority support, does not constitute a declaration in the sense employed here, which is why we do not code it.

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, which made some of them oppose the granting of autonomy or independence (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Given the discriminatory nature of the apartheid regime and the economic dependence of the homelands on

the central state, the quasi-independence or the self-government status of the homelands is not coded as regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The question of whether KwaNdebele should become independent was highly disputed and even caused violent clashes between proponents and opponents. Nevertheless, there is no indication of a claim that is different from outright independence and hence independence is coded as the claim throughout. [1982-1986: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Ndebele
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Blacks
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	56005000

- During apartheid EPR codes a single umbrella group of Blacks and does not distinguish between different black groups making their own claims for self-determination. The Ndebele are also subsumed under this umbrella group and thus do not have their separate power status for their period of activity. Nevertheless, the power status of the EPR group 'Blacks' (discriminated) can be applied to the Ndebele as well, given the discriminatory stance of the apartheid regime against all black South African citizens (Minahan 2002: 2117; Beinart & Dubow 1995) and the fact that the Ndebele were deported to KwaNdebele and encouraged to opt for independence, which eventually would have deprived them of South African citizenship. [1982-1986: discriminated]
- Regarding group size, we follow EPR, which lists black groups separately after apartheid, and according to which Ndebele make up around 1.5% of the South African population. [1982-1986: .015 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 1340), the Ndebele are concentrated in the northwestern part of South Africa, though he does not give exact figures. GeoEPR codes the Ndebele as "regionally based", though they employ a lower threshold (group has to make up only 25% of the regional bases' population). It proved difficult to find better evidence. An internet search suggested that there are multiple geographically separated types of Ndebele groups. The two largest settlements are roughly in the same area, and both appear to have a regional base where the Ndebele language dominates. They are not, however, spatially contiguous, at least according to the 2011 census (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/South_Africa_2011_Ndebele_speakers_proportion_map.svg). [not concentrated]
- The claim relates to the KwaNdebele Bantustan homeland. KwaNdebele did not border the sea or another country (see Encyclopedia Britannica). [border: no; seashore: no]
- No oil found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1340) there are more than 2.5 million Ndebeles in Zimbabwe and around 300,000 Ndebele in neighboring Botswana. EPR also codes kin in Zimbabwe. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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Zulus

Activity: 1970-2007

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The British occupied Zululand in 1882, the start of a long period of Zulu grievance and rebellion against foreign, white rule. The homeland of the Zulu was incorporated into the newly unified Union of South Africa in 1910, which previously had consisted of four separate British colonies. With the rise to power of the National Party, racial segregation – in place since Dutch colonial rule - was introduced as an official policy. Zulus, as all other black citizens of South Africa, were discriminated and restricted in movement, employment, livelihood and education (Minahan 2002). [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Within the framework of the “homeland policy” the Zulu homeland KwaZulu was established in 1970, followed by mass forced removals. Repeated offers of independence were refused as this would have deprived the Zulus of South African citizenship (Minahan 2002). The underlying purpose of the “homeland policy” was the expatriation of black citizens. Thus we do not code a concession. Instead, we code an autonomy restriction because of the mass deportations of Zulus to Kwa Zulu, in line with the codebook. [1970: autonomy restriction]
- Following the procedures lined out in the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 the KwaZulu constitution was promulgated in 1972. It provided for an executive assembly (KwaZulu Legislative Assembly KLA) and, according to Dlamini (2005: 52), was “a major step forward in the state’s constitutional planning for the bantustans, giving limited legislative as well as executive powers to regional administrators”. In 1977, the KwaZulu homeland was granted self-government. Nonetheless, we do not code a concession. Homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Self-government and independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, which made some of them oppose the granting of autonomy or independence (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995).
- The 1993 interim constitution gave the provinces, including KwaZulu Natal, significant competencies, not least due to the amendment pushed through by the Inkatha Freedom Party even before the constitution has entered into force (Klug 2000: 108). In 1994 the constitution entered into force; the KwaZulu homeland was dissolved and integrated into the new province of Kwa Zulu Natal. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). Furthermore, this ended the deportation policy; Zulus were again allowed to move freely. [1993: autonomy concession]
- A controversial deal made before the 1994 elections transferred vast swaths of land to the Zulu king (Cunningham 2014: 223; MAR; Keller 1994). [1994: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini declared KwaZulu a sovereign state, following a demonstration in Durban for Zulu independence one month before (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000;

Minahan 2002). [1994: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- The interim constitution entered into force in 1994. [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- As mentioned above, the homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands, which deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, is thus very far from the concept of regional autonomy we are interested in.
- In 1994 the interim constitution (which devolved significant competencies to the provinces) entered into force; the KwaZulu homeland was dissolved and integrated into the new province of Kwa Zulu Natal. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). We code regional autonomy from 1995 onwards in accordance with the first of January rule. [1995-2007: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- We code an autonomy claim from 1970-1990 for the following reasons:
 - o In 1970, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Zulu dissidents, was elected chief executive officer of the Zulu Bantustan (KwaZulu). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 165), Buthelezi promptly “called on South Africa to give the Zulu more land and resources” (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 165).
 - o Buthelezi continued to make claims for an autonomous and enlarged Zulu state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 165).
 - o The South African government repeatedly offered independence to KwaZulu. According to Minahan (2002), the Zulus preferred a self-governing status within the system of South-Africa which allowed them to remain citizens of the state of South Africa.
 - o The 1980s brought about a split in the Zulu community between supporters of the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, which aims at more self-determination, and supporters of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC did not make self-determinatino claims.
 - o Not all IFP members favored autonomy. Some, similar to the ANC, favored greater integration into the South African system. But those that advocated self-determination generally made claims for autonomy. [1970-1990: autonomy claim]
- In the process of democratization and prior to the first free elections in South Africa, Zulu nationalism grew rapidly. The situation is complex as there were various claims within the Zulu community: in 1990, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement was renamed the Inkatha Freedom Party and listed the implementation of federalism among its main goals. Chief Buthelezi, former KwaZulu head of government and leader of the Inkatha, at various occasions however also raised the issue of KwaZulu independence and put forward the idea of a sovereign state with its own president, courts, and army. In 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini declared KwaZulu a sovereign state, following a demonstration in Durban for Zulu independence one month before (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002). Given the importance of the two

leaders in the Zulu self-determination movement and the considerable popular support, we code a claim for secession in 1991-1994. [1991-1994: independence claim]

- After the dismantling of the apartheid system in 1994, the objective of Zulu separatism again reverted to the establishment of “a kingdom of KwaZulu as a federal unit within the South African republic” (Minahan 2002: 2119). This claim was supported by almost all of the 300 Zulu chiefs and is also in line with information from the Minorities at Risk Project, which states “greater regional autonomy” as the primary goal of Zulu separatism. Following these sources, we code devolution as the claim for the period 1995-2007 (first of January rule). Note, however, the 2001 reiteration of the Zulu leaders’ wish for a sovereign Zulu state. Such a state, they claim, is yet only achievable “in the future when the Zulus were once again united” (Minahan 2002: 2119). [1995-2007: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Zulus
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Blacks/Zulus
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	56005000/56005100

- During Apartheid, EPR codes an umbrella ‘Blacks’ group only. The power status given to the Blacks can be directly adapted, however, given the discriminatory treatment of all Blacks: discriminated in 1975-1989 and powerless in 1990-1993. From 1994 onwards, the Zulus are coded in EPR. [1970-1989: discriminated; 1990-1993: powerless]
- The EPR group size estimate is .23. This is supported by Minahan (2002: 2114), who reports 9,220,000 Zulus in South Africa (while South Africa at the time had a population of about 44 million according to the Worldbank). [1970-1993: .23 (group size)]

Territory

- According to Minahan (2002: 2114), 57% of the Zulus are located in Kwa Zulu Natal, where they make up more than 70% of the local population. This is consistent with information from MAR. [concentrated]
- The claims are focused on the KwaZulu Bantustan/the province of Kwa Zulu Natal that was created after the end of apartheid. Both the Bantustan and the province border the Indian Ocean as well as Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique (Encyclopedia Britannica). [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- There are no kin groups according to EPR. However, EPR only codes kin groups that are also considered politically relevant and in countries of a certain size. MAR, on the other hand, codes “close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base” and mentions the Zulu in Lesotho and Swaziland as the two largest kin groups. This is in line with Minahan (2002: 2114), who also mentions Zulu communities in Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and some European countries, particularly in the United Kingdom. With 320,000 people (see Joshua Project), the Zulu community in Lesotho crosses the numeric threshold, but also Zulu communities in Zimbabwe and Swaziland would. [kin in neighboring country]

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Khmer Krom

Activity: 1955-1975

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The Khmer Krom's history of independence reaches back to the ninth century, when the Khmer empire reunited and initiated the golden age of Khmer culture and power around the capital of Angkor. Under constant pressure from east and north, the Khmer power declined and came to an end in the 15th century. The neighbouring Vietnamese infiltrated the region, setting off a long history of antagonism between the Vietnamese and the Khmer that continued under French colonial rule. French colonial rule favoured the Vietnamese and relegated the Khmer. Vietnamese efforts to unify historical Vietnamese lands caused fierce resistance by the Khmer Krom also during the Japanese occupation. In 1949, their territory (as part of Cochinchina) was placed under Vietnamese control in exchange for specific rights for the Khmer Krom. These rights were ignored and the four Khmer Krom provinces were abolished and replaced by 21 Vietnamese provinces in 1949 (Minahan 2002). [1949: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- During the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the Republic of Vietnam initiated several assimilation campaigns. The use of the Khmer Krom language was discouraged, Khmer pagoda schools were closed, anti-Buddhist laws adopted and the Khmer identity was targeted by the obligation to take on Vietnamese surnames. Since we lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated, we code a single cultural rights restriction in 1956 since this is the year when the "nationalization" decree was adopted, which was at the root of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009). [1956: cultural rights restriction]
- As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Became part of Vietnam in 1975. [1975: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

- The land rights that were granted in 1965 were insufficient to warrant an autonomy code.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Khmer Krom in South Vietnam aimed at greater self-determination for the Khmer people in resistance against assimilation into South Vietnam. Upon inclusion into Vietnam in 1949, they favored reunification with the historical territory of Cambodia to achieve this goal (Minahan 2002). The movement allied with the Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées FULRO) in 1964 alongside the Chams and the Montagnards. Noseworthy (2013) describes FULRO as an irredentist movement that wants to join Cambodia, which is why we code an irredentist claim throughout. [1955-1975: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Khmer Krom
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- EPR does not code South Vietnam. The Khmer Krom were often targeted by Vietnamese nationalist as they were seen as opposing Vietnamese unification. Upon their inclusion in Vietnam in 1949, they were promised specific rights as part of an agreement between the French and Vietnamese nationalists. However, as stated above, these rights were not maintained. According to Minahan (2002: 995), the southern government “prohibited minority rights and pressed assimilation”. Based on the linguistic, religious and cultural discrimination described above, we code the Khmer Krom as discriminated. Discrimination “eased” (Minahan 2002: 995) when the US Army was seeking allies among the non-Vietnamese groups such as the Montagnards, the Chams and the Khmer Krom during the Vietnam War. Members of these ethnic minorities were trained by Special Forces and engaged in guerilla warfare. Despite these close ties between Americans and the Khmer Krom, the latter’s relationship with the South Vietnamese government did not improve significantly (Minahan 2002). [1955-1965: discriminated]
- Beginning in 1965 – and only as a result of pressure by the US – the South Vietnamese replaced discrimination and repression with programs to prevent culture and identity. The relation between FULRO and Saigon also appeared to improve as the government established a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities. Several highlanders, including a FULRO member, were elected to the National Assembly and legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land was also passed. In light of these developments, we change the power access variable to powerless. [1966-1975: powerless]
- Note: the Khmer Krom predominantly resided in South Vietnam. Since we were unable to get by ethno-demographic data for South Vietnam, we take the EPR group size estimate after the unification in 1975 (.013) and multiply this with 1/.45 (population-wise South Vietnam made up about 45% of the unified Vietnam) and get a group size estimate of .0289. [1955-1975: .0289 (group size)]

Territory

- The Khmer Krom are concentrated in Kampuchea Krom, where they make up 28% of the population (Minahan 2002: 990). Since they do not constitute a majority in their territory, we do not code them as regionally concentrated. We did not find evidence of an alternative territory where the Khmer Krom would form a majority. [not concentrated]
- The Khmer Krom homeland is Kampuchea Krom as illustrated by Minahan (2002: 990). The territory adjoins an international land border (Cambodia) and has access to the South China Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there is an offshore field off the coast of Kampuchea Krom (PRIMKEY: OF382PET). However, since the field was only discovered in 1981, we do not code oil/gas. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 990) there are approximately 1.2 million Khmer Krom in Cambodia. [kin in neighboring country]

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SPAIN

Basques

Activity: 1945-2012

General notes

- Note: the Basque nationalist movement has been active not only in the Basque Country, but also in Navarre. Navarre is a region in northern Spain that borders the Basque Country. However, only 10-20% of the local population are Basque speakers, thus only changes in the Basque Country's status are coded.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In 1936 the Basques were granted a statute of autonomy. Yet in June 1937 Franco's forces captured the Basque Country. The Basques' autonomy was abolished (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39). [1936: autonomy concession; 1937: autonomy restriction]
- Furthermore, Franco banned every language and dialect other than Castilian (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 279-280). [1937: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]
- Note that Franco allowed Navarra, which had supported the insurgents in the civil war, to continue its fuero system, which implied some limited autonomy (Keating & Bray 2006: 351).

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]
- In 1976, Juan Carlos lifted the ban on the Basque language (Weaver 2002: 57). [1976: cultural rights concession]
- December 31, 1977, the Basque Country was granted pre-autonomous status (Weaver 2002: 59), a status that implied some increased executive powers, that is, increased administrative autonomy (Pi-Suñyer 2010: 6). [1977: autonomy concession]
- The 1978 constitution foresaw an autonomous status for the Basque Country, and allowed autonomous communities to provide a co-official language status. In 1979, the Basque Autonomy Statute was accepted by Madrid. The 1979 autonomy statute gave the Basque Country its own parliament and Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Basque Country was allowed to raise and spend tax money. The Basque Country would also have its own police force. Furthermore, Basque attained official status along with Castilian in the Basque Country (Minahan 2002: 287; Minorities at Risk Project). Note that Basque also gained co-official language status in Basque-dominated areas of Navarra. We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
- In 2004, the Spanish Cortes vehemently rejected the Ibarretxe Plan, a proposal by the Basque government under Juan Ibarretxe to create a semi-independent Basque state in confederation with the rest of Spain (Keating & Wilson 2009: 540; BBC 2003; Keating & Bray 2006). In response, Ibarretxe initiated a self-determination referendum; the Spanish Constitutional Court stopped this move in 2008 (Reuters 2008). We do not code a restriction since Madrid has never conceded either a confederation or an independence referendum (thus their status was not lowered).

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1979: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- The Basque Country achieved a “pre-autonomous” status in 1977, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1979, the Autonomy Statute was approved. Given this we code regional autonomy from 1980 onwards in accordance with the first of January rule. [1980-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There are various claims associated with the Basque country, from independence over increased autonomy to (at least since the establishment of autonomy in 1979) the incorporation of Navarra into the Basque Country (Minorities at Risk Project; Degenhardt 1988: 342-343). The dominant claim is not fully clear (see, for instance, Keating & Bray 2006). We code a claim for independence throughout because there is evidence for significant contention towards independence throughout. In particular: i) Minorities at Risk notes that many Basques have a strong commitment to independence; ii) the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which has tended to dominate the Basque Country’s politics since democratization in the 1970s (e.g. Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 234), has a somewhat ambiguous stance towards independence, but at least part of the PNV favors independence. There was, for instance, the Ibarretxe Plan, a proposal by the Basque government under Juan Ibarretxe in the early 2000s to create a semi-independent Basque state in confederation with the rest of Spain (Keating & Wilson 2009: 540; BBC 2003). In response, Ibarretxe initiated a self-determination referendum, which was stopped by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2008. Moreover, Keating & Bray (2006) note that PNV, though not fully committed to independence, has at least maintained “a level of pro-independence rhetoric” (in contrast, Degenhardt 1988: 342 describes PNV as “autonomist”); and iii) ETA, the terrorist organization that was formed in 1959, advocates independence, and so does its political arm which has fetched a significant share of the vote share ever since democratization, even if it has been clearly outpaced by the PNV. [1945-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Basques
<i>Scenario</i>	1945/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Basques
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	23004000

- 1945 is not coded in EPR. No significant changes compared to 1945, thus we apply the 1945 code. [1945: powerless; 1945: 0.054 (group size)]

Territory

- Spain's Basques are concentrated in the Basque Country and adjacent areas of Navarra (Minahan 2002: 283). MAR gives conflicting information on the degree of spatial concentration. In phase I-IV, the Basques made up less than 50% of their homeland, while in phase V the Basques made up the majority. A possible explanation may be that MAR draws on the number of Basque speakers. The Basque language was severely repressed under Franco, and the number of Basque speakers has increased significantly since the transition (though it remains in the 30% area in terms of native speakers). Yet, language is not the same as ethnic self-identification. Though he also includes Basque regions in France, the figures in Minahan (2002: 283) suggest that the majority of self-identified Basques are located in the larger Basque area, and that they form an absolute majority there. Academic research also suggests that an absolute majority self-identifies as Basque in the Spanish Basque Country, and importantly, many more than in the French Basque Country (see e.g. Lancaster 1987). [concentrated]
- The Basque homeland and in particular the autonomous community of the Basque Country borders the Atlantic and France. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- The Basque lands include reserves. PRIMKEY SP002PET (discovered in 1960) overlaps with the Basque Country. There are also offshore resources, PRIMKEY OF318PET (discovered in 1978) (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: 1945-1960: no; 1961-2012: yes]

Kin

- EPR, MAR, and Minahan (2002: 283) all suggest numerically significant ethnic kin due to a the approx. 600-700,000 Basques in neighboring France. [kin in neighboring country]

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Leonese

Activity: 1980-2012

General notes

- The Leonese are located in the autonomous Castile and Leon region. The Leonese make up around a fifth of the province. There are no signs of discrimination against the Leonese, hence changes in this region's autonomy status seem to affect the Leonese and are coded as concessions or restrictions.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After Franco's death in 1975, Spain democratized and embarked on a process of decentralization in reversal of Franco's extreme centralism.
- In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]
- Leon makes up around a fifth of Castile and Leon (population-wise). Castile and Leon achieved a "pre-autonomous" status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers (see Minahan 2002: 1080, but note that he erroneously pegs this to 1979). Moreover, the 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, such as Castile and Leon, and allowed autonomous communities to provide a co-official language status. [1978: autonomy concession] [prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1983, Leon's provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and León autonomous community. The Spanish constitutional court rejected the proposal. Minahan (2002: 1082) seems to suggest that Leon was promised a separate status in 1978; however, this information could not be confirmed. Since Madrid appears never to have promised a separate status, we do not code a restriction.
 - o Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Castile and Leon, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
- In 1983, Castile and Leon's autonomy status was approved, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative competencies. We do not code a concession since the 1978 constitution had already foreseen the establishment of autonomous communities.
- In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as Castile-Leon), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further

competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Castile and Leon increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1994 revision was an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]

- In 1999, Castile and Leon’s autonomy statute was revised again (Magone 2009: 195). It is not fully clear whether the region’s competencies were actually increased, and the fact that the new statute was passed only five years after the last makes us suspect that this revision was one of the “tidying up exercises” hinged at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.
- In 2007, Madrid approved Castile and Leon’s new, second-generation autonomy statute, which transferred additional competencies to the region and provided for the protection of the Leonese language (Martinico 2010; Magone 2009: 195; Keating & Wilson 2009: 547-554). [2007: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1983: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Castile and Leon achieved a “pre-autonomous” status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1983, Castile and Leon’s autonomy status was approved, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Keating & Wilson 2009). There are no signs of discrimination against the Leonese, which make up around a fifth of the province. Given this we code regional autonomy from 1984 onwards. [1984-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The movement’s main drive has been for the separation from Castile and León, an autonomous community foreseen in 1978 and fully implemented by 1983 (Conversi 2000: 140). In particular, the Leonese People’s Union, an umbrella organization consisting of several regionalist and autonomist organizations that was founded in 1986, advocates separation from Castile and Leon. Further evidence for this coding is that in 1983, Leon’s provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and León autonomus community. Some smaller Leonese organizations (e.g., AGORA País Llionés) have also advocated full independence, but with little following. [1980-2012: sub-state secession claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Leonese
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Spanish
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	23001000

- EPR does not code the Leonese as such, but the 'Spanish'. The Leonese thus form a regional branch of the Spanish. According to EPR, the Spanish are senior partner throughout the movement's activities. The Leonese make up but a small part of EPR's umbrella group of the Spanish, which is dominated by the Castiles (see Linz et al. 2003: 33). According to Linz et al. (2003: 33) the autonomous community of Castile and Leon has a disproportionately high share of cabinet ministers after democratization, and thus during the movement's period of activity. Unfortunately, Linz et al. (2003) do not give the figure for the Leonese homeland, which makes up about half of Castil and Leon. Additional research into the regional origins of Spanish prime ministers and important cabinet members (defense, foreign affairs, and interior) suggests that the Castilian part of Castil and Leon has stronger representation than the Leonese. Still, during the movement's existence, several of the serving cabinet members have their origins in Leonese territory, including José Zapatero, the former prime minister, and José Antonio Alonso, the former defence and interior minister (serving from 2004 to 2008 under Zapatero). Hence, a junior partner coding appears most adequate (though one could conceivably also apply a senior partner code during the Zapatero reign). [1980-2012: junior partner]
- Minahan (2002: 1079) reports 1.3 million Leonese living in Spain and Portugal in 2002. However, we should not include Leonese in Portugal in the group size estimate. Minahan (2002: 1079) furthermore notes that the Leon region's population size amounts to 1.726 million, 68% of which are Leonese. Hence, in 2002 there are 1.17 million Leonese in the region of Leon. We use this figure (rounded up to 1.2 to account for Leonese living outside of Leon) in combination with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Spain's population (41.84 million) to calculate the group size estimate (0.0287). [1980-2012: .0287 (group size)]

Territory

- The Leonese are located in the autonomous Castile and Leon region. They make up around a fifth of the province as a whole, but are concentrated in the region of Leon. According to Minahan (2002: 1079), the overwhelming majority of the Leonese resides in Leon, where they make up 68% of the local population. [concentrated]
- The claim relates to the region of Leon, which has no international border and no seashore. [border: no; seashore: no]
- There is also no oil. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 1079) there are Leonese communities in northeastern Portugal (Mirandese region). Minahan does not provide an estimate of the number of Leonese in Portugal. We estimated the number of Leonese in Spain at 1.2 million out of a total of 1.3 worldwide (see above). But this was a very rough guess, and we do not feel confident to conclude on this basis that the number of Leonese in Portugal crosses the 100,000 threshold. [no kin]
 - o Note: The Leonese speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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SRI LANKA

Muslims

Activity: 1981-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Muslims make up approximately seven percent of the population of Sri Lanka and are divided into three sections: Sri Lankan Moors (93%), Indian Moors and Malays (Nubin 2002). In the early twentieth century, the previously peaceful Sinhalese-Muslim relationship suffered a heavy setback when rising Sinhalese nationalism and anti-minority sentiments targeted non-Sinhalese and non-Buddhists. The 1915 anti-Muslim riots by Sinhalese nationalists mainly targeted Indian Moors (Svanberg and Westerlund 1999; Zackariya Shanmugaratnam 1999). Following the Donoughmore Commission (1927/28), universal suffrage and joint electorates were introduced in 1931. The new system disadvantaged the Muslims - who demanded separate electorates - as they only managed to get one Muslim candidate elected in the first election to the assembly (Zackariya & Shanmugaratnam 1999). After the country gained independence in 1948, nationalist politics gained momentum. The 1950s saw the Sinhalese-dominated government implement public policies that institutionalized the Sinhalese dominance. The most prominent policy was the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 that made Sinhala the 'one official language of Ceylon'. Since the 'Sinhala Only Act' was (counterintuitively) supported by many Muslims, and in particular its Colombo-based leadership, it is somewhat ambiguous to consider this a restriction, despite the fact that Muslims are predominantly Tamil-speaking (Svanberg and Westerlund 1999). Nonetheless, we code a prior restriction due to the long-standing Sinhalese policy of colonialization in the eastern and northern part of the island, which "hurt the Muslim population" (Svanberg & Westerlund 1999: 249). Note, however, that we did not find a restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Muslims opposed the Tamil claims in fear of becoming a minority within a Tamil-dominated autonomous entity (Minority Rights Group International). They were thus often trapped between the two warring factions and were particularly targeted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 1987 "Indo-Sri Lanka accord" provided for the devolution of power through the establishment of a regional provincial council in the Tamil areas (Hennayake 1989); the Muslims were left out. Hence, the 1987 accord does not constitute a concession to the Muslims. It could even be considered a restriction, given the Muslim opposition to Tamil claims for more autonomy in the northern and eastern part of the island, but we consider this too ambiguous to be coded.
- Although the Muslims have been severely affected by the civil war, their role in the peace talks was at best marginal. Officially, they were not considered party to the 2002 process and were excluded from the negotiations (Minority Rights Group International). Hence, there was no concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The main demand of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress has been territorial autonomy through the establishment of separate administrative entities (regional councils) for Muslims in the north and east of Sri Lanka (Minority Rights Group International). This is supported by Uyangoda (2007), who also mentions the demand for a separate Muslim unit “that would combine administrative divisions with the Muslim majority in Amparai and Batticaloa districts”. [1981-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Muslims
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Moors (Muslims)
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	78002000

Territory

- The Sri Lankan Muslims are concentrated in the north and east of the country. However, in none of the provinces do Muslims constitute a majority (de Mel et al. 2012: 113; also see this map (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Sadalmelik#/media/File:Sri_Lanka_Islam.svg). The Muslims do not form a majority in any larger area (also see GeoEPR). [not concentrated]
- The Sri Lankan Muslims want separate regional councils for Muslims in the north and east of Sri Lanka, particularly in the Amparai and Batticaloa districts. This territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Indian Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are numerous kin groups in neighboring and non-neighboring states. These are located in India (Other Muslims), Pakistan (Punjabi), Bangladesh (Bengali Muslims), Nepal (Muslims) and Mauritius (Muslims). [kin in neighboring country]

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Tamils

Activity: 1949-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Sri Lanka came under British control in 1796 and remained so until the island's independence in 1948. The British colonial rule integrated previously separated parts of the island in a centralized state and followed an essentialist approach that considered the ethnic groups as "inherently separate" (Bandarage 2008: 29).
- The minority Tamils benefited disproportionately from British colonialism: Tamils were enabled to access Christian missionary schools and learn English, whereas the Buddhist religion, which most of the majority Sinhalese adhere to, was marginalized. As a consequence of the Tamils' alacrity to learn the English language and in line with British practice to promote minorities as a source of support against majorities, Tamils constituted a disproportionately high percentage of the civil service and the colonial administration. This intrinsic advantage put the Tamils, particularly the vellala caste, in a position of social and economic superiority over the Sinhalese majority (Bandarage 2008; DeVotta 2005; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000).
- The island moved towards democracy in the early twentieth century. First elections to the Legislative Council took place in 1921 and were based on territorial representation. This favoured the majority Sinhalese and threatened the colonial privileges of the Tamils, leading to growing Tamil nationalism and the creation of the Ceylon Tamil League in 1923.
- The Donoughmore Commission introduced a constitutional reform as a basis for the elections that same year. The reform foresaw universal franchise and signified "the beginning of what came to be seen as a 'reconquest' of power by the Sinhalese Buddhist majority[...] and a diminution of the power of minorities, especially the Sri Lankan Tamils" (Bandarage 2008: 36). The Tamil proposal of a 'fifty-fifty' system, according to which the Sinhalese majority's representation would be restricted to 50% of the seats, was turned down by the British and the Soulbury Commission and thus did not figure in the Soulbury Constitution, which was adopted by the State Council and which constituted the basis for independence.
- We consider the loss of colonial privileges and the diminution of the power of the Sri Lankan Tamils a prior restriction because, in addition to the above-mentioned restrictions concerning the access dimension, the Soulbury Constitution did not include sufficient protection of minority cultural rights and was considered a 'charter of slavery' by the Tamils (Bandarage 2008). We found no restrictions in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- After the country gained independence in 1948, nationalist politics gained momentum. The 1950s saw the Sinhalese-dominated government implement public policies that institutionalized the Sinhalese dominance. The most prominent policy was the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 that made Sinhala the 'one official language of Ceylon' (DeVotta 2005; Minorities at Risk Project, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1956: cultural rights restriction]
- The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 recognized Tamil as a national language for administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In addition, the pact stipulated the creation of several regional councils in order to grant some autonomy to the Tamil minority. In return, the Tamils agreed to abandon their demand for linguistic parity and the protest campaign (DeVotta 2005, 2002). [1957: autonomy concession]
- The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact was highly controversial among Sinhalese nationalists

(and some Tamil extremists), who feared that autonomy would be the first step towards dismemberment and racial division. Increased protests, ethnic outbidding and defamation of the Prime Minister made the latter abrogate the Pact in March 1958 (DeVotta 2005, 2002). [1958: autonomy restriction]

- The constitution of 1972 stipulated the primacy of Sinhala and Buddhism, thereby further downgrading minority languages and religious beliefs (DeVotta 2005; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 290). [1972: cultural rights restriction]
- When the United National Party (UNP) came to power in 1977, the relationship between the center and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was cordial at first, as “Tamil was recognized in the constitution as a national language” in the 1978 constitution (Devotta 2005; Minority Rights Group International). Although Sinhalese remained the higher-status ‘official language’ and the constitution ignored Tamil claims for autonomy, this constitutes a cultural rights concession. [1978: cultural rights concession]
- A 1987 agreement (also with India participating; “Indo-Sri Lanka accord”) provided for the devolution of power through the establishment of a regional provincial council in the Tamil areas. Furthermore, the thirteenth amendment to the constitution upgraded Tamil from a national language to an official language (Hennayake 1989; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 291). As part of the accord and in order to safeguard peace, around 50,000 Indian peacekeepers (IPKF) were deployed to Sri Lanka (Minorities at Risk Project). Since this is a single act, we code only the ‘higher’ concession (autonomy). [1987: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Sri Lanka attained independence in 1948, implying a host change. However, this was before the start date in 1949, and thus this is not coded.
- Following what has been lined out in the part on de-facto independence and regional autonomy, we code two major territorial changes: The establishment of de-facto independence in 1986 and its dissolution in 2009. [1986: establishment de-facto state] [2009: abolishment of de-facto state]

Regional autonomy

- The explicit granting of such autonomy did not happen until 1987, when the Indo-Sri Lanka accord (see above) provided for regional autonomy and the creation of a regional provincial council in the Tamil areas (Hennayake 1989; Minority Rights Group International). However, at this point, civil war had already been going on for three years and had resulted in Tamil de-facto independence as of 1986. We thus code regional autonomy along the lines of the coding of de-facto independence, which was set up one year prior to the regional autonomy concession. [1987-2009: regional autonomy]
- The regional council granted in 1987 continues to operate, but is meaningless due to strong military presence. Hence, we do not code regional autonomy beyond 2009.

De-facto independence

- Caspersen (2012) defines Eelam a de-facto state from 1986 to the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, when the civil war was officially declared terminated after the LTTE had to give up its remaining territory and all of its leaders were killed. During the period from 1986 to 2009, many characteristics of a de-facto independent state were present. McConell (2008) mentions an own police force, legal system, education and health systems, law school, courts as well as welfare

organizations, which made the LTTE a ‘de-facto administration’ in the controlled areas. We code de-facto independence from 1987-2009 in accordance with the first of January rule. [1987-2009: de-facto independence]

Claims

- In 1972, and in response to the discriminatory constitution, numerous organizations came together to form the Tamil United Front (later Tamil United Liberation Front TULF). Militancy emerged within Tamil community, eventually leading to the 1976 issuing of the Vaddukoddai resolution that for the first time publicly demanded for a separate Tamil state called Eelam (Kearney 1985; UCDP). According to DeVotta (2005), there were however only “a few dozen Tamil rebels” who demanded outright secession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, whereas the vast majority was seeking more autonomy for their homeland within the Sri Lankan state. This claim is not supported by Kearney (1985), who saw a clear shift to separation already in the 1970s (also see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 290). In light of the fact that the TULF, which issued another manifesto for independence in 1977, won all but one constituency with a Tamil majority in parliamentary elections in 1977, we go along with Kearney (1985) and code secession as the dominant claim from 1977 onwards (first of January rule). This is also in line with information from the Minority Rights Group International. The 1983 anti-Tamil riots brought along an increase in the number of rebels and a further radicalization of the separatists that eventually led to the Sri Lankan Civil War. The most radical organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which also aimed at secession, not only fought the Sri Lankan army but also other Tamil separatist groups such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) or the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and established itself as the most prominent actor on the Tamil side. [1949-1976: autonomy claim] [1977-2002: independence claim]
- In 2002, as a part of the Memorandum of Cessation of Hostilities, the LTTE dropped its demand for a separate state and accepted a less radical solution in the form of far-reaching autonomy within a unitary Sri Lanka (UCDP, Minorities at Risk Project). We thus code devolution as the dominant claim as of 2003 (first of January rule), in line with the set of proposals put forward by the LTTE in 2003, which outlined the group's vision of an autonomous, but not separate, north and eastern region in Sri Lanka. [2003-2005: autonomy claim]
- Renewed fighting broke out in 2005, making the ceasefire collapse and civil war re-erupt in 2006. While most moderate Tamil groups continue to seek autonomy, the LTTE does not accept a political solution short of an independent state. According to Minorities at Risk, the “LTTE has been the dominant force” and also backs the Tamil National Alliance, the largest Tamil group in Sri Lanka's parliament. We thus change the claim to secession for this last period. [2006-2012: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Tamils
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Sri Lankan Tamils
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	78004000

Territory

- The Tamils are concentrated in Eelam, where they make up 83% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1846). This amounts to 2,195,000 Tamils (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 3.5 million Tamils in the whole of Sri Lanka in that same year. [concentrated]

- The Tamils demand a separate Tamil state called Eelam consisting of the Northern and Eastern Province and the Puthalam district of the North-Western Province. The territory does not adjoin an international land border, but has access to the Pacific Ocean. [border: no; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- According to EPR (scenario 1:1) there are numerous kin groups in neighboring and non-neighboring states that are large enough to be coded here. These are the Tamils in India, the Asians in South Africa, the East Indians in Malaysia, the Indians in Singapore, and the Tamils and Telugus in Mauritius. The Minorities at Risk data confirm the presence of ethnic kin but only code the Indian Tamils in the state of Tamil Nadu in India. Minahan (2002: 1843) lists the same countries as EPR and adds a few more (Canada, United States, United Kingdom). [kin in neighboring country]

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SUDAN

Easterners

Activity: 1958-2012

General notes

- Two groups are associated with the movement, the Beja and the Rashaida.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The history of Eastern Sudan is a history of occupation by outsider groups such as the Ancient Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Funj, Ottoman-Egyptians or British. Nevertheless, the Beja managed to maintain some degree of autonomy and by the eighteenth century established themselves as the dominant people of eastern Sudan (Slight 2006).
- The Anglo-Egyptian administration was forced to withdraw from the country in 1885 after a religious leader named Muhammad Ahmad had begun to unify the tribes in 1881 and proclaimed himself the Mahdi ("guided one"). In the Mahdi period Eastern Sudan achieved a degree of recognition (Slight 2006). In 1889-1891 Darfur again fell to Anglo-Egyptian forces. Under the British colonial regime, Sudan was treated as a single colony with eight provinces (Blue Nile, Darfur, Equatoria, Kassala, Khartoum, Kurdufan, Northern, Upper Nile). Northern and southern Sudan were however administered separately as part of a divide-and-rule policy. The eastern region of Kassala did not have a separate administrative status. Arabic and English dominated in the northern districts, while in the south several tribal languages such as Dinka, Nuer, and Bari had the official status of regional languages (Minahan 2002: 1787; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). The Rashaida speak Arabic, but the Beja do not. There is no evidence of the Beja language (Bedawi) having had official status.
- In 1943, the north was prepared for separate self-government. In a reversal of policy, in 1946, the decision was taken to unify the northern and the southern districts into a single colonial province (Helata 2008; Seri-Hersch 2013). The constitution that was drafted in 1953 in continuance of previous policy foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281-282). Since this did not alter the level of eastern self-determination we do not code a restriction but code a prior restriction due to the gradual, historic loss of autonomy. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- According to the International Crisis Group (2006), the Nimeiri regime introduced a regional system of government in 1980. However, although being well represented at the provincial and regional level (the Beja at one time controlled nine of eleven ministerial positions in the regional government), the representatives were labelled "sons of Nimeiri" as they were appointed by the central government, committed to working within the one-party system and "did not represent power being devolved to the people of the Province, or a recognition of the special needs of the Beja" (International Crisis Group 2006: 4). Hence we do not code a concession.
- In 1983 Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project). Even if the Beja and the Rashaida are Muslims, the introduction of Sharia law was generally resented by many as it is contrary to traditional practice (Jok 2012: 154). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1983. [1983: cultural rights restriction]
- Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup of the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). According to the

International Crisis Group (2006: 5), the intensive Islamisation program also provoked resistance by some Muslim Beja, who saw their moderate Sufism being threatened. The regime also considered the “Beja’s pride in their ancient culture and tradition [...] incompatible with the regime’s emphasis on an Arab-Islamic identity”. [1989: cultural rights restriction]

- Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2006) also states that the NIF, in an attempt to exploit the East’s economic potential and “to centralise power and wealth in the hands of its ruling clique”, confiscated land and property and replaced the Beja governor (Mohamed Osman Karrar) of the Eastern Region with a riverain Arab army officer. [1989: autonomy restriction]
- An agreement mediated by Eritrea was signed in October 2006. The agreement had three major provisions: power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. First, the deal gave senior members of the Eastern Front ministerial positions at both national and regional levels with one junior minister in Khartoum, an assistant to the president, an adviser to the president, eight parliamentary seats in Khartoum and 10 parliamentary seats in each of the three eastern states (Thomson Reuters 2013). The EF was granted the right to nominate deputy governors for the states of Kassala and Gedaref and was reserved ten seats in the legislatures of each of the three eastern states (Assal 2013: 148). Second, the agreement established the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF) with the aim to share wealth between the central government and the eastern states of Sudan. Third, the parties agreed to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of EF forces (International Crisis Group 2013). Eastern rebels demobilize in December 2006. In addition to these three general provisions, Assal (2013: 148) states that the agreement foresaw the encouragement of local languages in education and media. According to the International Crisis Group (2013: 10), the peace agreement was only “partially implemented” and the efforts by Khartoum to address the situation have been limited at best. We nevertheless code a concession, since the most relevant provision in this context, which is the legislative and executive positions for EF representatives at federal and state levels, was implemented. [2006: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Sudan attained independence in 1956, two years before the start date. Thus we do not code a host change.

Regional autonomy

- The highly centralised state “gives federal authorities a near monopoly on revenue collection and control over both how much money is distributed to the states and how it is used (International Crisis Group (2006: 3). The absence of regional autonomy for the east is confirmed by EPR, where neither the Beja nor the Rashaida are coded as regionally autonomous.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Since independence the people of eastern Sudan have struggled with the Khartoum governments for greater political autonomy and wealth sharing. The Beja Congress (BC), established in 1958

made claims for a federal status within Sudan and economic decentralization with fairer distribution of resources (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013). The BC continued its call for greater autonomy for the East also as a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which it joined in 1995 (Hewitt et al. 2008; International Crisis Group 2006). The Rashaida Free Lions, another Easterner rebel group formed in 1999, also made claims for increased self-determination (Assal 2013: 157-158).

- In 2005 the Free Lions and the BC established a formal yet fragile alliance and formed the Eastern Front (EF). The EF demanded a Sudan with a federal structure reflecting the six regions – South, North, Central, West, East and Khartoum. In the peace negotiations the EF furthermore demanded a rotating Presidency Council consisting of the governors of the six regions and redistribution of wealth based on population size (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013). Greater autonomy from Khartoum was also the claim of the protesters that were killed in Port Sudan by government forces in 2005 (Thomson Reuters 2013). Calls for outright secession have become increasingly prevalent in recent years and in 2012 activists for separation announced the establishment of the “Democratic Revolutionary Front for Eastern Sudan’s Liberation”, which calls for separation from Khartoum and creation of the “Democratic Republic of Eastern Sudan” (International Crisis Group 2013: 24). While proponents of independence seem to be on the rise, the claim to autonomy appears to be dominant throughout. [1958-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Easterners
<i>Scenario</i>	1:n
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Beja; Rashaida
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	62503000; 62516000

- EPR distinguishes between two Eastern groups in Sudan: the Beja and the Rashaida. Jointly, they make up the Eastern self-determination movement. While the Beja are considered relevant throughout by EPR, the Rashaida are only coded relevant as of 2006, the year after the Rashaida Free Lions joined the Eastern Front. Since both groups are coded powerless in their periods of activity, the joint Easterners movement is also coded powerless throughout. [1958-2012: powerless]
- According to EPR, the Beja (0.06) and the Rashaida (0.002) together make up 0.062 of the total Sudanese population. [1958-2012: .062 (group size)]

Territory

- It proved difficult to find reliable spatial population data in this case. According to GeoEPR, the Beja and Rashaida are both concentrated in the three eastern states, with no settlements outside these states where group members make up >25% of the local population. This makes it likely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met: The Beja and Rashaida numbered 2.21 million in 2010, while the three eastern states had a population of 3.908 million. We could not find more detailed population data, and on this basis code the movement as spatially concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Easterners claim more self-determination for the three eastern states Kassala, Red Sea, and Al Qadarif. The territory adjoins an international land border (Eritrea) and has access to the Red Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there is an offshore field in the Red Sea off the coast of the Easterners’ territory (PRIMKEY: OF320PET). The field was discovered in 1976. Following the first of January rule we thus code oil/gas from 1977 onwards. [oil/gas: yes from 1977]

Kin

- The Beja and the Rashaida are subsumed under the “Easterners’ movement. There are approx. 100,000 Rashaida in Eritrea. [kin in neighboring country]

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Fur

Activity: 1960-1966; 1986-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- In the late 17th century there was large-scale conversion of Furs to Islam. For centuries there was a Fur kingdom, initially ruled by foreigners but increasingly nativized (Minahan 2002: 625-626). In 1874 (1821 according to Minorities at Risk) the Fur kingdom fell to Egypt. In 1889-1891 Darfur fell to Anglo-Egyptian forces. Yet Darfur retained some autonomy: it was the only region of present-day Sudan that was not included in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan before it finally fell to the British in 1916 and was annexed to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan as a province. The constitution that was drafted in 1953 in continuance of previous policy foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281-282). We code a prior restriction due to the loss of autonomy in the early 20th century. [1st phase: prior restriction]
- According to Minahan (2002: 627) Sudan granted Darfur limited autonomy and a regional assembly in 1980, but the Arabs continued to dominate the country. However, according to Fearon & Laitin (2005), autonomy was achieved de-facto and not granted explicitly by Khartoum. We do not code a concession. In 1983 Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project). Even if the Furs are Muslim, the introduction of Sharia law was resented by many Furs as it is contrary to traditional Fur practice (Minahan 2002: 627). We code a (prior) cultural rights restriction in 1983. [1983: cultural rights restriction] [2nd phase: prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). [1989: cultural rights restriction]
- According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “[i]n 1994 the administrative borders of Darfur [were] redrawn. Earlier Darfur had been one administrative territory but now it was divided up in three different, West, North and South Darfur. This was done by the government with the purpose to divide up the Fur tribe so that it would become a minority in all of the three territories. Before they had been in majority in the whole Darfur. Moreover, this administrative reformation created a lot of new positions and they were all given to Arabs. Put together these changes significantly reduced the power for the Fur and other African tribes.” [1994: autonomy restriction]
- In 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. Only one of the various rebel groups – and not the most important one – signed it. The agreement included provisions on power sharing and a transitional regional government (covering all of Darfur). The leader of the rebel group that signed the agreement was appointed head of the regional government (UCDP). Yet the agreement was effectively not implemented. In particular, Minni Minawi – the rebel leader appointed as presidential adviser – was largely excluded from government decisions (International Crisis Group 2014: 3). Also, the 2006 agreement foresaw a referendum on Darfur’s future status. It has not been held. In sum, the agreement looks more like window dressing. We do not code a concession.
- Another peace agreement was signed in 2011, the Doha agreement. The Doha agreement provided for power sharing and increased regional autonomy. Again, implementation has been sketchy, but International Crisis Group (2014: 6) notes that: “Power sharing has been one of the most contentious issues, though the best implemented (even if only partially) DDPD section. A

transitional Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) has been created, and LJM leaders and allies from civil society and the diaspora have been named to it and other institutional posts. Tijani Sese was appointed DRA chairman, a position that, per the DDPD, “comes directly after the Vice Presidents of the Republic”. However, LJM officials say, this is in protocol, and, unlike the vice presidents, Sese is not a Council of Ministers or National Security Council member. In principle, Darfur governor s are deputies of the DRA executive, but as Doha did not agree on a unified region, most do not accept the DRA as a supra-state institution. NCP barons, notably North Darfur Governor Osman Mohammed Yusuf Kibir, remain largely independent. A DRA official said only West Darfur Governor Haydar Galukuma accepts DRA authority. One of the few coalition leaders from the Masalit, the main West Darfur tribe, he is from the LJM and Sudan’s only non-NCP governor.” But: “[i]mplementation has focused on individual appointments rather than steps with broader impact” and “[p]rovisions with impact on the ground have not been implemented” (International Crisis Group 2014: 6-7). We do not code a concession. Instead, we code a restriction in 2011, for two reasons. First, in circumvention of the peace negotiations Khartoum unilaterally further fragmented Darfur by splitting the 3 existing Darfur region even further and creating two new regions in 2011 (International Crisis Group 2014: 5). Second, the Doha agreement foresaw another referendum on self-determination to be held no later than July 2011. It has not been held. [2011: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Sudan attained independence in 1956, four years before the start date. Thus we do not code a host change.
- The peace agreements have not been implemented to an extent that would allow us to code regional autonomy or a major territorial change (International Crisis Group 2014).

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The evidence on the Fur’s self-determination claims is relatively scarce. According to Minahan (2002: 627), “Fur separatism emerged as a force in 1956, following Sudanese independence and the creation of an Arab-dominated unitary state. In the early 1960s, the Sony Liberation Movement, based in Darfur, began agitation for the separation of the region from Sudan.” This suggests an independence claim. Salih (2005), however, states that the dominant claim was for autonomy. Minorities at Risk also portrays the Fur as an autonomist group, but they seem to refer to the post-2003 phase. Since we cannot establish which claim was dominant in the first phase we code the more radical claim, independence. [1960-1966: independence claim]
- Again, evidence is limited also in the initial years of the second phase. According to Salih (2005: 13), when the movement re-emerged in the 1980s it was initially centered around the aim of

secession. In particular the Darfur Liberation Front made claims for independence according to Salih. [1986-2003: independence claim]

- In 2003 one of the major organizations associated with the movement, the Darfur Liberation Front, changed its name to the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army). It also moderated its aim and henceforth has claimed autonomy. Another important rebel group, the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) also makes claims for the federalization of Sudan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Thus the dominant claim appears to have shifted to autonomy. Also Minorities at Risk notes a claim for self-determination and autonomy in recent years. [2004-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Fur
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Fur
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	62505000

Territory

- The Fur are concentrated in the Darfur region, where they make up 20% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 624). However, the Darfur region has been extended by the Sudanese government to include large non-Fur people, particularly Arabs in the north of Darfur. The Fur are concentrated in the south of Darfur in the region of Jebel Marra, where they also seem to form a majority. We could not find more detailed data. This case would profit from further research. [concentrated]
- The Fur claim the territory of Darfur. Darfur constituted a province between 1948 and 1973 and again from 1991 until 1994. Today it is split into Schamal Darfur, Gharb Darfur, Darfur al-wusta, Dschanub Darfur, Scharq Darfur. The territory adjoins an international land border (Libya, Chad, CAR, South Sudan) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there is a hydrocarbon reserve in Darfur (PRIMKEY: SU001PET). The field was discovered in 1979. We thus code oil/gas for the second period. [oil/gas: yes from 1986]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups. However, since EPR only codes kin groups that are politically relevant, additional sources needed to be consulted. The Minorities at Risk data codes 'Darfur Black Muslims' as an umbrella group consisting of three different tribes (Fur, Zaghawa and Masali). For the Darfur Black Muslims' MAR codes one kin group (Zaghawa, Massalit in Chad). Minahan (2002: 624) also mentions Fur population in northern Chad. However, the Fur population in Chad is too small to be considered here, which is why we do not code ethnic kin. [no kin]

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Southerners

Activity: 1956-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Under the British colonial regime, Sudan was treated as a single colony, but the southern districts were administered separately from the northern districts as part of a divide-and-rule policy, which nonetheless allowed the Southerners a degree of autonomy. In contrast to the northern districts, where the Arab language dominated, in the southern districts English served as the official language, with several tribal languages such as Dinka, Nuer, and Bari having the status of regional languages (Minahan 2002: 1787; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). In 1943, the north was prepared for separate self-government. In a reversal of policy, in 1946, the decision was taken to unify the northern and the southern districts into a single colonial province, implying a loss of autonomy for the South because they were largely excluded from the government (Helata 2008; Seri-Hersch 2013). [1946: autonomy restriction]
- Beginning in 1949, there was a gradual “Nordization” of southern education (Seri-Hersch 2013: 5). [1949: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]
- In continuance of previous policy, the constitution that was drafted in 1953 foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9). We do not code a new restriction.

Concessions and restrictions

- There was a plan to send 1-1.5 million Northern settlers into the South in the early 1960s (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 13). It appears that the plan was not implemented, but relocation policies are not coded anyway.
- In 1972 the South was granted a regional government and local autonomy (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 458). The 1972 agreement recognized that English as the South’s principal language can be used in administration and would be taught in schools while reaffirming the status of Arabic as Sudan’s official language (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 14). [1972: autonomy concession]
- In 1981, Khartoum suspended the Southern Regional Assembly (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 17; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 282). [1981: autonomy restriction]
- In 1983 the autonomy arrangement was fully revoked (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 458). [1983: autonomy restriction]
- Moreover, Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project. [1983: cultural rights restriction]
- Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). [1989: cultural rights restriction]
- Since 1989 there were several attempts to mediate the conflict, in which Khartoum also offered autonomy, though without taking any serious steps towards implementation (e.g., in 1991 the country was territorially re-organized and Bashir promised devolution; and in 1996 Khartoum signed a peace agreement with some rebel factions (though not the SPLM/A, which made the agreement useless) that foresaw both a referendum and devolution, see Minorities at Risk Project). Hence, we do not code a concession (see Minahan 2002: 1790-1791; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
- In 2002, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government signed the Machakos Protocol, one of the first documents that would eventually make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in

2005. The Machakos Protocol granted South Sudan the right to a referendum in six years to settle the issue of secession. We code the individual parts comprising the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement separately; note that the latter is not coded because of this. [2002: independence concession]

- The Machakos Protocol also lifted Sharia in the mostly non-Muslim South. [2002: cultural rights concession]
- In 2003, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government agreed on an agreement on sharing oil wealth, which had previously been a major contentious issue as most of the oil fields are located in southern Sudan. The resulting agreement splits revenues evenly during the six-year interim period between the southern government and the national government (Keesing's Record of World Events: December 2003). This is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. The two sides signed a further agreement on security arrangements on September 25, 2003. The agreement stipulated that South Sudan would maintain its own army during the six-year interim period, and that it would retain this army in the event that the referendum outcome is unity. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. [2003: autonomy concession]
- In 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government signed the Protocol on Power-Sharing, which stipulates the formation of a South Sudan regional government that would "exercise authority in respect of the people and States in the South." Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. [2004: autonomy concession]
- In 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government also signed the Resolution on the Abyei Conflict, which stipulated that "[s]imultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot." This separate ballot will determine, irrespective of the referendum results for southern Sudan, whether Abyei remains with the North, or whether it will be part of the South. The Resolution also gave Abyei special administrative status that would be represented by a locally elected Executive Council. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Furthermore, in 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government also signed the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States. The protocol agrees that the boundaries of the territories remain unchanged. Both sides, however, pledge that "the diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population of the State shall be developed and protected." Also, while the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were not entitled to a referendum in 2011, the two sides agreed to a system of "popular consultation" that determine the status of the states in the event of South Sudan's secession. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. [2004: independence concession]
- Another peace agreement was signed in 2007, but this did not deal with issues of self-determination (it was over demilitarization in Abyei) so this is not coded as a concession.
- In 2011, South Sudan gains independence from Sudan through referendum as agreed in earlier treaties. We do not code another concession.
- In 2011, Governor Haroun suspended the "popular consultations" on joining the South that were supposed to take place in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. Also, the referendum that was promised in Abyei was repeatedly delayed (Lexis Nexis). [2011: independence restriction]
- Based on a proposal by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, the Minister for Cabinet Affairs announced on October 28 that there would be a referendum in October 2013 to resolve the Abyei issue (Keesing's Record of World Events: October 2012). The referendum has not been held, thus we do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Sudan attained independence in 1956, implying a host change. [1956: host change (new)]

- [1972: erection of regional autonomy]
- [1983: revocation of regional autonomy]
- [2004: erection of regional autonomy]
- [2011: independence]

Regional autonomy

- Following the first of January rule (also see above): [1973-1983: regional autonomy]
- The 2004 agreement on power-sharing gave autonomy to the South (see above); the Abyei Protocol also gave autonomy to Abyei, which continues to be part of the North. However, the Nubas in South Kordofan and the Southerners in Blue Nile State make up the majority of the remaining Southerners in Sudan (about 95%). It appears that they do not have autonomy. Thus, we stop coding the Southerners as autonomous in 2011. [2005-2011: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Fearon & Laitin (2005: 10) suggest that in the initial years of Sudan's independence, the Southerners dominant claim was for autonomy within a federal Sudan. Minahan (2002: 1789) supports the contention that the Southerners initially lobbied for autonomy. Soon, however, significant factions demanded outright secession. One of the first appears to be Anya Nya, a rebel faction which fought in the First Sudanese War. Anya Nya was founded in 1963 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Sudan Tribune). It is not clear whether the independence claim had already been dominant at the time. Fearon & Laitin (2005: 14), for instance, suggest that Southern rebels demanded a decentralized state during the negotiations leading to the 1972 autonomy arrangement. In 1983, the the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded, which soon became the most important organization associated with the Southerners' movement. SPLM/A had the official aim of a united Socialist Sudan. However, despite this official policy, a significant part of SPLM/A strived for outright secession. The secessionist Anya Nya group also re-emerged in the 1980s (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). When the war came to an end, John Garang, the SPLM/A leader who had coined the official goal of a radically changed Sudan did not follow the originally espoused goal, but negotiated for an independent South Sudan. In sum, Anya Nya, the first significant organization with an outright secessionist claim, seems to have emerged in 1963, and even though parts of the movement continued to make (at least officially) claims for autonomy within Sudan, a very significant part demanded independence. Which of the two appears dominant is not fully clear, at least not until the 1990s (when it was clearly independence). Based on this, we code the more radical independence claim for 1964-2011, the year of South Sudanese independence, and an autonomy claim for 1956-1963. [1956-1963: autonomy claim; 1964-2011: independence claim]
- South Sudan became independent in July of the same year. Separate referendums were foreseen for Abyei (on joining the South) and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan area (on some undetermined form of autonomy). However, the promised referendums in Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan have not been held so far. In these areas the Southerners' agitation for secession is ongoing. For instance, in Abyei in 2013 a unilateral referendum was held on joining the South (Aljazeera 2013). Thus, we code an irredentist claim for 2012. [2012: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Southerners
<i>Scenario</i>	1:n/1:n
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Azande; Bari; Dinka; Latoka; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern groups; Shilluk/Nuba
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	62501000; 62502000; 62504000; 62506000; 62507000; 62508000; 62511000; 62513000/62507000

- Up until 2011, EPR distinguishes between eight Southern groups in Sudan: the biggest group is the Dinkas, followed by the Nuer. Five smaller groups are also coded (Azande, Bari, Lakota, Nuba, and Shilluk) as well as an umbrella group covering all remaining (smaller) Southern group. Jointly, they make up the Southerners. Until 2006, all Southern groups are coded as powerless. In 2006, the Dinka attain junior partner status due to a 2005 peace agreement, according to which the vice-presidency is given to the SPLM (the major self-determination organization). Since this position was consistently held by a Dinka (Garang and Kiir, respectively) EPR codes the Dinkas as junior partners. Other Southern groups, in particular the Nuer, also gained some influence, but this is not considered significant enough to qualify for a junior partner coding. Since the Dinkas dominate the self-determination movement, and since the second biggest Southern group, the Nuer, also gained some influence, we code the Southerners as junior partner in 2006-2011. [1956-2005: powerless; 2006-2011: junior partner]
- The sum of the Azande (.02), Bari (.02), Dinka (.1), Lakota (.01), Nuba (.05), Nuer (.05), Shilluk (.01), and Other Southern groups group (.09) sizes, which does not change over time in EPR (until 2012), is .35. [1956-2011: .35 (group size)]
- In 2011, South Sudan became independent. However, separatist agitation continued in some of the areas that remained with Sudan, namely by i) the Nubas in South Kordofan, ii) the Ngok (a sub-group of the Dinkas) in Abyei, and iii) by various smaller Southerner tribes in the Blue Nile state. EPR, however, stops coding all Southerner groups in 2011, except for one, the Nubas. The Nubas are coded as powerless in 2012, and the International Crisis Group (2013a, b) reports that also the other Southerner groups remaining in Sudan were marginalized, hence we code the Southerners as powerless in 2012. [2012: powerless]
- According to EPR, the Nubas have a group size of .07. To this, we need to add the Southerner groups in Abyei and Blue Nile state. Abyei, on the one hand, is estimated to have a population of about 100,000 (WHO), but this may include non-Dinkas (we were unable to get a more detailed estimate). The ethnically heterogeneous Blue Nile state, on the other hand, is home to more than a million (1 to 1.2 million according to International Crisis Group 2013b: 2), again including non-Southerners. The International Crisis Group (2013b: 3) estimates that around half of Blue Nile are “indigenous”, that is, Southerners. With Sudan’s total population of around 30 million, this yields a group size of about $.07 + ((550,000 + 100,000) / 30,000,000) = .0917$. [2012: .0917 (group size)]

Territory

- The Southerners were concentrated in the South Sudan, where they made up 88% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1785). This amounts to 5,962,000 Southerners (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 7.5 million Southerners in the whole of Sudan in that same year. We thus code the Southerners regionally concentrated. [concentrated]
- The Southerners claimed what today constitutes South Sudan, as well as the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions. The territory adjoins international land borders (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, CAR) and does not have access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there are several oil/gas fields on the Southerners’ territory (PRIMKEY: SU003PET, SU004PET, SU002PET). The earliest date of discovery was in 1980. Following the first of January rule, we thus code oil/gas from 1981 onwards. [oil/gas: yes from 1981]

Kin

- The Southerners have kin for example in neighboring Ethiopia (approx. 200,000 Nuer, see Joshua Project). The Azande have kin in DRC and Chad (see MAR, EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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SYRIA

Alawites

Activity: 1946-1954

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After World War I and the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, France was assigned the mandate of Syria and Lebanon in 1922. The French authorities divided the mandated region into six autonomous states, among which the Republic of the Alaouites. In order to gain minority support and to isolate the minorities from the anti-colonial Great Syrian Revolt, the French favored religious minorities, raised Alawite education, health care, and social services and included Alawites in the colonial armed forces (Khoury 1981; Minahan 2002).
- Alawite autonomy was ended in 1937, when the Alawite state was re-incorporated into Syria as a consequence of a Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936 and as a concession of the French to Syrian nationalists (Shambrook 1998). [1936: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]
- The Alawites revolted against growing Sunni dominance on their territory and declared Latakia, the Alawite homeland, independent in 1939. With World War II came an increased British presence which eventually led to re-incorporation of Latakia into Syria in 1942 (Khoury 1987). We do not code a restriction since the re-incorporation reversed a unilateral power grab. Re-incorporation caused renewed rebellion among the Alawites in support of an independent state.

Concessions and restrictions

- When the French mandate ended, the urban Sunni elite inherited the government and undertook every effort to integrate Latakia into Syria. With the goal of establishing centralized rule, they abolished Alawi military units and certain jurisdictional rights granted to the Alawites by the French such as courts that applied Alawite laws or the Alawite representation in the parliament (Fildis 2012; Pipes 1989). The exact date of these measures is not specified in our sources, but it is indicated that they were initiated at independence, which makes us code a restriction for 1946. [1946: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Syria attained independence in 1946, implying a host change. [1946: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- According to Minahan (2002) and Pipes (1989), the Alawi rebellions of 1946 and 1952 aimed at the establishment of an independent state. The failure of these efforts led the Alawis “to look into the possibility of attaching Latakia to Lebanon or Transjordan (Pipes 1989: 440). In 1954, which is also coded as movement termination, the Alawites became reconciled to Syrian citizenship and ultimately “gave up the dream of a separate state” (Pipes 1989: 440). Following the first of January rule, the claim is thus coded twofold: independence from 1946 until 1953 and irredentism in 1954. [1946-1953: independence claim; 1954: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Alawites
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Alawi
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	65203000

Territory

- The movement ended its activity in 1954. However, since there is no evidence that the Alawites' ethnic geography has changed fundamentally, we rely on the information provided by Minahan (2002: 79). The Alawites are concentrated in Latakia, where they make up 70% of the population (Minahan 2002: 79). This amounts to 1,402,800 Alawites (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 2.63 million Alawites in the whole of Syria in that same year. [concentrated]
- The Alawite homeland (Latakia) comprises the two governorates of Latakia and Tartus. The two governorates made up the Alawi State of Latakia during the French Mandate for Syria. The territory adjoins international land borders (Turkey, Lebanon) and has access to the Mediterranean Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- There are Alawites in Lebanon (approx. 100,000) and Turkey (approx. 500,000) (Joshua Project, also see Minahan 2002: 283 and MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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TAIWAN

Indigenous Taiwanese

Activity: 1988-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The ancestors of the indigenous Taiwanese have lived in Taiwan for centuries, long before the influence of the ethnic Han Chinese in the 17th/18th century. Under Japanese occupation (1895-1945) the indigenous Taiwanese were segregated and severely repressed. In the 1930s the Japanese began assimilation policies. After the Kuomintang take-over in 1945, tribal land was nationalized. The KMT also continued the Japanese's assimilationist policies (Minorities at Risk Project). Hence, we code a prior restriction due to the KMT take-over in 1945. Repression of Taiwan's indigenous groups continued. Legislation in 1968, ostensibly to protect Aboriginal lands, led to further nationalization of tribal land (Minority Rights Group International). [1986: autonomy restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1994 the constitution was changed and the indigenous peoples recognized as 'original inhabitants' instead of 'mountain compatriots'. Aborigines were again allowed to use their indigenous names on identity cards (Minority Rights Group International). [1994: cultural rights concession]
- The situation of Taiwan's indigenous peoples has been improving in recent years. In 2001, teaching in aboriginal languages was instituted in Taiwan (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International). [2001: cultural rights concession]
- Cunningham (2011) codes a language concession in 2003: "Recognition of all Aboriginal tongues as official languages. This was essentially an education policy which is a battleground between Chinese and Taiwanese identity advocates." This could not be confirmed. Could not be confirmed. The article she cites (Teo 2003) speaks of a planned law that would make 14 languages co-official, including 11 aboriginal ones. It does not say that the law was adopted or that the government committed to such a law in negotiations with indigenous groups. Minority Rights Group International states that "Despite Mandarin being the first language (mother tongue) of slightly more than 20 per cent, and therefore a 'minority language', it is the main and almost exclusive language used by public authorities." MRGI does not make mention of the 2003 act. The evidence we found suggests that Mandarin continues to be the only official language.
- Moreover, there were several affirmative action measures (Minority Rights Group International), but these do not constitute concessions as defined here.
- In 2005 the Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples was passed (in Taiwan). It called for the establishment of autonomous zones for Taiwan's indigenous, among other things. It set a deadline for implementation (in 2008). This deadline was not met (Simon 2008: 7) and the law has not been implemented until the end of 2011 (most likely also not until the end of 2012) (IWGIA 2011). We do not code a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Autonomy according to Scott (2008) and Minorities at Risk Project. [1988-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Indigenous Taiwanese
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Indigenous/Aboriginal Taiwanese
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	71301000

- EPR codes the Aboriginal Taiwanese only from 1996 onwards (before this they are considered irrelevant). The indigenous Taiwanese make up 2% of Taiwan's population according to EPR. [1988-1995: 0.02 (group size)]
- EPR codes the Aboriginal Taiwanese as powerless from 1996 onwards. Since the Taiwanese polity was dominated by the local Han Chinese as well as those Han Chinese that came in after the KMT's retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the powerless code aptly describes the Aboriginal Taiwanese' position pre-1996 too. [1988-1995: powerless]

Territory

- Taiwan's indigenous peoples tend to live scattered across the eastern part of the island; they do not make up a majority in any of the eastern provinces. The province with the highest aboriginal share is Taipung (approx. 36%). Approx. 80,000 aboriginal people live in this province, or 15% of the total population of approx. 530,000. Aboriginal people make up 28% of the neighboring Hualien province's population. On this basis, we code the indigenous Taiwanese as not concentrated. For the data see here: <http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/month/m1-04.xls>. [not concentrated]
- We lack clear-cut evidence regarding the nature of the claimed territory. Thus we draw on the GeoEPR settlement pattern and ethnic maps from other sources (such as the Council of Indigenous Peoples 2010). According to this, the claimed territory has no international land border, but access to the South/East China Sea. [border: no; seashore: yes]

- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there are numerous onshore oil/gas fields (PRIMKEY TW002PET, TW003PET, TW005PET, TW006PET) on the indigenous territory. The date of discovery of these reserves is unclear. Hence we rely on the closest other reserve for which the date of discovery is known, which is approx. 363 km away (PRIMKEY OF082PET). This reserve was discovered in 1989. [oil/gas: yes from 1990]

Kin

- According to EPR there are no kin groups. Older MAR releases note the Philippine's Filipinos, but newer releases do not. Thus, we do not code kin. [no kin]

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UKRAINE

Crimean Russians

Activity: 1991-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- After the Crimean Tatars were deported in 1944, the Crimean ASSR was downgraded to a (non-autonomous) Oblast status in 1945, and in 1954 Crimea was transferred to Ukraine (Sasse 2001: 87). Note that the Crimean ASSR is variably seen as the homeland of Crimean Tatars or a multi-ethnic autonomous entity. Still, the downgrade of the Crimean ASSR can be seen as a restriction, at least in combination with the transfer to the Ukrainian SSR.
- In 1989, Ukraine passed its language law, which made Ukrainian the official state language. The law was not overly restrictive. In particular, it stipulated that in those territories where minorities form a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration in addition to Ukrainian (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). Still, the elevation of Ukrainian to the only official language constitutes a downgrade of the Russian language. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
- However, the Communist elite in Kiev (and Moscow) from the outset adopted a favorable stance towards the autonomy issue. In June 1990, Crimean autonomy was given green light, subject to a referendum. After the referendum turned out positive, the Crimean ASSR was restored in February 1991 and in July Russian became the official language of the peninsula (Minority Rights Group International). We code a single autonomy concession (still under the header of the USSR) in 1990 since this is when the referendum was granted. [1990: autonomy concession] [prior concession]
- Note: in 1988 contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, which can be seen as a measure of decentralization (prior to this, officials were de-facto centrally appointed). However, groups without an autonomous entity (like the Crimean Russians at the time) did not profit much from increased local say over leader choice because non-autonomous entities' decision rights were rather limited. Thus, we do not code a concession.

Concessions and restrictions

- After negotiations with Crimea, in the spring of 1992 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law 'On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'. The law, as passed in Kiev, was extensively watered down, and fell clearly short of the compromise that was reached earlier on with Crimea. Intriguingly, the official name of Crimea was changed to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in negotiations Crimea and Kiev agreed on 'Republic of Crimea'), which underlined that Kiev was unwilling to accept that Crimea and Ukraine were equal partners, as it had been implicit in the original version Kiev and Crimea agreed on (Solchanyk 1994: 55; Sasse 2001). Since the law on the status of Crimea constituted a significant downgrade vis-à-vis the compromise reached with the Crimean authorities, we code an autonomy restriction. [1992: autonomy restriction]
- In response, Crimea declared independence in May 1992, and scheduled a vote on independence for August. Moreover, the same month the Crimean leaders passed the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, which proclaimed the peninsula a sovereign state that 'enters into the state of Ukraine and defines its relations with Ukraine on the basis of contract and agreements' (Sasse 2001: 92; Wolczuk 2002: 71). Kiev's response was harsh; it suspended the referendum and the

declaration, set a deadline until May 20 to annul its resolutions, ordered a parliamentary commission to examine whether laws adopted in Crimea for their constitutionality, and gave Kravchuk the power to use all necessary means to stop Crimean separatism. Still, Kiev offered further negotiations. In reaction to the Ukrainian ultimatum, the Crimean parliament rescinded its independence declaration, suspended (but did not rescind) the referendum, and suggested that Kiev suspends its law on Crimean autonomy and begins negotiations on a new delineation of powers. In June 1992, a compromise was reached, and Kiev passed a law that granted Crimea greater autonomy, though subject to Crimea bringing in line its constitution with the compromise reached. Crimea subsequently placed a ‘moratorium’ on its independence referendum (Solchanyk 1994: 56-57), and a compromise constitution was enacted in Crimea on September 25 (Sasse 2001: 92). Since the compromise solution resulted in increased autonomy for Crimea if compared to the earlier law on the status of Crimea, we code an autonomy concession. [1992: autonomy concession]

- The Russian nationalist movement reached its peak with the election of Yuri Meshkov, leader of Crimea’s Republican party, as president of Crimea in January 1994 (Sasse 2001: 88). Within months Meshkov proposed a new referendum to be held simultaneously with parliamentary elections on March 27, 1994. The 1994 referendum was indeed held; it involved three questions at the brink between maximal autonomy and outright secession. However, at that time the separatist movement had already begun to disintegrate (Minority Rights Group International). In March 1995, when the Russian movement in Crimea had already fragmented, President Kuchma cracked down on Crimea and Meshkov in particular, abolished the Crimean presidency and set an ultimatum for the regional parliament to draw up a new constitution (Sasse 2001). [1995: autonomy restriction]
 - o Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 307) note that this was in 1994, but Sasse’s case study evidence is richer and thus more reliable.
- Negotiations followed, and Crimea regained some of its lost powers with the acceptance of the new regional constitution and the adoption of Ukraine’s constitution in 1996. However, they did not return to the previous status; in particular, there no longer was a Crimean presidency, and Crimea’s Prime Minister was to be chosen by Kiev (MAR; Sasse 2001). [1998: autonomy concession]
- In 2012 a new language law was passed, the ‘law on the principles of the state language policy’. The law gave Russian as well as any other minority language the status of a regional official language in areas where a given national minority makes up more than 10 per cent of the total population, while Ukrainian remains the only state-wide official language. Since then, many cities and regions declared Russian a regional language, and so did a couple of Hungarian, Moldovan, and Romanian regions (see e.g. The Economist). Note that Russian had the status of an official language within the Crimean Autonomous Republic already since 1991 (Minority Rights Group International); still, this is coded since it allowed Sevastopol (a city in Crimea inhabited mostly by Russians which was left outside the Crimean Autonomous Republic due to the Russian military base there) to declare Russian as an official regional second state language. [2012: cultural rights concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- On May 5, 1992 the parliament of Crimea announced total independence subject to a referendum to be held in August 1992 (Sasse 2001). [1992: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
- In February 1991 (thus shortly before Ukraine’s independence), the Crimean ASSR was restored. Even if the exact delineation of powers between Kiev and Simferopol had still to be negotiated, this constitutes a major break with the prior status. [1991: erection of territorial autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- We code the Crimean Russians as autonomous as of 1991 (the Crimean ASSR was restored shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved). Subsequently there was some back and forth with regard to the region's competencies (see above), but Crimea never fully lost its autonomous status. [1991-2012: regionally autonomous]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- What began as a movement for decentralization within the Soviet Union carried over into independent Ukraine. In the early 1990s radicals were at the forefront of the movement, demanding outright separation from Ukraine. In the Crimea, irredentism is strong among the Russians due to the large numbers of Russians living there and the relatively strong historical link between Crimea and Russia. The Republican Movement of Crimea was the main vehicle of the separatist campaign, which advocated the nullification of the 1954 decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine and independent statehood (Solchanyk 1994: 52). In August 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine's independence, and a few days, in September 1991, the Crimean parliament declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of the Ukraine. The Republican movement then advocated another local referendum, this time on independence. In November 1991 the Crimean Supreme Soviet passed a referendum, and within a matter of months the Republican movement collected the required 180,000 signatures for a referendum on independence. Shortly after, the referendum was suspended, but not rescinded. The Russian nationalist movement reached its peak with the election of Yuri Meshkov, leader of Crimea's Republican party, as president of Crimea in January 1994 (Sasse 2001: 88). Within months Meshkov proposed a new referendum to be held simultaneously with parliamentary elections on March 27, 1994. The 1994 referendum was indeed held; it involved three questions at the brink between maximal autonomy and outright secession. In sum, in the first years of independent Ukraine the Crimean Russian movement was dominated by advocates of outright separation from Ukraine. There is a certain ambiguity whether the claim was for independence or union with Russia, but given i) the close ties with Russia, ii) the irredentist claims issued in the Russian Duma, and iii) the focus on the annulment of the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, we code a claim for union with Russia. [1991-1994: irredentist claim]
- Beginning in 1993, the separatist movement began to disintegrate (Minority Rights Group International; Sasse 2001). Sasse notes that the movement by 1995 had been heavily fragmented. With Russian nationalists losing power, the dominant claim shifted towards increased autonomy. [1995-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Crimean Russians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Russians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	36902000

- The Crimean Russians form a regional branch of the 'Russians' in EPR. Russians in Ukraine are regionally concentrated in Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. EPR codes the Russians in Ukraine as junior partner throughout, given that the Party of Regions (often the ruling party) ideologically defends and upholds the rights of ethnic Russians and speakers of Russian language in Ukraine.

The question is whether the Crimean Russians should be coded junior partners as well. Minorities at Risk, which codes both Russians and Crimean Russians in Ukraine, notes that there are no significant differences between Russians and Crimean Russians as regards their access to higher political offices (polic8; both are coded as not restricted). Furthermore, MAR notes that both Russians as a whole and Crimean Russians have preferential access to political power in Ukraine (poldifx<-1 in 1991-2003). Since Minorities at Risk treats Russians and Crimean Russians essentially the same with regard to power access in Ukraine, we follow EPR and peg the Crimean Russians as junior partners throughout. [1991-2012: junior partner]

- Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where Russians make up the majority of the population (58% according to the 2001 census or 1,180,441). The same 2001 census gives 48.5 million as Ukraine's population size. [1991-2012: .0243 (group size)]

Territory

- While there are Russians in different parts of Ukraine, this movement refers to Russians in Crimea. Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where Russians make up the majority of the population (58% according to the 2001 census). According to MAR, the majority of the Crimean Russians resides in Crimea. [concentrated]
- The Crimean peninsula did not have international land borders before Russia's annexation in 2014, yet a sea shore (Black Sea). [border: no; seashore: yes]
- There are both onshore and offshore reserves (Lujala et al. 2007). PRIMKEY UP009PET (discovery unknown, though production since 1966), PRIMKEY UP008PET (unknown), PRIMKEY, OF348PET (1974), PRIMKEY OF349PET (1970), PRIMKEY OF351PET (unknown). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- Ukraine's Russians have several kin groups in both adjoining and non-adjoining countries: Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Israel, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (EPR, MAR). [kin in adjoining country]

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UNITED KINGDOM

Catholics in Northern Ireland

Activity: 1948-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Following several Irish Catholic rebellions against English Protestant rule, Elizabeth the First of England confiscated Northern Ireland and colonized the region with Protestant Scots and later also loyal English Protestants in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, thereby dispossessing the Gaelic population. As a consequence, the province of Ulster developed a distinct culture and character compared to the the rest of Ireland (Minahan 2002). The British government policies favored Protestants and brought about centuries of discrimination and repression that in turn caused repeated Catholic rebellions against England. The incorporation of Ireland into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801 by the Act of Union further fuelled the Irish agitation for home rule (autonomous self-rule), which was however opposed by Protestant unionists, who feared Catholic discrimination in an independent, Catholic-dominated Ireland. Rebellions and sporadic violence continued. With World War I approaching, and in order to bring a halt to Catholic rebellion, the British granted Ireland home rule (autonomous self-rule) in 1914, but suspended it for the duration of the war. The Easter Rebellion of 1916 by Irish republicans to end British rule was crushed, but continuing guerilla warfare in the Irish War of Independence eventually led to the passing of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 that divided Ireland into a southern Irish part and a northern (Protestant dominated) British part consisting of the counties of Armagh, Antrim, Down, Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Londonderry. In each of the two entities, parliaments were established. The parliament of Northern Ireland ('Stormont') was granted responsibility for internal affairs and elected twelve representatives to the parliament in London. Since Protestants constituted a two-third majority of the population, they dominated the parliament. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922 confirmed the partition of Ireland and established its southern part as an independent Irish Free State (later Ireland) (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002). We code a prior restriction as the six northern counties, contrary to the rest of Ireland, were not granted independence in the 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty. This had dire consequences for the Catholics in Northern Ireland. Ever since Northern Ireland came into being, its Catholic minority has suffered decades of discrimination in education, employment and religion by both the government and by British Protestants living in the region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). This discrimination and the question of Northern Ireland's status in the United Kingdom lie at the root of the conflict between Protestant Unionists, who want Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom, and Catholic Irish nationalists and republicans, who want Northern Ireland to break away from the United Kingdom and join a united Ireland. [prior restriction]
- We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

Concessions and restrictions

- When violent protests erupted in the late 1960s, the British government intervened and sent in troops in July 1969. In the years that followed, violence escalated and it became clear that the Northern Irish government was no longer able to handle the situation and to guarantee security. Through the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1972, London suspended the

Northern Ireland government, announced direct rule and took over the administration of the province (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minorities at Risk Project). This is not coded as a restriction as the Northern Ireland government was dominated by Protestants at this point and the abolishment of Northern Irish self-determination thus did not affect the Catholics.

- In December 1972, the British Parliament decided to hold a plebiscite on Northern Ireland's status (whether Northern Ireland should remain with the UK or unite with Ireland). The vote was held March 9, 1973. Given that Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority, the result was a foregone conclusion: almost 99 per cent voted for continued union with the UK (the vote was boycotted by the Catholics; see c2d). Hence, we do not code a concession. The vote could even be considered an independence restriction, but we consider this too ambiguous to be coded.
- March 20, 1973, the British government proceeded to propose a 78-member Northern Ireland Assembly, to be elected in a proportional system. It was hoped that Protestant domination would end under a proportional system. The proposal became law on May 3, 1973, and the first elections were held on June 28. While radical Ulster Unionists were opposed to the agreement, pro-agreement forces won the election. In November, pro-agreement parties reached a compromise about a power-sharing regime whereunder both Protestants and Catholics would be represented in the regional executive. Moreover, in December 1973 the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. The Sunningdale Agreement revived the idea of (limited) Irish involvement in the Northern Irish government: it foresaw both a joint Irish-Northern-Irish executive and legislative council, though with very limited competencies in the areas of tourism, conservation, and aspects of animal health (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project). [1973: autonomy concession]
- A Protestant general strike led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement and the consociational Northern Irish government on May 28, 1974. Direct British rule was imposed (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project). [1974: autonomy restriction]
- In 1985 the UK and Ireland signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The two governments agreed that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would require majority consent of the Northern Irish population. The agreement also gave Ireland a consultative role in Northern Irish affairs and established an intergovernmental council that would consider political matters, security and related matters, legal matters, including the administration of justice, and the promotion of cross-border cooperation (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 22). No autonomy was devolved to the Catholics in Northern Ireland.
- After decades of violence, the Belfast Agreement ('Good Friday Agreement') was signed by eight parties in April 1998. The agreement gave legal force to the Northern Ireland Act and led to the devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Assembly, which has legislative and executive authority for all matters that fall under the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government Departments (Minorities at Risk Project). At the same time, the agreement reaffirmed Northern Ireland's status as part of the UK, unless a majority of the Northern Irish votes against continued union. Both the parliament and the coalition government contained mechanisms guaranteeing the influence from both Catholic and Protestant parties. Additionally, the agreement also included provisions that the paramilitary groups should decommission all weapons within two years. In addition, the agreement foresaw the establishment of joint Irish-Northern-Irish institutions to "develop consultation, co-operation and action" in 12 areas of mutual interest, and thus institutions similar to the ones in the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. The Belfast agreement was ratified on May 22 by referendums in both the Republic of Ireland (94 percent in favor) and Northern Ireland (71 percent). According to polls both communities in Northern Ireland supported the agreement, with higher support among Catholics (99 percent) than among Protestants (51 percent) (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 211-213; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1998: autonomy concession]
- When disarmament of the IRA still had not started by February 2000, direct rule from London was reintroduced for a period of a little more than three months (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2000: autonomy restriction; 2000: autonomy concession]
- The same happened in 2001, this time, the Northern Irish institutions were suspended for two 24-hour periods in August and September (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2001: autonomy restriction; 2001: autonomy concession]
- In October 2002, following continued discontent with the IRA's lack of commitment in the decommissioning process and allegations of intelligence activity in the Northern Ireland

Assembly by the Provisional IRA, the Northern Ireland Assembly was again suspended and direct rule re-imposed (Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2002: autonomy restriction]

- Following the 2006 St. Andrews Agreement, the devolved power-sharing government was reinstated on 8 May 2007. The element of the agreement most relevant to us is the acceptance of power-sharing, the most difficult element for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which viewed Sinn Féin as not having completed its transformation from a political arm of the IRA to a peaceful, democratic political party. Additionally, the agreement, among other things, also included support for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which was seen as pro-unionists and a review of the parades policy (Guardian 2006; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2006: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- In 1973 a consociational government emerged in Northern Ireland. [1973: establishment of autonomy]
- In 1974 the government collapsed and direct rule was imposed. [1974: revocation of autonomy]
- The 1998 Belfast Agreement foresaw the establishment of a consociational autonomous government; the Agreement was formally implemented on December 2, 1999 (The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Appointed Day) Order 1999). [1999: establishment of autonomy]
- The temporary impositions of direct rule are not coded as interruptions of regional autonomy as the assembly was only suspended and not abolished.

Regional autonomy

- See above. In line with general practice we do not code the suspensions of the power-sharing agreement in 2001 and 2002-2007 as interruptions of regional autonomy because the agreements were suspended rather than abolished. [1974: regional autonomy; 2000-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- Catholics in Northern Ireland are represented by various militant and conventional organizations among which the Irish Republican Army and its political arm, Sinn Féin, are the most prominent. Both organizations demand unification with the Republic of Ireland, a claim that both IRA and Sinn Féin emphasized on the occasion of the signing of the 'Good Friday Agreement' (English 2005; Minorities at Risk Project). Less militant nationalists tend to support the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which is also committed to Irish unification but by peaceful means. In the political arena, Sinn Féin and the SDLP are the two parties with most political support. Since the aim of both parties is union with Ireland, we code an irredentist claim throughout. [1948-2012: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Catholics in Northern Ireland
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Catholics In N. Ireland
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	20006000

Territory

- While most Northern Irish Catholics reside in Northern Ireland, they do not form a majority there according to Minahan (2002: 1400): 53% are Protestants, and only 46% are Catholics. This matches with information from MAR. Note: Catholics tend to dominate in the western areas bordering Ireland, but these are relatively sparsely populated, and the majority of the Catholics does not live there (see e.g. data from the 2011 census). We found no territory, however alternatively defined, that would fulfil the threshold for spatial concentration. [not concentrated]
- The claimed territory (Northern Ireland) borders Ireland and has a seashore (Atlantic). [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- EPR notes three kin groups: the Irish in Ireland, but also English-speakers in Australia and New Zealand. Whether or not the latter makes sense is debatable, but is irrelevant to us. MAR also codes the Irish in Ireland as kin (also see Minahan 2002: 1400). [kin in adjoining country]

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UNITED STATES

Hawaiians

Activity: 1974-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- “Native Hawaiians had an independent, centralized government, recognized as sovereign by virtue of multiple treaties and diplomatic relationships with European states and the United States by the mid-1800s. The Hawaiian monarchy was overthrown by American settlers in 1893, with assistance from the United States. Hawaii was annexed by the United States in 1898” (Minorities at Risk Project). Hawaii became a US state in 1959, but this should not be seen as a concession to the native Hawaiians given White dominance. We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1978, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was established. It is a semi-autonomous self-government device and many believe that as a state agency, there is an inherent conflict of interest (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 47; OHA). We code this as a cultural rights concession as the Office’s main mission is to support native Hawaiians economically and support Hawaiian culture (OHA). [1978: cultural rights concession]
- The Apology Resolution of 1993, in which the United States formally “acknowledges that the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii occurred with the active participation of agents and citizens of the United States...” It acknowledges that the Native Hawaiians had never relinquished their sovereignty to the United States also. Secessionists and autonomists have used the Apology Resolution to prove Hawaii’s sovereignty. However, the U.S. Congress in 2009 ruled that the Apology Resolution does not give Native Hawaiians legal rights to public lands. Thus, we do not code this as a concession.
- “In 1995, Clinton signed into law the Hawaiiin Home Lands Recovery Act, which established a way of compensating Native Hawaiians for land originally assigned under the 1921 Hawaiian Commission Act but illegally confiscated by the United States [...]” (Minorities at Risk Project). While a concession of some sort, the 1995 act involved only financial compensation and not autonomy/cultural rights.
- In 1996, a referendum on Hawaiiin sovereignty was organized. The vote was supported by the State of Hawaii, which appropriated two million dollars for the vote (Goldberg 1996; Minorities at Risk Project). However, the vote appears to have been informal and not have had immediate consequences; hence, we do not code a concession.
- In 2009, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act (also known as the Akaka Bill) was introduced to Congress. The purpose of the bill was “to express the policy of the United States regarding the United States relationship with Native Hawaiians and to provide a process for the recognition by the United States of the Native Hawaiian governing entity”. However, the bill was never passed (GovTrack.us 2009) and thus we do not code this as a concession.

Sovereignty declarations

- Independence declaration in 1994 (Minahan 2002: 724). [1994: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

NA

Regional autonomy

- The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is a semi-autonomous government agency overseeing native Hawaiian affairs, but not a regional government as we define it (see above; also see Minorities at Risk Project). Hence no regional autonomy.

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- There are some calls for independence, but the demand more generally issued is for autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project; Hewitt & Cheatham 2000: 122). [1974-2012: autonomy claim].

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Hawaiians
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- EPR does not code the native Hawaiians since Hawaii is a US overseas entity. There is no evidence that native Hawaiians would have played a significant role in the national executive (which according to EPR was dominated by Whites until 2009, when Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans attained junior partner status). But at least during the movement's activity, we have not come across evidence that native Hawaiians were actively discriminated against, either. Native Hawaiians have American citizenship and can vote in both national and regional elections. Daniel Akaka, a native Hawaiian politician, got elected to the House of Representatives in 1976, and in 1990 he became the first Native Hawaiian delegate to the US senate. Thus, we code the native Hawaiians powerless throughout. [1974-2012: powerless]
- According to Minahan (2002: 719) there are about 350,000 Hawaiians in the United States in 2002. Minorities at Risk estimates the Hawaiian population at 330,000 in 1998. With 180,000 the estimate from the World Directory of Minorities is significantly lower, but this estimate presumably disregards Hawaiians living on the mainland. Basing on Minahan and in combination with the 287.6 million living in the US in 2002 according to the World Bank, we get a group size estimate of about .0012. [1974-2012: .0012 (group size)]

Territory

- According to MAR, the native Hawaiians have a regional base, the Hawaiian Islands, yet they do not form a majority there. According to the MAR coding notes, “[w]hile [the native Hawaiians] are indigenous to the islands, they are now interspersed with non-Hawaiians.” According to Minahan (2002: 718), the Hawaiians make up but 20% of the local population. [not concentrated]
- No land border (island), yet seashore (Pacific). [border: no; seashore: yes]
- None. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- We could not find evidence suggesting that there are numerically significant populations of native Hawaiians outside the United States (see e.g. MAR). However, we code other Polynesian groups as ethnic kin (see Encyclopedia Britannica). The groups that are large enough are the Polynesians in New Zealand (Maori), Tahiti (French Polynesians), Australia (Tongan, Samoan, Maori Australians), and Samoa (Samoans). [kin in non-adjacent country]

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VENEZUELA

Indigenous Peoples

Activity: 1972-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Prior to the Spanish conquest in 1498, the indigenous peoples of Venezuela were divided into a diverse array of settled, nomadic and semi-nomadic groups. Traditionally warlike, they fiercely resisted the Conquistadors and were forced into the Venezuelan interior where they were largely left alone except for some missionary efforts. The system of communally held reserved land (resguardos) during the Spanish colonial regime was largely destroyed after Venezuela gained independence in 1811 (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
- Although there has been increasing contact with Venezuelan mestizos and some whites in the last half a century, several groups (especially the Yanomami) have limited contact with mestizo/white Venezuelans up to this day (Minorities at Risk Project).
- According to Van Cott (2001b), the 1947 constitution enshrined indigenous cultural and property rights. However, these rights were omitted in the 1961 constitution and indigenous rights were only referred to in Article 77, where it stated that “the state will promote the improved living conditions of the peasant population” and that “the law will establish a regime of exception that requires the protection of the indigenous communities and their progressive incorporation in the life of the Nation” (Van Cott 2001b: 4).
- Given the historic centralization process and cultural oppression, we code a prior restriction. [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1992, the Amazonian region – formerly a Federal Territory – became an “independent” state. The Amazonian state has a 43% indigenous population – the largest proportion of any state (Van Cott 2005). According to the Minorities at Risk Project or the Laboratorio de Paz (2014), the indigenous peoples even have a majority in the state. According to Laboratorio de Paz (2014: 6), the high concentration of indigenous peoples did not immediately result in increased participation in the regional political process as “mechanisms were established to avoid the participation of them in the discussion, which resulted in a territorial division that did not correspond with the geographical and cultural distribution of the communities themselves.” Indeed, only in the 2000 regional elections an indigenous representative was elected governor of Amazon state (the candidate won the elections in 2006 and 2012, thus the new state has remained in indigenous hands ever since). Nonetheless, the creation of an indigenous state appears to have given the local indigenous some increased stake in regional affairs: the Regional Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Amazonas (ORPIA), who was opposed to the new Amazonas state constitution, managed to “successfully insert unprecedented recognition and rights in the 1993 Amazonas constitution, including recognition of the state as multiethnic and pluricultural” (Van Cott 2005: 184). Based on this, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
- After his election in 1998 Hugo Chávez initiated a constitutional reform process. The 1961 constitution had omitted indigenous cultural and property rights and only referred to indigenous rights in Article 77, where it stated that “the state will promote the improved living conditions of the peasant population” and that “the law will establish a regime of exception that requires the

protection of the indigenous communities and their progressive incorporation in the life of the Nation” (Van Cott 2001b: 4). The new constitution, which was adopted in 1999, addressed the rights of indigenous peoples with 8 articles and guaranteed rights such as a quota for local, regional and national parliaments, collective land rights, three seats in the National Congress, access to basic public services and co-management of natural resources in the indigenous territory were also granted (Minority Rights Group International). Furthermore, in addition to Spanish, indigenous languages were recognized as official languages of Venezuela. According to Van Cott (2001a: 44), the new constitution formally recognized a federal system and indigenous autonomy as indigenous authorities were granted the right “to exercise public administrative functions and manage state resources in a manner comparable to other subnational, autonomous units of government”. This view is confirmed by Bello (2011, cited in Laboratorio de Paz 2014: 8), who sees the new constitution as “one of the most broad and extensive [with regard to] indigenous rights in Latin America”. [1999: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- [1999: establishment of regional autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- The Amazonian state remained in non-indigenous hands until 2000 (see above), thus we do not code regional autonomy immediately after the creation of the Amazonian state in 1992.
- The 1999 constitution granted the indigenous peoples regional autonomy (see above). This is confirmed by EPR, which codes the indigenous peoples as regionally autonomous as of 2000. Following the first of January rule, we thus also code the indigenous peoples as regionally autonomous as of 2000. [2000-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Indigenous Federation of Bolivar (FIB), the first indigenous organization in Venezuela, made a number of claims, ranging from the socio-economic over the cultural to the political, including “self-determination” and local control of natural resources (Laboratorio de Paz 2014: 5). The Consejo Nacional Indio de Venezuela (CONIVE), which was formed in 1989 as the first national indigenous organization, also demanded “greater implementation of their constitutional rights of self-determination by strengthening economic and political autonomy” (Minorities at Risk Project). Furthermore, CONVIVE advocates more political participation (proportional representation, ethnic quotas), land rights and protection of indigenous culture (Van Cott 2001a). Additional evidence for a claim for autonomy is provided by the Minorities at Risk Project which notes that “[i]n recent years, indigenous groups have focused on greater implementation of their constitutional rights of self-determination by strengthening economic and political autonomy.” There is no evidence of claim that goes beyond autonomy, which is why we code it as the dominant claim throughout. [1972-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Indigenous Peoples
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant/1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Indigenous Peoples
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	10103000

- Venezuela's indigenous peoples are coded as irrelevant in 1972 (though not in all subsequent years). We apply the 1973 codes as there were no major differences. [1972: powerless; 1972: 0.027 (group size)]

Territory

- Venezuela's Indigenous Peoples mainly live in the southern state of Amazonas and in the western state of Zulia. However, there are also settlements on the coast bordering Guyana. Minority Rights Group International also describes the settlement of the various indigenous groups as dispersed. MAR does not code a regional base. In sum, this suggests that the threshold for territorial concentration is not met. [not concentrated]
- Under Chavez, some indigenous groups have begun to officially demarcate their territory. The Yukpa, Bari, Karanakae and Saimadoyi indigenous groups, for example, inhabit designated indigenous territories of over 18,000 acres in the Sierra de Perija region of Zulia state (MAR). However, while land rights are on the agenda of the indigenous groups of Venezuela, the heterogeneity of the indigenous umbrella group makes it hard to identify a demarcated territory for the whole group. As a consequence, we consider as the claimed territory the Indigenous People's current settlement as identified by GeoEPR. The territory adjoins international land border (Colombia, Brazil, Guyana) and has access to the Caribbean Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there are several onshore oil/gas fields (PRIMKEY VE009PET, VE007PET, VE001PET). The earliest date of discovery was in 1945 (or before). [oil or gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR notes the following kin groups: Indigenous peoples in Brazil, Guyana, and Colombia. Further evidence comes from the Minorities at Risk data which codes "close kindred across a border" listing the Wayuu and the Guahibo in Colombia. [kin in neighboring country]

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VIETNAM

Chams

Activity: 1975-1984

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- When the Chinese Han dynasty broke up, the Cham kingdom (Champa) emerged as a separate kingdom in what is today central and southern Vietnam. Almost permanently at war, the kingdom had to fight off the Chinese, Javanese kingdoms, the Khmer, Mongols as well as the newly independent Vietnamese in the north. After a decisive defeat in 1471 by the Vietnamese, the Cham territory was further diminished in the mid-sixteenth century when the Viet army conquered all but the highland region and the Champa empire was reduced to its southern kingdom of Panduranga. The Cham territory was completely annexed by Vietnam in 1832 when Emperor Minh Mang crushed the last bits of Cham autonomy, burned down Cham villages and destroyed farmlands and religious symbols (Islam had replaced Hinduism as the dominant Cham religion between the fifteenth and seventeenth century). The Chams were recruited by the French colonial army and administration that colonized southern Vietnam in the 1860s. Amidst rising Cham nationalism, the French administration created an autonomous Cham region in the highlands. However, when the French were defeated by Vietnamese nationalists, Chams mobilized as they saw their autonomy threatened by Vietnamese efforts to unify historical Vietnamese lands. At the 1954 Geneva Conference the fate of the Cham territory was sealed as it was – against their will - incorporated into the newly established Republic of Vietnam, implying the loss of their autonomy (Minahan 2002). During the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the Republic of Vietnam initiated several assimilation campaigns against the country's minorities. The study of the Cham language was banned, language books were burned, Viet-Kinh Catholic migration into the Cham lands was encouraged, the official position of the mufti was eliminated and the Muslim pilgrimage to Mekka was prohibited (Noseworthy 2013; Minahan 2002). We coded a cultural rights restriction under the header of South Vietnam in 1956 since we lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated. 1956 is the year when the “nationalization” decree was adopted, which was at the root of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009).
- As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- During the Vietnam War, the Chams were recruited by the US military and fought besides the US troops until the ceasefire of 1973. After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the Chams suffered from heavy retaliation (Minahan 2002). These acts of repression do not represent restrictions in the sense of the codebook and are thus not coded. However, the discrimination against the Chams also included assimilation policies and several cultural restrictions targeting the religious beliefs and cultural identity of the Chams. Since there is no exact date given as of when all of these

restrictions were implemented (UNPO mentions the 1970s), we code a restriction in 1975, the year Vietnam was reunified. [1975: cultural rights restriction]

- Furthermore, the 1965 legislation, according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24), were reversed. This is confirmed by different sources: Minority Rights Group International, for example, observes an expropriation of traditional land and resources as agricultural lands were collectivized. Additional evidence is provided by Do and Iyer (2013). This is coded as a reversal of the autonomy concession of 1965 and thus an autonomy restriction. [1975: autonomy restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Used to be part of South Vietnam. [1975: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees FULRO) disbanded in 1984, which is also coded as the end of movement activity. Noseworthy (2013) describes FULRO as an irredentist movement that wants to join Cambodia, which is why we code an irredentist claim for 1975 onwards. [1975-1984: irredentist claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Chams
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	-
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	-

- The Chams in Vietnam are not included in EPR (in contrast to its Cambodian kin). EPR reports that there was wide-spread discrimination against ethnic groups associated with FULRO (such as the Chams) from 1975-1978 (also see Minahan 2002: 428; Noseworthy 2013: 8), and that they were powerless thereafter. [1975-1978: discriminated; 1979-1984: powerless]
- Population estimates vary substantially between sources, but given the small share of Cham in the country's total population, these differences are negligible. We follow Minahan (2002), who reports a figure of 240,000 in 2002. With Vietnam's population of around 79.54 million that same year, this yields a group size of .003. [1975-1984: .003 (group size)]

Territory

- In the assimilation campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s Viet-Kinh Catholic migration into the Cham lands was encouraged (Noseworthy 2013; Minahan 2002: 428). Taylor (2007: 2) states that the Cham “settlements are small and scattered within a dense circuitry of Vietnamese settlements”. [not concentrated]
- The Vietnamese part of the Cham homeland, Champa, encompasses the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands (see Global Security for illustration). The territory adjoins an international land border (Cambodia) and has access to the South China Sea. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- According to (Lujala et al. 2007), there is an offshore hydrocarbon reserve off the coast of Champa (PRIMKEY OF382PET). The field was discovered in 1981. Following the first of January rule, we thus code oil/gas from 1982 onwards. [oil/gas: yes from 1982]

Kin

- According to Minahan (2002: 424) there are 250,000 Chams in Cambodia. Smaller communities live in Laos, Malaysia and Thailand but they are too insignificant to be considered here. EPR codes close ethnic bonds also with Malays in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Indonesia. [kin in neighboring country]

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Montagnards

Activity: 1975-1984; 2001-2012

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The ethnic minorities of the highland areas were to a large extent autonomous from the Vietnamese state in the pre-colonial period but nonetheless experienced economic exploitation by the ethnic Kinh (Minority Rights Group International 1997).
- The French established colonial authority over what today is Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (French Indochina) in the nineteenth century. Increased penetration of the territory and French missionary activities in the highland areas resulted in increased contacts of the Montagnards with the outside world in the mid-nineteenth century, when the French began to settle in the central highlands (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project).
- In 1899, the French divided the administration of the Central Highlands into Montagnard provinces (Minahan 2002) and utilized direct rule through traditional chiefs to collect taxes and oversee development (Minorities at Risk Project). Although the population of the Central Highlands was divided into over forty groups, French policies gradually produced a common sense of identity among them (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000).
- Upon their return after the Second World War (Indochina was under Japanese influence between 1941-1945), the French attempted to reassert control over Vietnam against the Communist Viet-Minh forces, who also tried to recruit the Montagnards in their anticolonial struggle. To accommodate the Montagnards, the French colonial authorities in 1947 created the Commissariat of the Federal Government for the Montagnard Populations of South Indochina (*Commissariat du Gouvernement Federal pour les Populations Montagnardes du Sud Indochinois*) and in 1950 established the Country of the Montagnards of Southern Indochina (*Pays Montagnard du Sud Indochinois*), five separate provinces with far-reaching autonomy rights placed under the authority of the Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai. The latter was installed by the French as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The statute that established the Country of the Montagnards also guaranteed protection of the Montagnard's languages, traditions, and customary laws (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2002; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International 1997).
- At the 1954 Geneva Conference the Montagnard homeland was incorporated into the newly established Republic of Vietnam/South Vietnam. As the French withdrew, the South Vietnamese regime under Ngo Dinh Diem annexed the Central Highlands and abolished the autonomous Montagnard Region in 1955 (Minahan 2002). Vietnamese settlements in Montagnard areas were encouraged through the establishment of "land development centers" (Human Rights Watch 2002). Montagnards were classified as ethnic minorities and assimilation policies were launched with the goal to eradicate their local cultures, traditional lifestyles and religious beliefs (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). We lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated, but 1956 seems to be a good marker since this is the year when the "nationalization" decree was adopted, which was at the root of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009).
- As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

- For the second phase of activity, we code a prior restriction due to the 1975 restriction discussed further below. We did not identify a concession or restriction in the ten years before the second start date. [2nd phase: prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- Already before unification, at the founding meeting of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) in 1960, Ho Chi Minh announced plans for the establishment of autonomous regions in minority areas (Human Rights Watch 2002). These pledges of autonomy were repeated several times during the Second Indochina War. However, after the defeat of South Vietnam and the reunification, the victorious North Vietnamese government “reneged on their earlier promises to respect ethnic minority rights” and the often-promised autonomy for the Montagnards was not implemented (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 194). The deviation of earlier promises could theoretically be coded as an autonomy restriction but since the promise came from a foreign government, this is not coded. However, in addition to the reneging on the autonomy promise, the new government also launched several assimilation policies and “institutionalized the abolishment of the Montagnard way of life” (Minahan 2002: 1293). Religious practices and rites of passage were forbidden (Minahan 2002), catholic and protestant churches in the Central Highlands were closed (Human Rights Watch 2011) and a new campaign was undertaken to settle ethnic Vietnamese in New Economic Zones in the highlands. [1975: cultural rights restriction]
- Furthermore, the 1965 legislation, according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24), were reversed. This is confirmed by different sources: Minority Rights Group International, for example, observes an expropriation of traditional land and resources as agricultural lands were collectivized. Additional evidence is provided by Do and Iyer (2013). This is coded as a reversal of the autonomy concession of 1965 and thus an autonomy restriction. [1975: autonomy restriction]
- Instruction No. 1 is issued by the Prime Minister in February 2005. It specifically bans Dega (Montagnard) Protestantism and thereby reinforces a long-held official opinion that Dega Protestantism is not a legitimate religion. In March, further legislation is passed that requires all religious groups to be officially registered. Decree 22 of this legislation bans all religious activity “deemed to threaten national security, public order, or national unity” (Human Rights Watch 2011: 11). The new regulations provide a legal basis for authorities arresting Montagnard Christians and forcing them to join the government-approved Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam. [2005: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Used to be part of South Vietnam. [1975: host change (new)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1964, the Montagnards movement allied with the Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées FULRO). In other cases, alliance with or membership in FULRO results in the coding of an irredentist claim (see e.g. Noseworthy 2013), but not in this case. According to Minahan (2002), the Montagnard movement turned to one for independence in 1964. This seems to be the claim that gets most support in the relevant sources, e.g. Walker (2009) and Adams (1998). Following the first of January rule, we therefore change the claim to independence as of 1965. We code an independence claim up until and including 1984, when this phase of the movement ended due to the disbandment of FULRO. [1975-1984: independence claim]
- The Montagnard movement resumed in 2001. Both the Minorities at Risk Project and a Human Rights Watch (2011) report state that the rebellion now is over issues of autonomy, greater cultural and religious freedom and land rights. [2001-2012: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Montagnards
<i>Scenario</i>	Irrelevant/1:n
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Gia Rai
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	81610000

- Apart from the dominant ethnic Kinh, EPR codes all relevant ethnic groups as discriminated in the first years after reunification (1976-1978; EPR does not code 1975) and as powerless for the remaining years (1979-2012). Among these groups are also the Gia Rai, the largest of the upland ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. While they are not congruent with the whole group of Montagnards, which are a much more diverse group, the coding of their power status serves as an important guideline for the coding of the Montagnards.
- In the first years after reunification, a period of consolidation of the communist government of Vietnam in southern Vietnam, state repression of the highland ethnic minorities was systematically implemented as a consequence of the Montagnard resistance to the communist north and their support of the United States' military operations during the war. Between 1975 and 1979, around 8,000 Montagnards were killed or captured by the Vietnamese military. Evidence of discrimination can also be found in Minahan (2002), who lists the denial of land rights, courts, restrictions on church services and equal education among the discriminatory measures by the central government. Finally, Human Rights Watch (2011) states that catholic and protestant churches in the Central Highlands were closed and a new campaign to settle ethnic Vietnamese in the highlands was initiated. We thus code the Montagnards as discriminated from 1975 onwards. [1975-1978: discriminated]
- Since we did not find any clear evidence as of when discrimination ended, we follow the EPR coding of the Gia Rai (Jrai) and code the Montagnards as powerless as of 1979. [1979-1984: powerless]
- After the reemergence of the Montagnard movement in 2001, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the Minorities at Risk Project gives numerous reports of repression/discrimination. These include repression of the self-determination movement, repressive measures against protest activities, numerous arrests seemingly due to the Montagnards' Christian belief, the pressuring of women to undergo sterilization as well as the maintenance of a strong police presence in the Central Highlands. The discriminatory and repressive stance is confirmed by a Human Rights

Watch (2011) report according to which political organizing and independent religious activities among Montagnard Christians was suppressed and fundamental rights have been violated by authorities with ongoing arrests and imprisonment, torture and mistreatment in custody. It remains unclear if these repressive acts also resulted in explicit and targeted discrimination that also blocks the group's access to regional and/or central state power or if they only targeted (violent) protestors. As far as the access to state power is concerned, Thuat (2009) claims that ethnic minority people in Vietnam actively exercise their rights to political participation. In the National Assembly, for example, there were 87 members of minorities in the 2007-2011 tenure, accounting for 17.65% of the Deputies, while ethnic minority people account for only 13.8% of the total population. Also in the People's Councils (2004-2009), there was disproportionately high representation of ethnic minorities with 20.52% at provincial level, 20.18% at district level, and 24.4% at commune level. Finally, Thuat (200) also provides evidence for ethnic minority people to hold key positions in state organs from central to local levels. We struggled with the decision to classify the Montagnards as powerless or discriminated and both decisions could be justified. We follow EPR and its coding of the Gia Rai (Jari) and code the Montagnards as powerless in the whole period from 2001 to 2012. We hereby mirror the fact that the stance of the government seems to target mostly the protestors and regime critics and is not reflected in a systematic discrimination of all Montagnards. [2001-2012: powerless]

- The sources on the number of Montagnards are not very detailed but usually coincide with one another. According to a Human Rights Watch (2011) report, the Montagnards number between 1 and 2 million. The same indication is also provided by UNPO (2008). It is hence reasonable to assume a current Montagnard population of around 1.5 million. This would also be compatible with the population number in Minahan (2002), who estimates 1.31 million Montagnards in the Central Highlands of Vietnam and adjacent areas of Cambodia and Laos a few years back in 2002. Similar data can be found in a Human Rights Watch (2002: 13) report of 2002, according to which "the population of the Central Highlands provinces [...] is approximately four million, of whom approximately one-quarter are indigenous highlanders." In combination with the 2011 World Bank estimate of Vietnam's population (87.84 million), 1.5 million translates into a population share of 0.0171. [1975-1984; 2001-2012: .0171 (group size)]
- The group size the estimate draws on the figure provided in Minahan (2002: 1288): 1.31 million. In combination with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Vietnam's population of 79.54 million, we get a 2002 group size estimate of 0.0165. [1954-1975: 0.0165 (group size)]
 - o Note: group size estimates tend not to be very exact but usually coincide across sources. According to a Human Rights Watch (2011) report, the Montagnards number between 1 and 2 million. The same indication is also provided by UNPO (2008). Similar data can also be found in a Human Rights Watch (2002: 13) report of 2002, according to which "the population of the Central Highlands provinces [...] is approximately four million, of whom approximately one-quarter are indigenous highlanders."

Territory

- The Montagnards are concentrated in their homeland, where also almost all Montagnards live (Minahan 2002: 1288; MAR). However, we also require the group to make up a majority in their respective territory. This requirement is not fulfilled: According to Minahan (2002: 1288), the Montagnards only make up only 32% of the population of the Dega Republic. We found no evidence suggesting an alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the threshold for spatial concentration. [not concentrated]
- The Montagnard homeland has no official status in Vietnam. Montagnards call it Dega Republic. The territory encompasses the Central Highlands as illustrated by UNPO (2008). The territory adjoins international land borders (Cambodia, Laos), but has no access to the sea. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- No hydrocarbon reserves found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- EPR does not code the Montagnards but only the Gia Rai as the largest of the upland ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. The Gia Rai are not coded as having any kin group. Minorities at Risk data, however, which code the Montagnards as a group of its own, codes “close kindred in one country“, referring to the Khmer Leou in Cambodia (over 140,000 in 1996). This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 424) who mentions kin communities in adjacent areas of Cambodia and Laos as well as a small number (3,000) in the United States. [kin in neighboring country]

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YUGOSLAVIA

Croats

Activity: 1967-1972; 1989-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Since 1946, Croatia had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia. After Slovenia, Croatia was the second wealthiest republic (Iglar 1992: 233). The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia between 1966 and 1969, which led to giving a larger role to the Leagues of Communists of each individual republic and province (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984). [1966: autonomy concession] [1st phase: prior concession]
- As a result of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslavia was decentralized with the 1969 and 1971 constitutional reforms. Furthermore, the new Yugoslav Constitution that was ratified in 1974 increased the autonomy of the federal republics and regions (Keesing's Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000). We identified no concession or restriction in the ten years before the second start date. [2nd phase: prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted six amendments to the 1963 Constitution on April 19, 1967, which inter alia considerably increased the powers of the Council of Nationalities and abolished the offices of Vice-President of the Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander. The enlargement of the powers of the Council of Nationalities was accordingly designed to ensure that Federal legislation respected the equal rights of all regions and did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Republics (Keesing's Record of World Events: May 1967). [1967: autonomy concession]
- In 1969, "a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter possible Soviet invasion." Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). [1969: autonomy concession]
- After several months of intense and often embittered controversy, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted on June 30, 1971, a series of amendments to the Constitution which limited the powers of the Federal Government to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade and the unity of the economic and social system, all other matters falling within the authority of the six Republics composing the Federation. The amendments also established a Presidency of 22 members in which all the Republics were equally represented (Keesing's Record of World Events: August 1971). [1971: autonomy concession]
- Croatia declared independence in June 1991 (see below). The Yugoslav Constitutional Court declared the declaration illegal in November 1991 (Radan 2002: 177). Croatia proceeded on its path to independence, and the first recognition trickled in in late 1991: Germany recognized Croatian independence on December 19, 1991. January 15, 1992, the EC Council of Ministers recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148). However, there was strong (and violent) opposition to Croatian independence from the Yugoslav

and the Serbian side. Thus we do not code a concession on independence. It can be argued that Milosevic eventually came to terms with Croatia's secession, though continuing to insist on the Croatian Serbs' recursive right to secession from Croatia. But this came only after Croatia's internationally recognized independence in late 1991.

Sovereignty declarations

- On June 25, 1991, on the same day as Slovenia, the Croatian Parliament declared independence from Yugoslavia (Iglar 1992). [1991: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1991: independence]
- A significant part of the Croats remained in Yugoslavia and became part of Bosnia in 1992. As this movement is coded only until and including 1991, this host change is not reflected here.

Regional autonomy

- Although, until the early 1970s, Croatia's autonomy was limited compared to the situation after the 1974 constitution, the Croats still had some meaningful autonomy (Bertsch 1977; Denitch 1977). [1967-1972: regional autonomy]
- With the 1974 constitution, the autonomy of the Croats increased substantially (see above); hence we also code autonomy for the second phase. [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- The core demand during the Croatian Spring, which began shortly after Aleksandr Rankovic's fall, was for increased political and economic autonomy (Benson 2004: 123). [1967-1972: autonomy claim]
- The core organization associated with the Croat movement, the HDZ, began to mobilize for Croat independence immediately after it was founded in 1989 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146). In 1990, after the nationalist opposition had taken over power, Slovenia and Croatia issued a joint document proposing a Yugoslav Confederation composed of sovereign and independent republics (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). Also in 1990, the Croatian parliament amended the Croatian Constitution declaring "political and economic sovereignty over Croatian territory" (Woodward 1995: 120). The Croatian referendum in May 1991 supported full independence. We code an independence claim throughout the second phase. [1989-1991: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Croats
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Croats
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34502000

Territory

- The Croats formed a majority (>50%) of the Croat republic throughout the period of activity, where also a majority of Croats lived. For example, according to the 1981 census, 78% of the 4.428 million Croats lived in Croatia, where the Croats made up 75% of the population. [concentrated]
- The territory that was claimed (the Croatian republic) borders the Mediterranean Sea, and has a land border with Hungary. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- The claimed territory includes oil, PRIMKEY = HR001PET, discovered in 1952, well before the movement emerged (Lujala et al. 2007) [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- EPR does not code transnational kin during the period of activity, and nor does MAR. [no kin]

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Hungarians

Activity: 1992-2012

General notes

- The Hungarians in Yugoslavia are concentrated in the North of the Vojvodina region, bordering Hungary. While the Hungarians comprise only about 13 per cent of Vojvodina's population, parts of the movement have called for increased autonomy for the Vojvodina region (while others have called for a Hungarian-only region in the north of Vojvodina). Despite their minority status within Vojvodina, the Hungarians have played a certain role in the region's government (Minahan 2002: 2003); hence, changes in Vojvodina's autonomy level directly affect the Hungarians, and are coded as concessions or restrictions.

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The 1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 constitution gave the Vojvodina significant autonomy. Moreover, the Hungarian language was recognized (Fox 1996). However, in 1988, the members of the ethnically and religiously diverse provincial assembly of Vojvodina resigned and were replaced by Serbs who shared Milosevic's irredentist ambitions in the wake of the anti-bureaucratic revolution. The anti-bureaucratic revolution is widely seen as orchestrated by Milosevic, who aimed to foster his control over the regions. It could be seen as a restriction, but we considered this too ambiguous to be coded.
- However, we code a cultural rights restriction because after the revolution, the use of the Hungarian language was phased out, and media leaders were replaced. [1988: cultural rights restriction]
- In 1989 Vojvodina's autonomy was revoked. The 1990 constitution reiterated the revocation of autonomy (Fox 1996; Ristic 2010). [1989: autonomy restriction]
- In 1991 Serbia passed a law that made Serbian the official language throughout the country, including Vojvodina (Minorities at Risk Project). [1991: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- By way of the 2002 Omnibus Law, Vojvodina regained many of the competencies that it had lost when its autonomy was taken away in 1989 (Minority Rights Group International; Omnibus Zakon 2002). In particular, Vojvodina gained autonomy over cultural and economic affairs. Furthermore, the 2002 Omnibus Law provided for the re-establishment of Hungarian as one of the official languages in Vojvodina (Petsinis 2003). [2002: autonomy concession]
 - o Furthermore, in March 2002, the Yugoslav parliament passed a law on national minorities. In particular, the law outlined the creation of a Federal Council of National Minorities, comprised of representatives of the National Councils of each minority group, including the Hungarians. The councils are designed to protect minority languages, education, media, and culture (Stroschein n.d.). In particular, the law stipulates that national minorities can use their language within their municipality or locality if they form 15 per cent of the local population, as well as have education in their native language (Petsinis 2003). We code an autonomy concession because the minority councils can be understood as a form of non-territorial autonomy (Korhecz n.d.).
- In 2006, Serbia adopted a new Constitution that further increased the autonomy of the Vojvodina province in terms of financial autonomy (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2006). [2006: autonomy concession]
- In 2009, the Serbian parliament adopted another minority law, which increased the competencies of the minority councils that were introduced back in 2002, and hence the cultural autonomy of

Hungarians in Serbia (Kokai 2010: 6; OSCE 2010). Furthermore, on November 30, 2009, the Serbian Parliament ratified the Constitution/Statute of the autonomous province Vojvodina (that was drafted by the provincial parliament in 2008). The provincial Constitution came into force on January 1, 2010. The new constitution conferred additional autonomy upon Vojvodina, and thus comes closest to the autonomy rights that the Vojvodina had had before 1990 (Radio Free Europe 2009). [2009: autonomy concession]

Sovereignty declarations

- At the end of 1995, several opposition groups published the “Manifesto of Vojvodina”. The manifesto was signed in May 1996 by a total of seventeen political organizations, including Hungarian ones (Briza 1995). The manifesto demanded autonomy for Vojvodina (Devetak 1997: 75) but did not unilaterally declare sovereignty. Thus no declaration is coded.

Major territorial change

- [2002: erection of territorial autonomy]

Regional autonomy

- Vojvodina re-attained its autonomous status in 2002 (see above). The Hungarians play a certain role in the regional government, hence we code them as autonomous from 2003 onwards, following the first of January rule. [2003-2012: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In 1992 the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DCHV/VDMK) published a proposal demanding wide autonomy rights for the Hungarians (Fox 1996; VDMK 2014). Hungarian organizations continued to lobby for increased autonomy in subsequent years. In 2002, Vojvodina regained many of the competencies it had lost when its autonomy was revoked in 1990. Many Hungarians continued to make claims for increased autonomy (Minority Rights Group International). There also been calls for the establishment of an autonomous Hungarian region separate from Vojvodina, though Stroschein (n.d.) suggests that most Hungarians support the idea of having a Vojvodina region with yet increased autonomy. Some Serbian media outlets have argued that there is an irredentist threat due to the Hungarians in Vojvodina, but union with Hungary is certainly not the movement’s dominant claim (Waters 2000). Calls for merging the region with Hungary have mainly come from nationalists based in Hungary rather than in Vojvodina. Based on this, we code a claim for autonomy throughout. [1992-2012: autonomy claim].

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Hungarians
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Hungarians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34511000 (until and including 2006); 34011000 (from 2007 onwards)

Territory

- The Hungarians in Yugoslavia are concentrated in the North of the Vojvodina region, bordering Hungary. According to MRGI, “most live in Vojvodina where they make up some 14 per cent of the population, and a majority in 8 municipalities.” According to MAR, more than 50% of Hungarians in Yugoslavia live in their “regional base.” Data from the 2011 census also suggests that the Hungarians can be considered spatially concentrated. They constitute an absolute majority in five districts (municipalities), and a relative majority in another three. The eight municipalities are spatially contiguous, and, if combined, 59% of Serbia’s 254,000 Hungarians reside there, and they make up a narrow absolute majority of 50.1% (see below for the figures by municipality). [concentrated]
 - o Kanjiza: 85% out of 25,000
 - o Senta: 79% out of 23,000
 - o Ada: 75% out of 17,000
 - o Backa Topola: 58% out of 33,000
 - o Mali Idos: 54% out of 12,000
 - o Coka: 49.7% out of 11,000
 - o Becej: 46% out of 37,000
 - o Subotica: 36% out of 141,000
- The Hungarian territories/Vojvodina have a land border with Hungary, no seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- There is a reserve, PRIMKEY = SR001PET, discovered in 1952, well before the movement started (Lujala et al. 2007). [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- In neighboring Hungary, among others (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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Macedonian Albanians

Activity: 1990-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- The 1980s saw assimilationist campaigns and repeated acts of repression against ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. For instance, in 1983, teachers in Tetova were disciplined and dismissed from the League of Communists for not observing certain regulations concerning the use of Macedonian in official paperwork. In December 1986, a registrar in Tetova was expelled for registering names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment” (Poulton 1993: 80). Repression appears to have intensified towards the end of the decade. According to Milosavljevski & Tomovski (1997), in the late 1980s, the Albanian language was removed from public sight, and Albanian families were prohibited from naming their children with Albanian names. Also, Albanian families were prohibited from having more than two children. In 1988, a ban was introduced on restricting the selling of land in western Macedonia to ethnic Albanians. This was to prevent ethnic Albanians buying land, thereby creating ethnically pure areas (Poulton 1993; Bennett 1994). Hence, there was a cultural rights restriction due to the events in the late 1980s (we code it in 1988). [1988: cultural rights restriction] [prior restriction]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1990 Macedonia’s constitution was amended. The amendment redefined the state from a “state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish nationalities” to a “national state of the Macedonian people” without making mention of Albanians (Poulton 2000). [1990: cultural rights restriction]

Sovereignty declarations

NA

Major territorial change

- Macedonia attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

Regional autonomy

NA

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- In February 1990, there was a demonstration for autonomy, if not independence and attachment to Albania, of Albanian-inhabited districts of Macedonia (Lund 2005: 232). We code an autonomy claim throughout, in particular because the two Macedonian Albanian parties (PPD and PDP) both accepted the territorial integrity of Macedonia (Rexhepi 2008; Minorities at Risk Project; PPD). [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Macedonian Albanians
<i>Scenario</i>	n:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Albanians
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34506000

- In Yugoslavia's final years, Albanians were strongly repressed and actively excluded from state power, hence both Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians are coded as discriminated. [1990-1991: discriminated]
- According to the 1991 census, Albanians made up 21.73 per cent of Macedonia's population. Macedonia made up about 8.8 per cent of Yugoslavia's population, which yields a group size estimate of .0247. [1990-1991: .0247 (group size)]

Territory

- The majority of Macedonia's Albanians are concentrated in western Macedonia (MRGI). They form more than 75% of the local population in their "regional base" according to MAR. Further evidence comes from Macedonia's 2002 census. The 2002 census counted 509,000 Albanians. Macedonia is divided into eight statistical regions. There were 223,000 Albanians in the Polog region, where Albanians make up 73% of the local population. An additional 82,000 Albanians were in the Southwestern region, where Albanians make up 37% of the local population. Combining the two, 60% of the Albanians lived in those two regions, and they made up 56% of the local population. [concentrated]
- The claimed territory (western Macedonia) borders Albania, and after Macedonia's secession also Yugoslavia (as of 2008: Kosovo). No seashore. [border: yes; seashore: no]
- None found. [oil/gas: no]

Kin

- In neighboring Albania, and after Macedonia's independence also in Yugoslavia (mainly Kosovo), and after 2008 also in Kosovo (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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Slovenes

Activity: 1968-1972; 1986-1991

General notes

NA

Concessions and restrictions before movement activity

- Slovenia had been part of Yugoslavia since 1918. In 1946, Slovenia became one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia. Compared to other Yugoslav republics, Slovenia was relatively wealthy (Stokes et. al 1996: 140), had a relatively homogenous population (90 percent Slovenes) and no neighbor made claims on the Slovene territory (Ramet 1993: 869). In the 1960s, the Slovenian Communist Party was led by reformists under Evard Kardelj and initiated modernization reforms of the economy and society. Consequently, the Slovenian federal republic became economically much more developed than more southern Yugoslav republics and regions. For 1973 onwards, the reform pace decreased, given that conservative factions controlled the Slovene Communist Party (Svincena Leta). Nevertheless, Slovenia remained a major economic force in Yugoslavia, producing 20 percent of Yugoslavia's GDP and 25 percent of the Yugoslav exports. In the context of the economic crisis in the 1980s, the differences between the Yugoslav republics became more evident, and the Slovenes perceived themselves as being economically exploited by the federal administration, which resulted in disaffection among the Slovene population (Suligoj 1999: 5).
- In terms of concessions and restrictions, we code a prior concession for the first phase on the following grounds:
 - o The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia between 1966 and 1969, which led to giving a larger role to the Leagues of Communists of each individual republic and province (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984). [1966: autonomy concession]
 - o The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted six amendments to the 1963 Constitution on April 19, 1967, which inter alia considerably increased the powers of the Council of Nationalities and abolished the offices of Vice-President of the Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander. The enlargement of the powers of the Council of Nationalities was accordingly designed to ensure that Federal legislation respected the equal rights of all regions and did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Republics (Keesing's Record of World Events: May 1967). [1967: autonomy concession] [1st phase: prior concession]
- We code a prior concession for the second phase too:
 - o The federalization efforts noted below culminated into the 1974 constitution, which granted the six federal republics as well as to the two autonomous Serbian provinces increased autonomy. [2nd phase: prior concession]

Concessions and restrictions

- In 1969, "a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter possible Soviet invasion." Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). [1969: autonomy concession]
- After several months of intense and often embittered controversy, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted on June 30, 1971, a series of amendments to the Constitution which limited the powers of the Federal Government to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade and the unity of

the economic and social system, all other matters falling within the authority of the six Republics composing the Federation. The amendments also established a Presidency of 22 members in which all the Republics were equally represented (Keesing's Record of World Events: August 1971). [1971: autonomy concession]

- In 1989, Milosevic initiated an economic blockade against Slovene products (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146; Rogel 2004: 18). At the time Milosevic was the president of Serbia rather than Yugoslavia, but given Milosevic's and Serbia's prominent role within the weak Yugoslav federation, this is coded as an autonomy restriction. We found no evidence suggesting that the blockade was lifted before Slovenia's independence in 1991. [1989: autonomy restriction]
- In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, which underlined Slovenian sovereignty, and declared that only the Slovenian parliament itself could authorize the declaration of a state of emergency in Slovenia, or the movement of Yugoslav military forces into the republic (Hayden 1992: 658; Ramet 1993: 871). Since this constitutes unilateral legislation and since the amendments were strongly opposed by the federal authorities, we do not code this as a concession.
- Slovenia held a plebiscite on independence in late 1990 and declared independence in June 1991. The independence declaration led to a short armed conflict between Slovenian and Yugoslav forces. A cease-fire was signed in July by all six republics (Brioni Agreement) that "introduced a three month moratorium on the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, handed over the international border control to Slovenia's government, lifted the Slovenian blockade of the Yugoslav army garrisons in Slovenia and introduced EC monitors to oversee the ceasefire" (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148).
 - o Note: The handing over of border control to Slovenian police simply re-established the status quo ex-ante before the outbreak of armed conflict in June (Hanson 2000: 85) and is thus not coded as an autonomy concession.
- The Brioni Agreement eventually paved the way for Slovenian independence (Radan 2002: 174). In late 1991, the first countries recognized Slovenia's independence: the three Baltic countries, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus and then, in December, Germany, Sweden and Iceland. January 15, 1992, the EC Council of Ministers recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148). It can be argued that Milosevic (at the time de-facto the leader of Yugoslavia) eventually came to terms with Slovenian independence, given the lack of a Serbian minority in Slovenia. [1991: independence concession]
 - o Note: The independence concession is not unambiguous. The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia had repeatedly declared Slovenia's actions illegal. The last ruling we have found dates from October 1991 (Radan 2002: 169, 173). Furthermore, Milosevic's acquiescence was of a rather informal nature. The Brioni Peace Agreement had provided for a three months moratorium on Slovenian independence. These negotiations started in late July, but soon broke down. When the moratorium ended, Slovenia effectively proceeded unilaterally without the official agreement of the Yugoslav state (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).

Sovereignty declarations

- In 1989, Slovenia declared itself sovereign over the Yugoslav federation and passed amendments to the constitution that reinforced the right to secede (Ramet 1993: 871; Sulgoj 1999: 6). [1989: autonomy declaration]
- Based on the right of federal republics to secede from Yugoslavia, which is granted by the Yugoslav constitutions of 1946, 1963 and 1974, (Iglar 1992: 219), Slovenia declared itself independent from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. On December 23, 1990, the vast majority of the Slovene population had voted in favor of a sovereign and independent Slovene state. [1991: independence declaration]

Major territorial change

- [1991: independence]

Regional autonomy

- Although, until the early 1970s, Slovenia's autonomy was limited compared to the situation after the 1974 constitution, the Slovenes still had some meaningful autonomy (Bertsch 1977; Denitch 1977). [1968-1972: regional autonomy]
- The 1974 constitution provided for extensive autonomy, including the use of the Slovene language as one of the official languages in Yugoslavia, economic policies or elections. [1986-1991: regional autonomy]

De-facto independence

NA

Claims

- We code an autonomy claim for the first phase based on the following account:
 - o The first overt stirrings of Slovenian nationalism in the post-WWII phase came in the mid- and late 1960s, when the "national question" became one of the central themes of Slovene journalism and cultural discussion. Slovenia's political elite began to make reformist claims in the direction of increased autonomy for Slovenia and economic reform. The first clear-cut evidence for something that can be interpreted as organized activity we have found is in 1968, when a number of speakers at the Slovenian Congress of the League of Communists spoke of Slovenian statehood and sovereignty. Unlike in the case of Croatia, the Slovenian reform movement did not develop into a mass movement. It was led and limited to parts of Slovenia's Communist elite, in particular Stane Kavcic who was president of Slovenia from 1967-1972 and aimed for a more independent position for Slovenia within Yugoslavia. In 1972, Kavcic was forced to resign and the Slovenian reform movement was suppressed (Vodopivec 1992: 233-236; Radan 2002: 167). [1968-1972: autonomy claim]
- In 1986, Slovene nationalists began to request greater autonomy (Vankovska 2002: 4). In January 1987 the *New Review* published 16 articles of intellectuals and dissidents claiming the "introduction of political pluralism, democracy, a market economy, and independence for Slovenia" (Nova Revija 1987; Suligoj 1999). In September 1989, the Communist leadership of Slovenia unilaterally declared Slovenia sovereign over Yugoslavia, but by that time the opposition, had easily outbid the Communist party, calling for outright independence (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146). The independence-minded opposition won the first multi-party elections in the spring of 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). In 1990, after the nationalist opposition had taken over power, Slovenia and Croatia issued a joint document proposing a Yugoslav Confederation composed of sovereign and independent republics (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). A referendum held in late 1990 showed massive support for independence. Based on this, we code an autonomy claim for 1986-1989, and an independence claim for 1990-1991 (in accordance with the first of January rule). [1986-1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

EPR2SDM

<i>Movement</i>	Slovenes
<i>Scenario</i>	1:1
<i>EPR group(s)</i>	Slovenes
<i>Gwgroupid(s)</i>	34507000

Territory

- Both MAR and GeoEPR code the Slovenes as concentrated. Census data confirms that almost all Slovenes lived in the Slovene republic, where they comprised a large majority. For example according to the 1981 census, 95% of the 1.75 million Slovenes lived in Slovenia, where they made up 91% of the local population. [concentrated]
- The Slovene republic had land borders with Austria and Hungary, as well as (though this is a very short strip) sea access. [border: yes; seashore: yes]
- The republic of Slovenia contained an oil reserve, PRIMKEY = SI001PET, that was discovered in the early 1940s. [oil/gas: yes]

Kin

- According to EPR there are Slovenes in Austria. Yet, their population is only about 20,000 according to the 1981 census (MRGI). EPR, too, pegs their population at below 100,000. [no kin]

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